THE CHIEF CURRENTS

OF

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

By the same author

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AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPH
(With Dr. S. C. Chatterji, Calcutta Universit

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THE CHIEF CURRENTS

OF

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

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PATNA COLLEGE

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ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING

To

My Brother & Teacher

PROFESSOR SURESH CHANDRA DATTA

PREFACE

The purpose of the publication of this book is to share with a wider reading public, interested in modern problems, my studies in the chief philosophical movements of the present century in Europe, America and India. These studies were undertaken primarily for self-education and for the preparation of courses of lectures on Contemporary Philosophy to the post-graduate students of Patna University at Patna College. The successive batches of students who attended them have repeatedly advised me to publish them as there was no single book covering the pretty vast field trodden here. The all too human temptation to 'immortalize in print' the labours of one decade added strength to the counsel. But coming to the actual work of publication, it was found that the ravages of the last world war, left in the domain of paper, press and printing, had made publication much more difficult than even the writing of a difficult book. After over two years' struggle through the press the book has emerged at last into the open, for what it is worth.

The period covered here is roughly the twentieth century with a little background of the nineteenth. The term 'contemporary' has an elusive denotation. Time passes away while it is being grasped and the attempt to describe the present turns out to be as futile as that of the snake, in the Indian imagery, which swallows its tail and tries to swallow itself! While the successive chapters of the book were being added during the long time of ten years mostly the period of the world war—new movements began to appear and the living ones faded away. But yet it is hoped that the chief currents of the present century have not been ignored. One palpable omission would appear to be existentialism, 'the post-war craze', which, however, is yet a little too amorphous to allow a clear picture. In India the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo has also gained some ground meanwhile; but a brief description of it will be found in the Appendix along with an account of other non-academic thinkers like Tagore and Gandhi who have been responsible for the Indian reawakening.

The choice of the movements and thinkers and the importance attached to each are, of course, due to my own judgment and readings which suffer from great limitations. But I have been greatly influenced in these respects by the repeated philosophical discussions of such topics in the books and particularly the English periodicals of Great Britain and America during the last quarter of this century. Since I had the unique good fortune to attend in 1949 the six-weeks' Conference of the East-West Philosophers organized by the University of Hawaii, U.S.A., I have deeply regretted my ignorance of Chinese and Japanese thought which should have, otherwise, found an important place in a book like this.

As the book deals primarily with movements, thinkers belonging to particular movements have necessarily got more attention than those without definite affilia-[illegible] But individuals whose thoughts have acquired as great influence as movements have also been treated separately.

Attempt has been made to pick out the headlights of contemporary thought and to dwell on them at some length rather than give a running account of many thinkers and views. For the latter purpose Professor Laird's little book, *Recent Philosophy* (Home Univ. Lib.) would be found very helpful.

What may be found to be an advantage of this book by the general reader is the method of presenting each movement and thinker with utmost sympathy, rather than pressing them all to yield one final conclusion. Criticisms are made either to bring out the deeper implications or to show how far a school or a thinker is self-consistent. This method is born of the conviction that the different philosophical schools are but different possible approaches to reality and that their soundness depends mainly on self-consistency, rather than on the impossibility of refutation from other points of view.

As for obligations, next to my students I am indebted to Dr. Harichand, late Principal, Patna College, who encouraged me in this work during a very trying period of uphill toil. I am indebted to late Professor K. C. Bhattacharya and Sir S. Radhakrishnan for going through the chapter on Indian Idealism. I am also grateful to Professors S. C. Datta, S. C. Chatterji, R. Das, S. S. Chaudhury and D. Chatterji for reading different parts of the manuscripts and helping me with valuable suggestions. I am very greatly indebted again to my past pupils and present colleagues

Messrs. H. M. Jha, N. Mishra, R. Prasad for reading the proofs with great patience. Among other pupils of mine, from whom I have received occasional help, are Messrs. Kumar D Sinha U C. Jha and M. S. Prasad and others too many to name

I am indebted to the Secretary of the Indian Philosophical Congress for the permission to use for this book material published in the Proceedings of the Congress I am grateful to my esteemed friend, Professor E. A Burtt of Cornell University and the Editorial Board of *The Philosophical Review* for permitting me to reprint in the Appendix of this book some extracts of an article published in that Journal in November, 1948

It was always my desire to express my indirect but very real debt to Professor J. B Pratt who discussed in an article in the *Journal of Philosophy* (Sept., 1933), an early book of mine and expressed a very encouraging opinion about my treatment of contemporary western thought which acted as a great impetus to these further studies But unfortunately he and other philosophers like Bergson and Whitehead to whom I would have liked to present these rough sketches of their ideas have passed away proving again the fleeting character of the immediate present"

I must thank finally Mr Bhupal C. Dutt, B.A., Proprietor A Press and the University of Calcutta for undertaking the printing and publication, respectively, of this book

Patna-6 India,
July, 1950

D M DATTA

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CHAPTER I

NEO-HEGELIAN IDEALISM

1. Introduction

Idealism was the dominant philosophy of the west during the end of the last century and the beginning of the present. The movements that follow are chiefly reactions against it. Idealism, in the metaphysical sense, is the theory that ultimate reality is spiritual; and it is thus opposed to materialism and even neutralism. In its epistemological sense, idealism is the view that objects of knowledge are not independent of the knower, and it is thus opposed to epistemological realism. Metaphysical idealism is very often based on epistemological idealism (as in Berkeley); the latter logically leads up to the former. But metaphysical idealism is not incompatible with epistemological realism. One may grant that the object of knowledge is independent of the knower, and yet come to the conclusion, on other grounds, that knowers and objects known are all spiritual at bottom. What we shall discuss in this chapter will be found mostly to be idealism in the metaphysical sense.

Contemporary western idealism is *chiefly* the product of Hegelian philosophy. Italian idealism, as advocated by Croce and Gentile, is sometimes claimed to have an indigenous origin. But even there the influence of Hegelian thought is clearly visible. The revival of some aspects of Platonic idealism is, of course, noticed in some present-day thinkers.[1] But their philosophy is mixed up with many other trends, and does not openly profess idealism in any unambiguous manner. Even though there may be a few idealists here and there working out their views along new paths, the main idealistic movement bears a Hegelian stamp. We must remember, however, that Hegel, as he himself was proud to confess, drew into his synthetic philosophy valuable elements of thoughts from his great predecessors, ancient and modern. The influence of Hegel, therefore, means the influence also of those previous thinkers through Hegel. The word 'neo-Hegelianism' should not be taken to mean 'the *revival* of Hegelianism in new forms in modern times',—a meaning which is apt to be suggested by a parallel word like 'neo-Platonism'. On the contrary, neo-Hegelianism is the *continuation* of Hegel's ideas in the expositions of his modern followers. Neo-Hegelianism is really a kind of delayed response to Hegel's teachings mostly in countries outside Germany and specially in England and America. Though Hegel died in 1831 at the age of sixty-one, his influence was very slow to spread. The delay was natural. The encyclopaedic system which took the entire life time of the philosopher to evolve, required an equally long period to be understood in all its aspects and implications. Though the central spirit and method of Hegel's philosophy were not difficult to grasp, their application to the different aspects of the vast universe, on which their practical utility depended, was full of complications and difficulties. The system, as he had to leave at death, was not also complete in all detail, and required several revisions as Hegel himself admitted. It was left, therefore, to his critics and followers to fill in the many gaps in the system with their own imagination. There arose thus in Germany after Hegel's death the many Hegelian schools, falling under two broad divisions, the Hegelian Right and the Hegelian Left, as they were called. The former included those who tried to utilize Hegel's philosophy in supporting all orthodox and established ideals of religion, ethics, politics etc., and the latter comprised the opposite group of thinkers who sought to support some revolutionary ideals with Hegel's negative dialectic. The organic system which held together the opposite forces of thought thus came to pieces—redounding, according to Hegel's own criterion, to the glory of the system, and showing that it had a real power of synthesizing opposites.

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[1] *Vide* J. H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Traditions in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy.*

2. Neo-Hegelianism in England and America

In England the first systematic study and interpretation of Hegel was undertaken as late as 1865 by J. H. Stirling in his famous work, *The Secret of Hegel*, which laid the foundation of Neo-Hegelianism in that country. The movement gradually established itself afterwards there through a fairly long series of first-rate thinkers like T. H. Green, Edward Caird, J. E. McTaggart, Lord Haldane, till it reached its height in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley, and his friend and follower, Bernard Bosanquet. The influence of British Neo-Hegelianism spread over to America which had already been greatly influenced by Kant and Hegel. The chief leader of the movement there was Josiah Royce.

Anglo-American Hegelianism in these many thinkers emphasized and developed certain ideas of Hegel, and acquired a definite form. We shall try to give here, first, a general account of the beginning of this philosophy, and then indicate how it developed through the speculation of some of the greatest thinkers of this school.

Most of the early English Hegelians, such as Stirling, Green, Caird, reached the Hegelian standpoint through the critical study of Kant. They believed with Hegel that every philosophical school is the logical outcome of the preceding ones, and is not merely accidental. Seen in this light the philosophy of Hegel is found to be the logical perfection of Kant's philosophy through those of Fichte and Schelling. Let us consider briefly how Hegel is reached through Kant.

One-sided empiricists tried to explain the origin of human knowledge by the mind's passive reception of impressions from the external world, whereas extreme rationalists thought that all knowledge sprang from within the mind out of its own independent activity. Kant corrects and reconciles both, by showing that mind is partly passive and partly active. Mind in its passive aspect is sensibility which receives impressions in its own forms of space and time. In its active aspect mind is understanding which works on the raw material supplied by sensibility with its own concepts or categories and thus produces judgments which constitute knowledge proper. Sensibility supplies the matter of knowledge, whereas understanding gives it an intelligible form. Our knowledge of objects would be impossible without either.

Two conclusions follow from this. On the one hand, knowledge is impossible if there is not something outside the mind to excite sensibility. On the other hand this non-mental something as such is not knowable, since what appears in knowledge is sensation dressed up in the mind's own *a priori* forms of space and time and the categories. Kant is driven thus by the logic of his epistemological analysis to believe in the thing-in-itself, and assert, at the same time, its unknowability.

This paradoxical position—declaring something unknowable and yet believing in it—puzzles Kant's successors. Two alternative solutions offer themselves:—either to explain and *justify the belief* in the thing-in-itself or to *abolish the thing-in-itself* altogether. Jacobi resorts to the first. He tries to show that there is an immediate kind of feeling through which the thing-in-itself is irresistably forced on our mind. Hence there arises in us an intuitive faith in the supersensuous. He agrees with Kant that the supersensuous is unknowable in the sense that it cannot be grasped through sense and understanding. But our faith in it still remains unshaken because we have, besides sense and understanding, a third faculty namely feeling which informs us of the presence of the supersensuous. But this explanation of Jacobi does not satisfy the followers of Kant, because Jacobi is himself uncertain about the real nature of this faith, and its relation to sense and understanding. They avoid this mystical solution and take to the other alternative by giving up the thing-in-itself, the bone of all contention. Fichte rejects this supposed unknowable source of sense-impression and retains the mind or the ego as the sole reality. It is true, he admits, that mind as sensibility is passive. But this passivity can be explained otherwise than by admitting, as Kant does, that some-thing-beyond-the-mind acts on the mind. For passivity can be explained as decreased activity. Mind as understanding is active, and mind as sensibility has comparatively less activity and thus appears to be passive. The constraint that we feel in the reception of sense-impressions is not due to the non-mental thing-in-itself acting on the mind. Mind in part acts on its other part,—or rather, mind opposes itself, by splitting itself up into subject and object. The feeling of mind's passivity then does not imply the presence of any non-mental cause, but its self-limitation. Mind is, therefore, the absolute reality. Fichte fortifies his subjective idealism by demonstrating further how from the ego everything else can be derived or deduced by a process of alternative analysis and synthesis—a series of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Schelling begins his philosophy by supporting Fichte's reduction of all reality to mind. But gradually he recoils from the one-sided subjectivism of Fichte, and replaces it by a kind of objective idealism. He discovers the presence of the same fundamental principles in nature as are present in mind, and being convinced of their identity he tries to conceive them as the two aspects of one Absolute Reality. Nature is looked upon as 'the visible soul', and soul as the 'invisible nature.' The Absolute which includes both is the principle of identity underlying them. It is a neutral principle which appears here as mind, and there as nature.

Hegel bases his philosophy on that of Kant. But with Fichte he agrees to drop the surd of Kantian philosophy, the unknowable thing-in-itself, and to hold that mind is the absolute reality. But he goes beyond Fichte to hold with Schelling that the Absolute is not simply ego or mind; it includes both matter and mind within itself. He dislikes, however, Schelling's one-sided emphasis on the aspect of identity. Schelling, he complains, levels down all differences to a featureless identity; his neutral Absolute resembles, therefore, the night in which all cows appear black. But if the Absolute must explain everything, it must not be conceived as a pure identity, but a unity in difference, a reality having inherent diversity.

3. Stirling's Transmutation of Kant into Hegel

Reviewing this evolution of Hegel out of Kant Stirling observes, "Kant's categories form really the substance of Hegel; but Hegel's whole endeavour is to conceal this. Hegel seems a crafty borrower generally. His absolute is the neutrum of Schelling, converted into subject by the Ego of Fichte. . . . But his infinitely greatest obligations are to Kant, who enables him to lay out his whole system and carry out his whole process."[1] "We must see the obligations of Hegel to his predecessors, however, and among these, whatever may be due to Fichte and Schelling, Kant must be named the quarry."[2] The early neo-Hegelians try to lay bare, in different ways, what Hegel has been said above to conceal, namely how his basic thoughts are derived from Kant.

According to Stirling the essence of Hegel's philosophy is notion or thought. He tries to derive everything from this. Hegel learns from Kant the concrete nature of thought. The function of thought, in its widest sense, is manifested, according to Kant, in the three kinds of mental functions: apprehension, judgment and reasoning. These constitute respectively the subject-matter of the three sections of Kant's critiques—the Aesthetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic. Thought begins with simple apprehension. This is its first moment. The object posited by thought as apprehension is a self-identical, non-analysed datum. Understanding, the second moment of thought, analyses what is given in apprehension and produces judgments, splitting the given into the duality of subject and predicate. Reason, the third moment of thought, unifies the elements distinguished by several judgments and works them once more into a concrete whole, a syllogism, in which the distinct elements are preserved and yet converted into a new unity. This last product of reason again becomes the object of simple apprehension, and the starting point of a fresh triple movement of thought in a new syllogism which uses the conclusion of the last one as its premise. Thus we discover too the pulse of the dialectic movement in the triple function of thought,—apprehension, judgment and reason. Without reference to this concrete setting Hegel's dialectical method of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis becomes a mere matter of words, an abstract scheme with little tangible meaning. But studied in the light of the concrete movement of thought described by Kant one can understand how Hegel can deduce with the dialectic method all the categories of reality from the inherent nature of thought. That is why Stirling regards this as the secret of Hegel. That Hegel's basic notion is derived from Kant's philosophy, Stirling "claims to have first said and demonstrated."[1]

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[1] *The Secret of Hegel*, vol. 1, pp. 97-8. [2] *Ibid.* p. 146.

The "transmutation of Kant into Hegel"[2] is the main object of Stirling's famous work, *The Secret of Hegel.* For he believes that "the secret of Kant is the secret of Hegel also."[3] He tries to effect this transmutation in different ways in that work. The approach to Hegel's dialectical method through an adequate interpretation of Kant's threefold function of thought, as we have just described, is the basic point in the transmutation, as is evident from Stirling's summary treatment of the subject in his annotations on Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, under the section on Hegel. But this gives us chiefly an account of how the dialectical method of Hegel originates from Kant. It will be interesting to see how Stirling gets also the chief contents of Hegel's philosophy out of Kant's.

According to Kant the categories are the abstract, internal, forms of thought. We do not realize their nature till we apply them in determination of objects sensed in the forms of space and time. Perception of an object in space and time takes place, then, through the materialization, or external reference, of the inward principles, the categories of understanding and the forms of sense (space and time). But sense and understanding are but forms of consciousness or thought. Therefore, it is found that perception of objects is a kind of externalization of thought. But for this externalization of thought no objects would appear to us (as Kant himself admits when he says that understanding maketh nature). "Here lies the germ of the thought of Hegel that initiated his whole system. The universe is but a materialisation, but an externalisation, but a heterisation of certain thoughts. . ."[1]

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[1] Annotations on Schwegler's *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 433.
[2] *The Secret of Hegel.* Vol. I, p. 146.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 145.

If objects are explicable as embodied or externalized thought, the belief in something beyond thought is uncalled for. Hegel is convinced by Fichte's demonstration of the absoluteness and self-sufficiency of thought or ego, and the consequent redundancy of the thing-in-itself. But he differs from both Kant and Fichte in holding that thought, of which objects are the products, is not *our* individual thought. Thought is reason, and reason is the common possession of man; the same reason is in all of us. Therefore the universe is the manifestation of an Absolute reason or God. The categories, through which reason can be shown dialectically to evolve the universe, are but God's thoughts which must have guided the creation of objects. Thus Hegel makes thought objective and identifies it with God.[2]

But if thought is God, and it is not finite, but infinite and absolute, does it not become unknowable to the finite mind? How is a philosophy of the Absolute or Infinite possible at all? This puzzle is overcome as soon as it is realized that the thought in a particular knower is nothing but that Infinite Thought, and it can, therefore, know itself. Besides, some kind of absolute or ultimate is directly or indirectly implied by every kind of thought in philosophy, as well as in every day life. "To tell us we cannot reach the Absolute", says Stirling, "is to tell us not to think; and we *must* think, for we are sent to think. To live is to think; and to think is to seek an ultimate principle, and that is the Absolute. Nor have we anything to think but *that which is*, which is Infinite."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[2] *Ibid.*

In this way Stirling tries to fling a bridge between Kant and Hegel, or 'transmute' Kant into Hegel. To-day most of what Stirling says appears to be familiar and little seems original. But at the root of this familiarity one can trace among other things the efforts made by Stirling himself in an age when most of his renowned British contemporaries were really innocent of Hegelian philosophy, though many of them glibly refuted or criticized it. *The Secret of Hegel* was the result of a life-long study and devotion, and its greatest reward was the rapid growth of a Hegelian school in England. According to his own statement,[2] Stirling is "not properly an Hegelian", because, though he expounds Hegel's idea of Notion, he has his doubts as to whether "that Notion be really the pulse of thought." His object in studying and presenting Hegel's philosophy is "making the unintelligible intelligible" and doing "a service for the public." Though it may be true as he says, "I have not sought, and do not seek, to be considered a disciple", there is a consensus of Hegelian opinion as to the fact that Stirling secured for Hegel a large number of disciples who dominated British thought for more than a quarter of a century.

4. The Idealism of Green

Another highly talented British philosopher who paved the way for Hegelians by an acute epistemological analysis of Kant was Thomas Hill Green (1836-82). His view is represented best by his famous work, *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

Starting from Kant's theory of knowledge Green proceeds to show that human knowledge involves two principles—one natural, and the other supernatural or spiritual. The perception of an object, for example, consists not only of a series of successive sensations (which Green calls feelings) but also of something other than sensations and beyond this time-order a consciousness which transcends sensations and can synthesize them into the one object perceived. But for this relating consciousness there would be only a succession of feelings or sense impressions, but no consciousness of succession or series; there would be no synopsis, no synthesis, as Kant would say; and knowledge would be impossible.

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[1] *Ibid.* P. 140.

[2] Annotations on Schwegler's *Hist. of Phil.* p. 445.

In every perception (or for the matter of that, in every kind of knowledge) there is the presentation of an object, which, on analysis, is found to be a synthesis of many elements. This presentation of a unity of the many data implies logically a principle which (a) relates or synthesizes the many into one, (b) *without 'fusing'* the many into one, but preserving their 'multiplicity,' (c) and which, in order to be able to relate the data, must keep itself *distinct* from the data. Green repeatedly asserts that such a principle can only be consciousness or mind; the mind is the "only agent that we know as maintaining an identity with itself throughout a series of changes, or as a principle that can unite a manifold without cancelling its multiplicity."[1]

Consciousness, argues Green, cannot be itself a member of any space or time series. For, no particular member of any series can be conceived to be able to relate all the members and grasp the whole. That which can grasp the series must be such that the series as a whole must be present to it; it must then be distinct from, and, therefore, beyond the series. It means then that consciousness which can relate, unite, and thus know objects in space and time must be itself beyond space and time. It must then be spiritual and supernatural (since nature is in space and time). It must be eternal, since otherwise it has to be supposed to have a beginning *in* time. It must be itself free from internal change, though its objects do undergo change. If consciousness changed, there would be nothing to grasp the change by relating the successive moments of change. Change, causation, relation of before and after all fall in the *region of objects* of consciousness. As Green says, "There may be change *into a state* of consciousness *of change*, and a change *out* of it, on the part of this man or that: but *within the consciousness itself there can be no change*, because no relation of before and after, of here and there, between its *constituent* members—between the presentation, for instance, of point A, and that of point B in the process which forms the *object* of the consciousness."[1]

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[1] *Prolegomena* p. 40 (also *vide*. pp. 88 and 72), 5th edition.

Green admits, on the basis of such analysis, the existence of two principles in man. The spiritual principle of eternal, changeless consciousness and the natural principle of which the successive, changing feelings or sense-impressions are the products. Since man lives in the animal body, he is a part of nature. His changing experiences are conditioned by the body, and hence they are subject to the laws of nature. But in so far as man knows this nature, he is also a spirit above nature. The spiritual character of man is also proved, according to Green, by his free will. Wants that arise in man are of course the products of his animal nature, but the *motive* which guides man to *will* the fulfilment of those wants involves the action of self-consciousness on the want. The 'motive is always an idea of personal good'. That man thinks and chooses the satisfaction of an animal want as his own good, shows in him the free spirit that *knows* animal wants and *wills* their fulfilment.

Turning from knowledge and will in man to nature Green discovers, again in the light of Kant's theory, the presence of a spiritual principle also there. Understanding maketh nature, says Kant. Nature, as conceived by science and common sense, is a system of objects related by some fixed laws. These objects, as we know them, are formed out of sensations which are arranged by mind in the space-time order, and interpreted by mind in the light of its own categories. An object would not be out there, would not be one, would not be a substance having existence and possessing relations to other objects but for the mind. Again these objects could not amount to nature, as conceived by us, unless mind interrelated the objects into a system—a whole of interrelated objects. Hence mind can truly be said to be the maker of nature. It follows then from this very Kantian analysis that even nature involves a supernatural or spiritual principle, mind or consciousness, without which nature would not have been what it appears to us.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 23 (our italics).

Thus Green discovers the presence of the spiritual principle in both knowledge and nature. So far he follows the lead of Kant. But though Kant admitted that mind makes nature, on the grounds set forth above, he meant by 'making,' not 'creating' but 'constructing' out of given material. The Kantian dictum is "Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht,"[1]—Understanding surely makes nature, but does not create her. The matter out of which mind constructed nature was, according to him, feeling or sensation. Following Locke Kant believed that sensations could not be produced by the mind. Mind could only arrange, relate and impart forms to sensations, and thus turn them into objects. The source of sensations is held to be things-in-themselves. Kant's philosophy ends, therefore, in an irreducible dualism between mind and things-in-themselves, by the interaction of which sensation and knowledge arise.

This dualism, Green points out, is inconsistent with Kant's own teachings. If things-in-themselves are said to be the causes of our feelings, then they must fall within the world of phenomena to which alone, according to Kant, any category like causality can be applied. The cause of a feeling, being thinkable as a cause, cannot be any unknowable thing-in-itself. Here Green leaves then the lead of Kant to make Kant's philosophy logically consistent. He believes that Kant's own doctrine "had not obtained full possession of his mind"[1], and he could not therefore feel the inconsistency.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 15.

To remove the dualism of Kant Green shows that both the 'matter' and the 'form' of our knowledge are the products of mind, and that consequently mind makes nature not simply by supplying the form of nature, but also its matter.

But, it may be asked, the matter of our knowledge is sensation or feeling; is not sensation a simple and ultimate element of our mind as Locke points out? How can it be said to be the product of the mind whose function is to *relate* these elements, and not create them? Green answers this doubt by showing that even 'feeling' or sensation is really the product of many kinds of relations.[2] When we analyse knowledge it appears at first of course that there are some elements *given* to the mind and there are some forms which the mind imposes upon them. The given element or sensation appears to be ultimate, because we cannot remember to have made it by our own thought. But when we reflect further on the nature of each such sensation or feeling supposed to be ultimate and independent of mind's activity, we discover that feeling is the product of mental relations, and our memory's report about its simplicity is unreliable. The degree and the temporal sequence of a sensation or feeling, without which minimum qualifications we cannot even think of a sensation, are clearly found to be determined by the relation of this sensation to other contents of the mind. Unless mind related a sensation to other contents, sensation would lack its determining characters. The relativity of sensations, which is a commonplace of modern Psychology, is emphasized by Green in its different aspects to discard the belief in the existence of 'mere feeling', independent of mental activity. Green says, "Mere feeling, then, as a matter unformed by thought, has no place in the world of facts, in the cosmos of possible experience"[3].

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 48.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 39.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 55.

But if there is no mere feeling, and feeling is the product of thought, what does then thought relate? Can there be any relation without objects to be related? Can there be only form without matter or only thought without feeling? Green's reply is that there can neither be mere feeling nor mere thought. "But we deny" he says, "that there is really such a thing as 'mere feeling' or 'mere thought'. We hold that these phrases represent abstractions to which no reality corresponds, either in the facts of the world or in the consciousness to which these facts are relative".[1] "Feeling and thought are inseparable, and mutually dependent in the consciousness for which the world of experience exists."[2] When by analytic abstraction we separate thought from a concrete consciousness, there is then also feeling for its object. Thought and feeling are then correlatives, mutually implying each other.

If feeling were reduced to 'mere thought' only then would there arise the question how mere 'thought'—a mere relating act or mere relation—could exist without objects to be related. But according to Green such supposition is false, and the consequent difficulty does not appear.

The logic underlying all these arguments of Green is that it is a false abstraction to hold that isolated terms are given first, and then they are related ; the truth, on the contrary, is that terms and relations among them, matter and form, are correlative and inseparable aspects of a concrete whole, a consciousness, by analysing which we discover these two distinguishable but inseparable aspects.

What is ultimate, then, in Green's view is consciousness or mind, neither mere feeling nor mere thought which are only abstractions. In consciousness feeling and thought are held synthesized. The dualism of sensation and understanding which was ultimate for Kant is thus transmuted by Green, following the implications of Kant's own teachings, into a monism of consciousness (which Green calls mind, and also thought) in which sensation and understanding are unified. But this epistemological separation between sensation and understanding was the ground on which Kant's metaphysical dualism between things-in-themselves (the sources of sensations) and mind was based. This dualism also vanishes, therefore, as soon as sense and understanding are found reducible to consciousness. Things-in-themselves become discarded, or rather they are transformed into aspects of the all-inclusive mind.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 57.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 55.

Consciousness, as explained already, is really beyond space and time, it is, therefore, infinite and eternal. Nature, as has been also seen, is a system of objects related by laws which a human being cannot change. Hence there is no reason to believe that the consciousness or mind which makes nature is an individual, finite mind. If the universe is to be conceived as one whole, we must have to admit one world consciousness as well, because without it the numberless objects could not be unified into the one system, that the universe represents. It is thus that Green reaches the conclusion: "The unification of the manifold in the world implies the presence of the manifold to a mind, for which, and through the action of which, it is a related whole"[1]. This mind is, therefore, universal or absolute.

The universal mind creates then the system of objects called nature, as it also perceives them. The spiritual principle or the knowing consciousness in man is identical with this universal mind, only it chooses to create and know here through the limitation of the human organism, which is also its own creation. Our knowledge and the objects known by us, which are inseparably correlated, are both the reproductions of the absolute mind through its self-created limitations, that is, our bodies. Green rejects the common view of knowledge thus, "The growth of knowledge on our part is regarded not as a process in which facts or objects, in themselves unrelated to thought, by some inexplicable means gradually produce intelligible counterparts of themselves in thought. The true account of it is held to be that the concrete whole, which may be described indifferently as an eternal *intelligence realised in the related facts* of the world, or as a system of related facts rendered possible by such an intelligence, partially and gradually *reproduces itself in us,* communicating piece-meal but in inseparable correlation, understanding and the facts understood, *experience and the experienced* world".[1] Our consciousness is then a 'limited mode' of 'world consciousness'.[2] But for this monistic idealism, but for the reduction of both individual minds and things-in-themselves to modes of one Absolute consciousness, we fail to solve the Kantian puzzle as to how thoughts and things, how sense and understanding, harmoniously fit in together, and how the categories can be applicable to externally determined sensations.

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[1] *Ibid* p 93

But why the Absolute mind should reproduce itself through finite organisms, why it should try to realise itself through them, are questions which, Green admits, cannot be answered. The mystery of the final why of the universe as a whole must remain a mystery. "The wonder in which philosophy is said to begin will not cease"[3] with the theory of the Absolute. The Absolute which is the irrelative and the whole, cannot possibly be understood by reference to anything else; moreover our knowledge, being subject to the limitations of the finite organism, cannot be complete. Regarding the Absolute, "we can only make negative statements"[4] But this much can be said about the Absolute on the analogy of our own consciousness that unless it manifested a world of finite objects it would cease to be the absolute mind. Without *objects* there would be no mind; for mind must be conscious and self-conscious; and consciousness or knowledge of objects means relating *objects* into one system of experience, whereas self-consciousness means the mind's distinguishing itself from *objects* and realising thereby its own existence as non-objective being. Without objects there would be no absolute, since it is its contrast to the finite, relative objects that makes the

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 41 (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 58.

[3] *Ibid* p. 93.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 58.

Absolute the Absolute. Both feeling and thought [illegible] the objects of thought and thought must be present in the Absolute. The world is then necessary for the absolute mind. But little more can we guess about the ways of the Absolute, and about the process of the [illegible] of the world.

Green's absolute idealism, the outlines of which have been set forth above, is obviously of the [illegible]. In transmuting the Kantian doctrines into [illegible] ones also Green uses the Hegelian method, [illegible] basic principles like identity-in-difference, correlation of thought and things. But strangely enough he scarcely mentions Hegel in his principal works while reference to Kant is found at every step. A partial explanation of this can be had in some incidental remark Green made in the course of reviewing, John Caird's *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*.[1] He says there: "When we think out the problem left by previous inquiries, we find ourselves led to it (that is, to Hegel's doctrine) by an intellectual necessity; but on reflection we become aware that we are Hegelian, so to speak, with only a fraction of our thoughts on the Sundays of 'speculation', not on the week-days of 'ordinary thought'. . . " Green feels, in Hegel's philosophy, the want "of some such mediation between speculative truth and our judgments concerning [illegible] as will help philosophy to come to an understanding with science". Therefore he thinks that Hegel's philosophy "must all be done over again". This shows that he was, perhaps unconsciously, led to a position like Hegel's by an intellectual necessity, though he was not fully satisfied with the manner Hegel worked out his sound [illegible] principles.

But inspite of Green's misgivings he has come to be remembered as one of the pioneers of Hegelianism in England. His works have had considerable influence in shaping the neo-Hegelian school and placing it on [illegible] basis. Though Green fails to see in Hegel the link between speculation and ordinary thought, he himself supplies one such, by the practical application of his metaphysics to the domains of morality, politics—to the 'week-days' of life in general.

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[1] *Vide* G. W. Cunningham's *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* pp. 41-2.

For Green is not merely a profound metaphysician. With him metaphysics is only a rational foundation on which life's superstructure is built sound. His metaphysical belief becomes, therefore, the basis of his moral, political and spiritual outlook.

In ethics he is a supporter of the view that in so far as man is a spiritual being, and not merely a physical organism, he is above nature, not conditioned by natural causes, but free to form his own motives of action. The highest good, according to Green, is naturally self-realisation or realisation of his spirituality, which is but divinity. As the moral self is the free spiritual self or the *universal* self in us, there is no clash between personal and social good; such conflicts arise only when man identifies himself with his natural existence or the interests of his body and acts accordingly, and not when he bases his actions on an identification of himself with the self of the universe. That the moral good lies in the direction of the realisation or perfection of the moral or spiritual self is, therefore, quite plain, and that the state of perfection must be the state of full satisfaction, 'a state of desirable consciousness', is also certain. But nothing more can be predicted as to what exactly will be the nature of the state when the full spiritual potentiality of man will be realised, because we do not fully know what man is capable of before this capability is actualised.

Green's political view is inspired also by the same vision of divinity in man, and the possibility of its realisation through political institutions. When man can thus look upon and mould political organizations as means to the realisation of his own highest end, he gladly bows down to political authority, identifies himself with its will, feels no pain, constraint and compulsion.

Green's religious belief is vivified by the feeling of the presence of God in man and nature, for God is nothing but the Omnipresent Spirit. One can, therefore, literally see God if he has the eyes to see. The feeling of God's immanence makes service of society a tangible and practical kind of devotion and worship. Religion finds manifestation, therefore, also in politics and morality.

All these different aspects of Green's theory are thus rationally strung together by his metaphysics. And all of them are reflected in Green's own personality ;—in his "life in which philosophy was reconciled with religion on the one side and with politics on the other".[1]

5. Neo-Hegelianism in its Developed Form

The process of 'transmutation of Kant into Hegel' started by Stirling, and carried on by Green reached a kind of completion in the work of Edward Caird, entitled *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. Caird examines here the theories of Kant in extensive detail to show that inconsistencies, and short-comings of Kant's philosophy can be removed by accepting the views of Hegel. In addition to this polemic work Caird also deals with different philosophical problems from the Hegelian point of view, and he gives a constructive exposition of the different important aspects of Hegel's philosophy in a small, but highly commended book, *Hegel*[2].

In Caird's writings we have what can be regarded in the English-speaking world as the standard and developed form of neo-Hegelianism. In spite of his clear Hegelian bent Green partially retained some Kantian tendencies. His statement that the nature of the ultimate reality can be best described negatively bears, for example, the influence of Kantian thought. Moreover while he mounts up to the Absolute or spiritual principle as the logical presupposition of man and nature, he does not show how the world is deduced from the Absolute. Developed neo-Hegelianism, as we have in Caird, follows Hegel to hold that the Absolute is knowable and intelligible in the only possible human sense of the term 'knowledge'. It tries to show not only how the Absolute is logically discovered, but also how the world can be logically deduced from the Absolute. We shall try to set forth now the more important aspects of this developed neo-Hegelianism, which has come to be known as such in contemporary philosophy and has often been the target of critics.

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[1] *Memoir*, Works of T. H. Green, Vol., 3, p. XI. For a criticism of Green's panlogism, vide Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, pp. 99f.

[2] Included in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics Series.

6. The Root-idea of Neo-Hegelianism

The root-idea of Hegelianism is, as Caird[1] tells us, the notion of the spirit, and it is, therefore, also the key-stone of neo-Hegelianism. Understanding the true nature of the spirit is the best way of grasping the basic concepts of this school. A spirit is a self-conscious being. It, therefore, knows itself. This means that it is both the subject and the object of the kind of consciousness called self-consciousness. This fact, judged from different aspects, opens our eyes to various kinds of possibilities which we are otherwise reluctant to admit.

1. First and foremost of all, we find here the example of a unity that tolerates, nay is upheld by, multiplicity. The spirit is one, but at the same time it is a subject, as well as an object. Without its subjectivity it would cease to be conscious of *itself*. The multiple characters of subjectivity and objectivity are, therefore, essentially necessary for the spirit's being what it is. The dualism between mind and matter which raises insoluble puzzles in metaphysics can, therefore, be solved and the respective importances of mind and matter can be retained, if reality be understood as a spirit. What is found actually to be true in our own self-conscious self, may be supposed to be true also in the universe. That is to say Reality may be supposed to be a self-conscious spirit, in which mind and matter are included as two different but correlative aspects, subjective and objective. The concept of *unity-in-multiplicity* or *identity-in-difference* is, therefore, not a chimera, as it is very often supposed, but it is a fact illustrated by the nature of spirit.

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[1] *Hegel*, p. 41.

2. Not simply the identity of distincts but even the *identity of opposites* can be discovered in a spirit, looked at from another angle. The spirit is conscious of itself. It shows then, that it is both the subject or self that knows, and the object or not-self, that is known. The self and the not-self, a pair of opposites or contradictories constitute thus the being of one and the same entity, the spirit. The opposites are contained, and reconciled in a unity which is a harmonious whole. Moreover, this unity does not flourish by the destruction of the contradictories. On the contrary, to be a self-conscious spirit it is essential that it should *remain* both a self, and a not-self, and not cease to be any of them. Furthermore, the contradictories, the self and the not-self, *cannot be understood* and related to each other except by reference to their underlying unity, the spirit, of whom they are the two correlative aspects. The moral that metaphysics derives from these considerations is that though the universe may appear to be 'a nest of contradictions', though all ideas of reality may lead us to antinomies, all these contradictions point to one reality like a spirit without whom they cannot be understood and in whom they are reconciled and synthesized without any loss of their distinctive characters. On the very failures of the understanding in its attempt to grasp the nature of the universe, on the very contradictions to which philosophical speculation is led (as in Kant), it is possible to raise a triumphant philosophy that understands the proper meaning of contradictions, and makes them reveal the hidden clue to their own reconciliation.

3. The unity that the spirit exemplifies is of an organic nature. In an organism, or living body the constituent parts are held unified in the whole and we observe that (a) the whole depends on the parts and also determines them in turn, (b) the parts also depend on the whole, and at the same time determine the nature of the whole, and (c) the parts among themselves are inseparably related through the whole. The ideal example of such an organic unity we have in the spirit, even more than in plants, and animal bodies. For in a spirit we find that its constituent

elements, subjective and objective, are related in such an intimate way that the spirit depends for what it is, on its subjective and objective aspects, and the latter are in turn dependent, for their existence, on the spirit of which they are the aspects; and moreover the subject and the object are, among themselves, inseparably related in such a way that the one is meaningless without the other.

4. Again, we notice that the nature of a spirit's development is a process of self-negation and self-transcendence leading to self-realisation and self-expansion. "When we consider how a spiritual being grows and realises itself, we see that it is by a perpetual process of self-denial. *Intellectually* it can develop its powers only by going out of itself; by yielding to impressions from without; by persistently occupying itself with the not-self—the world of objects; and without such occupation with the external, it could not even be conscious of itself. And if we regard the practical life of such a being, we have to give a similar account of it. For all moral growth consists in learning to go out of self, and so to take a wider life into our own. It begins, therefore, in the negation of immediate desires and appetites which, if they were suffered directly to assert themselves, would assuredly defeat their own ends."[1]

The process of change and development which we find in a spirit is then one of self-enrichment through self-abnegation, self-realisation through self-transcendence; it is a sort of dying to live. But how is it possible, it is often asked, for the self to go out of itself, transcend itself or abnegate itself? The reply to this question from the Hegelian point of view is that the object which the self goes out to in knowledge is only its 'other' (we can almost say its other self); it is not *really* a foreign being. As Stirling has shown, this theory can be clearly understood if we remember Kant's doctrine that the knowledge of an object means the application or externalisation of mind's own forms and categories, and also remember that even sensation, to which these *a priori* elements are applied, is itself the product of thought (as Green has demonstrated). This means that knowledge of an object is clear realisation or objectification of the self's own potential power. Hence, though to superficial view the object is other than and external to the spirit, to Hegel's deeper insight it is nothing but an externalisation and expansion of the self itself. Self-transcendence does not then *really* mean going beyond the self, but only discovery of a hitherto unknown domain which really belonged to the self, but was not previously recognised as such. Similarly when a man sacrifices his own interest for the family or society, he goes beyond him*self*, abnegates him*self*, only in the narrow or superficial sense of the *self*. Because in the true sense of the self, the family and society are also included within its potential domain and this identity of the self with the family or society is proved by the self's capacity to identify itself with the interest of the family or society, even at the cost or sacrifice of the interest of the little ego. In loving society the self only realises what it was potentially identical with; it is also, therefore an act of self-realisation through expansion of the self by breaking through the limits of what is superficially regarded as the self. It is possible, then, for the self to transcend or abnegate itself, because the self can leave its actual state to realise a potential state. The potential, implicit, abstract (the terms are synonymously used by Hegelians) can become actual, explicit and concrete (these terms are also synonymously used). There is, therefore, nothing mystical about self's transcending itself and at the same time returning to itself, if we only remember that the actual self becomes what it was potentially, though not actually, and that when its potentiality is realised it does not cease to be the self, though it surely ceases to be in its former potential condition.

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[1] Caird's *Hegel*, pp. 41-2.

5. In all these processes we notice that there is development through negation. The *principle of negation* takes, therefore, an important place in the Hegelian explanation of the universe,—in deduction of the categories of reality.

But Hegel's notion of negation must be distinguished from the ordinary one. Negation, he asserts, is meaningless if it is taken only as such. Negation is based on some implicit affirmation. Spinoza points out that all determination (or affirmation of determinate quality) is negation, since it implies by obversion the negation of its contradictory. Hegel points out that the converse of this dictum is also true, and far more important. All negation is also determination (or affirmation of some positive character). As shown already, self-negation involves self-completion, self-perfection and not mere denial of the self.

6. In evolution through negation we notice, again, the triple rhythm of *thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis*, which constitute what is known as the dialectical movement of reason or spirit. In knowledge, for example, we can discover these three moments. The spirit starts from its present condition (thesis), goes beyond itself to its other, the object (anti-thesis), but returns to itself after encompassing in one grasp its former self and the object of knowledge (synthesis).

As we know, Hegel tries to explain the evolution and logical interconnection of the entire universe by applying this dialectical method to deduction of the categories of logic, metaphysics, science, art, religion, philosophy. The secret of this method must be learnt from the method of spiritual development as explained. All neo-Hegelians do not accept the validity of Hegel's manner of *application* of the dialectical method, perhaps because science and history do not support entirely Hegel's detailed cosmology. But the basic principles of the method, the theory of growth by thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, the idea of development of the self through self-negation, are not usually denied.

7. At the bottom of spiritual development there is '*spiritual unrest*', the inherent tendency to become t it explicitly is not, but what it implicitly feels to be able of being. This spiritual unrest (divine discontent) e motive—the *conatus*—behind all change and becom-

ing, and, therefore, it is the cause of the dialectical movement as well. It is described by some neo-Hegelians like Bosanquet[1] as 'spirit of the whole', by others as the 'tendency to self-completion'—all descriptions meaning the same thing substantially.

Bradley puts it thus, "The opposition between the real, in the fragmentary character in which the mind possesses it, and the true reality felt within the mind, is the moving cause of that unrest which sets up the dialectical process". McTaggart holds essentially the same view regarding the force behind the dialectical movement of reason. "The motive force of the process", he says, "lies in the discrepancy between the concrete and perfect idea implicitly in our minds, and the abstract and imperfect idea explicitly in our minds, and the essential characteristic of the process is in the search of this abstract and imperfect idea, not after its negation as such, but after its complement as such."[2] All these statements are different formulations of Hegel's view: "What moves the world is contradiction."[3]

8. This last discussion also throws light on the nature of spiritual causation. The cause of a spirit's change must be sought in itself, taken of course in its full potential and actual aspects. In other words, all changes in spirit are self-caused. Causation here is not of the external sort, not the production of one thing which temporally succeeds another which precedes as we say in dealing abstractly with scientific phenomena. Causation in the spirit is self-determination.

To sum up, the basic concepts which we find again and again in all Hegelian writings can be understood if we understand Hegel's conception of the spirit, or (as Stirling chooses to call) the notion.[4] The idea of spirit may be regarded as the 'generating insight'[1] behind Hegelian philosophy, as the idea of life may be in the case of Bergson's creative evolution and the idea of will in the case of James's pragmatism. The failure to grasp this secret of Hegel is, as the neo-Hegelians often complain, the cause of certain misunderstandings and accusations, relating to the fundamental principles of Hegel, which may be briefly considered in the next section.

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[1] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 267.

[2] *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic* p. 132

[3] *Encyclop.* p. 119, quoted in Bosanquet's *Principle of Ind.*, p. 229.

[4] Mind, thought, notion, consciousness, experience are all used in this sense of spirit by different Hegelians, though to some embarrassment of their readers.

7. The Laws of Identity and Contradiction

We have seen all through that identity of distincts and opposites is the nature of the self. The laws of identity and contradiction are, according to most logicians, the fundamental laws of reasoning. Hegel is often accused of violating these laws by asserting the identity of distincts and opposites. The neo-Hegelians point out that this accusation is unjustified. Hegel fully admits these laws, but at the same time he sees the bottom truth on which they stand. One of the functions of thought, it is true, is distinction, discrimination, exclusion and ascertainment of the identity of things. It was the great merit of Aristotle to point out this characteristic of thought, on which the law of contradiction, and therefore, that of identity are based. The law of contradiction signifies that thought distinguishes an object, A, from not-A, and excludes the one from the other. The law of identity represents the positive aspect of the same truth, namely A is A, that A is self-identical.

But there is a more fundamental truth which Hegel emphasizes, a truth that complements Aristotle's one-sided view. As Caird puts it: "But thought is *not only* distinction, it is at the same time *relation*. If it marks off one thing from another, it, at the same time, connects one thing with another".[2] "A thing which has nothing to distinguish it is unthinkable, but equally unthinkable is a thing which is so separated from all other things as to have no community with them. If, therefore, the law of contradiction be taken as asserting the self-identity of things or thoughts, in a sense that excludes their community—in other words, if it be *not* taken as limited by another law which asserts the relativity of the things or thoughts distinguished—it involves a false abstraction".[1] "An absolute difference is something which cannot exist within the intelligible world, and the thought which attempts to fix such a difference is unconscious of its own meaning".[2] "If then the world, as an intelligible world is a world of distinction, differentiation, individuality, it is equally true that in it, as an intelligible world, there are no absolute separations or oppositions, no antagonisms which cannot be reconciled. All difference presupposes a unity, and is itself, indeed, an expression of that unity .."[3] Caird concludes, therefore, that all that Hegel denies is the *absolute* validity of the laws of identity and contradiction, not the laws themselves.

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[1] This happy phrase is used by Lovejoy in his criticism of pragmatism in *Essays in critical Realism.*

[2] *Hegel*, p. 134-5

McTaggart also tries to remove the charge against Hegel in a similar way. But he adds that far from violating the laws of contradiction, Hegel bases his dialectic on it. The dialectic movement of reason is essentially a reconciliation of contradictories, and such reconciliation again is based on the recognition of contradiction, though also on the possibility of overcoming contradiction.

In short, the Hegelian contention is that though the laws of identity and contradiction are true, they are true within the limits of our ordinary practical purpose. In ordinary life it is necessary for the mind to grasp the positive nature of a finite object by distinguishing it from other finite objects. But philosophy, though recognizing the utility of this limited outlook, should not be confined to it. On the contrary, to be sound, philosophy should be able to look beyond the limited aspects of objects into their deeper meanings and far-reaching implications. To such deeper insight it is revealed that the exclusiveness of objects is not the absolute truth, that an object, to be limited to itself by exclusion from others, must be bearing positive relations to other objects. Hence the laws, though good for ordinary logical purpose, should not be thought to contain the *whole* truth.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 185. [2] *Ibid*. [3] *Ibid*. p. 136.

This explanation of the Hegelians is based on the assumption that the philosophic point of view is different from that of ordinary life and science. It does not, therefore, convince either the pragmatist or the commonsense realist. And the ultimate reply of the Hegelian to such thinkers would be that their philosophy is no philosophy at all, since it moves within the standpoint of the finite, which taken by itself is both meaningless and contradictory.

From principles and root concepts of Hegelianism we may turn next to their applications and developments in modern idealistic thinkers. We shall select for discussion here the more important aspects of their theories.

8. Arguments for Absolute Idealism

Absolute idealism is the doctrine that reality is ideal or spiritual, and that there are not many such independent realities, but there is only one all-inclusive reality, which being dependent on nothing else (there being nothing outside it) can be said to be independent, irrelative or absolute. We know how Hegel came to hold absolute idealism. We shall discuss now how the different Hegelians arrive at this conclusion. The arguments used are many, and all lines of argument do not wholly converge, consequently we have slightly different conceptions of the Absolute. But the different formulations of absolute idealism are all attempts, conscious or unconscious, at reaching Hegel's conclusion from different points of departure consistently with modern currents of thought.

There has been an attempt[1] to classify the different modern arguments for idealism under three heads, (a) the epistemological argument, (b) the argument from the contingent nature of the objects of experience, (c) the ontological argument. This classification is neither exhaustive, nor wholly exclusive. A more convenient classification, which we shall adopt here, is to bring the arguments under two classes, epistemological and non-epistemological. We must remember, however, that the two are scarcely found in isolated forms in any individual thinker.

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[1] *Vide* G. W. Cunningham's *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, Part II, for an elaborate exposition and critical account. *Vide* also A. C. Ewing's *Idealism: A Critical Survey*.

(1) The Epistemological Argument

This argument is based on considerations regarding the nature of knowledge. In history we have an instance of this in the gradual elimination of the not-self through the epistemological doctrines of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Reverses of materialism which began in Kant's epistemology were carried to logical completion by his successors. Berkeley also bases his idealism on an empirical analysis of knowledge.

(a) Among modern idealists we find the epistemological argument in Green. We have already seen how Green discovers the existence of a spiritual principle as the necessary presupposition of human knowledge and how he shows that for the possibility of knowledge it is necessary that this principle should be considered identical with the one underlying the world of nature, and how he comes thus to establish an eternal all-inclusive consciousness of which self and nature are different correlative aspects. We have here then an instance of absolute idealism reached chiefly through epistemological considerations.

(b) Another argument cited[1] as an instance of this epistemological argument for absolute idealism we have also in an earlier British thinker, J. F. Ferrier (1808-64) who uses it in his *Institutes of Metaphysics*. His argument proceeds in a geometrical form. It has been briefly summed up by Cunningham[2] thus:

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[1] By Cunningham, *op. cit.* [2] *Op. cit.* pp. 315.

"That which truly and absolutely exists is either that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of, or that which we neither know nor are ignorant of; and no other alternative is possible. But that which we neither know nor are ignorant of must be the contradictory; for if it were not the contradictory it would be knowable, and therefore either an object of knowledge or an object of ignorance[1]. That which truly and absolutely exists is not the contradictory, however, since there is no contradiction involved in the proposition that something (whatever it may be) truly and absolutely exists. Consequently, that which exists must be either an object of knowledge or an object of ignorance—that is, it can be neither matter *per se* nor ego *per se*, but only some-object-plus-some-subject. Any absolute existent, then, is necessarily mind-together-with-that-which-it-apprehends".

Ferrier thus proves that what is real must be a mind in synthesis with objects. But how many such reals are there? One or many? Following the law of parsimony he asserts that as only one such mind is sufficient to explain everything, only one is logically necessary. He thus feels certain of the existence of One Absolute Mind having all things for its objects. The supposition of many finite reals (i.e., finite minds in connection with its limited objects) is redundant. Ferrier concludes, therefore, that "there is One, but only One, Absolute Existence which is strictly necessary; and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and ever-lasting Mind in synthesis with all things"[2].

The epistemological argument of absolute idealists like Green and Ferrier differs from that of subjective idealists like Berkeley in this that while the latter try to prove by it the existence of mind, as subject, as the only independent substance, the former try to prove the existence of a mind in which the subject and the object are inseparably correlated aspects.

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[1] Something can be said to be the object of my ignorance, when I say that *I* do not know *it*, and hence it also, in one respect, must be *related* to *me*.

[2] *Institutes of Metaphysics*, section 3, proposition XI, p. 510.

(c) Another kind of epistemological argument often found in Hegelian writings is based on the knowledge of the finite, the imperfect, the conditioned etc. It is pointed out that such knowledge presupposes a subject which is distinct from these and, therefore, capable of knowing these as such. The very knowledge, for example, of the finite as finite, it is argued, implies that the knower is capable of transcending the finite; it implies an implicit feeling of being infinite.[1] This argument thus reinforces the belief in an Infinite (and similarly Perfect, Unconditioned) Mind.

The epistemological argument ultimately depends for its strength on the assumption that knowledge is the most undoubted fact that the mind is acquainted with, so that even a sceptic cannot deny this without self-contradiction and that consequently if any proof is based on knowledge, and is logically sound, it cannot be overturned. The force of the argument is lost when this assumption is disproved either by showing that what we know immediately and with certainty in knowledge is not knowledge itself but its object or that there is nothing like knowledge at all apart from objects. The modern critics of idealism, we shall see, try both these methods. Idealists repel these attacks by sticking to the claim that knowledge must be aware of itself, otherwise no *object even* can be known. This claim is made, for example, by the very first theorem of Ferrier's work which runs: "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself."

The epistemological argument figured as the chief argument for idealism; and, therefore modern realists like Moore and Perry, as we shall see, attack this argument to overthrow what they regard as the foundation of all idealism. Naturally enough idealism seeks to fortify and strengthen itself further with other kinds of arguments of a non-epistemological nature.

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[1] *Vide* John Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 128f. and p. 151f.

(2) The Non-Epistemological Arguments

These arguments are of various kinds ; but all of them may be regarded as objective approaches to absolute idealism, as distinguished from the subjective approach furnished by the epistemological arguments. They try to show that we cannot explain, nor understand, the objective world in its different aspects without the conception of the Absolute Spirit. Some of these arguments, as we shall see, utilize the results of the epistemological arguments, and cannot, therefore, be said to be *wholly objective.*

(a) *The argument from the relational nature of objects*

This argument also is found in Green, along with the epistemological one, and repeated by other idealists. It points out that every object when analysed is found to be a unity in which different elements are interrelated. But interrelation of the many into one, without which the object would cease to exist, is inconceivable without a mind. Only a mind is known to be capable of synthesizing the many into one, without destroying their multiplicity. Hence no object can be conceived to exist without relation to some mind. Again, nature is the totality of all such objects interrelated into one system. So it presupposes the existence of One Mind, without relation to which its unity would be inexplicable. The universe must, therefore, be conceived as the interrelated system of objects in an absolute, all-inclusive, self-conscious mind or spirit on which it is dependent. Without one mind, there could not be a *universe* or *one* world.

Moreover, space and time are also unified systems of many interrelated elements (finite spaces and events), and, as such, the unity-in-difference, found in each, presupposes a mind without which it would lose its character. Besides, the Absolute mind, already proved, cannot be *in* space nor *in* time, but must be above space and time in order to be able to unify them into what they are. The existence of one eternal absolute spirit is thus demonstrated as the ground of the objective world.

(b) *The argument from the contingent nature of finites*

This argument also utilizes the relational nature of a finite object in another way. A finite object is what it is by virtue of its relations to other finites by which it is limited and determined into that kind of finite existence. The colour, size, shape, weight and other qualities of a finite object would not be what they are but for the determining influences of the other objects of the world by which they are caused. It means that the nature possessed by every finite object is determined by and contingent on the rest of the world. In Hegelian language, every finite (when analyzed is found to be dependent on and therefore) passes into its other (things other than itself). It possesses then a self-negating or self-contradicting nature. As Caird puts it: "Every finite thing, by the fact that it is finite, has an essential relation to that which limits it, and thus it contains the principle of its destruction in itself. It is, therefore, in this sense, a self-contradictory existence, which at once is itself and its other, itself and not itself. It is at war with itself, and its very life-process is the process of its dissolution".[1]

No finite, therefore, can be said to be self-existent or self-contained or to have independent existence. If reality means self-existence no finite can be real. Again if reality must be free from self-contradiction no finite can be real.

The only thing that can possess reality is the whole including all finites. This whole is not a mere aggregate. Since every finite is related to and determined by every other finite, the parts of this whole are inseparably related and mutually determined. The whole is then a genuine organic whole. The whole being all-inclusive, it is one. Reality is identical with this whole and must be one. There being nothing but the whole, the existence of the whole is not determined by anything outside it. It is not, therefore, relative, but absolute. Thus the reality of one absolute in which all finites are interrelated as parts is forced on us. Applying to this conclusion the theory, stated before, that a system of many interrelated members in which there is unity of the manifold implies a self-conscious mind which unifies it as an object, we reach the doctrine of absolute idealism, or the doctrine that there is the Absolute Mind of which all finite things are objects and in which they are unified into a system.

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[1] *Hegel*, p. 136.

What is proved in the above argument is also sometimes reached in a slightly different way. Starting from the Leibnitzian assumption that reality must be self-determined, that "nothing really exists which is not *self-determined* and *self-related*",[1], it is shown that no particular, finite object can be said to be self-determined and no such object can, therefore, be real. The only self-determined entity is the whole system containing all finites—that in which all finite objects stand related. This system being a unity of the manifold can be nothing but a self-conscious being. From an argument like this Caird concludes: "So soon as we are driven to recognize that reality can be found in that and that only which has a principle of self-determination in itself, we seem forced to recognise that the only reality is God".[2]

(c) *Bosanquet's*[3] *Argument*

Bosanquet's argument for the Absolute belongs to this general class, as the name '*a contingentia mundi*' (literally, 'from the contingent character of the world') which he gives to it, shows. But his formulation of the argument has some novelty worth mention. He points out that if we reflect we find that all our experiences (cognitive, aesthetic, moral, etc.) which are fragmentary, incomplete and incoherent always tend to become more and more complete and coherent. Every finite experience is opposed by something else, and there is a constant tendency of the finite to expand itself, include its other, overcome opposition and become more complete and coherent. This inward tendency shows that the whole of our being points towards a perfect experience in which all opposition is to be overcome by the harmonious absorption of everything. This inclusive whole of experience, may be called the Absolute.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 175.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 177.

[3] Bernard Bosanquet (1848—1923).

"This then, is the fundamental nature of the inference to Absolute; the passage from the contradictory, and unstable in all experience alike to the stable and satisfactory".[1] The tendency towards completion by overcoming contradiction is "the positive and constructive principle of non-contradiction—in other words, the spirit of the whole" and it "is the operative principle of life as of metaphysical thought".[2]

This spirit is the underlying principle in Logic understood, as it was by Plato and Hegel, as "the supreme law or nature of experience, the impulse towards unity and coherence (the positive spirit of non-contradiction) by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs, and every self to its completion in the Absolute and of which the Absolute itself is at once an incarnation and a satisfaction".[3] Every idealist[4] metaphysic bases its argument on this spirit of the whole, and such argument in general may be described as argument *a contingentia mundi* "or inference from the imperfection of data and premises",[5] (i.e., from fragmentary and contingent nature of finite experience as the starting point, to the all-inclusive and coherent whole). The Absolute thus inferred is best conceived in terms of our spirit *in so far as* different fragmentary experiences are in it knit together into a coherent individual. But the finite self never is a fully complete and coherent system; it has its unresolved conflicts, it is still on the way to completion. The Absolute is the perfect, self-complete and fully coherent Individual. As the concrete all-inclusive synthesis of every conceivable thing and thought it is the *Concrete Universal.*

The conception of the concrete universal has been developed elaborately by Bosanquet,[6] and it has come to occupy a very important place in his philosophy. He contrasts the concrete universal to the abstract universal which is attained by generalisation from particulars by omitting their individual peculiarities. "The generality is framed by attending to the common qualities of a number of individuals, and disregarding their differences.'"[1] Such an abstract universal is pure identity without diversity; there is no synthesis, no harmony, no coherence in it as it is empty of contents. Such a false abstraction cannot be the nature of the Absolute. The Absolute being the all-inclusive, harmonious synthesis of all particulars cannot be conceived after such an abstract universal. The key to the conception of the Absolute can be found in the idea of an individual (like Socrates) who unifies diverse aspects and states into one, inclusive whole. Such a universal which contains and unifies the many into one, without omitting or effacing their multiplicity is called by Bosanquet the true or the concrete universal. As he puts it, "a diversity recognised as a unity, a macrocosm constituted by microcosms, is the type of the concrete universal"[2] The Absolute according to Bosanquet is, therefore, a concrete universal, a perfect individual. This conception is an elaboration of Bradley's idea of the Absolute.[3]

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[1] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 268.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 267.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 340.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 262.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 267.

[6] *Ibid.* Lecture II.

(d) *Royce's*[4] *Argument*

Josiah Royce, the leading American Idealist, also argues (in his Gifford Lectures entitled *The World and the Individual*), like Bosanquet, to show that the self-transcending implications of our finite experience point to an Absolute Being, a self-complete Individual Life or Experience. His dynamic and teleological conception of the human mind and the Absolute Being imparts, however, a new turn to his argument, as well as to the movement of Absolute Idealism. Therefore, his views deserve special consideration.

Royce shares with his great pragmatist colleague, William James, the voluntaristic outlook. He also follows Plato and Kant in thinking that human knowledge develops by the materialization or external application of ideas. The ideas that our mind inwardly entertains seek materialization in sense-experience. The ideas by themselves are abstract and universal; and they strive to become real through concrete and individual sense-experience. If we study the purpose and tendency of our mental life, we should not fail to notice that the mind is not satisfied with vague, indeterminate, abstract ideas. It always craves for concrete, determinate individual reality. Perception or sense-experience is the process by which the mind constructs by selection external objects for the concrete realization of its inner ideas. "Every idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellectual process."[1] If we examine an idea we find that the purpose that moves this act of will is that of self-realization in concrete experience. This purpose can, therefore, be regarded as the internal meaning of the idea. The concrete external object of perception in which the idea seeks self-fulfilment can be said to be the external meaning of the idea. The external is only the embodiment of the internal and not alien to it.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 35 [2] *Ibid.* p. 38.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 40; also Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* p. 107. For a critical estimation *Vide* H. B. Action, The Theory of Concrete Universals, in *Mind*, 1936-37.

[4] Josiah Royce (1855-1916).

Realists who think of the object as existing independently of mental activity fail to explain how the two independent entities, the idea and the object, can come to fit in and correspond with each other so marvellously without a miracle. Analysis of perception shows that it is through and through a selective, purposive activity of the mind.[2]. What object will be perceived at a particular time will depend on the idea, the selecting activity of the perceiver. Sense-experience is not "whatever happens to come to hand. It is carefully and attentively selected experience."[3] The so-called "stubborn empirical facts" are really the products of mind's purposive selection in the light of its ideas. "Man thinks in order to get control of his world, and thereby of himself"[4] The external experience which he has is what he selects in accordance with his needs and cravings.

If we critically examine the correspondence theory of truth held by most realists, we also find out the error of realism.[1] Truth is not really attained by mind's copying or resembling a pre-existing independent object, for in that case most of what is accepted as true would cease to be so. The "accounts in the ledger", "the symbols of an algebra", "X-ray photographs" and most other scientific representations of facts bear no point-to-point correspondence to things of which they are taken as true accounts. Similarly "a true idea of a dog need not itself bark in order to be true"[2]. All these instances go only to show that truth does not necessarily depend upon any objective resemblance or correspondence between ideas and facts, but that it depends on the fulfilment of mind's intention or purpose. What kind and degree of relation between ideas and objects will be taken as necessary for a true representation of facts will depend upon the mind which chooses such representation. Truth is thus found to be determined by the purposive, selective activity of the mind and not by any objective relation. This again points to the fact that true knowledge is mind's successful selection and construction of objects for the realization of its ideas, and not mind's representation of already existing objects.

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[1] *The World and the Individual*, p. 311.

[2] For a fuller discussion of this theory of perception, *vide Ibid*. Chap. IV, The Pragmatic Theory of knowledge.

[3] *Ibid*. p. 285.

[4] *Ibid*. p. 286.

Now, in the light of this theory of knowledge, Royce tries to find out the implications of human experience. We have seen that our inner life of ideas is constantly craving for becoming more real by being more concrete and more determinate through sense-experience. But this craving is not fully satisfied by the perceived objects which collectively constitute my world. For, even this world of external objects cannot be accepted by me as the final fulfilment of the mind's quest for the concrete and the individual reality. I have the idea of a substance in the mind; it is general, vague and abstract as compared with a particular substance, say a man, that I perceive as the outer embodiment of the idea. Therefore I say that the perceived substance is more real than the mere idea of it. But even the perceived substance, man, is not completely determinate and concrete, because on seeing it I feel that this is only one of the innumerable perceptions of substance I could possibly have. Similarly, my perceived world, as a whole, also leaves me to think that this is not the only way in which the ideas, of which it is the external fulfilment, could be realized, and that other perceivers might have quite other kinds of worlds in fulfilment of similar ideas. Owing to this lingering uncertainty and want of complete determination I cannot accept the world of perception as the only and ultimate reality.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 300 *et seq.*

[2] *Ibid.* p. 305.

The ultimate reality, of which I have an idea, is understood by me as that about which there can be no doubt whether it is of this nature or of another nature. A table or a chair perceived by me always leaves room, however, for the doubt whether it is perceived to be the same by all others, or whether tables and chairs may not be of other kinds. Therefore the perceived world of mine cannot be accepted by me as the only and full *realization* of my ideas. Perception is quest for reality, but it fails to attain complete reality.

But this failure is not without its lessons. For it teaches us that what is real must not be merely an idea, general and vague, but a concrete and determinate embodiment of the idea in immediate experience. Moreover, to be ultimately real, this reality sought by the ideas must be the complete fulfilment or embodiment of *all* ideas, admitting of no other alternatives. It can be concluded, therefore, that the ultimate Reality which our thought seeks can be nothing other than the Absolute which has the complete realization in immediate experience of all ideas in all possible ways. It follows that there cannot be such an Absolute and Ultimate Reality without an Absolute Experience. This Experience must include all finite experiences but achieve what they fail completely to attain, by overcoming their shortcomings. This concrete experience can be said to be the perfect Individual, because like an individual it claims uniqueness ; it allows no alternative since it is all-inclusive. In view of the dynamic nature of experience this Absolute is described by Royce, in contrast with the intellectualist Hegelians, as follows: "A will concretely embodied in a life,—and these meanings identical with the very purposes that our poor fleeting finite ideas are even now so fragmentarily seeking, amidst all their flickerings and their conflicts, to express,—this, I say, is the reality. This alone is. All else is either shadow, or else is partial embodiment, *i.e.*, is a striving after that ideal which needs for its own expression this very striving".[1] Thus the examination of the meaning of finite experience leads us to Absolute Experience.

By admitting this all-inclusive Absolute as the organised system of all finite ideas, objects and experiences and by admitting these latter as its fragments, we can understand better the possibility of agreement between ideas and objects, and between the experience of one person and that of another; and we can also explain better the meaning of one absolute reality which science wants to know, as well as the meaning of *consensus* of scientific opinion.

Royce sums up, in another work[2] the argument for the Absolute in the following way:—"There is, for us as we are, experience. Our thought undertakes the interpretation of this experience. Every intelligent interpretation of an experience involves, however, the appeal from this experienced fragment to some more organized whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place. To talk of any reality which this fragmentary reality indicates, is to conceive this reality as the content of the more organized experience. To assert that there is any absolutely real fact indicated by our experience is to regard this reality as presented to an absolutely organized experience, in which every fragment finds its place".

This Absolute of Philosophy is, for Royce, the God of religion. The dynamic conception of mind, as will, enables us to conceive the Absolute as creator of the world, all finite wills being regarded as the fragments of one Will ; the inclusion of all experience and reality makes the Absolute omniscient and all-powerful ; the fulfilment of all finite cravings and wants in Absolute Experience makes it perfect; and the overcoming of all evils makes it all-good. As a self-conscious individual the Absolute is a Person. Royce's philosophy thus provides also a rational justification for the popular beliefs about God.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 359.

[2] *The Conception of God,* p. 42.

(e) *Argument from opposites*

Reflection reveals to us some basic oppositions such as between the subjective and the objective, thoughts and things. Opposition is meaningless unless the opposites are somehow positively related. The relation which can be discovered in all cases of opposition, even where no other point of community is seen, is at least this that the opposites are both the objects of some mind. Without a mind to know, relate and contrast, opposition would cease. Hence all oppositions presuppose a unity, namely the knowing mind, which transcends and relates the opposites. Some of these opposites are of such a nature (e.g., matter and mind, phenomenon and noumenon) that the mind presupposed by them cannot be finite. The belief in a universal mind is thus necessary.

(f) *Argument from the intelligible nature of the world*

Kant expressed the principle: "The intelligible world is relative to the intelligence". By this he meant that it is the mind which constructed the world with its own categories and rendered it intelligible or knowable, so that the intelligible world could not exist without the mind. Caird points out[2] that the full meaning of this principle could not be realized by Kant himself since he still retained the belief also in something unintelligible—the thing-in-itself behind the world. Caird demonstrates the untenability of this unintelligible residue proving thereby that the intelligible world is the only world. The principle of Kant thus interpreted in Hegelian light points to an Absolute Mind as the presupposition of the world.

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[1] *Ibid.* and *The World and the Individual*, 2nd. series, Lects. VII-X

[2] *Hegel* p. 140 f.

(g) *The ontological argument of McTaggart*

Though McTaggart distinguished himself as an interpreter of Hegel's philosophy, he develops towards the end of his life an original philosophy of his own in his great but highly abstruse book, *The Nature of Existence*, which is one of the very few attempts at building a systematic philosophy of the universe made during the present century in Great Britain. Its importance can be judged from the fact that Dr. C. D. Broad, an eminent British philosopher, considers it worth his while to write, in criticism, an equally big book, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy.*

Inspite of the rather strange and independent manner of his argument, his penetrating analysis and geometrical rigour, his conclusion is not essentially different from Hegelian idealism ; it is idealism, and it is also absolutism though of a qualified nature. It is, therefore, ranked usually as an unorthodox type of neo-Hegelianism and contrasted with the orthodox variety.

He likes to call his philosophy ontological idealism,[1] because his philosophy starts with an enquiry regarding the nature of *existence* and ends with the conviction that existence is *spiritual.* His argument has also, therefore, been called ontological argument. It is perhaps the most objective approach to idealism in modern times; but it is extremely abstract too.

McTaggart starts with existence, because existence is perceived in objects and no one can wholly deny the reality of existence. "And if it should be denied or doubted that anything existed, then the very assertion of or denial or doubt would show that, at least, the assertion in question existed".[2] Existence is then an absolute certainty, on which philosophy can be based without fear.

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[1] *Vide Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I, for a brief account of his theory.

[2] Op. Cit. p. 252.

But existence is a quality of things. That which possesses a quality is a substance. Therefore it is also certain that there is substance having existence as its quality. It is also "evident that whatever exists must have some quality besides existence". We cannot find any substance with bare existence, having no other quality.

Perception shows that substances are many. "But, at the same time, all the substances which exist may be taken together as a single substance".

As there are many substances there are also relations among them. Relations exist also among qualities and even among relations themselves. Again, every "relationship generates a derivative quality in each of its terms—the quality of being a term in that relationship".[1] So every substance must have innumerable qualities.

Substances are particular; two substances cannot have *exactly* the same nature. "The nature of a substance may be regarded as a unity compounded of the particular characteristics which constitute it. But it may be regarded with equal truth as a unity which is manifested in those characteristics".[2]

But several substances may be combined in thought to form one compound substance. There is thus "one substance which contains all other substances. This substance is the Universe".[3] By virtue of relations that exist among all facts in the universe, the characters of objects are mutually determined.

Every substance being possessed of infinite characteristics, can be divided infinitely into the component elements. No substance is, therefore, simple. Now, if every substance is infinitely divisible, no substance can be material for the following reasons :—In order that any substance may exist it must be distinguishable from other substances, and so it should at least theoretically admit of exclusive and, therefore, sufficient description, without which its particular existence would be unthinkable. Moreover, in order that a whole substance may be described, its parts must be described. But a material substance, supposed to exist, is such that the parts into which it would be divided would *not* possess such relations that the nature of one part could determine the nature of the rest. So that a sufficient description of one part would not give us a sufficient description of the whole. One part of a material substance, for example, may be red, the other yellow, and there would be no determination of the one by the other. Besides, the sufficient description of these parts of a material substance again cannot yield a sufficient description of the infinite parts of those parts. It is not possible, therefore, to think of a sufficient description of such substance. In the absence of any conceivable sufficient description a spatial or material substance then cannot be distinguished from another, and cannot, therefore, be ascertained as a particular substance. This shows that the very conception of a particular material substance involves contradiction and is absurd.[1]

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[1] Cf. Moore's conception of relational property. If 'a is *before* b', then a gets from this relation the quality of anteriority, and b that of posteriority.

[2] *Contemp. Brit. Phil.* Vol. I, p. 254.

[3] *Ibid.* p, 255.

On this positive ground, and on the further grounds that materiality is not directly perceived but only inferred, and such inferences are unsatisfactory, McTaggart denies the existence of material substances. But the infinite divisibility of a substance cannot be denied since a substance, in all cases, must have infinite characteristics and hence must be divisible. Hence a substance must be conceived in a way that will make sufficient description of it thinkable inspite of its infinite divisibility. So far as our knowledge goes only a spiritual conception of substance can satisfy this condition. We can think of any given substance as spiritual and its parts also as spirits or selves. A self has the power of perception. Every self that is a part of the compound spiritual substance can then be conceived to perceive itself and the other selves which are in that whole. So that every part reflects the nature of the other parts as well, and the sufficient description of one part yields also sufficient descriptions of other parts. Moreover that part perceives or reflects also the nature of its own parts, hence its sufficient description also yields sufficient descriptions of its parts. Inspite of infinite divisibility, then, the nature of substance can be determined by the sufficient description of even a few parts of it, if it is spiritual.[1] As to the proof of the existence of a self, which is the basis of this spiritual explanation, McTaggart says that we are directly acquainted with one such substance in our own "self".[2] McTaggart thus comes to believe that there is a reasonable certainty that all substances are spiritual, though there is no absolute guarantee that there cannot be any other alternative explanation

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[1] This rough summary tries to avoid the very technical, and elaborate formulation of the argument McTaggart himself gives, and for which *The Nature of Existence* should be consulted.

The universe is a compound of all selves and therefore it is also a spiritual whole—it is the Absolute. The Absolute, however, cannot be regarded as a person, any more than a college consisting of different persons can be regarded as a person. It cannot be looked upon as God, either in the sense of controller or in the sense of creator. Time is unreal, since it involves contradiction to think of anything as possessing the contradictory predicates of being present, past and future. Creation is meaningless without the reality of time. The idea of a creator is thus untenable.

The spiritual whole has perception of its parts; this perception reflecting the natures of the parts is determined by the parts, the objects of perception. The Absolute is, therefore, in this sense dependent on the parts, and not they on it. McTaggart, like the realists, emphasizes the importance of the parts more than the whole, the individual selves or persons more than the Absolute. To indicate this aspect of his philosophy he also calls it *personal idealism*[3].

McTaggart's idea that "the universe consists of selves", that some selves are self-conscious while others are not and that there can be compounds of selves, and his pluralistic emphasis are all reminiscent of Leibnitz. But the main argument by which he proves the spiritual nature of substances is based on the idea of the relation of mutual determination obtaining among different substances, and this relation, inspite of the highly complicated and original way in which it is formulated by McTaggart, is at bottom not different from the Hegelian idea of community or correlativity on which Green and Caird also base their proofs of the existence of spirits as explanations of objects.

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[1] *Contemp. Brit. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 260. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.* p 251.

One more feature of McTaggart's idealism is the attempt to demonstrate perception as the essence of a spirit's activity, and the attempt to reduce emotion and volition to kinds of perception.[1] In this respect it is a contrast to Royce's conception of will as the essence of mind. We find here the basic reason why McTaggart is unwilling to attribute will and purpose to the Absolute and why he does not think of it as a creator and controller, nor regard it as a person.[2]

9. The Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley (1846-1924)

(1) *The place of Bradley*

Bradley's conception of the Absolute presents, in a way, the high water mark of neo-Hegelian thought[3], and, on that account, it deserves separate attention. In him the monistic tendency of the movement attains its height.

His dialectical acuteness and originality have few parallels in ancient or modern European philosophy; and it is a training for the intellect to pursue his arguments. While he uses his genius for shattering our common beliefs to pieces, he also combines with this destructive ability, a constructive one of a high order. His metaphysical speculation has come, therefore, to be regarded by a consensus of all schools of philosophers in Great Britain as the source of a new life in British Philosophy[4]. An eminent German writer, Rudolf Metz, fixes his place in European thought thus, "he was one of the few great builders of system, and one of the boldest and most original and speculative thinkers that Britain has ever produced. In modern British thought he takes a high, perhaps the highest, rank."[1] The importance of Bradley's thought is not simply for the consummation that idealism reaches in it, but, perhaps more, for the vitality it introduces into philosophical speculation, provoking thereby a host of non-idealistic lines of reaction. Even for understanding such anti-Hegelian contemporary movements as realism, pragmatism, one has to understand the problems raised by Bradley and the solutions he offers. We shall briefly state here some of the chief arguments on which Bradley builds his position in his greatest work, *Appearance and Reality*, about which it has been said that "no other work has so deeply troubled the present-day philosophy of Britain, provoked so much reflection, and exercised so much influence both positive and negative."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 261—"I hold that perceptions which are cogitations can be volitions and emotions".

[2] For a searching criticism of the premises and conclusions of McTaggart, vide Broad's *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy.*

[3] Note, however, that, like Stirling and Green, Bradley also says, "I never could have called myself a Hegelian." (Preface to the first edition of *The Principles of Logic*). But the world has passed a different verdict on all of them.

[4] *Vide* the dedication of the second volume of *Contemp. British Philosophy*—"To F. H. Bradley, O.M., to whom British philosophy owed the impulse that gave it new life in our time".

Bradley advances many arguments to show that the universe, conceived as it is as a system of interrelated terms of various kinds, is full of puzzling contradictions and hence it is not a reality, but a mere appearance of reality. These arguments themselves puzzle the average reader, and often prove baffling. To appreciate them and understand their connections fully one must grasp the 'generating insight' behind the philosopher's mind—the vision which generates the arguments and is, therefore, implicitly prior to them though explicitly the arguments come first and then the conclusion embodying the vision. In support of this inverted procedure we can recall Bradley's own words: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

(2) *The 'generating insight' of Bradley's Philosophy*

The vision or instinctive faith which generates Bradley's philosophy is the vision of Reality as a harmonious undivided whole of experience, in which all aspects of infinite experience are included, but are not parted and related. It is generically akin to the root concept of spirit on which the Hegelian outlook has been seen to be based, with two important points of difference. First, Bradley's 'experience' is a whole which is not simply reason or *thought*, but also *feeling* and *willing*, all of which remain merged in one undifferentiated Absolute. Secondly, this Absolute is not conceived by him in a *relational* form; though it contains all thoughts and things, they are not split up into different elements. "Fully to realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible"; but a limited idea of the Absolute "seems fully attainable by the finite intellect".[1] In "mere feeling or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity, and, on the other hand, is not parted by relations." Such an experience "serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one".[2]

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[1] *A hundred years of British Philosophy*, p. 322.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 335. Caird also describes it as "the greatest thing since Kant".

But inspite of the differences just pointed out, Bradley's Absolute resembles the common Hegelian Absolute in that both are organic in nature. In other words, the finite elements contained in the Absolute are dependent on the whole, and are also mutually interdependent. That being the case, if any finite aspect of the whole is sought to be isolated and understood, it is found to imply another, to depend on a second finite; and this latter again when analysed is found to be involved in the first. The attempt to understand the universe from the finite point of view, that is to say, the attempt to understand one finite by another, ends thus in a logical circle. This is the nature of the contradiction which Bradley repeatedly shows, with different examples, to be the fate of all common scientific and philosophical attempts to understand the universe rationally, for all logical thinking is the *relational way* of explaining finites by finites, fragments by fragments, discovering interrelations among them.

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[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 140 (2nd. ed. 9th impression)
[2] *Ibid.* p. 141.

It should be noticed that Hegel and other Hegelians also had recognized before Bradley the peculiar relation of mutual interdependence among finites, e.g., between thoughts and things, sensation and thought. But while they tried to explain this difficult relation by taking this as an ultimate fact of experience and calling it correlativity, Bradley does not rest satisfied with it. If anything, A, is dependent on another thing, B, and B again is found to be dependent on A, our thought passes from A to B and B to A. The back-movement of thought contradicts its forward movement; thought is involved in self-contradiction, and it must escape from it and cannot rest satisfied with it. But there is no escape from such self-contradiction so long as thought moves within finites, as it must do to make life possible. Thought is essentially a relational way of understanding finites, and has to confess its inability to escape contradiction. The only means of escape is the voluntary merging of thought back into undivided experience, suppressing thereby the source of puzzles, contradictions. In the light of the foregoing synopsis of Bradley's philosophical outlook it will be easier to follow his destructive dialectic.[1]

(3) *Primary and Secondary qualities*

He begins with the attempt made by some philosophers like Locke and also by some scientists, to interpret the world in terms of primary and secondary qualities. Finding that our perceptions of material objects are often erroneous, and such errors threaten the very existence of material objects, these thinkers make a distinction between qualities and qualities. They point out that some qualities like colour, touch, smell, sound, taste, about which we are often deceived are not the *primary* or essential qualities of a material substance, they are only secondary. These secondary qualities do not exist as such in any object. It is only when the object becomes *related to* some sense-organ, say the eyes, a quality like colour appears to be in

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[1] For a critical but appreciative treatment, *Vide* R. W. Church *Bradley's Dialectic* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1942).

[illegible] Apart from this relation a secondary quality cannot, therefore, be said to exist in the object. Extension alone belongs really to object; every object occupies space even though it lacks colour etc.; and, therefore, the spatial quality of extension (in its different aspects like size, shape) must belong to the object even when the object is not related to any sense-organ. From such considerations the conclusion is drawn by those thinkers that the "secondary qualities, therefore, are appearance, coming from the reality which itself has no quality but extension".[1]

This position, Bradley notes, is also held by materialism and he demonstrates its untenability on the following chief grounds:

(a) If the primary quality of extension forms the substantive essence of matter, and the secondary qualities are only adjectival to it, the problem arises how to understand the relation between the two. It is not sufficient to say that the secondary qualities are the appearance of matter which is constituted by the primary. For the question arises then: Does this appearance *belong to* matter or does it not? If it does, then it infects matter with its unreal character. If it does not, then where does appearance belong (there being nothing except matter according to materialism)? There is thus an insoluble dilemma.[2]

(b) Again, the argument on which a secondary quality is said to be a conditional appearance, applies equally to the case of the primary quality of extension. For, the "extended comes to us only by relation to an organ; and, whether the organ is touch or is sight or muscle-feeling—or whatever else it may be—makes no difference to the argument. For, in any case, the thing is perceived by us through an affection of our body, and never without that".[3]

(c) What is more, without "secondary quality extension is not conceivable".[4] One "cannot think of extension without thinking at the same time of a 'what' that is extended". If the idea of extension comes to him through touch, the extended comes qualified by touch, if through the eyes, it is qualified by colour and so on. In short the thought of the sole reality of extension "is the violent abstraction of one aspect from the rest, and the mere confinement of our attention to a single side of things, a fiction which forgetting itself, takes a ghost for solid reality".

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[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 10 (2nd. ed., 9th. imp.).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 12. [3] *Ibid.* p. 12—3. [4] *Ibid.* 13—14.

Chiefly on these grounds Bradley concludes that "if the secondary qualities are appearance the primary are certainly not able to stand by themselves. This distinction, from which materialism is blindly developed, has been seen to bring us no nearer to the true nature of reality". In short, matter which materialism tries to pass as reality is self-contradictory in nature and is a mere appearance, not really reality. The fault of materialism, if we judge it by Bradley's central creed, is that it breaks up the whole, takes out only a fragment (namely, primary quality) by abstraction, and passes it for reality forgetting the concrete whole.

(4) *Substantive and adjective*

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is, in one sense, a particular case of a more general distinction between substantive and adjective. On this latter distinction are based many kinds of interpretations of the universe, even some non-materialistic ones. But this distinction is also equally untenable. Bradley points out many objections, the chief of which are the following:

(a) Take the example of a lump of sugar. According to the time-honoured distinction, this lump is a substantive whereas white, sweet, hard are the adjectives which qualify it. But we find, on reflection, that if we take away the qualities, nothing is left to be the substantive. There is no *thing* to be found in addition to the qualities. But neither can we identify the thing with any or all of its qualities. If sugar were identical with sweetness, it could not at the same time be also hard; since sweetness and hardness would then be identical, which is absurd. A substantive can then be neither something other than its qualities, nor identical with the qualities.

(b) It is possible to suggest an escape from this dilemma by finding a third alternative, namely that the substantive is a name for qualities in relation. "When 'white', 'hard', 'sweet', and the rest co-exist in a certain way, that is surely the secret of the thing", that is what is called sugar and is the substantive.

But this suggestion also raises difficulties. What is the relation of relation to the qualities? The qualities themselves cannot *be* relations. 'White' is not the same as its relation to 'sweet' or 'hard'. But if relation be different or other than the qualities, how can we say that qualities *have* relations? The well-known dilemma of predication arises here. "If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is *not*; and if you predicate what is *not* different, you say nothing at all".[1]

(c) Lest it should be thought that the unintelligibility of the relation of relation to its terms just pointed out, arises from the wrong assumption that a relation must be a predicate or attribute of the terms, Bradley considers also the other possible view that relation is not a predicate qualifying terms, but is more or less independent of the terms. He points out that even on this view, the nature of relation remains as unintelligible as before. If two terms A and B are related by some relation R, then according to this view R being independent of A and B, is outside, or external to, the terms. If so then how can R be related to A, without a fresh connecting relation (R^1). And this new relation being also external to its terms (A and R) there must be a third relation (R^2) to connect them and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus the external view of relations is involved in infinite regress and makes relation unintelligible.

Bradley shows thus the untenability of the time-honoured attempt to interpret the universe in terms of substantives and adjectives. Incidentally he discovers also the puzzling nature of all relations.

The root cause of all these troubles, he points out here, is the fragmentary outlook which breaks up the universe into its different aspects but fails to re-unite them. The lesson which he derives from the failures to unite and interrelate the fragments, is that we cannot solve the riddles unless we suppose that "everywhere there must be a whole embracing what is related, or there would be no differences and no relation".[1] It is only on the supposition of such a whole which "relaxing its unity, takes the form of an arrangement" of the many related elements, that we can explain the world's multiplicity and relations. The fragmentary outlook with its splitting of the whole into parts and their arrangement by different sorts of relations may be quite good for practical life. "Such an arrangement may work, but the theoretical problem is not solved".[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 17.

(5) *Relation and quality*

The problems raised by the discussion on substantive and adjective have been found to turn ultimately on relation and quality. These two, already discussed partially, are more fully considered again by Bradley. He shows that the very essence of the ideas of relation and quality involves self-contradiction; each of these presupposes the other and there is a 'vicious' circle.

(a) "Qualities are nothing without relations." In immediate presentation or "mere unbroken feeling, you have no relations and no qualities". It is only when the different aspects of immediate experience are distinguished, that we get, by abstraction, these aspects as qualities of the given. "There is an operation which, removing one part of what is given, presents the other part in abstraction. This result is never to be found anywhere apart from a persisting abstraction".[3] It is clear then that qualities cannot be qualities but for this mental operation, or *relation* of the given to the mind. Nor would there be qualities unless the different aspects were distinguished as such by the mind. But distinction of aspects, again, would be impossible if the aspects are not related. In short there would be no qualities without differences of aspects, and there would be no differences without distinction (i.e., distinguishing), and no distinction can be made without the mind's inter-*relation* of the aspects distinguished. Hence qualities presuppose relations, and are not intelligible without them.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 18. [2] *Ibid.* p. 19. [3] *Ibid.* p. 23.

(b) But on the other hand relation is unthinkable without qualities. For, relation must relate some terms. When something given in immediate presentation is split up by our mental operation into different interrelated aspects, i.e., qualities in relation, it is true that the qualities cannot be there without the relations. But from this it would be wrong to suppose that qualities can "be wholly resolved into relations". To "turn qualities in relation into mere relations is impossible",[1] "relations must depend upon terms, just as much as terms upon relations".

It is seen thus that qualities are supported by relations. and relations cannot exist without qualities as relata.

(6) *The negative conclusion—The Realm of Appearance*

This contradictory nature of the world which our thought makes out of immediate experience through its relational activity shows that it cannot be real. Bradley says, therefore, "The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth".[2]

This conclusion sums up the central principles of Bradley's metaphysics. He remarks, therefore, that one who has grasped this has little need to go through his other arguments. The nature of relation being contradictory and unintelligible, the nature of everything that involves some kind of relation must be so. But we cannot point out any object in the world which does not involve some relation, since there is no object, we can think of, which has no quality, and no quality, as we have seen, which can exist without relation. Though Bradley's conclusion does not require any further illustrative evidence, he wants to strengthen his position further by examining one after another the natures of space, time, change, causation, activity, thing, self. All these categories with which our intellect or thought interprets the world are found to possess self-contradictory nature. Hence none of these can be real, they must be mere appearances of reality.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 25.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 28.

So far Bradley's philosophy is merely negative, it ends in a vain search for reality. But he does not rest there. On the contrary, he utilizes the very failures of the intellect to grasp reality and tries to construct on them a positive philosophy of the real.

(7) *The constructive Philosophy of the Absolute*

For this constructive work Bradley uses his logical principle that every negation implies some positive basis ; there can be no 'bare denial'. This principle enables him first to lay down the general position that rejection of the relational form of the universe as mere appearance implies some reality; for the very judgment that something is an appearance is based on the assumption that it does not possess the characters of reality. The criterion, "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself"[1] is assumed in calling a thought-construct appearance. Bare phenomenalism without belief in any reality cannot, therefore, stand.

Nor is it possible to deny this criterion of reality self-consistently. It is not possible to be a thorough-going sceptic, and hold that truth is not knowable at all. For even such a sceptic must have to satisfy the criterion of self-consistency or non-contradiction in order to justify himself. One can scarcely think without a positive criterion, "to think is to judge, and to judge is to criticize, and to criticize is to use a criterion of reality".[2] The criterion of reality is absolute, because "either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity".[3]

We have to admit, therefore, that the denial of reality to appearance implies the positive knowledge that the real must exclude contradiction. This is the first point we know positively about the real. Moreover, in so far as phenomena are appearances of the real, they must somehow belong to the real, that is, they must be in the real. This, when combined with the first point, gives the further knowledge about reality, that, "everything, which appears, *is somehow real* in such a way as to be *self-consistent*".[1] In other words all objects which are found to be self-contradictory in the phenomenal world constructed by our thought, must remain in the real in such an arrangement as to be in complete harmony.

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[1] *Ibid* p. 120 [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid*

Yet another point we can know about the real is that it must be *one*. This follows from the last point. If reality is to be harmonious and free from conflict, there cannot be many independent reals. Because if there are many independent reals, we have to suppose that they are connected together into a harmonious whole by some relations. But if a relation between any two reals affects their natures, they are mutually influenced and determined; and then we can no longer think that the reals are mutually independent. But if a relation does not so affect the reals, then it is external to or outside them; and then another relation has to be supposed to connect the first relation with either term. In that case as we previously saw, there would be an infinite regress and no relation can be established.[2] The impossibility of many reals is thus proved, and along with it the unity of the real is also established. In a word the "bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity must hence somehow be at unity and self-consistent; for it cannot be elsewhere than in reality, and reality excludes discord".[3]

As embracing "all differences in an inclusive harmony" "the real is individual".[4] In this respect it can also be called a '*concrete universal*',[5] that is, a universal which is not obtained by merely abstracting intellectually what is common among different things, but a universal which includes all diversities of concrete existents within itself.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 123 (our ital.).

[2] *Ibid*. p. 125.

[3] *Ibid*. p. 123

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] *Ibid*. p. 107.

Reality as the concrete all-inclusive whole is not, therefore, to be confused with the abstract Kantian Thing-in-itself, which does not include phenomena but excludes them completely.

As to the 'matter' which fills up the outline of the Absolute chalked out above, Bradley holds that it must be made up of the very stuff of which every given or immediately present fact is composed, namely *experience*. As to the proof that what is given is experience, or that experience constitutes existence, Bradley says, "Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. . . . . I am driven to the conclusion that for me *experience* is the same as reality".[1]

But this position of Bradley should not be confused with subjective idealism which tries to reduce all objects to the percipient subject. The distinction between subject and object is the result of our mental abstraction, our thought splits up the concrete whole of experience into its fragmentary aspects like subject and object. As such the subject, according to Bradley, is as much a fictitious appearance, as the object. If we go back to immediate experience we do not find these fragments. "What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist".[2] It is such experience that Bradley means when he urges "that reality is sentient experience".

It may be objected[3] that what is given in experience is a particular something—a 'this' as related to a particular knower. Bradley points out that the 'this' is presented in immediate feeling which is at a level below distinctions; the whole of experience has not been split up by thought into 'that' and 'what', subject and object, feeling and the felt: neither has the 'this' been yet contrasted with any 'what'. It is an undivided whole without any feeling of limitation that is presented to us. Therefore the character of immediate experience is not incompatible with the Absolute. What is present in each case of immediate experience is of course different from that in another, and each is, in this sense, fragmentary. But it does not contain any feature which can resist its absorption in Absolute experience. On the contrary as we have found, immediate experience possesses some essential features which our intellect demands of reality. What is more, each fragmentary experience transcends itself and points to something beyond itself. If the different fragments of experience were not included in one whole, it would not have been possible to contrast them, differentiate them and interrelate them. The Absolute experience is thus implied by every finite experience.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 127—8, (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 128.

[3] *Ibid.* chap. 19.

Bradley confesses, however, that our minds cannot grasp the process by which finite experience arises, and *how* the plurality of finites becomes merged into the harmonious Absolute experience. These processes are inexplicable.[1] We possess no detailed knowledge of the Absolute. But our "complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail is no good ground for our declining to entertain it". On the contrary the example of immediate experience gives us a rough, general idea as to how diversity can be present without conflict in a harmonious whole of undifferentiated experience.

The Absolute thus discovered by metaphysics is self-consistent and satisfies the demands of intellect or thought. Since "metaphysics is mere theory, and since theory from its nature must be made by the intellect, it is here the intellect alone which has to be satisfied"[2]. But even the intellect is not completely satisfied if feeling and will remain unsatisfied, since in concrete human experience all the elements—thought, feeling, will and the like—remain inseparably merged in one undivided whole. Any thing that proves jarring to any side of experience infects the whole of experience. To satisfy the intellect fully metaphysics must, therefore, "take account of all sides of our being".[1] Fortunately, it is not an impossible demand. For imperfection, whatever be its nature—whether it is related to thought, will, emotion or any other aspect—is basically the same; everywhere it consists in unresolved conflict, struggle or contradiction. And as the Absolute reached by intellect is free from all contradiction, it being the complete whole bereft of internal and external conflict and disharmony, there cannot be any imperfection of any kind in it. To prove the same thing indirectly, if there were any imperfection even from the side of feeling and will the Absolute would not satisfy the intellect completely, but as it does so satisfy the intellect it cannot have any imperfection.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 200.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 186.

It follows therefore that the Absolute Reality which is discovered by the intellect must be perfectly good as well.[2] It must also be emotionally satisfying, that is there must be absence of pain, and 'a balance of pleasure'.[3]

Bradley's Absolute, it should be clear, is neither a self-conscious spirit, nor a person. Self-hood and personality are essentially marks of finitude. The self as pitted against not-self cannot be the Real, that is, the all-inclusive whole; but only a part or aspect of it. Personality implies self-hood and will and progress in time—all marks of imperfection. Bradley says, therefore, " . . . . for me a person is finite or is meaningless":[4] and, therefore, "assuredly the Absolute is not merely personal. It is not personal, because it is personal and more. It is, in a word, super-personal".[5] Personality, like self-hood, is a finite appearance of the Absolute; the Absolute has this appearance, but also transcends it.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 130

[2] *Ibid.* pp 131, 406

[3] *Ibid.* p. 133

[4] *Ibid.* p. 471

[5] *Ibid.* p. 471.

For the same reason the Absolute is not identical with the God of religion. "God again is a finite object standing above and apart from man".[1] As an object of worship God must be distinct from the worshipper, hence He is not the all-inclusive Reality; but only an aspect of it. "If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the Whole".[2] "God is but an aspect, and that must mean but an appearance, of the Absolute".[3]

10. The Place of the finite in Absolute Idealism – the problems of personality and individuality, imperfection and evil

The Absolute, in whatever way it may be conceived by the different idealists, is the all-inclusive whole. Therefore every finite existence, whatever may be its nature, must exist in the Absolute or nowhere. But there is a difference of emphasis regarding the importance of the finites, and the degree of their dependence on the Absolute. The reason is that even within the fold of absolutists, there are, relatively speaking, the pluralists, and the monists, as well as the followers of the middle path who try to hold the balance evenly between the two. As we have seen an absolutist like McTaggart emphasizes the importance of the parts, more than the whole. The whole in this view does not possess any individuality of its own, it is little more than the totality of finites. Pluralism here relatively dominates over monism. There is at the other extreme the monistic tendency in absolutists like Bradley and Bosanquet for whom reality is really one; and, therefore, the whole alone is genuinely real; the parts are real only so far as they are in the whole; taken by themselves the finites are meaningless abstractions. Midway between the two extremes, there are the average Hegelians like Caird who try to do equal justice to the one and the many, the whole and the parts, stressing the inseparable relation of correlativity between the two. In this view the Absolute is empty without the finites which it includes and transcends; and the finites are not rationally conceivable without reference to something beyond them in which they are included and inter-related.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 394.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 395.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 397; *Vide* also Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality*, chap. XV.

In the light of these different positions held by Hegelians regarding finites in general we can understand their views regarding personality. McTaggart believes that the Absolute is not personal, since the Absolute is a compound substance and does not possess the degree of unity necessary for being regarded as *one* person. Bradley, on the other hand, holds that the Absolute is not personal because personality implies some degree of distinction and all distinctions are merged into homogeneous unity in the Absolute. The average Hegelian holds that the Absolute is a unity in multiplicity as a person is, and can, therefore, be regarded as a person.

A distinction is made, however, by Bradley, and Bosanquet, between individuality and personality. Individuality carries the idea of a unity of distincts, something which includes, harmonizes and unifies many contents. Individuality, according to this notion belongs to the human self only in a limited sense, since it is not completely harmonious, though partly it is so. The self stands opposed to the not-self, it has its struggles with opposing elements not yet overcome. Hence it is not a perfect individual. Perfect individuality, implying perfect harmony and unity, belongs only to the Absolute. But personality, according to Bradley, connotes distinction, finitude, exclusiveness; and hence can be attributed only to the human self and not to the Absolute.

The average Hegelian does not care much to distinguish between individuality and personality. Basing his conception of the Absolute on the anology of his own self, he tries to put everything essential and valuable found in his own personality into the absolute, leaving only what is finite and imperfect. He likes, therefore, to attribute personality to the Absolute in this sense. The finitude which Bradley finds to be an essential element in the idea of personality, is not of course attributed to the absolute. Ordinarily an Hegelian holds that finitude and imperfection, though found in the human personality are not any part of its essence. The essence of personality, according to him, is spirituality; and the spirit is a self-revealing, self-determining principle which holds together its diverse elements by its unifying power. And this essence is attributable, without any fear, to the Absolute. In this way the Hegelians like Caird find it convenient to identify the Absolute with the personal God of Christianity, or a similar theistic faith. Hegelianism, in this aspect, plays an important role by supplying a metaphysical basis and justification of religion, Christianity in particular.

But if the human selves and the Absolute are all persons, how can we understand their relation? How can we think of many persons existing within one person? The difficulty in understanding this point drives, as we saw, the absolutists and personal idealists, like McTaggart to deny the personality of the Absolute. But an attempt is made by some Hegelians to solve this difficulty. Dr. Haldar, an Indian Hegelian of note, has made this problem the special subject of a searching enquiry.[1] He tries, in the light of Hegel's own fundamental principles, to find out a means of reconciling the personality of the finite self with that of the Absolute. We may sum up his valuable suggestions here.

Like an Hegelian of the central position he points out that neither the extreme monistic tendency of Bradley, nor the pluralistic one of McTaggart represents the true spirit of Hegel who is always anxious to do justice both to unity and plurality. Some Hegelians emphasize the unity of the Absolute so much as to drown the value and importance of the finite individuals, and make Hegelianism indistinguishable from pantheism. McTaggart on the other hand interprets Hegel's absolute with so great emphasis on the finites as to reduce the unity of the Absolute to a mere impersonal totality. But the teachings of Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of Religion*, Haldar points out, make it sufficiently clear that "Absolute is not a principle of unity differentiated into objects, but a self whose nature is to communicate itself to its constituent selves, in each of which it is present, completely and indivisibly, and to bring them back to its own unity, the objective world being the otherness of this system of selves. Nature, to express the idea in another way, is related to a spiritual principle which is not a barren identity but a concrete unity of persons".[1] Briefly speaking, *the Absolute is a society of selves.*

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[1] *Vide* *Neo-Hegelianism* (by Hiralal Haldar, Heath, Cranton) Appendix.

But a difficulty arises here. Is it fair to regard the unity represented by a society as sufficient for personality or self-hood? If that be so then, as McTaggart points out, "every college, every goose-club, every gang of thieves must be called a person".[2]

To this Haldar replies, that the degree of community of purpose present among the members of a club or gang is incomparably low as contrasted with that present among different selves which form parts of the Absolute self. The members of a club have diverse interests, only an insignificant fraction of which is shared by them in common. Hence the unity represented by the club is very imperfect. "The relation, however, of the Absolute to its constituent individuals is different. It is a union which makes not this or that phase of their existence but the whole of their existence, including their existence as *inter-conscious members of it* possible. . . . So the unity of the Absolute is, besides other things, the continuity of consciousness involved in the inter-consciousness of the selves that constitute it".[3]

Haldar means to say that unless the one Absolute consciousness differentiated itself into the many fragmentary centres of consciousness called selves, the selves would not be what they themselves are, nor would they know each other. The Absolute explains both the individuality of

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 455-6.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 463.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 463 f.

each self and the continuity, as proved by mutual knowledge, among the different selves. It differentiates itself into the many as well as synthesizes or integrates them.

But here an objection is possible. If this view is correct then the Absolute is the only all-pervasive unity, and hence it deserves to be called the only self. To remove this difficulty Haldar draws attention to Hegel's saying that the unity of the Absolute does not consist in being one substance, but one subject. In other words unity consists in the capacity of unifying by consciousness diverse elements into a continuous system of consciousness. What is one need not be like a mere indivisible point devoid of constituent elements; it is really one only if it can unify the many into a system. Real unity is not bare identity, it is really an identity of distincts. The conclusion inevitably follows that what is one must contain many elements as objects of its unifying consciousness. To this Haldar adds the further thought that (just as a living organism can have for its constituents only living organisms or it would otherwise not be living at all, similarly) every constituent element of a conscious self can only be a conscious self; if the constituents were unconscious the self would not be conscious. The final conclusion drawn from these two truths is that the Absolute is a self, in so far as all things are unified into a system by the absolute consciousness, and also that every constituent of the Absolute must be a conscious self. The Absolute thus is the Self which is a system of selves.

But does it not follow then from this that even a human self, on the same grounds, must consist of many selves? Haldar does not swerve from this conclusion. On the contrary he points out that psychic phenomena like multiple personality support the supposition that the human self is not one soul substance, but is a colony of selves in which unification is normally, but not always, present.[1]

The question how what is an *object* of the Absolute consciousness (and in that sense constituent of it) can itself again be a self or *subject* need not prove an obstacle to the acceptance of this view. Nothing in the universe is purely a subject or purely an object. The Absolute itself is the subject and object of its self-consciousness, similarly is every finite self. In fact when a particular self A perceives another self B, he is in turn perceived by B, so that each of A and B is a subject-object. Everything in the universe reflects the Absolute from its own stand-point, or is the fragment of the Absolute consciousness, which reflects or experiences the entire universe in a particular unique way, while it is itself reflected from infinite other similar centres. The Absolute is the unified integration of all finite experiences. Rather every finite experience is the finite product of the self-differentiating process of the Absolute, just as every peculiar organ in the human body is the result of the differentiation of the seed of life.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 466—7.

Man consists of body and soul. The body is a product of nature which is again the product of the self-differentiation of the Absolute. The human consciousness or the human soul is consciousness attained through the body. As consciousness is one and eternal and thus identical with the Absolute, we cannot think that human consciousness can be *produced* by the body. We must think that human consciousness is nothing but the one absolute consciousness reproduced or *reflected* through the body. To put the same thing in another way the Absolute realizes itself through each body, which is also the product of its own differentiation. Man is, therefore, God come to himself (i.e., knowing himself) through nature.

From all these considerations Haldar concludes that "man is a partial manifestation of a self-differentiation of the Absolute, which is the ideality of his body. His knowledge or experience forms part of the Absolute Thought and Experience and is valid so far as it goes. What he understands and perceives, the Absolute understands and perceives *in him*, but the Absolute understands and perceives infinitely more than he ever does".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 484. For further discussion *Vide* Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality.*

Along with the finite, evil and imperfection also engage the attention of the Hegelians. If the Absolute is a harmonious, perfect whole how could there be evil within it i.e., in the world?

The solution of this problem, the absolutists repeatedly point out, lies in the correct understanding of the nature of perfection. Perfection is not a static quality of the Absolute, it is the *dynamic process* by which the Absolute realizes itself by overcoming all imperfections. Perfection would, therefore, be meaningless without imperfection, truth without error, good without evil. Seen in this light evil, error—all imperfections, only contribute towards perfection, just as each crooked, fragmentary arc of a circle contributes to the perfect roundness of the circle.

Again, all imperfections, including evil, are there, as imperfections only for *us*, finite minds. They are all overcome and reduced to elements of perfection in the Absolute. As Mackenzie puts it: "There can be no real unity without differentiation, and this involves the breaking up of the harmony of the whole and its restoration again. The broken music which arises in this process may, from the point of view of the whole, seem perfect harmony; but for us who are at the point of view of the parts, there is necessarily something of the nature of evil".[1]

The existence of evil, Bosanquet points out, should not be ignored as a mere illusion,[2] nor should it be a source of pessimism in life. "The universe is not a place of pleasure", but "a place of soul-making".[3] It is a place where man gets an opportunity for overcoming his imperfections and perfecting his self. For him "suffering and privation are also opportunities. The question for him is how much he can make of them".[4] The feeling of imperfection is the cause of all moral endeavour. "In the moments of moral difficulty, we are full of effort, preoccupied with the sense of wrong in the world, the sense that the next move is with us, and that good and evil rest upon our shoulders".[5]

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[1] *Outlines of Metaphysics*, p. 155.

[2] *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 279—80.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 26. [4] *Ibid.* p. 21 [5] *Ibid.* p. 279—80

Taken in the right spirit, then, evil is a source of good; it is a necessary condition for the process of self-development called perfection.

11. Degrees of Reality

Closely connected with the Hegelian theory of finites there is the theory of degrees of Reality which is held by some notable Hegelians like Bradley, Bosanquet and Lord Haldane. Though all these thinkers do not come to the theory of degrees from identical considerations, there is something inherent in the common Hegelian outlook which may be regarded as the source of their views. All finites, in the Hegelian view, are expressions of the Absolute Reality in different ways, and all of them are fragmentary in nature and, therefore, imperfect. But in spite of their imperfections, all are not equally imperfect. Hegel himself, we know, distinguished between the higher and the lower categories, on the criterion that the higher is more concrete, more complete or inclusive, more harmonious, whereas the lower is more abstract, less complete and less harmonious. So Hegel arranged the categories of logic, nature and spirit in the ascending order of perfection.

Bradley is influenced by this aspect of Hegel's philosophy.[1] All finites, we have seen, are regarded by him as appearances of reality and as such imperfect and unreal. But all are not equally imperfect. As he says, "Of two given appearances the one more wide, or more harmonious, is more real. It approaches nearer to a single, all-containing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a smaller alteration. The truth and the fact, which, to be converted into the Absolute, would require less rearrangement and addition, is more real and truer. And this is what we mean by degrees of reality and truth. To possess more the character of reality, and to contain within oneself a greater amount of the real, are two expressions for the same thing".[1] Judged by this criterion Bradley finds, for example, that though body and soul are both appearances, and hence unreal, the soul is more real than the body. The soul shows greater identity, self-consistency, self-completeness than the body.

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[1] *Vide* footnote on p. 318 of *App. and Real.*, where regarding the Chapt. on Degrees of Truth and Reality he says, "I may mention that in this chapter I am, perhaps even more than elsewhere, indebted to Hegel".

Bosanquet follows Bradley in this as in many other respects. He stresses the idea of individuality which for him stands for all that is connoted by reality and perfection in the above description of Bradley. He would, therefore, say that whatever possesses the marks of individuality (inclusiveness, coherence, etc.) to a greater extent approaches Reality more, and is relatively more real.

But it should be noted that according to these thinkers only the imperfect or appearances admit of degrees; what is perfect, is absolutely so, and there is no question of degrees there. Hence the Absolute or Reality proper has no degrees. As Bradley puts it, "The Absolute, considered as such, has of course no degrees; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection. Such predicates belong to, and have a meaning only in, the world of appearance".[2]

Lord Haldane reaches the theory of degrees of reality[3] in a slightly different way, namely, as a conclusion obtained from the combination of two theories, (a) the theory that knowledge is foundational, that is the ultimately real, and (b) the theory of the relativity of all knowledge. The first of these premises is only re-affirmation of the basic idealistic "principle that the spiritual alone is real".[4]

Haldane tries to show that knowledge or thought is foundational. It is the fundamental reality of which 'mind' and 'object' are different limited aspects or determinations. He controverts the idea, common among philosophers including some idealists like Berkeley, that knowledge is the product or effect or activity of some substance. In fact, knowledge constitutes the nature of substance, quality and everything else we can mention; "thought is constitutive, rather than constituted. It does not truly find itself in reality, for it constructs reality by its own activity".[1] Knowledge in us, or our experience, is only a finite determination of that one Absolute knowledge; it is the manifestation of the eternal knowledge through the finite conditions of body and life.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 322—3.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 318.

[3] *Vide* his essay (read before the British Academy), *The Doctrine of Degrees in Knowledge, Truth, and Reality.* References are to the booklet reprinted from the Proceedings of Brit. Academy Vol. 9.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 31.

This last fact truly understood proves also the relativity of our experience. "We are what we are, and we cannot take in at any one moment all the possible aspects" of reality. "In order to accomplish anything we finite beings have to limit our endeavours and our purposes".[2] We have thus to 'break up' the whole of reality or knowledge and abstract only those aspects of it which the purpose of the moment needs. Finite human experience presents, therefore, the different aspects of reality, each of which is true only in relation to a particular standpoint from which reality happens to be viewed. This means that *our* experience or knowledge is never absolute, it does not give the whole truth about reality, it is only relatively true.

Now if this relativity of our experience is true, it follows that the different objects known by us are different aspects of one fundamental reality each being true presentation of reality from a particular standpoint. But some of these aspects are fuller presentations of reality compared with some other aspects. For example, the conception of reality as mere inorganic matter, is not as complete as the conception of it as a living organism (which includes matter and also life); similarly the conception of reality as a self-conscious spirit is fuller and more adequate than its conception as a mere living organism. Every higher category (under which our understanding views reality) possesses then a higher degree of perfection or reality. There are thus different degrees of reality possessed by its different aspects.

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[1] *Ibid* p. 28.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 5.

It should not be thought that degrees belong only to finite presentations of reality, to our thought-constructs, not to reality itself. As *we* think, the Absolute thinks in us, and what is constructed by our thought is really then the construction of absolute thought. Reality being constructed by thought, and different thought-constructs being more or less perfect, there must be degrees belonging to Reality itself. The different aspects of reality which are characterized by different degrees of perfection, are aspects of Reality itself. Hence degrees cannot but fall within Reality. Haldane differs, therefore, from Bradley. According to Bradley our views of Reality are contained of course within Reality, but in a transmuted form in which their distinctions, and, therefore, degrees are absorbed and merged in an undifferentiated unity. But Haldane is not an extreme monist in this respect. On the contrary his view is that our finite, relative views of reality, the degrees and distinctions of the various kinds of our knowledge are not only contained but kept uneffaced, within Reality. Consequently while Bradley holds that only appearances of Reality, and not Reality itself, admit of degrees, Haldane thinks that Reality itself has degrees.

Referring to the point on which he differs from Bradley, Haldane says, "I think that the point of difference is one which is possibly more important as regards words than principle. But still there is a difference which I must not pass by. For me *thought is* the very foundation and meaning of *reality,* it is *comprehensive* even of its own self-imposed *limitations and errors*; it is that in terms of which alone all that seems other can be expressed, and is that which cannot itself be described in any terms but its own".[1]

It should be noticed that the word reality has at least two senses which are not distinguished by the Hegelian and it is left undecided in which of these senses reality can be said to have degrees. 'Reality' may be taken in the substantive sense of 'that which is real' and also in the abstract sense of 'the character of being real'. Common sense may feel puzzled as to how the substantive can admit of degrees though it may entertain the plausibility of the character of reality being more or less real. But ultimately this distinction does not stand, since 'the character of being real' must itself fall within the denotation of reality as it is also something real. In fact this distinction, the Hegelian may point out, is based on the idea of a distinction of substance and quality, which he does not accept as ultimate. Reality is not primarily a substance according to him. It is the all-inclusive term which denotes everything, substance as well as qualities.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 18 (the words italicized by us express the point of difference).

12. Relations

(1) General Relations

The neo-Hegelian view of relations has acquired some prominence in contemporary discussions. It has also greatly exercised the realistic minds, and provoked opposite theories.[1]

All relations, according to neo-Hegelians, are internal. Their theory is, therefore, known as the internal theory of relations. By calling relations internal it is generally meant that relations modify (or determine) the nature of the terms related.

This view is only another aspect of the Hegelian theory that the universe is like an organic whole in which every part determines, and is determined by, every other part; and the whole and the parts are also mutually determined. There is an inseparable relation by which all things are united in the interrelated system called the Universe.

According to the opposite theory of externality of relations, relations are external to the terms; in other words, they do not modify the terms; the terms in relation remain what they were or will be out of relations. This view, we shall see, is held by realists for whom the universe is not an organic whole but only a totality of many independent entities.

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[1] For some important criticism and analysis, *vide* Moore *Philosophical Studies;* Holt and others, *The New Realism;* Ewing, *Idealism.*

Most idealists believe that the universe is the product of a self-differentiating Absolute; all things are, therefore, the finite modes of that one ultimate reality, and they have no independent separate existence. They are like the branches, leaves, trunk and roots of a tree, all differentiations of the same seed. Relations among things, according to this view, are not, therefore, merely connecting links accidentally interposed between previously existing things. On the contrary things *are*, from the time of our first acquaintance with them, members of a relational system; and are what they are because of their relations to the system. In other words, as soon as finite things get differentiated within the Absolute, they are also inter-*related*. Hence terms and relations are inseparable correlatives, and cannot be isolated or conceived in isolation.

Green, we have seen, tried to show that all objects are produced by thought relations, and, consequently, no thing would be what it is apart from such relations. Relations are, therefore, internal in the sense that relations determine the very nature of things related.

Bradley, it has been found, also shows that if relations are external or extrinsic it would follow that relations and terms can exist independently of one another, and in that case we would be compelled to conceive some other relation to connect the independent entities called relations with the terms, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress disabling thought can be avoided only if relations, by their own intrinsic nature, are conceived to enter into the being of the terms without the help of further relations; that is to say, only if relations are conceived not as falling outside the terms but as being internal to the terms.

Arguing in the same manner Joachim says that a "purely external relation is in the end meaningless", for, "a relation, which really *falls between* two independent entities is .... a third independent entity which in no intelligible sense relates the first two." Every relation, says Joachim, "at least qualifies its terms, and is so far an adjective of them even if it be also something besides.

And I am maintaining that, so far as A and B are related, they are *eo ipso* interdependent features of something other than either of them singly: and, on the other hand, that if A and B really are each absolutely simple and independent it is nonsense to say that they also are really related."[1]

The difference between Green's and Bradley's view, according to some writers, is that while Green tries to reduce reality to relation, Bradley exempts reality from all relation. But this distinction must be understood with some reservations. It is true that Green holds that even the so-called simplest fact of experience like sensation or feeling is found on inspection to be determined, in respect of its nature, by other facts related to it, and that it can also be shown by analysis to be a unity of multiple elements related by thought. In this sense Green holds that every reality, which is the object of our knowledge, is made up of thought relation. But it should not be forgotten that he holds that thought, the relating principle, is itself only an aspect of the fundamental reality, eternal consciousness, of which feeling is another aspect. Thought being an aspect of that ultimate reality, that reality cannot be said by Green to be dependent on thought. Hence ultimate reality must be above or independent of thought relations; and all relation, according to him, being possible only through thought, it must be altogether above relations. In other words though finite modes of reality, as known through thought, are shot through with thought-relations, the eternal consciousness not being a thought product, must be exempt from such relations. Though this conclusion may not be found in so many words in Green's works, it is an obvious logical implication of his position. This being accepted the difference between Bradley and Green would not be so great as it is usually supposed. According to both reality, only in so far as it enters human experience, has a relational texture which depends on thought relations; but foundational reality is not dependent on thought relations.

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[1] *The Nature of Truth* pp. 11-12.

Concerning the finite differentiations of reality, again, here is a distinction, often made, between Green and Bradley. Green, it is said, tries to reduce all such objects of knowledge wholly to relation, whereas Bradley does not go so far. Though Bradley holds that all qualities imply and depend on relations, he also says that relations without terms to relate are meaningless. But as we have shown in connection with Green's doctrines, he does not really believe that there are relations without terms. The real point is that when two finite terms, A and B, are found related by a relation, R, neither Bradley, nor even Green, would say that A and B are wholly produced by *that* R, though both would say that A and B are partly made or modified by *it*. But the constitution of the terms, on further examination, might reveal, according to Green, a texture which is made by other kinds of relations and terms, these constituent terms, again, on further analysis would reveal yet other terms and relations, and this will be true as far as thought analysis can go; and thought fails to find out any simple object of experience bereft of a relational structure. So this position of Green by no means contradicts the general position of the neo-Hegelian, or that of Bradley, that in any particular case if there be a relation there must also be terms to be related, or that a relation without terms is inconceivable.

(2) *Knowledge Relation*

The problem of relations discussed above in a general way acquires, for the realist and the idealist, a special significance in relation to the problem of knowledge. Does the character of an object undergo modification when it is related to some mind and becomes known? Putting the same question in a different way, Does knowledge relation affect the object? The realist bent on demonstrating that objects of knowledge are independent of the mind, holds that knowledge relation is an external relation; that an object related to a knower by such a relation remains what it was before it was known, and will remain so, even when it ceases to be so related to some mind.

But the idealist, in keeping with his general view, holds that knowledge relation is an organic and internal one. The object, according to him, is not only modified, but in a way, constructed by the mind. To establish this position the external view of the realist is thus refuted by the idealist.[1]

It is difficult to understand the meaning of a view like: "Experiencing makes no difference to the facts. Sensating, conceiving, judging leave untouched and independent the Real Qualities sensated, the Entities conceived or judged". Take, for example, the perception of a green colour. How can we think that greenness remains *there* independently, and in itself, even when it is not related to any perceiver or visual organ? Even if it remains so, what proof is there of that it is so, unless it is seen? If the contention of the realist is that greenness may exist there if not as the object of an actual knowledge, but at least as an object of possible knowledge, then it can be pointed out that in that case greenness still bears some relation to consciousness in general; so that its existence independent of all relation is not proved.

But let it be granted that greenness is "an ultimate entity in the nature of things, which has its being absolutely in itself" without any relation to anything outside it. The difficulty then is as to how it can at all become related to a visual organ? And when it is so related, how can we think that at the same time it exists *both* as an independent reality unaffected by the relation (therefore, as good as unrelated), and also as related to sense-organ? How, again, can we feel sure or prove that no change has come over greenness when it has been so related?

The belief in a self-identical quality without any variation is not borne out by experience. The object that is judged green by us, may appear otherwise to a colour-blind man.[2] Even people of normal vision do not all perceive always the identical shade of greenness. Again, the "painter sees many different greennesses where the untrained eye sees but one".

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[1] Vide Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, pp. 39-50.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Some realists would reply that particular cases of greenness existing here and there of course vary, but common to them there is a universal self-identical greenness, the essence of all greennesses, and this does not vary. But this defence is scarcely intelligible. If the universal greenness is to remain self-identical and unchanged, how can greenness vary from case to case?

It is difficult then to understand, and far more to accept, the realists' contention that knowledge does not modify the object known, or that knowledge relation is an external one.

Before closing this topic, we may remark that the two contending views about relation are closely linked up with two ultimate attitudes with which metaphysical speculation may start. One may start, as the realist does, with the finites which are regarded as the ultimate simple constituents of the world and try to explain the universe as an aggregate of the finites. He then comes to conceive all relations among finites as external, imposed accidentally *ab extra*. On the other hand, one may also choose to start like the absolute idealist, from the universe as a whole and try to explain all finites as its many differentiated parts. He has then to conceive relations among parts, or between the parts and the whole, as internal, organic bonds without which the *relata* would not be what they are. The absolute idealist chooses the second alternative, for he complains that when he tries to start with finites, his attempt is baffled. Every attempt to grasp the finite by discovering its boundaries reveals that it extends beyond its imagined limitations and points in all directions to be continuous with what is beyond. He complains further, that he fails to find in the universe any ultimately simple finite from which a start can be made. Every finite reveals, on analysis, a complex constitution in which unexhaustible lines of reference to all that is beyond converge and declare it to be a product of relations with all other things in the universe. And even if he succeeds by abstraction to imagine some ultimate independent simples, he fails to see how such independent unrelated entities can come to be related and form the universe.[1] He is thus compelled to give up the vain attempt to start with the parts, and has to begin from the whole—the whole which is partly experienced and partly implied by experience. And then he is also inevitably driven to the conception of all relations being within the whole, sustained and determined by the whole. This whole being conceived as an organic one, its different parts must be thought of as mutually determining one another, and all of them must also be thought of as determined also by the whole, as the whole is determined by them. All relations—whether between one finite and another within the universe, or between any finite and the whole—have consequently to be regarded as internal.

13. Truth and Error

(1) *Bradley's View*

(i) *Conception of Truth*

There are many senses in which the term truth is used. Truth primarily means the character of being true, and this character is ordinarily attributed to our judgments. Judgments are said to be true or false. Sometimes, by a slight modification of the primary meaning, a true judgment itself also is called truth.[2] Error has also two corresponding senses, indicating the false character of a judgment, or in some cases, such judgment itself. There are other senses also in which truth and error are used, as we shall see later. But the senses just indicated are what we generally find in idealistic writings, though we scarcely find them clearly defined.

The basic absolutist attitude towards truth and error is found in Bradley. Judgment, according to Bradley, is the attempt of thought to understand reality with the help of some adjective that belongs to reality but is 'loosened' from it by our thought. He points out[1] that "anything real has two aspects, existence and character", a 'that' and a 'what'. In judging, thought distinguishes these two aspects, and tries to relate them in the subject-predicate way. "In every judgment the genuine subject is reality, which goes beyond the predicate and of which the predicate is an adjective".[2] "Judgment is essentially the re-union of two sides, 'what' and 'that' *provisionally estranged*".[3] Reality in its entirety cannot be grasped by us either in perception or in conception. We select from Reality at a time that fragmentary aspect which suits the purpose of the moment. In its attempt to know that fragment of reality our thought isolates an adjective inherent in reality and tries to know that fragment through that loosened quality. It takes, therefore, the form of a judgment.

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[1] Vide Joachin, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[2] cf. "...the aim of truth is to qualify existence ideally." "Truth is the predication of such content as, when predicated, is harmonious. ." *Appearance and Reality*, p. 145.

A judgment is true if the adjective applied to that fragment of reality is harmonious with it. "Truth must exhibit the mark of internal harmony".[4] Such harmony exists when the predicate of the judgment is such that it does not get repelled in thought's attempt to unite it with the subject. Where there is such repulsion or discord there is error. Truth consists then in non-contradiction, coherence, or harmony, and error in contradiction or discord.

But here a difficulty arises. If in a judgment the subject is reality, and the predicate is an adjective or an aspect which thought takes out also from reality itself and re-unites it with the self-same reality, how can an adjective discovered in reality, be repelled by reality, and be incoherent at all?

In solution of this difficulty Bradley points out that though all predicates or adjectives are ultimately taken from reality, and have, therefore, a place therein, yet an adjective 'loosened' from one aspect or part of reality may not fit in with some other part. Our thought or judgment can give us only partial views of reality; and it is, therefore. possible that a predicate that belongs to one part of reality is applied by thought to another part. To illustrate Bradley's meaning, if I judge that milk is black, though 'black' is a real adjective of reality, in so far as reality is coal, hair, soot, etc., it does not belong to reality in so far as it is milk (lime, etc.). Hence there is want of coherence between this predicate, black, and *this* aspect of reality, called milk, which has been selected by thought as the subject.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 145 (our italics).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

As all human judgments are finite partial views of reality, it follows that they can, at best, be true only with respect to *those* particular aspects of reality. No finite judgment can, therefore, be absolutely true; "all our judgments, to be true, must become conditional".[2] To put the same thing in another way, "finite truth must be conditional".[3]

It also follows from the same considerations that our errors also are conditional. A predicate fails to apply to a subject, or is in discord with it only when the subject is a particular aspect of reality. If we take a sufficiently wider view of reality and make that the subject, it will be found that the predicate is quite compatible. Referring to a windy day, it may be wrong to judge that the sea is calm; but it is wrong only with respect to the sea of that time. The judgment may be quite true when the sea, the subject of the judgment is taken in a wider sense, the sea of all days. It may be a true description of the sea for most parts of the year. In consideration of such facts, Bradley says, "There will be no truth which is entirely true, just as there will be no error which is totally false".[4]

An oft-repeated criticism of this view of truth is that it does not explain the meaning of the word truth as used in daily life. If no truth is wholly true then our life ends in sceptic puzzles. We lack in daily life criterion of truth and error if every truth is partly error, and every error is a partial truth. But a sympathetic reader will scarcely find a justification for such criticism. "Our thoughts", says Bradley, "*certainly, for some purposes,* may be taken as *wholly* false, or again as *quite* accurate; but truth and error, *measured by the Absolute,* must each be subject always to degree".[1] The critic either ignores, or is not prepared to admit, the distinction between the relative standpoint of daily life, and the absolute one of metaphysics. From the relative point of view a truth is wholly true, and an error is wholly erroneous, and no lack of distinction puzzles the practical man. Such relative truth, which represents the character of absolute truth within specified limits, and is truth for all *practical* purposes, Bradley, following Lotze, calls *validity.*[2]

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[1] For a full exposition, vide *App. and Real.* p. 169 and p. 170f.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 319-20. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 179. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 320-1.

(ii) *Degrees of Truth*

We have seen previously that according to Bradley and Haldane the various views that thought presents of reality are but appearances, and that such appearances represent reality more or less faithfully, according as they are more or less inclusive and harmonious in character. Appearances, therefore, possess different *degrees* of reality. As our judgments pertain to different appearances of reality, they also are accordingly more or less true. Truth, therefore, admits, like reality, of various degrees. The different judgments about reality in its different aspects form a universe or system which may be narrow or wide in extent in accordance with the wealth of its contents. A judgment which is found coherent in a wider or more inclusive system is more true than one which is found coherent only within a narrower one. The Ptolemaic hypothesis was quite compatible with, and could explain, a body of observations and so far true. But the Copernican theory is more true since it can explain (and is coherent with) not only those facts which the former could explain but also many more which the former failed to explain. Hence it possesses a greater degree of truth. If truth admits of degrees, error also must. Because to the extent that there is deficiency of truth in a judgment, there must be a balance of error, and the increase and decrease in the degree of truth will consequently result in decrease and increase in error.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 321 (our italics).
[2] *Ibid.*, and also p. 503 foot-note.

To put the whole matter more simply the defects of our views of reality arise from their partial or incomplete nature. Our views are more true and less false according as they are more complete and comprehensive. Our views are less true and more false according as they are less complete and comprehensive.

(iii) *Error and illusion*

Another point which must be borne in mind in understanding Bradley's notion of error, is the distinction, he draws, between error and illusion. "Everything", he says, "is error, but everything is not illusion".[1] All that we know about reality, through thought, is appearance. Every appearance, while revealing reality, does so only partially. To the extent that it falls short there is defect or error. In this sense every appearance, every idea of reality entails some element of error. All human knowledge is in this sense subject to error. In fact human life would be impossible without finite and fragmentary appearances of reality, without finite truths. And all finite truths, in so far as they give us inadequate and fragmentary knowledge of reality, are also errors. It can be said, therefore, that error "in the sense of one-sided and partial truth, is necessary to our being"; i.e., it is there "to suit the divergent aspects of our inconsistent finite lives". Life would be impossible without such error, which is another name for partial truth or fragmentary appearance of reality.

Though appearance falsifies reality to a certain extent, there is a system, an order, in our experience in which appearances arise. Though the white colour and the sweet taste of sugar are both appearances, there is in our experience a uniform orderly connection between them. Our life would be impossible without such connections among experienced phenomena. But sometimes it happens that phenomena are found to lack such uniform connections;

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 486.

the expectations, we have about them from our past experiences, prove false; there is want of harmony, *within* our experience, between what we expect and what we find. Such cases are instances of illusion.

It is seen then that while error arises from defective relation between appearance and reality, illusion arises from defective relations existing between appearances themselves,—between one aspect of our experience and another. Whereas error, in being partial truth, serves the purpose of life, illusion is a source of danger to life, a source of pain, disappointment and shock.[1]

(2) *Joachim's view*

The neo-Hegelian theory of truth and error has been critically developed by Joachim in *The Nature of Truth* which has come to be received, by idealists as well as their critics, as the most competent exposition of the subject. As he himself admits he has been 'influenced by' Bradley and Bosanquet, and 'draws inspiration from the writings of Hegel'.[2] Joachim upholds like Bradley the notion of truth as systematic coherence after criticising two other alternative notions, namely truth as correspondence, and truth as a quality of independent entities. He does not think it worth while to criticize the pragmatic theory of truth, because, he thinks, it is not a 'theory of truth, but a denial of truth altogether'.[3]

(*i*) *Criticism of the correspondence theory*

Joachim shows that this theory implies two things. Wherever there is truth, (1) there must be two distinct factors "each a one-of-many" and "each constituent of the one stands in a *one-one relation* to a determinate constituent of the other" and (2) "there is 'truth' when this correspondence is '*for*' *a consciousness*".[4] A picture is a true picture of a man, when for every detail constituting the picture there is a corresponding feature in the man, and this correspondence is recognized by some mind. Without such a mind to recognize the one as the representative of the other, the question of truth and error does not arise at all. A judgment is true similarly, because corresponding to the ideas constituting it, there are facts, and that very mind which possesses the judgment recognizes its own judgment as being in conformity with reality.

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[1] For criticism of Bradley's theory of truth, see Russell's article on Truth in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1907, and Stout's in *Mind*, no. 65; and for reply see Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Chap. VII.

[2] *The Nature of Truth*, Preface, pp. 4-5.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 3-4.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 9 (our italics).

In criticism of this theory Joachim points out that the explanation of correspondence as one-one-relation between points of one complex factor and those of another proves unintelligible on deeper thought. One point or a simple component of a complex cannot correspond to that of another. One particular point on the *nose* of a picture can scarcely be said to resemble a point on the nose of the real man. The picture as a *whole* (or its parts as wholes) may be said to resemble the man, in so far as both have the same 'structural plan' or 'purpose'. And we can at best say about the simple parts of the two wholes, "the part X in A (the first whole) corresponds to the part Y in B (the second whole)".[1] This would only mean that "X fulfils in the inner systematization of A the same function as Y fulfils in that of B: *i.e.* what X is to A, that Y is to B".[2] "The parts of the one whole are materially different from the parts of the other; but the structure of the two wholes, the form or plan of *coherence* of their parts, is the same".[3]

It is found then that a picture or narrative or judgment is true in so far as its parts *co-here* in such a way as to reveal the plan or purpose of the original or the facts which it represents. Coherence of the different elements into a system conveys the plan or idea of the system represented, and is, therefore, seen to constitute truth. This *systematic coherence* is the real thing underlying correspondence which is uncritically held to be the essence of truth. Coherence, and not correspondence, as explained above, may at best be said to be "a symptom of truth", not its essence.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 10.

[2] *Loc. Cit.*

[3] *Ibid.* p. 15 (our italics).

But the inadequacy of the correspondence theory becomes more obvious when we consider the mental factor of recognition involved in truth. It is not mere point-to-point correspondence between two factors that constitutes truth of the one as representing the other. Some mind must recognize the one as embodying the same idea or plan as is contained in the other. The degree or nature of correspondence is quite immaterial. A few strokes of pencil may be recognized by a mind as the *true* picture of a man, inspite of scanty point-to-point correspondence. The letters 'c o w' may be recognized by an English-knowing person as a *true* symbol of the animal, though there is no point-to-point correspondence at all between the word and the animal. It depends not on the degree or nature of correspondence but on the interpretation of the recognizing mind whether one whole is taken as the true representation of another. The mind must first of all recognize each whole as one whole; and it cannot synthesize different elements into one whole unless it relates them together in the light of one *purpose*. Secondly, the mind must recognize the identity of purpose embodied by both the wholes. It is found then that truth does not lie ready-made only to be discovered by a disinterested mind; but that, on the contrary, "the mind sees what it makes by its interpretation: and the 'truth' of the corresponding factor varies in degree with the nature of the recognition which the mind brings to bear".[2]

It is found then that both the factors involved in truth depend more or less on the mind recognizing the truth. In discovering the identity of purpose or structure in the two factors, the mind only discovers that its ideas about the one are coherent with its ideas about the other. The truth of our judgments consists then in coherence among

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 17.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 16; *Vide* Royce, *The World and the Individual,* pp. 305-8. for a similar criticism of the correspondence notion.

two sets of ideas, rather than correspondence between mental and non-mental factors.

(ii) *Criticism of the theory that truth is a quality of independent entities*

This conclusion would be rejected by those realists who hold that knowledge of an object does not change the object. They assert that in sensation, "we are in direct contact with the Real. The Real is indeed 'given' to us, and it is also 'accepted'......the nature of the Real is in no way affected by its presence to the sentient consciousness".[1] In short, the subject and the object are related by a unique relation, which is external to both and does not change their natures.

This theory of knowledge is utilized for supporting both the theory of truth as correspondence, and the theory of truth as a quality of independent entities. The correspondence theory is supported thus:— As we can know in sensation reality, as it is, it is possible for us to compare our judgment about reality with reality itself, and find out if the judgment in the mind corresponds to or truly represents the reality grasped in sensation. If it does, then the judgment can be declared to be true.

The other theory of truth is thus based on the direct theory of perception:—Truth, asserts this other theory, does not lie in correspondence between ideas (judgment) and objects. It is a quality of propositions. Propositions alone can be true and false. A proposition is not a mental fact, but a logical fact independent of the mind. The mind apprehends, believes, disbelieves or doubts a proposition and passes judgment on it, but does not *make* it. Just as in sensation simple sense qualities are related to the mind without being affected or altered by such relation and we know thus a green colour or a round shape, similarly we can also directly apprehend a complex non-mental fact or a proposition like *a tree being green*, or *a coin being round*. Truth and falsity of such a proposition "is, so to say, its *flavour*, which we must *recognize*, if we *recognize* it at all, *immediately*; much as we appreciate the flavour of pineapple",[1] and not by comparing ideas and objects. Knowledge is the "appreciation" and error is the "misappreciation" of the flavours of such entities as propositions. In other words knowledge involves belief in true propositions, and error belief in false ones. Truth is then the quality of propositions which are entities independent of the mind, and it is directly known in perception which reveals these complex non-mental entities called propositions.

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[1] *The Nature of Truth*, p. 33.

Joachim shows that the externality of knowledge relation, the fundamental assumption on which the direct theory of perception and the two afore-said theories of truth are based, is itself untenable. We have already seen the grounds on which Joachim rejects the externalists' view, namely, that experience makes no difference to the facts experienced.[2] Knowledge, he shows on the contrary, cannot leave its object unchanged. If so then it is false to hold that sensation gives us a direct knowledge of Reality itself. So, the correspondence theory can no longer get any support. Nor can the other theory of truth stand. For, if truth were a quality of non-mental entities like propositions, we would not know truth as it is, since it would be changed in the process of being experienced; and if truth were not experienced it would remain wholly unknown, and nothing could be said about it.

(iii) The Coherence-notion

Refuting these two theories of truth, Joachim tries to strengthen again the notion of truth as coherence which emerged out of the previous criticism of the correspondence theory. He points out that no object can be experienced without being idealized or interpreted by the mind in the light of its concepts. Experience or knowledge is not, therefore, a relation between the mental and the non-mental. Both the factors in experience are spiritual. In knowledge 'spirit greets spirit' or 'mind recognizes itself'.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 87 (our italics).

[2] See *ante.* Relations.

[3] *Loc. Cit.* p. 68.

The question of truth is, therefore, not one of correspondence of the ideal to an utterly foreign or external factor, called the real; it is, on the other hand, one of coherence of two sets of ideas both of which fall within consciousness or an experience system. This experience, however, is not the possession of any particular person. It is a universal experience which includes all particular experiences. In short, Joachim, as an absolute idealist, holds that subjects and objects, ideas and facts all form parts of an absolute whole whose nature is spiritual. This Absolute is a self-realizing and self-fulfilling system. Coherence is the mark of this system in so far as this system is a *dynamic synthesis* or a unity that maintains itself by reconciling all its diverse moments or elements. Coherence as possessed by this Absolute system of experience is the ultimate nature of truth—it is truth *par excellence*, or the ideal truth.

This conception of truth is distinguished by Joachim from the ordinary view of truth as formal consistency which outwardly resembles it. Formal consistency is a kind of coherence, but it is a static form that relates some unalterable or fixed elements. But the systematic coherence, which Joachim calls truth, is essentially dynamic in nature. It can be said, of course, to be the form of the system of absolute experience. But it is a "form which through and through interpenetrates its materials ......And the form *is* only as the sustained process of self-fulfilment, wherein just these materials reveal themselves as constitutive moments of the coherence".[1] It is "the conception of truth as living and moving whole" as against the view of "fixed truths on which the structure of knowledge is built."[2] Truth is the "process of self-fulfilment" of "Ideal Experience"[3] or the Absolute. "It is not a movement playing between static elements, but the very substance of the moving elements".[4]

This "Ideal Truth" must be one as it can belong to 'Ideal Experience' alone. But the "Ideal Experience is everywhere and at all times; it is the partial possession of all finite beings, and they are the incomplete vehicles of it". Therefore, human experience also partially reflects the 'Ideal Truth' in different degrees.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 77. [2] *Loc. Cit.* [3] *Ibid.* p. 84. [4] *Ibid.* p. 77.

By analysing different human judgments which are regarded as true, Joachim shows that "their 'truth' *in the end* involves the Ideal which we described"[1] To understand the full significance and truth of my human judgment we have to refer it to the system of judgments which forms its background and makes it true; this system again cannot be fully understood without reference to a more inclusive system and so on; we are thus led by implication ultimately to an all-inclusive system of experience, which is self-complete, and self-fulfilled—the Ideal Experience. The truth of a human judgment cannot, therefore, be absolutely guaranteed unless it is ascertained to be coherent with the all-inclusive system of Ideal Experience. But this process of verification cannot be complete in finite time. All that can be done is to refer a particular judgment to more and more inclusive systems of judgments and realize its significance and coherence in the light of these greater and greater wholes. Human truth can, therefore, be realized to be only more and more true. There are thus degrees of such truth.

Critics of this conception of degrees point out that any judgment is either wholly true or wholly false; if the judgment is found to be consistent with a greater number of judgments its *truth* does not increase, but *belief* in the judgment increases.

Joachim's reply to such critics is that the truth of a judgment is dependent on its significance or meaning. When we say that a judgment is true we surely attach *some* meaning to the judgment, and think it to be true in *that* meaning. If the judgment remains the same in expression, but changes its meaning, it is not reasonable to say that the judgment has remained the same. Truth of the judgment also cannot be said to remain fixed when its meaning changes. The judgment, 'Caesar crossed the

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 85.

Rubicon' has some meaning for a school student; but it is very inadequate compared with the significance attached to it by a historian in the light of his vast knowledge; and it is, therefore, different too. It is wrong, therefore, to hold that the fact is true in the *same sense* for both. Truth cannot then be said to remain the same. The fuller the significance the greater the truth of the judgment accepted to be true.

Joachim admits, therefore, that there is no finality in human truth. He is also frank enough to admit that his own theory of truth cannot claim absolute truth. But it is at least "*as true as a theory can be*" and as a theory it at least goes deeper and "further into the heart of the problem".[1]

Consistently with his own theory of truth, Joachim describes error as a positive discordance within experience. It is not simply negative, not mere ignorance. Error is not mere want of knowledge, but it is a "determinate opinion in positive antagonism to the true".[2] Error consists in treating incomplete or partial experience as self-complete. It is "an insistent belief in the completeness" of partial knowledge.[3]

In human experience, "truth is everywhere confronted with falsehood, and error is the inseparable shadow of knowledge. The antagonism is vital to the nature of the conflicting contraries, and neither can be understood apart from the other".[4] As truth is the process by which experience unifies its diverse elements, error is the opposing or discordant element which it has to overcome and remove, to achieve harmony or coherence among these elements. Error, evil, etc., imply the existence of a negative element within experience—some refractory factor which creates an opposition within its bosom. In Ideal Experience in which harmony or coherence is fully realized this negative element must by fully overcome and the opposition must be fully resolved. But in finite experience the opposition is always manifest, in the dualism between subject and object, good and evil, truth and error, and it is never fully resolved. The correspondence theory of truth fails to explain error. According to it thinking is "the ideal representation of the real". But there is no real at all corresponding to false thinking. "Error is thinking the thing which is not. False thinking is thinking of nothing".[1] But this is absurd, if thinking must have some corresponding reality. *Either* then this theory has to admit some real counterpart corresponding even to false thinking (and then false thinking ceases to be false),[2] *or* it has to give up its basic assumption that thought is a copy of reality (and then the correspondence-notion breaks down). The theory of systematic coherence does not experience this difficulty, for as we have seen according to it truth is a living process of self-harmonizing experience and truth would be meaningless had there been no error to overcome, no conflicting elements to harmonize and render coherent.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 178. [2] *Ibid.* p. 124. [3] *Ibid.* p. 144. [4] *Ibid.* p. 122.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 127.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 129.

[3] For a critical estimate of the Coherence Theory, see Ewing. *Idealism.* Chap. V.

CHAPTER II

ITALIAN IDEALISM

1. Introduction

Two contemporary Italian idealists, Benedetto Croce[1] and Giovanni Gentile,[2] have distinguished themselves in present day philosophy as the advocates of what has sometimes been called New Idealism. This philosophy represents a branch of Hegelianism developed under indigenous Italian influence. It is regarded by some as the Hegelian left and contrasted with the right wing of Hegelianism represented by Bradley. While the latter conceives the Absolute as a self-complete system, relegates all change and development to the sphere of appearance and thus reduces the world into what their critics call a 'block universe', the former regards the Absolute as the dynamic spirit of which activity, change and development are the very essence. In its emphasis on the dynamic or active nature of the spirit the idealism of Croce and Gentile resembles Royce's idealism which also has been described by some[3] as a representative of the Hegelian left. But Italian idealism has developed the dynamic aspect of Hegel's philosophy along an original path which has been the chief source of its attraction and fame. The new elements in this idealism can be traced back to the thoughts of some earlier Italian thinkers like Vico, Spaventa, Sanctis. The stress that Croce and Gentile place on the philosophy of History and Art is the legacy of previous Italian thought. In fact their philosophy may be regarded as the solution of problems uppermost in the Italian mind in the Hegelian way. It is in this respect that the idealism of Croce and Gentile is the national philosophy of Italy as well as a kind of Hegelianism.

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[1] Born 1866. [2] Born 1875.

[3] Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy* (English trans. by Hannay & Collingwood), p. 282; for Croce being an anti-Hegelian, *vide* Douglas Ainslie's trans. of Aesthetic, p. xxi.

2. Croce

"The different tendencies visible in the history of Italian idealism", says Ruggiero, a contemporary Italian idealist writer, "are gathered up and brought into a single brilliant focus by the philosophy of Croce".[1] Vico's 'historical and aesthetic speculations', De Sancti's views of literary criticism, Spaventa's revival of the Hegelian idea of the creative activity of thought—all leave their stamp on the philosophy of Croce; yet his claim to originality remains unaffected.

Croce's originality is perhaps due to his unorthodox and novel approach to philosophy. He was neither primarily a student of philosophy, and nor ever a professional teacher of it. He distinguished himself as a literary man, a critic of art and an assiduous student of history. It is his deepening insight in art and history which gradually developed into a philosophy of his own and drew him within the arena of academic philosophic discussions.

(1) *The four grades of Spiritual Life*

Under idealistic influence the conviction grew in him that the mind or spirit is the absolute reality. /He imbibed Spaventa's belief in the creativity of mind. The so-called external objects are not really external to and independent of the mind; they are the mind's own creations. We cannot think or speak of anything other than our experience. Our mind can never go beyond itself. Hence the only reality that we know of is the mind. Philosophy which wants to study Reality should, therefore, be a study of mind. It does not mean, however, that philosophy should be identical with psychology or the *science* of mental phenomena. Sciences deal with abstract objects. For practical convenience, our mind makes objects by selecting certain aspects of concrete experience. Objects and the laws governing them are real only for practical purposes; they do not possess any absolute reality. Philosophy is not concerned with them but with concrete reality itself. Hence philosophy is different from science. While sciences deal with the different abstract and isolated aspects of experience or spiritual life, philosophy deals with that concrete life in all its fullness; it is, in this respect, truly the science of all sciences. Croce offers such a concrete theory of reality in the different parts of his great work, *Philosophy of Spirit* (*Filosofia dello spirito*).[1]

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[1] *Vide* his *Modern Philosophy*, English trans. p. 346.

The concrete reality of the spirit consists in its ceaseless activity. Spiritual activity is broadly divisible into two kinds, theoretical and practical. Knowing and willing are however very closely related because there cannot be any willing without knowing. Knowing again involves two kinds of activity, aesthetic and logical, *i.e.*, imagining (perceiving or intuiting) and judging (or conceiving). Willing also involves two kinds of activity, economic and ethical, *i.e.*, self-regarding and other-regarding. In all these two-fold divisions the relation existing between the two sub-classes is like that between knowing and willing, the second includes, implies and depends on the first but not conversely.

This four-fold gradual division of concrete mental activity (aesthetic. logical, economic, ethical) supply the themes which Croce discusses in the different parts of his *Philosophy of Spirit*. His philosophy is *anti-metaphysical*, in the sense that it does not admit the possibility of metaphysics which is commonly conceived as a science of reality behind phenomena, and beyond experience. This is but the natural conclusion of his view, already stated, namely that there is no reality beyond our mind; and there is, therefore, nothing transcendental or transphenomenal which can form the subject matter of metaphysics. The method of philosophy is immanent; it is investigation into the different concrete activities of the mind, and the understanding of their inter-relations—all of which fall *within* the mind itself and nothing *beyond* it.

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[1] Translated in part into English by Douglas Ainslie.

The events of history are all manifestations of spiritual activity; every historical incident is a spiritual phenomenon there being no other reality except the spirit. Philosophy, as a study of all concrete spiritual activity, must take into consideration then all historical phenomena and understand their deeper spiritual significance. True philosophy thus becomes identical with genuine history. True history again is not a mere chronicle of events, but judgment on events; and as all events are really spiritual, all genuine history must be interpretation of spiritual life and thus must be one with philosophy. This conclusion, that *philosophy is history* and *history is philosophy*, bears the evident mark of Hegelian influence on Croce. For Hegel too, as we know, reality is rational, and the historical is identical with the logical or the spiritual. But this position is also perhaps the outcome of the fact that Croce himself approached philosophy through historical research.

The history of spiritual life according to Croce does not signify merely the *succession* of spiritual activities. Every present fact of spiritual life contains its entire past; progress takes place not by succession but greater and greater inclusion. "Every fact which is subsequent contains within it that which is precedent, as the precedent also contains virtually the subsequent being what it is by virtue of producing it".[1]

With this idea Croce tries to understand the interrelations among the four spiritual activities already mentioned. Knowledge issues forth into action for which it exists; willing is the completion of knowledge; thus willing does not simply succeed knowledge, but contains it as one of its constituent elements. Willing is, therefore, a higher grade or degree of spiritual activity being fuller and more concrete as compared with knowing. Willing implies, or depends on, knowing; but the converse is not true. Within knowing itself, again, the same relation holds between two kinds of activities—aesthetic intuition and logical judgment. Intuition of the particular is completed in, and therefore also contained in, judgment which universalizes the particular. Judgment is thus a higher grade of mental activity compared with intuition. Similarly are the two kinds of volition, economic and ethical, related in mental life. Economic action, actuated by individual ends, is included and completed in ethical action which is actuated by universal ends. The second, in every case, depends for its existence on the first; but the second marks a higher degree or grade of spiritual activity. This theory of the inter-relation among different spiritual activities in Croce's philosophy is known as the *theory of grades*. Each of the four kinds of spiritual activity is called a *moment*. We are now in a position to discuss more fully the four moments of spiritual life.

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[1] Wildon Carr., *The Philosophy of Croce*, p. 18 (and Croce, *Logica*, p. 55).

(2) *Intuition and aesthetic activity*

Croce points out: "Knowledge has two forms. It is either *intuitive* knowledge or *logical* knowledge; knowledge we acquire by imagination or knowledge we acquire by intellect; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal; knowledge is, in short, either productive of images or productive of concepts".[1]

Intuition is then the knowledge of the individual acquired by creative or productive (not reproductive) imagination. It is the first grade of mental activity on which all the other three moments are based. The distinguishing character of intuition is *expression*, is shaping or imparting *form* to all dumb animal feelings in man. It is, therefore, also distinctively human, "our whole real patrimony".[2]

When intuition is so described and also contrasted with intellection, one feels curious to know how it is related to the more common concept of sensation. Is intuition the same as sensation which, according to Kant and others, is developed by the intellect with its logical concepts into knowledge proper? Croce would reply that intuition is the expression of sensation in images; it is the activity which imparts form to sensation. Both sensation and intuition are non-intellectual, free from the logical activity of the intellect. Intuition of Croce, as sensation of common thinkers, supplies the matter on which intellect works. But sensation unexpressed, devoid of an individual form, is below intuition. When sensation is presented to the mind in some form, it is intuition. Sensation can be regarded, therefore, as the inarticulate *matter* to which intuition imparts form. As Croce clearly points out: "The intuition or presentation is distinguished from the sensitive flux or wave, from what we merely feel and experience, from psychical matter, as form. And this form, this taking into possession, is the expression. Intuition is expression; and it is nothing else, nothing more, and also nothing less."[1]

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[1] *Estetica*, p. 3 (trans. by W. Carr in *Phil. of Croce*, p. 59).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 14 (*vide Carr*, *op. cit.* p. 69).

The question, therefore, would arise wherefrom does sensation, the matter of intuition, come? Does Croce believe, like Kant, in any extra-mental thing-in-itself from which sensations arise? Croce sometimes speaks of sensation as "passive, natural fact",[2] as "animal nature", remaining "as yet outside the mind",[3] such language would suggest that Croce, like Kant, is at least partly a realist. But this doubt is removed when we find him very emphatically asserting that the matter of intuition, apart from its form, is only an abstraction made for the convenience of description. Croce makes the 'explicit declaration' that, "matter does not really exist, but is posited for the convenience of exposition".[4]

Intuition then is mind's creative activity which expresses and objectifies our sensations, as well as 'impressions', 'feelings', 'impulses', 'emotions' and all other inarticulate facts born of our animal nature. Intuition produces objects because it enjoys them. No distinctions of real and unreal, objective and subjective, exist at this primary grade or level of mental activity—these distinctions are made on the next higher level when the products of intuition are subjected to logical judgment. Croce, therefore, says, "The intuition is the undifferentiated unity of perception of the *real* and of the simple image of the possible. In intuition we *do not oppose ourselves* as empirical beings to the external reality, but *objectify* without addition our impressions such as they are."[1]

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[1] *Estetica*, p. 14 (Op. Cit. p. 70).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 11 (Op. Cit. p. 66)
[3] *Ibid.* p. 14 (*Op. Cit* p. 69).
[4] W. Carr., *Op. Cit.* p. 75.

It is on intuition, thus described, that art is based according to Croce. Pure intuition and aesthetic activity are identical. For, beauty, says Croce, is expression, and "Every true intuition is at the same time expression. Whatever is not objectified in an expression is not intuition, it is not an image or presentation, but sensation and animal nature".[2] The artist fixes, and externally translates into colour, shape, music or language the products of such pure intuition, and we thus have 'The impressions of moonlight portrayed by a painter', 'The outline of a landscape sketched by a map-maker', 'A musical theme', 'The words of interrogation, of command, of lament'.[3]

The external representation of the intuition made by the artist is not, however, the real art. It is only an execution, a kind of volition. Real art is internal, purely mental; it is the successful expression that intuition gives to our impressions, feelings etc. The artist says what has already been said within, sings what has been really sung within, he externalizes what has been inwardly intuited. Expression, the essence of art, is really *mental,* and it should not be confused with the act of externalization which is also unfortunately called expression. "The terminology", says Croce, "is unfortunate because the work of *art is always and only internal,* and what is external is no longer the work of art."[4]

Beauty, which is expression, truly belongs, therefore, to the mental intuition, and the external work of art can be called beautiful only metaphorically—by a transference of epithet from the symbolized to the symbol.

This view of Croce has come to be known as the *expressionist theory of art,* and it is one of the chief sources of his fame. He draws his inspiration from an earlier Italian philosopher, Vico. To understand Croce's view it will be convenient to compare and contrast it with that of Kant. Croce gratefully admits that Kant has thrown much light on the problem of aesthetic judgment; Kant's special service has been in securing for aesthetics a philosophical status, and in recognizing the aesthetic faculty as different from the intellectual and the moral. But Croce differs from Kant on important points. Kant defines "a work of art as the adequate representation of a concept. in which intellect and imagination are combined in the genius of the artist". We find then that Kant, though distinguishing the aesthetic from the intellectual, retains an element of intellectualism. Croce emphatically differs from Kant in holding that art is not at all concerned with any universal, like the concept, on the other hand it is the expression of the individual, the particular object. lighted up by intuition, or creative imagination, untouched by the intellect's universalizing logical activity. Neither does Croce like Kant's mystical attitude towards beauty, as 'symbol of moral good', or as a non-intellectual intimation of the transcendent unreached by thought. But the most important point of difference is that while Kant places the aesthetic faculty very high among spiritual activities, even beyond the intellectual and the moral, and while even Hegel places Art among the highest triad of his dialectic, along with Religion and Philosophy, Croce seeks for the foundation of art in intuition, the lowest, rather the most primary, activity of the human mind.

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[1] *Estetica* p. 6 (*Op. Cit.* p. 62 our italics).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 11 (*Op. Cit.* pp. 66-7). [3] Carr. *Op. Cit.* p. 60.
[4] *Estetica* p. 58 (*Op. Cit.* p. 163, our italics).

But the placing of art at the simplest and lowest grade of spiritual activity, does not affect the dignity of art at all. "In being thus simple, naked, and poor lies the force of art . . . Art, which creates the first presentations and inaugurates the life of knowledge, also continually keeps fresh in our mind the aspects of things which thought has submitted to reflexion and intellect to abstraction, and so for ever is making us become poets again. Without it, thinking would lack its stimulus and the very material of its mysterious and critical work. It is the root of our whole theoretical life. To be the root and not the flower or fruit is its special function. Without root there can be neither flower nor fruit.'"[1]

We may point out that Croce's theory of art as expression, explains among other things, the question how there can be beauty in a work of art that contains the tragic, pathetic, melancholy and even the disgusting aspects of life. If beauty be conceived as it ordinarily is, it would be inexplicable how such work can contain beauty. Conceived as expression, we can easily see how, beauty can lie even here. The art of the artist lies in *expressing* successfully in his different intuitions the different aspects of spiritual life, which is but reality, and only secondarily in his ability to fix them on external material, paper, marble, colour, sound etc. The aspects of spiritual life depicted are immaterial. Beauty consists in their *expression*, not in the matter expressed, be it tragic or comic or of any other kind.

(3) *Conceptual knowledge*

The second moment of spiritual activity is knowledge through logical concept. The first moment is invariably included in the second in the concrete life of the spirit; but the two can be distinguished and hence they are distinct as well. Just as sensation is matter to intuition, intuition is the matter on which logical thought works. The individual objects produced by intuition are interrelated and interpreted by universal logical concepts, and converted into judgment and knowledge proper. Croce states it thus: "What is knowledge by concepts? It is knowledge of the relations of things and the things are intuitions. Without intuitions concepts are not possible, just as without the matter of impressions intuition itself is not possible".[2] While intuitions are particular, concepts are universal. "This river, this lake, this brook, this glass of water, this rain, are intuitions, the concept is water, not this or that appearance or particular instance, but water in general, in whatever circumstances of place or time it is realised, the matter of infinite intuitions, but of one constant concept only".[2]

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[1] *Problemi de Estetica*, p. 15 (trans. W. Carr. on pp. 55-6, *Op. Cit.*).

[2] *Estetica*, p. 27 (*Op. Cit.* p. 31).

As for Kant, so for Croce, intuitions or percepts without concepts are blind, they do not yield complete knowledge; whereas concepts without percepts are empty, are not even knowable as concepts. Concepts form the subject-matter of Logic, just as intuitions do of Aesthetic.

Croce makes an important distinction, however, between pure or *a priori* concepts and pseudo-concepts. Pure concepts are those universal categories, which are not derived from intuition, but which apply to all intuitions as we have them and universalize the intuitions. A pure concept, says Croce, is "the universal in regard to what is individual in the presentations, it must refer at once to all individuals, and also to each individual".[1] Water, house, tree are not true concepts because each can apply to *some* not *all* intuitions (*i.e.*, objects intuited). Such concepts are convenient symbols that we make for referring to particular groups of intuitions; and they are really *a posteriori*, derived from intuitions, not *prior* to them. Again, triangle, free movement etc., are not pure concepts, because they are too abstract to apply to any concrete intuition; no figure perceived actually is a perfect triangle, and no free movement, unhampered by obstacles, can anywhere be perceived in the world.

Pure concepts should be both universal and concrete, they must *apply* or be true of *every concrete* intuition. Moreover they must be, like intuitions, expressive, *i.e.*, must yield *knowledge*. As examples of these, Croce cites the "concepts of quality, evolution, beauty, finality".[2] He points out we cannot have *any* intuition which lacks quality, does not evolve and change but remains immobile, does not possess expression or beauty, and does not have any purpose to fulfil.

Another way of distinguishing pure concepts from ficticious ones is that the pure ones extend our knowledge, give new knowledge. Combined with intuitions they produce the world, the objects of our knowledge. But pseudo-concepts do not yield any new knowledge. The concept of water is a mere short-hand that reminds us of the intuitions of water we already had. In fact it has been derived from such intuitions by abstraction of common characters. Pseudo-concepts possess only practical value.

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[1] *Logica*, p. 16 (*Op. Cit.* p. 83).

[2] *Ibid.*

Sciences deal with such pseudo-concepts, and with their help classify and label the different aspects of our intuitions or experiences. Their value lies then in practical utility. But true philosophy deals with pure concepts. *Philosophy in this sense is identical with logic*, the knowledge of pure concepts. In the light of the history of philosophy Croce shows how the greatest philosophers of the world extended human knowledge by the discovery of pure concepts, of some kind or another. Socrates discovered the concept of 'concept' itself as the basis of all knowledge. Kant discovered the concept of '*a priori* synthesis' (synthesis of intuition by categories) as the basis, again, of all judgments. Hegel discovered the concept of 'dialectic movement' underlying all activities of thought.

Knowledge, we have already seen, is the unity of the two distinct but inseparable grades of spiritual activity—intuition and conception. Expression is the common form of both these grades, though the second is something more, being universal. For Croce intuition too deep for expression, and conception too deep for language are, therefore, mere myths.

(4) *Practical activity, economic and moral*

Expression or knowledge is not however the end of spiritual life, it is an instrument to practical activity. Just as intuition is incomplete without concept, knowledge as a whole is also incomplete without volition. Knowledge and Action are the two complementary arcs of the circle of life. There is constant swinging of life from knowledge to will, and from will back to knowledge. The ceaseless progress of life is thus kept up. "Knowledge serves life and life serves knowledge. The contemplative life, if it is not to become idle stupidity, must complete itself in the active, and the active life, if it is not to become irrational and sterile tumult, must complete itself in the contemplative."[1]

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[1] *Practica*, p. 207 (*Op. Cit.* pp. 109-10).

Now, "*every volition is an action and every action a volition*"[1]. Just as there is no knowledge without expression there is no will without external manifestation in action or movement. Emphasizing the identity of volition and movement, Croce asserts, "The volition is not followed by movements of the legs and arms, these movements are themselves the volition. For the physicist the movements are material and extrinsic. for the philosopher they are mental".[2] "Not one single volitional fact", he further asserts, "can be indicated which is not also what we call a physical movement . . . Every volition, however small it be, is already putting the organism in movement"[2] "On the other hand, it is impossible to bring forward any instances of actions without volitions. Instinctive acts, and habits become instinctive, are adduced, but even these require volition to put them in motion, not, it may be, in the particular movements one by one, but as a whole, just as one hand may set going the most complicated machine which a thousand hands were required to construct. Neither, then, is volition ever without action, nor action without volition, as intuition is never without expression, nor expression without intuition"[3] It is not quite clear what Croce means in the above passage when he says that even instinctive actions originate in volition. Perhaps he means that some kind of will, like the will to live, must be supposed at the root of all so-called non-voluntary action. But whatever the argument, his conclusion is clear that will and action are completely identical.

As Croce identifies reality with spirit, all movements in nature are also volitions. Mere physical movement is, as we have seen, an abstraction, just as nature is. It is true, objects of nature seem often to resist our will. I may will in vain to push aside a rock on the way. But such experience does not prove the existence of any non-mental reality, nor the existence of any unrealized will. The rock that seems to resist my will, is itself the creation of the mind and would not exist but for mental activity. The resisted and the resister are both equally mental. It is quite thinkable that within the mind as will two opposing tendencies may exist. "In the will to do", says Croce, "is also included, in its scientific use, what is commonly called not-doing; that is to say, the will to resist."[1]

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[1] *Practica*, p. 52 (*Op. Cit.* p. 105). [2] *Ibid.* p. 53 (*Op. Cit.* p. 105).
[3] *Ibid.* (*Op. Cit.* pp. 105-6).

There are two forms of volition, as we already have seen, constituting the *two grades of practical activity.* The will first of all produces changes in objects posited by knowledge with a view to satisfy the individual's needs, and it makes the survival of the individual possible. It changes and utilizes all materials known to promote the individual's interest. This form of activity is called economic or utilitarian action. Pleasure born of satisfaction of wants and desires results from economic action. Economic adjustment, utility, pleasure all relate then to action of this first grade. But the "individuals who at first appear merely economic are on closer inspection found to be also moral and those who appear as purely moral are economic also, and the same is true of institutions".[2] Individuals live in families and society and their own interests coincide with interests of others. They cannot be *fully* satisfied unless their actions are also good for others. No individual can exist by himself apart from others; even for his own existence, therefore, it is necessary that his actions while conducing to the satisfaction of his own needs should also conduce to the universal good. As intuition finds its completion in concept, so economic action is perfected in the second grade of action called moral, or ethical, action,—that is to say, action performed for universal ends. But no action can be performed by an individual if it is good only for others. Even in the greatest act of self-sacrifice, there is involved satisfaction of the individual's own longing as is proved by the *pleasure* he derives from the act. Ethical action, therefore, depends on economic action; the motive behind it is only an universalized form of the private motive.

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[1] *Estetica* (*Op. Cit.* p. 103). [2] *Practica* (*Op. Cit.* p. 113).

The individual as individual seeks pleasure, but as a man he seeks what is good for all. In the performance of a moral action, the individual is satisfied as a man. The end of moral activity is "individual and universal in one." Complete satisfaction cannot be attained unless we know "how to insert the eternal in the contingent, the universal in the individual, duty in desire. It is only then we acquire internal peace, which is not in the future but in the present because in the present moment is eternity for whoever knows how to find refuge therein."

In this reconciliation between pleasure and good Croce is evidently more of a Hegelian, than a Kantian. While Kant believes that a good action should be completely disinterested, and that pleasure cannot be united with moral action here on earth, Croce asserts that unless a moral action brings pleasure it is not completely moral and that the union of pleasure and good is possible here. "A good action," he says, "in so far as it is good, always brings satisfaction and pleasure. If it be accompanied by pain it can only be that the good action is not yet wholly good, either because not willed with full inward accord, or else because, besides the moral action, which itself is pleasing, there is a new practical problem yet unsolved and therefore painful".[2] Reconciliation of the pleasant and the good, the economical and the moral, is possible because the individual is included within the universal and can identify itself with the whole. "Morality triumphs over interests only because it is itself the supreme interest".[3]

(3) *The unity of distincts*

The four moments of spiritual life described above reveal the unity of distincts not the unity of opposites. Knowing and the good, the economical and the moral, is possible higher grade depends on knowing. Similar also is the relation between intuition and conception, as well as that between economic and ethical action. We find that the dialectic of spiritual life underlying Croce's conception of four moments

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[1] *Practica* (*Op. Cit.* p. 116). [2] *Ibid.* (*Op. Cit.* p. 133).
[3] *Ibid.* (*Op. Cit.* p. 127).

is different from the Hegelian dialectic, which proceeds from a thesis to its opposite the antithesis, reaching in the third moment the synthesis of two opposites. The new synthesis is again made a thesis, initiating another triad and so on. Instead of this triple rhythm of Hegel we have in Croce the two-fold degree, the second degree depending on, and not opposing the first.

In his treatise, *What is living and what is dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, Croce points out that what is of value in Hegel is his discovery of the dialectic of the synthesis of opposites. But what is objectionable is his abuse of the method by its illegitimate extension to the concepts which are not opposites, but really distincts. He shows, for example, that being and nothing are real opposites and the synthesis of the two in Becoming, as shown by the Hegelian dialectic, is also quite valid. But all the triads of Hegel do not contain such real opposites. The highest triad of Art, Religion and Philosophy, for example, does not really illustrate the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. Art is not an antithesis of religion; nor philosophy their synthesis. We have here distincts not opposites; and the Hegelian dialectic is really a misapplication here.

But though denying the applicability of the dialectic of opposites to the four moments of spiritual activity, Croce recognizes the great value of the Hegelian dialectic in understanding the real significance of each of these distinct moments. Concrete beauty cannot be understood except in relation to its antithesis, ugliness. The aesthetic activity can flourish only by overcoming ugliness. Ugliness is then an element in the concrete conception of beauty. Concrete beauty is a synthesis of the two opposites, abstract beauty (beauty conceived without reference to ugliness) and ugliness. Similarly truth in the concrete, flourishes by overcoming the two opposites, abstract truth (without reference to error) and error. Truth as the concrete ideal of logical activity is reached only by overcoming error. Similarly, too, we can understand utility in the concrete, as a synthesis of the opposites, abstract utility and useless-ness: and can understand concrete goodness as the synthesis of the two opposites, abstract goodness and evil. What is living in Hegel is this light shed by his dialectic on concepts which are really synthesis of opposites. But this dialectic of Hegel fails to throw any light on the understanding of the mental relations among the different degrees of spiritual reality,—intuition, knowledge, economic and moral action (or beauty, truth, utility, good). In this respect it is dead. Croce's theory of unity of distincts supplies the principle in the light of which the relations among distincts can be grasped. This constitutes his improvement on the Hegelian dialectic.

(6) *Subjectivism or Absolute Idealism?*

The idealism of Croce is based on the initial assumption that we cannot go beyond our experience. The natural logical conclusion would be solipsism. But we have found that Croce is not a solipsist. The distinction between intuition and conception, as also between economic and ethical action, he bases on the distinction between the individual and the universal. In attaining truth and in being moral an individual ceases to be a mere individual; his experience and action are universalized in these second grades. Obviously then Croce's idealism rises beyond solipsism to be some type of absolute idealism.

The problem, therefore, arises, how can the Absolute be said to be wholly immanent in, and accessible through the immediate experience of the individual? Hegel and most other Hegelians, we have seen, reach the Absolute through the logical implication of the immediate, and by transcending the experience of the finite individual. For Croce the Absolute is wholly immanent in the present experience; transcendence is a meaningless concept. The reconciliation of the immanent and the absolute, the individual and the universal, is however a difficult problem which is more raised than solved in his philosophy. The solution of this problem is the chief work of Gentile to whom we shall next turn.

Meanwhile we may note a few more points on which Croce seems to differ from Hegel. The absolutism of Croce is not the pan-logism of Hegel, it is rather pan-activism. Logical thought, we have seen, is only *one* of the four moments of the spirit, the fundamental essence of which is not reason but activity. Croce does not, therefore, think like Hegel that Philosophy is the highest form of spiritual activity. The four forms of spiritual activity retain their distinctive individualities, and the one does not, as we saw, flourish by opposing and cancelling the other. Art, Philosophy, Economics, Ethics are distinct; none of these can replace the other. Here we have the pluralistic note of Crocian philosophy which bears a contrast to the monistic tendency of Hegel according to whom the higher categories flourish by transcending and sublating the lower ones, retaining them only as cancelled. Gentile, we shall find, prefers to go back to Hegel, replacing the Crocian idea of the four-fold form of spirit by the unity of spiritual act.

3. *Gentile*

Gentile's relation to Croce is in many respects like that of Bosanquet to Bradley. He develops his philosophy in close agreement and friendship with Croce. He shares Croce's activistic idealism, his emphasis on the identity of history and philosophy, and on the concrete and immanent nature of reality. Where he differs from Croce, Gentile does little more than elaborate, deepen and render logically consistent the basic tenets of Crocian philosophy. And in doing so he often harks back to Hegel, and sometimes to Kant.

(1) *The theory of mind as pure act*

This is the title[1] of one of his most important books and it sums up as well the gist and generating insight of his philosophy. Croce's conception of spiritual activity is endowed by him with a higher degree of inwardness; that is the real point of Gentile's originality. He points out[2] that it is quite possible to be an idealist and yet skim on the surface and fail to understand the real depth of spiritual activity. Berkeley, for example, tries to reduce objects to ideas of the self. But the self's thinking, according to him, is conditioned by God (instead of nature). Inspite of realizing the truth that objects exist in so far as they are thought, he misses thus the full importance of human thought as the ultimate, unconditioned reality. The self is reduced to the position of an object of God's thought and is not a pure subject. Kant shows a greater insight by distinguishing between the empirical and the transcendental ego, and making the latter the condition of all knowledge. His special credit lies in thinking of the transcendental ego in terms of activity, rather than substance. The transcendental ego is the transcendental act, the '*I think*' which must accompany all empirical judgments. But "he fails to grasp firmly his own sound principle".[1] For he also retains his belief in noumenon as another condition without which thought cannot arise. The activity of the transcendental ego is not, therefore, absolute and unconditioned.

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[1] English trans. by H. Wildon Carr (Macmillan).

[2] *Ibid.* Chap. I.

If the Kantian idea of the transcendental ego is seriously grasped, it is found that the mind or ego as the presupposition of all knowledge must be an ultimate, original, absolute act which cannot itself be objectified. The subject that is distinguished from the object and thus known is really an object. In self-consciousness we have a clue to the real nature of mind that transcends objectivity. We are here aware of the subject, and the object, but that which knows both must be other than subject and object, which are both objects to it, and which must therefore transcend both the objectified subject and the objectified object. The real transcendental ego is, therefore, this ultimate mental act, which is never objectified; it is the mind as pure act. The real subject must, therefore, be distinguished from the so-called subject which flourishes by contrast and opposition to an object and which is therefore a conditioned thing.

That which has been objectified becomes a thing, an accomplished fact. Gentile lays the greatest possible emphasis on the distinction between act and fact, the process and the product. A fact is, but an act *becomes.* Reality or mind truly conceived is a process, is an act, is *becoming;* it is not a fact accomplished or substance or thing or finished event.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 99.

(2) *Relation to previous idealists*

On this distinction is also based the distinction of Gentile's spiritualism from some older types. "Mind according to our theory", says Gentile, "is act or process *not substance.* It is very different therefore from the concept of mind in the old spiritualistic doctrine. That theory, in *opposing* mind to matter, materialized mind. It declared it to be substance, by which it meant that it was the subject of an activity of which it was independent, an activity therefore which it could realize or *not* realize without thereby losing or gaining its own being. In our view mind has no existence apart from its manifestations; for these manifestations are according to us its own inward and essential realization. We can also say of our mind that it is our experience, so long as we do not fall into the common error, due to faulty interpretation, of meaning by experience, the *content* of experience. By experience we must mean the *act* of *experiencing,* pure experience, that which is living and real".[1]

It should be noted that Gentile makes no distinction between theoretical and practical activity; "the mind is never properly the pure theoretical activity which we imagine to stand in opposition to the practical activity. There is no theory, no contemplation of reality, which is not at the same time action and therefore a creation of reality".[2]

"If then we would know the essence of mind's transcendental activity we must not present it as spectator and spectacle, the mind as an object of experience, the subject an outside on-looker. In so far as consciousness is an object of consciousness, it is no longer consciousness . . . Strictly speaking it is no longer a subject, but an object;

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 20 (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 33 (our italics).

no longer an ego, but a non-ego''.[1] The reality of thinking lies in its being an act in the doing, *not* in its being fact or an act done. ''This act we can never absolutely transcend since it is our very subjectivity, that is our own self; an act therefore which we can never in any possible manner objectify''.[1]

The true thinking activity cannot be defined; because it is ''what is defining'' and remains beyond everything defined as ''the subject for which it is defined as an object''.[2]

Kant's transcendental idealism makes, of course, the bold attempt to establish the reality of the transcendental principle of the mind as the presupposition of every knowledge. But as we have seen he fails to show that the transcendental principle is the only and all-sufficient *creative* principle in knowledge and reality. Hegel grasps the idea of the *creative* power of thought and makes the attempt to deduce everything from thought by the dialectic method. But when applying these sound principles to the actual deduction of categories of reality, he also falls into the usual pitfall of abstraction. The categories of being, non-being and becoming, for example, are conceived by him not as concrete moments of creative thinking which develops and realizes itself by positing, opposing and synthesizing its activities—but as 'abstract', 'immobile', dead concepts. These categories of Hegel are not really thinking itself but 'thinking thought' and objectified by abstraction, and sundered from the moving activity of thinking. The student of Hegel is puzzled, therefore, how these immobile concepts, devoid of the power of dialectical development can by themselves "pass one into another and be unified in a real continuous logical movement"[3]

The same objection arises also against the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle. In explaining the evolution of things out of reality they also conceived reality as object thought and not as the thinking act.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 6.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 7.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 54.

(3) *His dialectic*

The dialectic which Gentile conceives and describes as the dialectic of 'modern idealist philosophy' is based on the notion of reality as thinking, not as thought or object of thought. With the help of this method he tries to show the evolution of all subjects and objects out of mind. The mind is the developing process; it is neither to be conceived as the beginning nor as the end of the world; for both these conceptions would make mind confined to a fixed moment, make it a static event—an object rather than mind.

But the true idea of development which is the nature of mind, is not to be confused with the ordinary idea of development, that is a mere succession of states. We can speak of real development only when there is unity in multiplicity. "The plant lives and grows not only in so far as there is a succession of different states, but in so far as there is the unity of all its states beginning with the germ".[1]

But it is quite possible to miss the real significance of development even after it has been described as a process involving unity and multiplicity. Some may think of it as a process by which that which is originally one becomes many. This is, for example, the idea of development with the vitalists who try to explain different phenomena as the product of a unitary principle of life. Some, on the contrary, may think of development as the process by which the many are organized into one—this is, for instance, the error of the mechanists who try to explain the genesis of life out of the combination of different factors. Gentile points out that both these are absurd. The many cannot be thought to come out of the one, devoid of plurality, nor can the one be conceived to come out of the many, devoid of unity. The mind as pure act can be conceived as the ground of the world of multiplicity, because as a pure act it is always a unity in multiplicity.

Gentile's conception of the relation between unity and multiplicity, involved in mental development, is *concrete*, and not abstract. It is conception of 'unity as multiplicity' and 'multiplicity as unity'; "it shows in multiplicity the reality, the life of the unity. This life just because it never is but always becomes, forms itself".[1] "Multiplicity is necessary to the very concreteness, to the very dialectical reality of the unity. Its infinity which is the essential attribute of the unity is not denied by its multiplicity but is confirmed by it. Infinity is realized through the multiplicity, for the multiplicity is nothing but the unfolding which is the actualizing of the reality".[2] Explaining further the dialectic process of mind which develops the world of multiplicity, he says, "The dialectical concept of mind, then, not only does not exclude, it requires spiritual multiplicity as the essential mark of the concept of the infinite unity of mind. Infinite unity is therefore infinite unification of the multiple as it is infinite multiplication of the one".[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 38.

Such then is the conception of mind, as unity in multiplicity and the dialectic process by which according to Gentile, everything that is, is the creation of mind.

In spite of Gentile's statement, in defence, that his conception of unity does not cancel multiplicity, we should note that his position still remains distinct from Croce's. For, the monistic tendency is more pronounced in Gentile's attempt to derive all concepts from the self-concept, than in Croce's theory of unity of distinct concepts. While Gentile subordinates multiplicity to the unity of the mental act, Croce's attempt is to emphasize distinctness and multiplicity of the concepts inspite of their unity. The real view of Gentile emerges not so clearly in his defensive declarations as in his positive expositions, like the following: " . . . . since the unity is of the subject who conceives the concept, the multiplicity of the concepts of things can be no more than the superficial shell of the nut whose kernel is one concept only, the concept of the subject-centre of all things. So that the true concept, that which alone has a right to be called *the* concept, is the self-concept (*conceptus sui*)".[4]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 39. [2-3] *Ibid.* p. 40. [4] *Ibid.* p. 242.

(4) *Mind the only explaining principle*

But while granting the *possibility* of explaining the world by the creative activity of the mind one may want still more convincing arguments to show that this is the only satisfactory explaining principle.

To remove such doubts Gentile would point out that mind, as described, is the only principle which is presupposed as the subject of everything which we can think or speak of. Even the conception of unknown things, or ignorance, would be impossible unless we related them to some consciousness by which it is known as unknown.[1]

"When we present the concept of our consciousness to ourselves we can only conceive it as a sphere whose radius is infinite. Because, whatever effort we make to think or imagine other things or other consciousnesses outside our own consciousness, these things or consciousnesses remain within it, precisely because they are posited by us, even though posited as external to us."[2]

Mind is the only explaining principle, then, because it is the infinite, all-inclusive, and *therefore*, the *only* reality; "we never come to our thought's margin, we never come up against something other than thought"; we are "never able even to refer to an object which is external to it", never able therefore even to conceive mind as "a real among reals, as a part only of the reality".

A misconception that is possible here is to mistake this position of Gentile as a return to subjective idealism. But this confusion should not arise if it be remembered that the mind which is identified here with absolute reality is not the empirical self, but the transcendental ego, the 'I think' or mind as pure act which transcends both empirical selves and their objects. When we are contrasting ourselves as subjects with objects, when we are distinguishing our selves from one another, and limiting them "we are regarding our empirical selves, not the transcendental self which alone is the true subject of our experience and therefore the only true self".[4]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 28-9, and p. 238.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 28.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 30.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 32.

The apparent contradiction in the statement that even what is unknown is known, and what is without is within, ceases when we realize this distinction between the empirical self and the true, transcendental self. The object that is unknown to the empirical self is known to the transcendental self as unknown.

(5) *The relation between the empirical and the transcendental*

The inseparable relation between the empirical and the transcendental should not however be lost sight of. Unless the universal or transcendental mind were present in the empirical, *we* could not *know* the *unknown* as unknown. The transcendental self lives in the empirical. "The absolute 'I' is the 'I' which each of us realizes in every pulsation of our spiritual existence. It is the I which thinks and feels, the I which fears and hopes, the I which wills and works and which has responsibility, rights, and duties, and constitutes to each of us the pivot of his world. This pivot, when we reflect on it, we find to be one for all, if we seek and find the all where alone it is, within us, our own reality".[1]

In this way Gentile tries to solve the relation of the universal and the particular. The universal is universal not because it is not the particular, but because it is the particular and a good deal more. Its universality lies in its dynamic unity, its activity producing and unifying the multiple, the 'infinite off-spring'. It is transcendental only because it is not simply immanent; it also remains beyond each particular by making it the object of thought. Here we have in another form the Hegelian notion of concrete universal or true individual on which so much stress is laid by Bosanquet and Royce.

(6) *Denial of agnosticism*

As the absolute is immanent in all particular experiences, the charge of agnosticism does not stand against Gentile. The absolute is present in all experience, *not*, of course as the *object* of knowledge, but as the ultimate *subject*. In the act of "thinking we are conscious of what thinks, just as in seeing we are conscious of what sees".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 274.

We grasp the absolute act even in "our ordinary life so long as we enjoy a certain feeling of life"[2] It is known subjectively, enjoyingly, not by being objectified.

Should any one object that knowledge must always be of an *object*, and what is not an object is unknown, Gentile would point out that quite reverse is really the case. Even an object is known in so far as it is "something immediately identical with our own spiritual activity". "To know is to identify, to overcome otherness",[4] it is to dissolve the objectivity of the object into the activity of the mind. This identity of the subject and object is possible because both of these are posited by, and rooted in, the same ultimate reality—the creative mind.

That knowledge is unification of subject and object is proved more clearly when we consider the knowledge of other minds. "Without the agreement and unification of our mind with the other mind with which it would enter into relation, it is impossible to have any kind of understanding . . . Every spiritual relation, every communication between our inner reality and another's is essential unity".[5] This is why "good will, charity, sympathy, open-mindedness, warmth of affection" are necessary for lifting our self-imposed barriers between ourselves and others in order to be able to understand them.

Knowledge from the standpoint of an individual is then nothing but an act of self-expansion and self-realization; it is the attempt to abolish the distinction between what we are and "what we can think but yet fail to realize",[6] between our empirical self and our infinite, true self.

(7) *Both mysticism and intellectualism untenable*

According to the above conception of Gentile the world is resolved into spiritual act, the human is identified with the transcendental or divine, the divine with the human. Croce calls this view of Gentile mysticism; for, it demands the denial of multiplicity, the dissolution of individual in the universal. "And this is mysticism", he complains, "excellent in making us feel in unity with God, but ill-adapted for thinking the world, or for acting in it".[1] Gentile replies that charge of mysticism would be tenable if his theory really abolished all distinctions and altogether denied the human self in affirming the absolute. But in fact his idealism "reconciles all distinctions, but does not, like mysticism, cancel them, and it affirms the finite no less resolutely than it affirms the infinite, difference no less than identity".[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 56.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 7 (our italics).
[3] *Ibid.* p. 7.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 18.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 8.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 9.

Though Gentile thus denies the mystic dissolution of individuality in the divine, neither does he hold that the individual has any reality of its own apart from the Absolute. The individual conceived as an independent reality is a mere abstraction, and thus false. It is this abstract notion of the individual that is cancelled and falsified by the true knowledge of Reality. But the individual truly conceived is only a finite expression of the absolute which lives in it. As a concrete manifestation of the absolute the individual is real. It is in this sense that the individual is eternal and immortal. The abstract individual is false and mortal; its denial gives us the true individual which is identical in essence with the absolute. The false, limited, abstract must, therefore, die if it hopes to be immortal. This is the meaning of Gentile's epigram "Its immortality consists in its mortality".[3]

The "individual as spiritual act, the individual individualizing, is immortal. The mind's act as *pure act*, outside which there is nothing which is not an abstraction, is the realm of immortality".[4] But if a critic complains that individuality worth the name and for the preservation of which alone any one would care is individuality as distinct from and not identical with the Absolute, Gentile would reply that such individuality never existed in reality, it is a mere false abstraction, and therefore, the preservation of the unreal is an irrational wish.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 265, f.n.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 266-7.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 153-4.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 154.

Just as Gentile is opposed to mysticism, he is also opposed to intellectualism.[1] Because intellectualism, in essence, is based on the admission that there is something *other than* the intellect which it can know. Intellect is, therefore, conceived as passive receiver or spectator and the object as an external non-mental reality. The passive intellect and the independent object are both abstractions and false. In reality the mind that knows is not passive, it is *freedom* itself, and the object known is its own creation. It is only by abstracting and separating the object from the concrete mental act in which it lives, that we come to imagine on the one hand objects of nature external to and independent of the mind, and picture, on the other hand, the mind as the passive onlooker. When we realize this we find that the passive intellect and its external counterpart are both myths. Intellectualism is no better than mysticism, since the two extremes meet in starting from the common belief in some abstract transcendent reality lying beyond our mind. Both are forms of objectivism.

(8) *The new idealistic interpretation of Christianity*

Rejecting mysticism and intellectualism Gentile accepts what he calls the 'profoundly Christian' view, "meaning the intrinsically moral conception of the world", attaching the highest importance to morality which consists in the perfection of human personality. "This moral conception is one which is alien to India", since Indian morality "ends in asceticism", and it is "the simple negation of the real in which morality realizes itself, human personality". It is also alien to Greece, since it is intellectualistic; "Greek morality ends in the stoical doctrine of suicide.[2] The true Christian conception is that reality is created by us, not found ready made. "It is a reality which waits for us to construct, a reality which is truly even now *love and will*, because it is the inward *effort of the soul*, its living process, not its ideal and external model. *It is man himself who*

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 267f.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 269.

rises above humanity and becomes God. And even God is no longer a reality who already is, but the God who is begotten in us and is ourselves in so far as we with our whole being rise to him. Here mind is no longer intellect but will. The world is no longer what is known but what is made; and therefore not only can we begin to conceive the mind as freedom or moral activity, but the world, the whole world of the Christian is freed and redeemed. The whole world is a world which is what it would be, or a world, as we say, essentially moral."[1] It is "the most radical, most logical, and the sincerest. conception of Christianity."[2]

(9) *Art, Religion, Philosophy*

The account of Gentile's philosophy will be incomplete without an account of his theory of art, religion and history. With Croce he agrees that a true history consists in the historian's reflection on the concrete manifestations and development of spiritual activity. It is thus identical with philosophy. But he differs from Croce as to the relation of history (or philosophy) to art and religion. He bases his conception on the Hegelian dialectic of synthesis of opposites rather than the Crocian theory of grades and the twofold degrees.

With Hegel Gentile admits that art is concerned with the subjective, religion with the objective, and philosophy with the concrete mind which is a synthesis of the two opposites. The life of mind as pure act, as we have seen. is a unity in multiplicity. It posits the object and by the very act also the subject, as their necessary correlative, while it maintains the unity between these two created by its own act. The transcendental 'I' opposes itself to itself, and thus becomes subject and object. Hence the self and not-self though opposed are only opposite forms of the same fundamental reality, the transcendental self, which, therefore, can overcome its internal self-made opposition. Thus the dialectic of mind yields three *necessary* concepts "(1) The reality of the subject, as pure subject; (2) the reality of the object as pure object; (3) the reality of mind, as the unity or process of the subject, and the immanence of the object in the subject".[1] Art, religion and philosophy correspond to these three moments.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 270.

[2] *Ibid.* p 273-4.

The work of art lives in the imagination of the artist; the world in which it has its being is the subjective world of the artist's fancy, not the objective world. Even if the matter of art is taken from nature or history, it "is not there for its own sake but for the soul's life, for its feeling. It represents the 'I' as it stands in its subjective immediacy".[2] The artist withdraws himself into the pure subjective world where he enjoys his full freedom from the conditions imposed on the objective world. "Art is the exaltation of the subject released from the chains of the real".[3] "Religion may be defined as the antithesis of art".[4] Because "religion is the exaltation of the object released from the chains of the mind".[5] The demand of a true religious consciousness is that God the object of worship should be all in all, the all-inclusive reality, so that even the mind of the worshipper is engulfed therein. Besides, that object worshipped must be *believed* to be an entirely objective reality, whose existence does not depend in any way on the mere fancy of the worshipper. Religion thus posits an objective absolute wholly divorced from subjectivity or mind.

Reflection on the one-sided natures of the abstract subject, and abstract object leads us to the conception of the concrete mind presupposed by both. It leads to philosophy. "It is the culminating point, because philosophy is the highest, and at the same time the concretest form of spiritual activity, the form which judges all the others and can itself be judged by none".[6]

To judge and to criticize art is to philosophize; criticism of art is not an art. Similarly to judge and criticize religion is to philosophize; the criticism of religion is not religion. Art and Religion are thus transcended in philosophy. But to "judge philosophy, in fact, is t philosophize". Philosophy is not, therefore, transcended.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 249.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 223.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 226-7
[4] *Ibid.* p. 226.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 227.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 215.

Conclusion

The theory of Gentile sketched above is called by him *actual idealism*,[1] to emphasize the idea of mi as pure act on which his view is based. He ve often refers to it as new or *modern idealism* to stress it difference from previous idealistic theories.

The distinguishing feature of the new idealism of It is its dynamic conception of mind; and on this it shou like to distinguish itself from the idealism of othe Hegelians who reduce change to appearance, and the worl to a 'block universe'. But inspite of so much stress o the reality of spiritual activity, this left wing of Hegelianism like the right wing of it, denies the ultimate reality o time, as ordinarily conceived. Space as the order o co-existence, and time, as the order of succession ar themselves the products of the spatializing and temporalizing acts of mind, and they have, therefore, n reality apart from these acts. The ordinary conception o temporal moments, past, present and future, are declared to be mere abstractions. Their reality is the unity of the mental act which creates this multiplicity and also holds it together. The Act is, therefore, above time, it is eternal. The past, present and future are eternally present to it and are held together in the eternal present of the Act. Ordinary ideas of progress, change, activity, dynamism and history are all reduced to mere abstractions and appearances as much by this actual idealism, as, for example, by the absolutism of Bradley. It is important to bear this in mind; or one is apt to be misled by the name of 'activity', the watchword of this new idealism.

The activism of Croce and Gentile should not be confused with pragmatism. Pragmatism tries to reduce knowledge and other mental functions to will. This is not countenanced by Croce for whom knowledge is a distinct grade of spiritual activity, on which will itself depends for s existence. Nor is it supported by Gentile for whom ll and knowledge, theory and practice are mutually inseparable, so that mere will, like mere knowledge, is an empty abstraction.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 233.

The chief credit of Gentile, as we have already mentioned, lies in his ability to realize and express with so great force and vividness the transcendental nature of subjectivity which has eluded the grasp of even the greatest of European idealists.

We may also mention in conclusion that the idea of the creative activity of mind—the theory that the mind, our own human mind, has the freedom to create the world has exercised a great influence on the Italian mind. It has bred the confident belief that man is the maker of his destiny and this conviction is at the back of the modern Italian political renaissance which has set about shaping the world afresh to its own purpose.[1] The teachings of Groce and Gentile that our mind *makes* reality, that man makes history, is the speculative background of the political doctrine of *fascism*. Gentile's denial of the metaphysical independence of the individual leads to the fascist denial of political independence of the individual. Gentile is regarded, therefore, as the philosopher of fascism.

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[1] This was written during the last world-war, before Italy was defeated.

CHAPTER III.

INDIAN IDEALISM

1. Introduction

The philosophy of ancient India, inspite of its vast and varied developments, suffered a long stagnation owing chiefly to political vicissitudes. But in recent times, with an all-round re-awakening, there has been a revival of philosophical thought as well. The new philosophy of India is not, however, a mere revival of ancient speculation. The cultural contact India had with the west through British rule and introduction of English education, made such simple revival impossible. In the universities western philosophy alone used to be taught until very recently; and even now where Indian philosophy has been introduced, it scarcely forms more than a fifth part of the course. The result is that the average Indian student learns a little of Indian philosophy, while he acquires an elaborate knowledge of western philosophy, Greek, medieval and modern. But though his knowledge of Indian philosophy is generally very meagre, he cannot altogether free himself from indigenous ideas ingrained in his inherited culture and tradition.[1]

The philosophical mind of modern India is thus confronted by the double task of assimilating both western as well as Indian ideas before it can attempt to create anything new. Interpretation of ancient Indian philosophy in the light of the western has, therefore, occupied the Indian mind for a long time, and fresh thinking has been comparatively rare.

One of the earliest Indian savants to undertake the comparative study of Indian and western thought and to infuse successive generations of students with an enthusiasm for research along that line was the late Sir B. N.

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[1] *Vide* present writer's article, Contemporary Ind. Phil. in *The Aryan Path*, March 1935 (Bombay).

Seal, a scholar, teacher and philosopher, whose versatility has been acknowledged, even by competent Europeans like Sir Michael Sadler, to have very few parallels in the modern world. His gigantic intellect moved freely in the different branches of modern science, European literature and philosophy in all their stages and aspects, as well as in the abstruse texts of the Indian systems of science and philosophy.[1] With a wonderful power of assimilation he developed a synthetic philosophy, of an idealistic character, but unfortunately his passion for perfection, his desire to do full justice even to the latest developments in science, made him put off indefinitely the work of writing down his views which, if published, would have constituted one of the most broad-minded and momentous contributions to modern philosophy.

The ancient Indian systems were not all monistic, idealistic, mystical or nihilistic. as most ill-informed western writers even to-day seem to believe. There were realistic, materialistic, dualistic, atheistic and many other varieties of schools, some with vast literature.[2] But idealistic thought, specially of the type of the monistic system of Vedanta, became more popular than any of the rest.Idealism of some form or another dominates. therefore, even contemporary Indian Philosophy. This will be evident from personal statements in the recent work, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*[3] edited by Muirhead and Radhakrishnan.

Contemporary Indian idealism in the most prominent thinkers (except a few orthodox scholars untouched by English education) draws its sustenance from European Idealists like Plato, Kant and Hegel, even when it attempts to uphold ultimately some indigenous view. Therefore. it deserves some mention as a peculiar development of European philosophy in Indian atmosphere. We shall select for statement here, the views of two outstanding Indian idealists, Professors Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya (1875—) and Sir S. Radhakrishnan (1888—), whose theories come under this category. We have already mentioned, among neo-Hegelians, another modern Indian idealist Professor Hiralal Haldar whose view is the product of purely western influence (though recently he has also sought confirmation of his mature ideas in Indian thought[1]).

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[1] *Vide* his *Positive Sciences of the Hindus* (Longmans, 1915).

[2] Interested readers are referred to *Indian Philosophy* (in 2 vols.) by S. Radhakrishnan (G. Allen and Unwin) and *History of Ind. Phil.* (in several volumes) by S. N. Das Gupta (Cambridge Univ.).

[3] In the Library of Philosophy, (G. Allen & Unwin).

Bhattacharya and Radhakrishnan are the foremost among modern Indian thinkers who have attempted to construct any comprehensive philosophies of their own out of the assimilated elements of Indian and European systems of thought. Though there has scarcely been any mutual influence, both have utilized their extensive knowledge of western philosophy to uphold, in different forms, absolute idealism resembling that of the Vedanta.

Bhattacharya's writings are extremely few, his style too compact and his thoughts too analytical and abstract to be intelligible to the ordinary reader without repeated attempts. His fame is, therefore, confined to the few who have had the privilege of his personal contact or have the patience to toil through his short but taxing essays and books. He has invariably impressed such persons as a remarkable thinker, and like Whitehead, profound even when baffling. His analytic intellect would remind one of Moore, but his originality and the comprehensive range of his analytic insight in its depth and width, in its penetration into the objective, as well as the subjective, sphere entitle him to a place among the classic masters. His superiority lies not in demolishing the views of others, but in being able to work out their unknown and unthought of implications, showing them at their best, and assigning them a place among the many possible alternative views which would make partisans voluntarily give up all airs of self-sufficiency. For him the ideal of philosophic conquest lies in self-denying sympathy and love. His temperamental aversion to self-assertion is reflected also in his unwillingess to publish his own views, unless somehow pressed to so. This is partly responsible for his comparative bscurity.

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[1] *Vide* his statement in *Contemporary Ind Phil.*

Radhakrishnan is in many respects a contrast to Bhattacharya. He would rather be in the thick of life, nd philosophize there to change the course of events for he better, than retire into a life of lonely contemplation. He takes a lively interest in all affairs of men, ancient and modern, eastern and western, in all philosophical, cultural, social, religious and scientific movements. With an exceeding quickness of understanding that can grasp essentials, he combines a wonderful power of expression, of speaking as well as of writing. He knows how to capture the modern mind in its mad pursuits and also how to lead it up to a direction loftier and worthier of the human life. His many writings and speeches have provoked much thought[1] and brought him fame from far and near. Some western writers, like Sir Francis Younghusband, have placed him as the philosopher of India, together with Tagore, the poet, Bose, the scientist, Gandhi, the political leader, all usherers of a renascence in modern India. There is no doubt that he is the ablest advocate of all that is good in Indian culture. His credit lies in his ability to keep his vision clear even in the densest fogs of conflicting ideas of the modern world, and his ability to clear the mist by lucid presentation of issues and reconciliation of apparent conflicts.

A notable characteristic of most contemporary Indian philosophers, and specially of these two idealistic thinkers is that the circumstance under which they philosophize has made their outlook far wider than their western colleagues'. For they have to acquaint themselves with both western and Indian schools of thought and have to keep both in mind in forming their own conclusions.

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[1] *Vide* C. E. M. Joad's *Counter-attack from the East* (Allen and Unwin, 1933).

2. K. C. Bhattacharya

(1) *The Absolute Indefinite*

Like Gentile, Bhattacharya takes for his point of departure the consciousness which transcends the subjective and the objective and without which neither the distinction nor the relation between these two would be intelligible. But as this transcendental principle cannot be defined in terms of the objective and its correlate, the subjective, he likes to call it the indefinite. The subject and the object alone really belong to the sphere of the definite, and what transcends them is indefinite.

The conception of the indefinite has been reached in history in different ways. "The indefinite has found in fact a place in metaphysics in many forms. To mention only a few at random, there is the negative matter of Plato, the *maya* of the Vedantists, and the *sunyam* or 'void' of the Buddhists. There is the notion of objective chance in Aristotle and of the inexplicable change of direction of the atoms in Lucretius. There is the conception of the indeterminate will, specially in the extreme form of unmotived or irrational activity as presented by a Duns Scotus, a Schopenhauer or a Bergson, and there is finally the unknowable whether of Kant or of Spencer".[1] But few have clearly and consistently grasped the deeper significance of the indefinite. Most of them have given the indefinite a place among positive entities, treated them as a real among reals. To Kant and Spencer belong the credit of bringing out "the transcendent character of the indefinite but both uncritically take this indefinite to be unknowable *reality*".[2]

Bhattacharya follows Kant up to a point, and goes beyond him on the negative side to bring out the true implications of Kant's unknowable. The unknowable, he points out, cannot be treated as reality; it cannot be taken even as a thinkable. Thought of the absolute unknown is not 'thought in the literal sense'; it is only a symbolic thought. Though the indefinite is not thus a positive object, either of sense intuition or of pure thought, it cannot be avoided. Because the indefinite hems in our positive experiences on all sides and we always have a consciousness of the beyond. The indefinite hovering around all our definite experience creates the most fundamental dualism between the definite and the indefinite, between what we know, and what we do not. Every definite content of awareness implies an outlying indefinite out of which it has been carved, and of which it is a 'specification'. As a mode of the indefinite the definite also 'embodies' the indefinite. The indefinite is in this sense also immanent'. It is 'as much immanent in the definite as transcendent.'[1] There is no definite, hard and fast, line of demarcation between the definite and the indefinite; the indefinite breaks forth into the definite, and takes form in our consciousness.

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[1] *Place of the Indefinite in Logic*, p. 2.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 11.

The discovery of this absolute indefinite, Bhattacharya points out, is not at all difficult. Pragmatists, for example, come very near it when they hold that objects are the product of our will; that objects known are made by the selective action of the will. There interest, however, is more in the objects made than the background or the stuff out of which they are made. If they only *negatively attended* to that out of which objects are selected they would realize the true significance of the indefinite that enters into the field of consciousness as definite objects, but also remains beyond as their ground and outlying implicate.

Hegel's conception of the indeterminate, the pure being, is another possible line of approach to the indefinite. The pure being is emptied of all determinate qualities by Hegel; but he still conceives it as a positive object of thought; and to this extent being is not yet fully indeterminate. But if he only advanced a step further and left behind this last vestige of determination he would have come to the true indefinite of which *no* definite thinkable character can be asserted. In fact the opposition between the two definite contents of thought, being and non-being, cannot be understood at all without something which is neither and can yet make their relation possible. If thought be the creator of this pair of opposites, it must be thought that is neither positive, nor negative—neither being nor non-being—but indefinite thought free from all determination.

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[1] *Place of the Indefinite in Logic*, p. 11.

Even the realist is compelled to admit some indefinite as distinct from the definite. The realist admits that objects known are independent of knowing. Knowing is then distinct from or other than the known. It must, therefore, be admitted to be unknown, and, so to be indefinite. But the realist will perhaps contend that even if knowing is other than the known, it is not necessarily indefinite, it is definite at least as what is other than the known. To this Bhattacharya replies that in that case the realist must admit that knowing is known as other than the known, *i.e.*, as *unknown.* So a distinction must be still maintained by him between the known as known, and the known as unknown. And if this latter "is not a contradiction knowing can only be understood as the *indefinite* that is known (*i.e.*, is definite or objective) *as* the indefinite. The realistic equivalent of the relation of object and subject then is the relation of the definite and the indefinite".[1] The realist has to admit therefore, the indefinite which is definite (known) *only as indefinite,* and must distinguish it from the definite which is definite (known) as definite.

(2) *Place of the Indefinite in Logic*

In a brief *essay* with this title, Bhattacharya suggests a radical change in the outlook of traditional logic. If logic is to retain its claim to universality, and must deal with the most 'abstract principles, not only of all science but of all philosophy', it cannot commit itself to any particular metaphysical position, as it ordinarily does. It should deal with all *forms* of thought as *possible* contents of knowledge, without stopping to assess their metaphysical validity; "it must be universal in the sense not only of representing the form common to all that is claimed as knowledge, but also as presenting the form of all doubt and dispute"[1] So "its primary problem should be whether there is any form which is not matter, which is not determinate, which is undeniably presupposed in all determinate concrete thought, accepted or disputed".[2]

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[1] *The Jaina Theory of Anekanta-vada,* p. 9.

To be universal, logic must stand then on the height of abstraction. It "cannot stand on any so-called *necessary* or self-evident principle". For if such principles are doubted, as they often have been, logic can justify itself only by taking the help of a particular type of epistemology, and then it has to 'take sides' and 'enter into disputes' and thus cease to be universal. The same difficulty arises if logic starts with any determinate *contingent* principle. So "it can only stand on an indeterminate principle which can indifferently be called necessary or contingent. This principle can be no other than the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite, in which neither has even the specific implication of reality or unreality. A further criticism of this dualism is unintelligible, for negation of the principle is nothing other than the principle itself".

The recognition of the indefinite would cure logic of the dogmatic tendency to treat the definite, the rational, the knowable as the sole content of thought and change its general outlook. "The ground principle of logic has been formulated in at least three ways". Hegel's dialectical logic is based on the conception of *reason as a system*; 'the identity of being and non-being points to such system'. For conceptualists or intuitionists the fundamental principle is not reasoning or system, but *judgment* as a positive or negative *relation* between two terms. The empiricist starts with *terms* as the ultimate facts of experience. All these three start then with the positive and the definite. Recognition of the indefinite corrects this dogmatic bias of each, and yet gives to each a new light and reformed character. As against the dialectical principle that regards reason as the sole reality, "it indicates an alternative—*unreason*—beyond reason", and suggests that position and negation, being and non-being, need not necessarily be conceived as the moments of the *positive* absolute, but rather of the Indefinite which is beyond both. As against the conceptualist it points out that beyond judgment which is determinate affirmation or negation there is the indeterminate ground from which judgment emerges and which may be practically a useful form of doubt or ignorance. As against the empirical belief in the positive object of experience taken as the ultimate, it points out that such object is "always a determination carved out of the indeterminate". "It suggests in fact that the indefinite has to be recognised as standing outside the term, the judgment and the inference, that one should go beyond ordinary logic which simply turns its back on the outlying indefinite and looks to the definite as the sole content of thought".[1]

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[1] *Place etc.*, p 3. [2] *Ibid.* p. 2.

This new logic of the indefinite would be then the truly universal logic which "finds categories for widely different metaphysical notions of reality". Besides, while the recognition of the indefinite 'implies an extension of logical doctrine', it suggests, as just seen, also a 'material modification of the logic of the definite'. Bhattacharya illustrates the possible application of this new principle by taking 'at random' some topics of traditional logic (such as the conception of all and some, negative conditional propositions, disjunctive propositions, sub-alternation) and by showing how new light is thrown on some knotty problems concerning each of these. He does not work out in detail his fruitful suggestion so as to rewrite traditional logic in this new light, though he makes sufficient use of it, as we shall see, in all his metaphysical speculations.

(3) *Negation*

Closely connected with his central idea of the indefinite is Bhattacharya's doctrine of negation. The indefinite is also absolute negation of all knowables, it is, as he calls it, 'the unknowable negation'.[1] The definite, the determinate object of thought, again, is conceivable only as a negation of the indefinite, which amounts to the negation of the absolute negation. Both negation and negation of negation engage, therefore, his close attention in a short paper *Some aspects of negation*, a marvel in acute and original thinking. We can only give a brief and diluted version of his profound thoughts here, for, to explain his views fully is to expand each of his pithy sentences into pages.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 6.

"*Every system of philosophical thought or religion has its own logic and is bound up with one or other of the fundamental views of negation*".[2] There are different types of negation lying at the back of philosophers' minds and "all philosophical dispute resolves itself in the final analysis into a conflict between such types."

Negation may be understood as the rejection of the illusory. The question of negation arises when there is the correction of an actual or possible error; "when for example we say, A is real, not x". Now the conception of negation depends on the solution of the central question: "When an object is known to be illusory, what kind of being or non-being do we attribute to it?"

Two broad replies are possible. 'This object is not existent' either means that *this*, has no objective existence, but *some* other kind of non-objective abstract being. Or it may mean that the negated object does not have any being at all; as it seems to be an object which is no object really, it is thinkable merely as *contradiction*; and to the contradictory neither any abstract nor any concrete being can be attributed.

The first view, that the negated (or the illusory) has *some* kind of abstract being admits, of three different specifications. There are thus four main views of negation. Each of these views indicates a distinctive philosophical temperament, a certain mode of will and attention. Moreever each is based on a distinctive attitude towards truth.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 11.

[2] *Some aspects of Negation*, p. 1 (our italics).

Truth being what is not negated or not illusory, is inseparably related to the conception of the negated. As each view of negation implies a view of truth, truth is found to be manifold. Bhattacharya treats each of the four views of negation in all these aspects.

The first view corresponds to that stage of attention where one's impulse is to analyse the confusedly given, 'to break up its continuity to single out its elements.' Attention is here withdrawn from the indefinite given and even this withdrawal is not attended to. Attention is wholly *positive* and is directed to the *object* singled out, whereas its ground, the confused given, is simply forgotten or left behind.

The positive, determinate *object* is the sole reality, the ultimate truth for a philosophy of this stage. What is not object has a being only to be denied. The negated object has no reality, nor even any ascribed relation to reality, it is utterly indefinite. Each object is regarded here as independent real existing by its own right; its nature is not determined by its relation to anything else. Relation (being no part of these self-existing monads or reals discovered by positive attention) is something unreal or illusory. Truth resides in these positive reals, and not in any relation. - [illegible]

The second view of negation belongs to the stage of attention in which the given is not left behind or forgotten but remembered along with the analysed elements got out of it. Attention alternates between the two—the complex given and the elements contained within it. While attention asserts itself here by positing objects it does not rest contented with them. Haunted by a sense that truth has been left behind, it returns to the given again. The given and its elements are both taken as ultimate. There is positive attention directed to both. Objects are recognized here as elements related within the given complex. Reality appears, therefore, as an interrelated system. Truth here is seen to belong to judgments expressing relations, and not to self-identical reals. It is ultimately a relation between 'that' and a 'what', between the given and elements isolated from it.

In this view an object negated has a subjective being; what is *not* an object is a subjective fact. The subjective is something definite, expressible as the negation of the objective; the objective, on the other hand, is a negation of the subjective. There is a negative relation between the two; they do not together make one system. But facts constitute one system corresponding to and standing apart from another system composed of objective facts.

The third view of negation corresponds to the stage in which the oscillation of attention between the given and its elements, is stopped. The two are simultaneously attended to; and they appear as one identical complex system. Elements and the given are viewed here, therefore, as identical. Identity becomes the only relation here. The system comprising the given and elements into an identity is truth. "This truth in which the will finds rest —for it is still anxious for rest—is not dull being but a free play, a moving identity."[1] It is felt at this stage that truth has been constructed by the mind's free play. though mind fails to construct to order any particular truth.

Negation is viewed here as identical with affirmation. Every negation implies some position. Any particular fact is viewed here as being posited by the negation of what it is not, so by infinite negation; and the negation of a fact implies an infinite position, affirmation of everything other than that fact.

In all the three successive stages so far described attention is positive, it is occupied respectively with object as the only definite, with the objective and the subjective as two definite and co-ordinate but distinct spheres, and with the definite identity of the two. But when at the third stage all definites are found to be products of negation, attention to positive objects is overturned.

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[1] *Some Aspects of Negation*, p. 10.

This leads to the fourth stage where attention becomes negative. Even though attention is apparently directed to the positive object alone, the positive is no longer the the objective of attention. This negative attention resembles that of a person who looks at the things on a table not to see the things, but to feel the *absence* of a particular book. "Positive attention denies itself utterly" and the definite, the positive, appears before the negative attention only to be rejected, transcended—and to turn into a dream. What is negated remains here as an inexplicable appearance. The assertive will no longer reigns here as in the previous stages. It turns into the act of self-withdrawal. "All truth is retracted into this self-denying negative attention and what remains over is but the demand for its intensive discipline".

The four stages of attention define the basic outlook of four different types of philosophy. Though here as elsewhere Bhattacharya is averse to explicit historical reference we can guess that these four types refer respectively to pan-objectivism, dualism, Hegelian monism and some type of pragmatism and Vedantic monism.

Truth reveals a new form in each of these stages. Truth is thus found to be manifold. It is, therefore, unreasonable to criticize the philosophy or religion of one type from the standpoint of another. Wisdom lies in realizing their basic, mutually irreducible, different outlooks. The only legitimate criticism of a philosophy would be its self-criticism, the examination of its self-consistency. This theory of manifoldness of truth is justified by Bhattacharya, again, in a paper, *The Jaina theory of Anekantavada,* where he exhibits the profound implication of the Jaina theory of multiple truth.

(4) *Absolute Idealism*

The conceptions of the indefinite and negation which took shape in the earlier short papers, referred to so far, strike root in Bhattacharya's mind and they appear in more developed forms in his later thoughts—in a small work, *The subject as Freedom*,[1] which is the only elaborate attempt to explain his views, and in his personal statement, *The concept of Philosophy* in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*.

The indefinite of his early logical thought gradually emerges in his later philosophy as the Absolute or Absolute subject which transcends the relative subject and object. Negation takes the form of a series of denials by which the Absolute is reached.

Denial of a fact (or the object of external perception) leads to the self-subsistent, the pure object of thought, without a belief in which such denial is not possible.

Every judgment of fact like "A is related to B", is based on a prior theoretical possibility of A being B, and this pure object of thought or contemplation is independent of A being actually B or not; it is thus a self-subsistent object of thought; and it remains even when the actuality of the fact is denied. This is recognised, Bhattacharya points out, by some modern logicians who speak, for example, of the proposition as a self-subsistent entity of the form 'That A is B'.

Denial of the pure object of contemplation (or the self-subsistent) again implies a belief in the subjective—the contemplating act, for instance, which is enjoyingly known (as Alexander holds) and which remains even when the object of contemplation is denied. The occasion for such a denial of the pure object may arise when a subjectivist, for instance, is persuaded that *any* object even a pure one, is not even a self-consistent object of contemplation and, therefore, unreal.

The real, that is the subject, the reality of which is left over by the denial of all objects empirical and pure, falls a prey to the same devastating process of denial. For even the subject as an *individual* enjoyed reality may be denied in some self-abnegating experience (like religious self-surrender and self-effacement). In religious experience or worship the self-abnegation is an enjoyed experience. But when there is theoretic denial of the individual self in the form 'I am not', what remains over, and makes such self-abdication possible, is the Absolute. This is the limit of the process of negation, for the negating individual does not survive it to continue negation any further. As the undeniable being the Absolute is truth, as the all-transcending negating process it is absolute freedom. If it is to be called the subject, the subject should be conceived as the transcendent freedom; it is not certainly the individual subject pitted against an object.

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[1] Pub. by Institute of Philosophy, Amalner Bombay

(5) *The grades of consciousness*

The empirical object, the self-subsistent, the subject (or the real), the Absolute (or truth) are thus discovered to constitute the full gamut of the contents of *all possible* consciousness. These four are the contents of *four grades of theoretic consciiousness* which respectively, "may be roughly called empirical thought, pure objective thought, spiritual thought and transcendental thought"[1] taking thought in the widest sense of awareness. The first grade of consciousness involves reference to a fact—an object of sense-perception. The second grade is contemplation which also refers to an object; but an object of contemplation has no necessary reference to sense-perception. The third grade is spiritual consciousness in which the objective attitude is replaced altogether by a subjective one of self-enjoying experience. The fourth grade is transcendental thought. "the consciousness of a content that is neither objective nor subjective".

(6) *Science and Philosophy*

Of the four contents of theoretical consciousness the first. namely the object of empirical thought or fact, is the subject-matter of science. The last three, the objects of pure thought form the subject-matter of philosophy proper. The distinction between the provinces of science and metaphysics is fundamental in Bhattacharya's thought, and while it has some resemblance to modern logical positivism, it is perhaps an indirect product of Kantian influence.

The domain of Science is fact. "By fact is meant what is perceivable or has necessary reference to the perceivable, is speakable in the form of a literal judgment and is believed without reference to the speaking of it".[1] "Fact is always a fact related to facts." It is "always expressible as a judgment of the form 'A is thus related to B' ". All knowledge proper must yield some information, and must, therefore, be expressible as a synthetic judgment. Knowledge about fact gives such genuine information. Science is the system of such information or knowledge.

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[1] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*. pp. 66f.

Philosophy, correctly conceived, is not concerned with facts. When philosophy blunders into the domain of science, begins to speculate on facts it produces neither good philosophy, nor good science, but 'only a species of imaginative literature'. Such, for example, is what is known as the philosophy of evolution. The story of cosmic evolution spun out by philosophers has no scientific value, since, unlike a scientific hypothesis, a philosophical conjecture cannot be *verified*.

For this reason it is wrong to suppose, as it is often done, that the problem of philosophy is to piece together the results of the sciences into a world view. The synthesis of scientific laws offered by philosophy would at best be an "imaginative description of the world, which would be not only not actual knowledge, but not even a hypothesis that is intended to be turned into knowledge".[2]

Neither is "the formulation of the postulates or structural concepts of science, which used to be regarded as a philosophical problem" is the legitimate concern of philosophy. The axioms or postulates of science are but hypotheses, to be formulated by science itself, for the organisation of facts into a system. If philosophy is confused with science, science is also sometimes confused with philosophy. The "romantic philosophy that has sprung up round the physico-mathematical theory of realitivity" is an instance of the "confusion of science with philosophy and not of philosophy with science".

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 74. [2] *Ibid.* p. 75.

(7) *The true province of Philosophy*

Though philosophy is thus dislodged by Bhattacharya from the sphere of facts and discredited there with all the fervour of a logical positivist, it is given ample scope in the far-flung region of the last three contents of thought. Philosophy deals with the 'contents of pure thought, in the objective, subjective and transcendental attitudes'. These contents—the self-subsistent pure object, the individual enjoyed self, the Absolute that transcends both—are not distinguishable from the thought of them. We can understand empirical facts existing apart from the experience of them. But the contents of pure thought are not intelligible apart from such thought. The pure contents are not therefore assertible as facts. They are believed as they shine out in thought as identical with such thought. They are thus self-evident (like a spark of light which is both the illuminator and the illuminated). Being self-evident a pure content reveals itself without any reference or relation to any other content. While a fact is always known as related, we are conscious of pure contents as non-related. If knowledge proper is (as Kant also holds) synthetic judgment *relating* a subject and predicate, we cannot call pure thought knowledge, for it cannot be expressed as a judgment. The object revealed in pure thought may be expressed in the form 'X is'. But this is no judgment in the literal sense, only the semblance of a judgment—it is only an artificial or symbolic judgment since a real judgment must be of the form 'A is related to B'. Of course sometimes a judgment about fact also is expressed in the form 'X is'. But it is only a periphrasis for a judgment of the relational form and on elucidation X turns out to be itself a relational judgment like 'A is related to B'.

Philosophy then cannot be said to yield any knowledge of facts, any synthetic judgment. It is analytic thought. Self-evident contents of pure thought are simply analysed and formulated by philosophy, and their inner meanings systematically elaborated. These elaborations are expressed *like* judgments, which, however, do not yield any factual formation, since they are analytic, and their predicates re only explications of their subjects. Philosophical judgments cannot be called judgments in the literal sense, but only in a metaphorical sense—they are symbolic judgments.

Corresponding to the three contents of pure thought there can be three broad divisions of philosophy. Bhattacharya gives a very brief synopsis of these three in his personal statement in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, under the headings: Philosophy of the object, Philosophy of the spirit and Philosophy of Truth. A fuller account is found in *The Subject As Freedom*, a masterpiece of analytic thought, metaphysical insight and speculative originality. We can give here only a very rough idea of his more important themes.

✓(8) *The subject and the object*

He shows that there is no absolute distinction between the objective and the subjective; the boundary between the two is a shifting one. There are different grades of subjectivity and corresponding grades of objectivity. The concept of an object is inseparably connected with that of the subject. The object is that which the subject feels or knows to be distinct from itself, that from which the self withdraws itself; the object is to the subject as shadow is to light.

There are 'three broad stages of subjectivity' and corresponding grades of objectivity. There is first bodily subjectivity. I find myself embodied or identified with the body and dissociate myself, as embodied, from all extra-organic objects. Such objects are objects only to the extent that the embodied subject withdraws itself from them. But within bodily subjectivity itself there are two grades, according as the subject is identified with the body perceived from outside, or identified with the body felt from within. Identified with the felt body I sometimes dissociate myself from the perceived body which then appears as an object external to the self. The second grade of subjectivity may be named psychical subjectivity. Identified with the psychical life of presentation (of image, idea, meaning) I may dissociate myself from all objects (including the body). The "dissociation of the subject or consciousness from this presentation conceived as a kind of object" would lead to the third grade of subjectivity which may be called spiritual subjectivity.

"To spiritual subjectivity, the psychical is objective and so to psychic subjectivity, the bodily and to bodily subjectivity, the extra-organic is objective".[1] The subjective and the objective are thus relative terms. As the boundary between the two is changing, shifting outward or inward, and what is now subjective can pass into the objective at another stage, two consequences follow. First, the distinction between the subject and the object implies some common substratum within which this distinction is made and which itself is neither subjective nor objective —but the Absolute. Secondly, the possibility of the subject withdrawing itself from what it was identified with implies the possibility of the subject's gradually freeing itself from the object.

Spiritual progress, holds Bhattacharya, is the gradual process of the realization of this freedom, the inwardization of consciousness by stages. Absolute freedom is possible only when the subject has fully dissociated itself from the object, empirical and pure, and thus also ceases to be a subject, since subjectivity is relative to objectivity. Such freedom, from the stage at which we ordinarily are, can be appreciated theoretically only as a possibility. We are wedded to the body, identified with it, and absolute freedom is at this stage only a dream. It is an aspiration which is aroused in us when even at this stage, the self as identified with the felt body detaches itself from the perceived body, looks upon it as an external object. This partial liberation generates a faith in the possibility of further liberation. At present, "I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective function from feeling". And further as "I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect," I can conceive even the introspective individuality of the self as a mere accident, freed from which the self would be 'de-individualised', absolute, freedom.[1]

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[1] *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 48.

(9) *The Self-revelation of the Absolute.*

All determinate contents of thought are the determinations of the indeterminate, the absolute. How the indefinite becomes definite, the indeterminate breaks forth into the determinate, is more than we can ascertain. We can at best say that the Absolute reveals itself in determinate forms. Its most important determination is the spirit or the self. In the very act of speaking in the first person, the absolute assumes the form of the self. In saying 'I', I become a determinate self. Self-hood is constituted by the function of speaking, apart from which its determinate reality is unintelligible. But as speaking is thinking in word symbols, the *I* or the spirit is a symbol of the absolute. Besides, as all thought about the spirit involves the explicit or implicit use of the first person, or *I*, the philosophy of the spirit is all symbolic thought, not thought in the literal sense as in the case of the thought of empirical objects.

The concept of the object is negatively dependent on that of the self. For we have seen that the object is precipitated by the self-withdrawing or dissociating act of the subject. The character of the object is determined negatively by that of spiritual experience. Each act of dissociation of the self is the position of the not-self or the object. The object, then, is a symbol of the spirit, just as shadow is of light, by virtue of a negative, but invariable, relation.

Thus we have a series of symbolisms. The object is the symbol of the spirit, the spirit of the Absolute. Philosophy which deals with these is, therefore, also symbolic thinking. Speech is both the basis and vehicle of such thought. The basic structure of philosophic thought is created by speech. The general forms of pure objects are the basic, universal forms of speech. Logic deals with such *forms*. Metaphysics deals with, not these forms, but the contents of pure objective thinking involving speaking. Metaphysics deals with pure *objects* alone. As metaphysics entails the objective attitude of thinking there cannot properly speaking, be any metaphysics of the spirit. For the spirit is known only in the *subjective* attitude of enjoyment, and cannot be known as object. What is ordinarily discussed in metaphysics as mind, and forms along with life and matter the subject matter of this branch of knowledge, is really an objectified shadow of spiritual consciousness, not the spirit itself. It is a mistake, Bhattacharya repeatedly points out, to think that the spirit can become an object of introspection. What ordinarily passes as introspection is really an act of looking in the objective attitude into the pure objects of thought—the symbols or the shadows of the spirit and not the spirit itself. Bhattacharya is, incidentally, critical of the use that many psychologists make of such introspection as a method of studying the mind. What is passed by such psychology as mind, is really an assemblage of those ghostly entities called pure objects which belong neither to the world of facts nor to the mind.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 205-6.

Consciousness of the spirit as determined by the speaking of 'I' has three grades—consciousness of *being embodied* (the embodied self), consciousness of *being related to other persons or selves* (the social self), consciousness of self-surrender to the overpersonal self in worship or religious communion (the religious self). In religious consciousness the worshipper and the worshipped have a relation of identity-in-difference; inspite of self-surrender the worshipping self does not theoretically deny himself; self-surrender is only an enjoyed identity of his self with the over-personal self.

The consciousness of the absolute or truth is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness—which arises only when the self is theoretically understood to be negated. What is left over after this negation is the absolute which, though believed positively, is not intelligible either in the objective or in the subjective attitude—nor speakable except symbolically or negatively as 'what the self is not'.

"The absolute as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being (truth) or positive non-being (freedom) or their positive indetermination (value). The absolute is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedanta. What is loosely called nihilistic Budhism apparently understands the absolute as freedom. The Hegelian absolute may be taken to represent the indermination, miscalled *identity*, of truth and freedom which is value."[1]

"This triple absolute is apparently the prototype of the three subjective functions, knowing, willing and feeling". Every consciousness of *I* is simple, and does not involve any awareness of these three elements. These elements cannot, therefore, be said to be discovered by introspection. We must then think that the absolute or transcendental consciousness distinguishes itself into, or reveals itself in, three forms. The self or I which is but a shadow or symbol of the absolute varies with the self-revealing form of the absolute, and appears now as *knowing* then as *willing* freely, and then again as *feeling* (according as the Absolute reveals itself as truth, goodness or beauty).

"All philosophy is systematic symbolism and symbolism necessarily admits of alternativles." There are naturally different schools. If the absolute or truth itself is manifold, and if differences regarding the conception of the absolute are necessarily reflected in the conceptions of the spirit and the object, it is an idle dream to think of "philosophy progressing towards a single unanimously acceptable solution".[2]

As philosophy in general varies in accordance with the self-revealed nature of the Absolute, the *philosophy of religion* also varies in accordance with the different types of religious experience. The attempt to systematize religions or grade them from outside, the attempt of

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[1] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 85.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 84.

Hegel for example, is "intrinsically irreligious". The relation among religions cannot be determined from outside by reflection. Each religious "experience by its self-deepening gets opposed to or synthesised with other experiences. One experience may enjoy another as a stage outgrown or as in absolute conflict with it, where a third experience may emerge as adjusting them to one another. There is no possibility of systematising them by secular reason and so far as they systematise themselves, they present themselves in many alternative systems. Each experience in fact is a revelation and we believe in a system only so far as it is actually revealed. Extensive internally coherent systems with indefinite boundaries are actually revealed, though there is no *a priori* necessity of a system, and still less of a system admitting of no alternative systems". "The theoretic form of a religious system is a philosophy of religion, there being as many forms of this philosophy as there are religious systems."[1]

As the nature of spiritual consciousness (or consciousness of the I) depends on the self-revealed nature of the overpersonal self or God, and the conception of the object depends on that of the spirit, there is an intimate relation among the different grades of consciousness. Bhattacharya concludes, therefore, "Every system of religious philosophy has its distinctive theory of the spirit, metaphysic and logic. The fundamental differences within logic are, as has been suggested, implicitly metaphysical, those in metaphysic are implicitly spiritual and those in the theory of the secular spirit are implicitly religious".[2]

We have attempted, in the foregoing pages, to perform the rather difficult task of summarizing a philosophy which is too compact to allow further condensation, and requires, for intelligent appreciation, elaborate explanation and defence. The philosophy of the indefinite has a dialect of its own. The interpreter who tries to translate it into the language of the definite finds himself describing a somersault at every step—passing through a process of alternate positive and negative attention; but he is ever left in doubt if the reader is following suit in order to follow him. One chief condition of understanding this philosophy is the ability to look at the world of objects with negative attention (just as we look at things in a room to ascertain the absence of an object) to be aware of the indefinite in the lap of which the definite stands. It demands a kind of 'open-eyed trance', in Santayana's phrase, but a trance which can dissolve, by reversing attention from the positive to the negative, all definite objects into their indefinite matrix.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 83.

[2] *Ibid.*

The discipline that this process of negative attention demands is recommended by some Indian systems. But to Bhattacharya lies the credit of conceiving an entire scheme of logic, metaphysics, philosophy of secular spirit, of religion and of the absolute in the light of the indefinite, and assigning a place to each of the apparently conflicting systems of logic, metaphysics and philosophy, justifying its claim to truth in the light of his conception of truth as manifold, i.e., as the possible alternative objective revelations of the indefinite absolute.

3. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Radhakrishnan's works are partly interpretative and partly constructive. But a 'holy fervour', a 'synthetic outlook' and a 'constructive passion' are evident all through. The search for a unity among the diverse manifestations of human culture takes him through a zigzag course.

The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, Indian Philosophy, The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy are the fruits of his long and arduous endeavour to discover and demonstrate that the soul of poetry, of the Ancient Indian systems, as well as of the present-day philosophical movements, is one at core: that 'one common purpose' through the universe runs beneath the apparent diversities of creed and custom, race and colour, age and clime. With a deep conviction in the spiritual unity of mankind bred in the early interpretative works mentioned above he enters upon the second period of constructive speculation, the chief works of this period being *An Idealist View of Life, Eastern Religions and Western Thought*. Even in these later works there is a vast wealth of illustrative material collected from science, poetry, philosophy, religion, history of all ages and corners of the universe. Civilizations of the Indus Valley, Sumer, Egypt, Minos, and China, the Vedic deities, Olympian gods and Iranian ones, Egyptian mysteries and Alexandrian theology, Plutarch, Poseidonius, Dionysius, St. Paul, Thomas Aquinas, Confucius, and a numberless other things which will stifle many a scholar and thinker out of breath, create for him a congenial atmosphere for free thinking. The vision of a universal spirit behind all human phenomena releases the shackles of his mind which finds a sacred home in everything human. It makes him specially feel that "there is a certain kinship of the spirit among the religious geniuses who have made their mark on history, who join hands across the centuries and bid us enter into the kingdom of the spirit".[1]

The burden of Radhakrishnan's teaching in all its forms is the presence of the spirit in man, the spirit that can be realized fully in religious intuition. It is the old theme of the Upanisads, and partly of many great idealists of the world. But Radhakrishnan's originality lies in boldly re-interpreting the much-abused doctrine with special reference to the present world and its needs. His idealism, though bearing the marks of Vedantic, Platonic and Hegelian influences is distinguished from all of these by some of its peculiar stresses and specially by its appeal to the modern mind torn asunder by conflicting ideals. His idealism, moreover, is not *idea*-ism but *ideal*-ism. It is the presentation of an ideal that can harmonize the flesh with the soul, individuals with individuals, nations with nations. Like Eucken he is a philosopher of life. His central interest is life and not metaphysics. Metaphysics, is to him as to the ancient Indian philosophers, only a rational preparation for the solution of life's problems. The key words of his philosophy are spirit, intuition and religion. All his ideas centre round these. We may conveniently discuss his philosophy under these three heads.

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[1] *Contemporary Ind. Phil*, his personal statement, p. 277.

(1) *Spirit*

The idea of spirit, we have found, is the root concept of Hegelianism. So also is it of Radhakrishnan's philosophy. But unlike many Hegelians and Indian idealists, he conceives the spirit not as a substance, but as life. The criticism of the concept of substance in contemporary physics, and in the works of realists like Whitehead, among other things, makes him reject the old substantial idea of reality. "Spirit", he says, "is life not thing, energy not immobility, something real in itself and by itself, and cannot be compared to any substance subjective or objective" [1]

The spirit in man is also the reality underlying all existence. "If we are asked to define what the spirit in man is, it would be difficult to give a definite answer. We know it, but we cannot explain it. It is felt everywhere though seen nowhere. It is not the physical body or the vital organism, the mind or the will, but something which underlies them all and sustains them. It is the basis and background of our being, the universality that cannot be reduced to this or to that formula".[2]

The self, God and Absolute are all names of the one universal spirit in its different aspects. The self is the manifestation of the spirit in the human centre, through the body and mind of man. God is the spirit conceived as the reality manifested in the world at large, Absolute is the spirit conceived as the infinite possibility of which the present world is only *one* actual manifestation.

Matter, life, mind (consciousness), self (self-consciousness) form a hierarchy of the manifestations of the spirit in the world. Each higher level includes the lower and is yet something more. Life that *emerges* from inorganic matter, for example, is not wholly reducible to matter, it has something new and unique. Every higher emergent quality is a fuller manifestation of the spirit. The emergence of a new quality indicates a sudden jump and a surprising deviation from the lower. The different levels are not, therefore, strictly continuous, though they can be arranged in an ascending series. But in all of them we can discover the presence of the essential characters of the spirit, creativity, change, order, progress. A little consideration will show this truth.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 275.

[2] *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 205.

(a) *Matter*

In earlier times the "familiar conception of matter was that of an enduring substance moving through a static space in a uniformly flowing time".[1] But this substantial, solid and static conception of matter has been upset by modern sub-atomic physics, according to which, "Matter is a form of energy or action. Physical objects are events, happenings, occurences. They are not self-contained, changeless, eternal entities, but only moving points in a continuous passage". Moreover, the researches of Einstein purport to show that "space, time and material are abstractions from the concrete fact which is a set of events. They exist together in concrete reality".[2] Two important consequences follow from the new light thrown on the conception of matter by modern science. First, matter is activity, it is not inert. Secondly, the entire physical world is an interrelated system; the existence of matter independent of space, time, observer, and other events is a mere myth. Crass materialism thus goes down leaving room for an organic, energetic view of the physical world.

Physical science cannot explain however the mystery behind the change and continuity, the order and progress in the world. "It describes the way in which bodies behave, and not why they do so". Every occurence in the physical world is a mystery. The past cannot wholly account for the present. Matter is essentially creative: there is always a creative advance. When new modes of organisation of matter arise, we can retrospectively link the new with the old. But science can little predict what new form will emerge in future out of the present form of matter. The creativity of matter is ultimately a mystery, which cannot be grasped by any equation or formula.

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[1] *Ibid.* p 226.

[2] *Ibid.* p 229.

(b) *Life*

The creative activity observed in inorganic matter is more evident in the behaviour of living matter. Order, progress, continuity and systematic interrelation are more clearly visible here, and on a higher scale that cannot be wholly explained by the inorganic kind of activity. Assimilation, respiration, reproduction, growth and development mark the emergence of this new higher level of activity, and its difference from the inorganic. "The strikingly specific behaviour of living beings cannot be confused with atomic activity".[1] "There is a specific inner direction in living organisms which grow, repair, reproduce themselves, and mould the outer circumstances into their own patterns. What we know of matter does not help us to understand the co-ordinated maintenance of life. Life is a different order of fact".

Biology studies life. But it neither explains the origin of life, nor does it unravel the mystery of evolution. It assumes the existence of life. The different theories of evolution are only attempts to arrange in a connected series the forms of life which have already emerged. "Evolution is no explanation. It does not say why the process should have ever occurred, why life should occur at all".[2] "A strict science of biology merely notes the facts"; it does not explain the creative mystery behind life.

(c) *Consciousness*

The emergence of mind or consciousness in the organism or living matter marks the advent of another new quality which cannot be wholly reduced to matter or life. Though the connection between nervous and psychical phenomena is intimate the one cannot be reduced to the other. When the behaviourist tries to identify consciousness with some organic responses, it mistakes the organism for the meaning it expresses. He also mistakes organic movements for behaviour. What is externally observable is not behaviour but only movements. "To treat them as behaviour is to assume a unity of direction and activity on the part of the organism as a whole". Intelligent adaptation cannot be explained as a mere conditioned reflex. Because the former embodies an insight which manifests itself as a direct hit, whereas the latter is a random process, a result built up by many repetitions.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 251.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 257.

"Just as a living organism is a whole with a far higher degree of internal relatedness than any non-living system, the mental represents a higher degree of self-regulation and control than the body. It cannot be understood by a study of the organism . . . The soul is the actuality of the organic body in man, even as vision is the actuality of the eye. We cannot reduce psychology to physics or physiology. While the conscious arises from or emerges out of the vital or the biological, it is as real as the biological, from which it emerges, and represents a kind of interaction with things different from the vital".[1]

(d) *Self-consciousness*

"In self-conscious beings, we meet with a set of phenomena quite distinct from the physical or the vital or the merely conscious". Self-consciousness marks a higher degree of consciousness, a new level of emergence. Self-conscious or reflective "mind is different from the unreflective mind of the infant or the animal". "The reflective capacity of the human mind and its power of free invention are not mere complications of lower instincts. It is the essence of self-conscious intelligence to look before and after and vary action according to circumstances. Instinct does neither".[2]

Man has grown, it is true, out of the physical, vital and animal life; he is a part of nature, and has been 'carved out of nature's continnum'. But when "we pass from animal to man, we find not a gradual development but a sudden break".[3] Man "is not simply the animal gone up any more than an animal is a man gone down. Between the two there is a gulf. No amount of scientific observation can help us to explain the astonishing change".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 261. [2] *Ibid.* p. 262. [3] *Ibid.*

Comparing thus matter, life, consciousness and self-consciousness Radhakrishnan draws attention to two chief facts. There is first, a general unity or continuity running through the different levels; in each of them we find activity, organic interrelation and progress which point to the possibility of conceiving one reality underlying all. Secondly, the emergence of the new and the higher at every level shows the creative freedom of the underlying reality. The one underlying reality is conceivable, therefore, only as a 'trans-mechanical' or spiritual energy which is gradually manifesting itself more and more through its fuller and fuller expressions; matter, life, consciousness, self-consciousnes.

Radhakrishnan thus comes to advocate a form of idealism. Its basis can be traced in the Upanisads where matter (anna), life (prana), perceptual consciousness (manas), self-conscious intellect (vijnana) and bliss (ananda) are shown to be the truer and truer expressions of the spirit.[2] But with this ancient Indian view we find blended here the modern idea of emergent evolution. The result is an absolute idealism of a dynamic type. To understand this view we should consider more fully the conceptions of the human self, God and the Absolute.

(e) *The human self, God and the Absolute*

The Absolute is the total spiritual reality, manifested and unmanifested, actual and potential, realized and unrealized. The world is the manifestation of the absolute spirit in time. It is not an exhaustive, nor the only possible, manifestation. The cosmic process is the attempt to realize only a few of the infinite possibilities contained in the Absolute.[3] But though the world is an actual manifestation of the Absolute it is not necessary for the

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 268.

[2] *Vide The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, Chap. XIII.

[3] *Contemp. Ind. Phil.* p. 280.

Absolute. Creation is a free act. As to why this world came into existence or any world at all, "we have to answer that it is an expression of the freedom of the Absolute. It is not necessary for the Absolute to express any of its possibilities. If this possibility is expressed, it is a free act of the Absolute"[1] "So far as the Absolute is concerned, the creation of the world makes no difference to it. It cannot add anything to or take away anything from the Absolute . . . We cannot say that the world follows from the nature of the Absolute even as the conclusion of the syllogism follows from the premises, as Spinoza would have us believe. The Absolute is the ground of the world only in the sense that a possibility of the Absolute is the logical prius of the world. The world would not be but for this possibility in the Absolute":[2]

"God is the Absolute with reference to this possibility of which He is the source and creator". God is the Absolute considered as the ground of this world. "Even as the world is a definite manifestation of one specific possibility of the Absolute, God with whom the worshipper stands in personal relation is the very Absolute in the world context and is not a mere appearance of the Absolute"[3] As a creator God is personal while the Absolute is impersonal. But the "life of a personal being is not possible except in relation to an environment. If God has no environment on which He acts, He cannot be personal".[3] "God can only be a creative personality acting on an environment, which, though dependent on God, is not God",[4] In other words. God can be conceived as a creator because of His attempting to actualize an unrealized possibility in the Absolute. Things that are experienced by us as *being* in this world, or as possessed of being are that part of the possibility of the Absolute which has been already actualized. The unactualized part of the possibility can be called, therefore, non-being. God is trying to turn this non-being into being, actualize the unrealized potential. The non-being is, therefore, the environment by which God is faced, and on which the creative effort of God is directed. When the non-being is reduced fully to being, the dualism between God and the given environment ceases, the distinction between the creator and the created vanishes; "God lapses into the Absolute". The world fully returns to God, or what is the same thing, God is fully manifested in the world.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 285—6.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* p. 282.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 283.

The Absolute is timeless. Time begins with creation. "The Newtonian conception of time as a prior frame work within which events happen . . is now given up. Time has no existence apart from events. It is a conceptual construction from the experience of successive events."[1] The world as totality of events is in time. Its evolution and history are "real and not mere appearances or illusions". Time is also real for God in the sense that God executes designs and the conception of the design is prior temporally to the realization of it. But the world, and so also time, are finite, as having a beginning and an end. "If we give up this view we will be committed to the belief in the eternity of this world. A dualism of God and the world where one of them will have a precarious, illusory existence will result". The possibility of the end of the world and time means that the "ideal of the world is not an ever elusive perfectibility", but that it "will one undated day be achieved".[2]

The emergence of life in matter, mind in life and self-consciousness in the human mind is the process of cosmic evolution by which God attempts to manifest himself in the world, tries to realize the potential ideal of the universe, tries, that is to say, to attain values like truth, goodness and beauty which are potentially contained in the Absolute.

What "appears in subhuman forms as tendency or striving becomes in man conscious will which is guided by the idea of value. Men are active agents, not passive participants in the return of all things to God. They can work with God or turn away from him. The religious soul who has direct contact with the Divine in an experience where the distance between the subject and the object, the lover and the beloved is overcome identifies itself with the Divine will and participates in the creative work of God".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 234.

[2] *Ibid.*

The human self is conceived, by Radhakrishnan, neither as *simple* nor as a *substance*. Like matter, life and other expressions of the spirit, it is an organized whole. It is the latest and highest product of the creative process of emergent evolution. As such it is much more integrated and organized than matter, life and the animal mind. While integration is automatic or instinctive in the sub-human world, it is at least partly conscious and voluntary in man. Through intelligence man can knit together the different aspects and moments of his life. He can conceive some ideals and organize all the activities of his life for the attainment of these values. The more he unifies his life in pursuit of ideals, the more organized, integrated and perfect does his self become. This unity differs from individual to individual. It is at its minimum in the abnormal cases of multiple personality. The maximum degree of unity can be attained only when the entire life is strung to one purpose; when man's physical, vital, sensitive and intellectual energies are all controlled, unified and guided by one common conscious purpose.

But this purpose can be no other than the conscious realization of man's unity with the spirit that underlies his entire existence as well as that of everything else. The spirit in man is always shining in him, even in the depths of his degradation, as the subject that transcends the empirical self and enlightens both. This subject is also the universal self, the core of all reality. In realizing his unity with the universal self or his own spiritual existence man becomes one with the universe. The internal conflict among the different aspects of his life, passions, desires, feelings, thoughts all disappear; and so also the conflicts between the self and the environment, his self and other selves. Only at this stage can we speak of the human self as being completely organized and becoming a self in the truest sense.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 284.

The attainment of this stage is possible in religious intuition, where intellect, will and emotion are fully integrated and man is one with the spirit in him. The philosophy of intuition is the dominant and persistent theme of Radhakrishnan's teachings. It draws to one brilliant focus his wide philosophic and theological scholarship, his mystic insight and great linguistic gift. It deserves, therefore, to be considered apart at some length.

(2) *Intuition*

There are three ways of knowing reality: "sense experience, discursive reasoning and intuitive apprehension."[1] Sense experience gives us the knowledge of the sensible qualities of the external world. Logical reasoning gives us knowledge of both the internal and the external, but in an indirect way through concepts. symbols. None of these gives us an immediate insight into reality. Even sense-perception is in a sense mediate, since it comes through the medium of such factors as sense-organs. But intuition is absolutely immediate. For in such knowledge the knower and the known are one; to know reality is here to *be* reality. The knowledge of the self is an example of intuitive apprehension. "We become aware of our own self, as we bebecome aware of love or anger, directly by a sort of identity with it. Self-knowledge is inseparable from self-existence."

But intuitive knowledge is not confined to the narrow region of our little self. By culture it can be widened to grasp the entire reality. As our self is more developed, so also our intuition. Intuitive knowledge is born of the identification of our self with the reality to be known.

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[1] *An Idealist view of Life*, p. 134.

The more the self is developed the greater is the reality it can absorb and identify itself with; the more of reality is known intuitively.

Intuition as a direct and absolute knowledge of reality is recognized by many eminent western thinkers like Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Bradley and Bergson. It is also admitted by many great ancient Indian thinkers like Sankara. Mystics of all ages and lands have testified to the possibility of the intuitive knowledge of God or the ultimate reality. Radhakrishnan courts the support of them in defence and explication of intuition. There are certain confusions regarding intuition which are mainly responsible for the general suspicion about it. "Intuition is not used as an apology for doctrines which either could not or would not be justified on intellectual grounds. It is not shadowy sentiment or pathological fancy fit for cranks and dancing dervishes"[1] It is distinguished from fancy or imagination by the *reality of the object*. "Just as in the common perception of finite things we become directly and inevitably aware of something which has its own definite nature which we cannot alter by our desires or imagination, even so intuitive consciousness apprehends real things which are not open to the senses. Even as there is something which is not imagined by us in our simplest perceptions and yet makes our knowledge possible, even so we have in our intuitions a real which controls our apprehension. It is not fancy or makebelieve, but a *bona fide* discovery of reality."[2] "The deepest things of life are known only through intuitive apprehension. We recognise their truth but do not reason about them. In the sphere of values we depend a good deal on this kind of knowledge."[3] Consciousness which makes us directly aware of right and wrong, and the aesthetic sense which makes us immediately aware of beauty and ugliness, are both forms of intuition.

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[1] *Contemp. Ind. Phil.*, p. 269.
[2] *An Idealist view of Life*, p. 143.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 142.

"It is unfortunate that insistence on intuition is often confused with anti-intellectualism". Bergson and Bradley have often been accused as anti-intellectualists. But intuition, as Radhakrishnan conceives it, is not antagonistic to the intellect. As he says, "Intuition which ignores intellect is useless. The two are not only incompatible but vitally united." "Intuition is beyond reason, though not against reason. As it is the *response of the whole man to reality,* it involves the activity of reason also. The truths of intuition are led up to by the work of the understanding and can be translated into language of understanding, though they are clearly intelligible only to those who already in some measure have immediate apprehension of them. Intuition is not independent but emphatically *dependent upon thought* and is immanent in the very nature of our thinking...... It is the result of a long and arduous process of study and analysis and is therefore higher than the discursive process from which it issues and on which it supervenes."[1]

Intellect, emotion and will are the fragmentary manifestations of the spiritual energy of man. They "are not cut off from one another"; "they flow into each other, modify support and control each other", because all spring from the same spiritual fount. Intuition, which makes man one with the spirit gives him the whole reality direct. Every great work of art, literature or philosophy is touched by the spirit and is rooted in some intuitive apprehension of the spirit. Similarly also every great act of morality, like Socrates's drinking hemlock or Christ's embracing the cross, which rises above traditional ethics springs from some intuitive flash of the spirit in man. Every great intellectual work, philosophical, scientific or otherwise, is also born of some direct touch with the spirit and is based, therefore, on intuition.

Intuition, as revealing the whole spirit, is regarded by Radhakrishnan as the integral whole, into which all the aspects of mind properly cultivated will develop, and will also be merged. There is as much, if not greater, need and scope for the development and cultivation of intuition as that of intellect, feeling and will. Every true religion is based on intuition, and the religious life commended by prophets, saints and seers consists in the culture of intuition through the harmonious perfection of emotion, intellect and will. Radhakrishnan reverently searches, therefore, the heart of every great religion to discover the intuitive basis from which it springs. To this purpose he specially devotes his book, *Eastern Religions and Western thought*.

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[1] *Contemp. Ind. Phil.* pp. 268-9 (our italics).

(8) *Religion*

"Religion is, in essence, experience of or living contact with ultimate reality." "Though religious experience is analogous in some respects to the other manifestations of spiritual activity, such as scientific genius, artistic creation or moral heroism, it cannot be identified with them. It is unique and autonomous. The spirit is at home with itself in religion and its life satisfies every side of our being." Therefore, religion can give us "the highest, that man can possess, constant contact with the creative principle of which life is the manifestation, coincidence with the divine will, serene calm, inward peace which no passion can disturb, no persecution can dismay."[1]

The absence of true religion is the cause of the all-round unrest and crisis in the present world. Radhakrishnan draws attention to this again and again in almost all his works and advocates a spiritual renewal, a true religious revival, which alone can save the world from the imminent disaster. The west inherited the emphasis on intellectual culture from the Greeks. The development of science and technology, and their ability to invent machines and control nature for the advantage of man have added to prestige of the intellect. The intellect and reason have come to be mistaken, as a consequence, to be the supreme glory of man. The culture of the spirit has suffered a set-back. Life has become aimless, a sport to passions, racial prejudices, national antagonisms. The neglected and suppressed spirit of man has been the cause of perpetual unrest, individual, social and national. This unrest is the sign of an unbalanced civilization which lays stress on one aspect of man and ignores the rest. It is the want, in other words, of a harmonious development of the spirit in man, such as is the ideal of religious perfection.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 275.

The east has been the birth place of great religions. But the religious traditions have got mixed up with secular interests, racial prejudices, political motives. The result has been a deporable degradation, the failure of traditional religions to perform the duty which was their exclusive privilege and right to existence.

Suppressed by scientific intellectualism and starved by traditional religions, the spirit of the modern man has always been seeking some other means of satisfying its hunger. We have as a result what Radhakrishnan calls the 'substitutes for religion'.[1]

"Those who are assailed by religious doubts are devising several ways to escape from the present confusion. In the absence of any definite direction from the leaders, they are taking to crude and amazing cults." Some are taking to theosophy, anthroposophy, Christian science, New thought and the like, while the more thoughtful prefer such less sentimental creeds as naturalistic atheism, agnosticism, scepticism, humanism, socialism, pragmatism, modernism. Radhakrishnan examines them one by one and shows that none of them proves completely satisfying to the whole man. "Their one lesson is that, notwithstanding the transformation of life, the shifting moral values and pre-occupations of the time, the primal craving for the eternal and the abiding remains inextinguishable. Unbelief is impossible. Along with a deep discontent with the standard forms of religion there is a growing seriousness about it. The forms are dissolving but the need persists. The millions who neither dare to have a religion nor do without one are rushing hither and thither seeking for direction."[2] "The world is passing through a period of

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[1] *An Idealist etc.*, *chap*. II, *Eastern Religions etc*. Lect. I.
[2] *An Idealist etc.*, p. 82.

The brief sketch of Radhakrishnan's philosophy drawn above would be sufficient to show how western and eastern ideas blend together to form a new species of contemporary idealism with a deep spiritual note, catholic outlook, a quick appreciation of the eternal values developed by the human race, and a confident optimism as to the future of human civilisation. Its distinguishing feature is not metaphysical subtlety, but its clear presentation of up-to-date human issues and problems and their possible solution. If philosophers of the present age have fallen into disrepute for tackling only abstract problems and for failing to guide men in practical life, Radhakrishnan at least attempts to repudiate the charge. Such of the present generation as still expect such a duty from philosophers can turn to Radhakrishnan's writings for an ennobling lead in life, for an ideal which individuals, societies and nations can profess and practise to establish the kingdom of spirit on earth and help the advent of a more harmonious and peaceful state of human existence.

The world is witnessing to-day the crumbling of ideals before the devastating acts of dictators who can organize the baser passions and exploit the innocent. There is no dearth of wise men now; but wisdom is silent, passions rule. What is wanted, now more than ever, is the compelling voice of the dictator combined with the noble insight of a philosopher. Radhakrishnan is among the very few who in the present world fulfil this urgent need—but unfortunately they are all too few!

CHAPTER IV

PRAGMATISM

1. Introduction

According to William James, one of the founders of Pragmatism, "The term is derived from the same Greek word 'pragma', meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into Philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled, 'How to make our Ideas clear',[1] in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year, Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our *beliefs are really rules for our action,* said that to develop a thought's meaning we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that *conduct is for us its sole significance.* And the tangible fact at the root of all thought distinction, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible *difference of practice.* To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what *conceivable effects of a practical kind* the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all".[2]

This lengthy quotation is justified by the fact that it contains what is taken by James as the basis of the modern pragmatic creed. The insight and wisdom of Peirce are being more and more appreciated as time goes by, and he is still a source of inspiration to some of the greatest thinkers of the day.[3] It is not however accurate to say that the term, pragmatism, was first introduced into philosophy by Peirce. As Dewey points out, Peirce did not really use the word in the article referred to by James, nor did he himself coin it. Peirce himself says that the idea was suggested to him by Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and the term by his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Yet Peirce deserves some credit for laying down the germinal principle of pragmatism in this new form. But to William James belongs the credit of making extensive application of this principle, popularizing it and bringing into existence a vigorous pragmatic movement. Though undoubtedly the greatest among pragmatists, James, like ancient Indian philosophers, attributes the various elements of his own thought to previous thinkers, and even to some contemporaries, and prefers to keep himself in the background.

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[1] This article is now included in the collection of Peirce's papers pub. by Kegan Paul under the title, *Chance, Love and Logic.*

[2] James, *Pragmatism,* pp. 46-7 (our italics). For history of the term, *vide* L. Stein, *Philosophical Currents of the Present Day* (Trans. by S. K. Maitra, pp. 49f.).

[3] E. g. Dewey, *vide* his *Logic* (1938).

Pragmatism, says James, is nothing new. It is only 'a new name for some old ways of thinking'. The pragmatic method was applied even by early philosophers. "Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means."[2] Among more recent logicians, philosophers and scientists James mentions Sigwart, Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, Milhaud, Poincare, Duhem, Ruyssen and others who show pragmatic tendencies; and Mill, to whom he dedicates Pragmatism, is described as "our leader were he alive today." Among continental writers the names of Papini (Italy) and Simmel (Germany) and Blondel (France) are also worth mention.

Notwithstanding these facts, the modern pragmatic movement has rightly been regarded as an American one.[4]

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[1] Vide Dewey's paper in *Chance, Love and Logic*, pp. 301-2.

[2] *Pragmatism*, p. 50.

[3] *Vide*. L. J. Walker, *Theories of knowledge*.

[4] *Vide* Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, p. 252 (Eng. trans. by Hannay and Collingwood) and Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, p. 145-6. It is, however, too rash to call it 'bourgeois philosophy' as some Marxists do, or think of it as the expression of American commercialism' as Russell does to get from Dewey the following rebuff : "the statement seemed to me to be that order of interpretation which would say that English neo-realism is a reflection of the snobbish aristocracy of the English etc.," *The Phil. of John Dewey*, p. 527.

it reflects the practical experimental outlook on life which distinguishes the new continent and it is also the philosophy of two of the most famous thinkers, William James and John Dewey, that America has yet produced. The American school of critical Realism also, as we shall see later, accepts pragmatism purged of its subjective empirical bias. The movement found very little support in Great Britain, the only great representative there being F. C. S. Schiller. James (1842-1910), Schiller (1864-1937) and Dewey (1859-) are the three chief thinkers through whose writings the movement has developed in its different phases.[1]

Of these three leaders of pragmatism, James lays a greater part of the foundation. His books on psychology stress the dynamic nature of mind, the selective and voluntaristic nature of perception and reasoning, and the biological significances of emotion[2]—all favouring the pragmatic attitude. His *Pragmatism* is a clear presentation of the faith showing how the pragmatic principle can be applied to the solution of philosophical problems. *Meaning of Truth, The Will to Believe* and *The Pluralistic Universe, Some Problems of Philosophy, The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and other books contain pragmatic treatment of special problems.

When German idealism, popularized by the great English idealists, dominated the American Universities and influenced the philosophy of Royce and many other university professors, James appeared on the scene as a national thinker trying to voice the unexpressed feelings of his own country and free them from foreign interference. He represented the spirit of protest[3] against absolutism, intellectualism, rationalism and idealism which had overpowered the native genius of America. He helped the young Americans, "who cut their philosophical teeth" under him at Harvard, to gather courage, think freely and fight Absolute idealism. Perry, Montague, Lovejoy and many other leaders of contemporary American realism and empiricism freely acknowledge their debts to James. But his influence on his colleagues and friends was no less tangible. The biological outlook which James acquired as the result of his medical training influenced Dewey as well, and the dynamic outlook of James infected, as we saw already, even the idealism of Royce who regarded will, rather than thought, as the fundamental nature of mind. A man of broad culture and wide sympathies, James felt at home in many spheres of life and thought:—art, science, philosophy and religion of all varieties. His influence was equally wide; it was neither confined simply to pragmatism nor even to his own country. We shall see hereafter how his dynamic philosophy, his novel conception of time[1] (the duration or span of the specious present) etc. influence Bergson, Whitehead and many other great philosophers of to-day.[2]

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[1] *Vide* Preface to *Studies in Humanism* (1st Edn.), for an account of Pragmatic Thinkers.

[2] *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 478.

[3] *Vide* his article, 'On some Hegelisms,' *Mind*, April 1882 (Reprinted in *The Will to Believe*).

Schiller, almost the sole representative of the pragmatic movement in England, distinguished himself as the founder of Humanism, a modern revival of the teaching of Protagoras that man is the measure of things—*Homo mensura.*[3] Humanism, as Schiller conceives it, is far wider than pragmatism. As he says, "Pragmatism will seem a special application of Humanism to the theory of knowledge. But humanism will seem more universal. It will seem to be possessed of a method which is applicable, universally to ethics, to aesthetics, to metaphysics, to theology, to every concern of man, as well as to the theory of knowledge". This wide applicability of humanism Schiller actually shows in his numerous writings, books and articles, dealing with diverse philosophical topics. *Humanism. Riddles of the Sphinx, Formal Logic, Logic for Use, Must Philosophers Disagree* are the more important of his books. Schiller's writings are mostly polemical. His style is marked by a tone of sarcastic humour without which he could not dispose of the opponent's views. Throughout his long career he fought with rare singleness of purpose and undaunted zeal against absolutism, intellectualism, formalism and transcendentalism. His Formal Logic is a detailed criticism of formal logic showing the barrenness of logic divorced from psychology and the concrete facts of human life.

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[1] *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 608. and *Text Book of Psychology,* p. 280.

[2] *Vide. Contemporary American Phil.*, 2 Vols. and *John Dewey, The Man and his Phil.*, pp. 93f.

[3] *Studies in Humanism.* 2nd Essay (From Plato to Protagoras).

Dewey's contribution to the movement is best summed up by the two key words *instrumentalism* and *experimentalism*. In keeping with the voluntaristic outlook he regards knowledge and every thing connected with it (*e.g.*, truth, science, logic) as instrument for successful action in life, and he looks upon life, in all its phases, as an *experiment* of the individual trying for successful adjustment. He began his long philosophical career as a believer in absolute idealism. Peirce's 'laboratory habit of mind' and James's biological outlook and experimental method in philosophy, and lastly his own appointment to the joint headship of the Philosophy and the Education departments of the University of Chicago, had a good deal to do with the gradual transformation of his faith 'from absolutism to experimentalism'.[1] Dewey's interest in education brought to a common focus the ideas and talents he possesses as a philosopher, logician, psychologist and social reformer. Viewing the child biologically as a young helpless animal and the democratic American Society as the environment to which it has to adjust itself and in which it has to develop its individuality, and believing further that "All that is human is learned", Dewey tries to solve the problem of education in a truly practical way. The child must learn through action. If knowledge is nothing but an instrument for action, mere theoretical knowledge is not worth the name. Knowledge is really "an action system, an attitude, a disposition to marshal past experiences to new needs" and, therefore, constructive activity, "searching, handling evidence, putting matters to the proof, helping and being helped, co-operating, making up one's own mind, doing one's part—all must have their place in the first school if they are to have their place in the last school and in the life which follows it''.[1] The school, therefore, must be life, not a mere preparation for life, the student must "*learn by doing*". "The activity school", which Dewey's system has brought into existence, "trains its children to choose their own purpose, to fix upon their own objectives and then to search for the means of accomplishing them, and to do these things co-operatively, that is, with and by the help of their fellows". The school thus becomes a place for play and work and for learning theories in their context when the appetite for more knowledge is whetted by practical difficulties. Dewey carries thus the pragmatic biological outlook of James to completion in a particular direction and earns the unique fame of being the only great educationist philosopher of the present day. He is assigned a place among the greatest philosophers of education, the world has ever produced—Socrates, Plato, John Locke and Johann Friedrich Herbart.[2]

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[1] *Vide, Contemporary American Phil.*, Dewey's personal statement (vol. 2), and *John Dewey* etc. (G. H. Mead's contribution. The Phil. of Royce, James and Dewey in their American setting).

Dewey's writings cover a very large field—ethics, psychology, logic and education.[3] But all of them are not of pragmatic interest. His *Studies in Logical Theory* was generously regarded by James (in the Preface to *Pragmatism*) as the foundation of the pragmatic movement in America. *Essays in Experimental Logic* attempts to show that "knowledge cannot serve two masters", that its purpose is action and not also presentation of reality. *How we think*, though chiefly bearing on the educative process, makes clear the biological conception of reflective thinking as an attempt evoked by practical "perplexity, confusion or doubt", and not simply arising spontaneously. *The Quest for certainty* contains the epistemology of biological pragmatism. *In Logic*, his recent great work, the basic ideas of his earlier works are developed and modified, and logic is regarded, after Peirce, as the theory of Inquiry, reflective thought being identified with objective inquiry. He attempts to show here how the interconnection of the ferent topics of logic can be understood in the light of the biological individual, placed in a world of doubts and difficulties, and enquiring and exploring the possible paths of adjustment. "The basic conception of inquiry as determination of an indeterminate situation not only enables the vexed topic of the relation of judgment and propositions to obtain an objective solution, but, in connection with the conjugate relation of observed and conceptual material, enables a coherent account of the different propositional forms to be given". Moreover, "Application of this principle enables an empirical account to be given of logical forms" and "the interpretation of them as *a priori* is unnecessary".[1] Formal Logic is thus shown to be a mere abstraction oblivious of the original purpose of logic in life.

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[1] *John Dewey* etc. p. 22. [2] *Ibid.* p. 9.

[3] For the great contributions and influence of Dewey, *vide The Philosophy of John Dewey* (Library of Living Philosophers Series), 1939.

Dewey thus develops, from another quarter, a position akin to that of Schiller. The distinction between the two, as we shall see, chiefly lies in the objective leaning of the former and the subjective one of the latter. There were two strains of thought in James, as Dewey points out,[2] a subjective one (developing out of an empirical reaction against rationalism) and an objective one (arising out of the influence of biology). Dewey is influenced by the latter. He is thus more in accord with Peirce whose inspiration he feels even in his recent work, *Logic*. And here he avoids the use of the word pragmatism to avoid misconception and controversy, though he admits that the work is thoroughly pragmatic in the true sense of the word, namely, "the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations".[3]

Though Peirce was regarded by James as the founder of the first principle of pragmatism, Peirce did not look with any great favour at the deductions made by the pragmatists from his doctrine, for erecting a systematic philosophy. His pragmatism was meant to be confined to the logical method of ascertaining the meanings of intellectual concepts by reference to practical consequences.[1] In order to disown the later developments of pragmatism, he liked to keep his own theory distinct by calling it *pragmaticism*.[2] Peirce is regarded now by the consensus of modern American experts as one of their greatest thinkers. But his title to fame depends not on pragmatism, but on the great versatility and originality with which he turned, though in a fitful manner, to a variety of subjects such as astronomy, physics, symbolic logic, probability and even scholastic philosophy, and left on each the marks of a genius full of new suggestive ideas. Some of his important writings bearing on pragmatism are found in the collection of his papers published under the title, *Chance, Love and Logic.*

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[1] *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry*, Preface.
[2] *Contemp. Am. Phil.* Vol. 2, pp. 23-4.
[3] *Logic*, Preface.

Though James did not like to confine pragmatism to the extremely narrow scope mentioned by Peirce, he holds still, with great emphasis, the view that pragmatism is only a method, rather than a system of philosophy. It is "only an attitude of orientation", he says, "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts".[3] So also does Papini, the Italian pragmatist, hold that the pragmatic method is *like a hotel corridor* leading to different chambers of philosophy and of practical life, such as atheism, practice of religion, idealistic metaphysics and even refutation of the possibility of metaphysics.[4]

We can realize the truth of this assertion if we remember that even absolute idealism, such as that of Bradley, adopts partially the pragmatic criterion for the phenomenal world, and that, on the other hand, Bergson, Whitehead and critical realists also take recourse to it, as we shall find, for different purposes. Moreover, C. I. Lewis, an old student of James, establishes a happy alliance between pragmatism and symbolic logic, which Schiller[1] used regard as the last trench of a retreating formal logic. But most recent is the further crossing between logistic and pragmatism yielding the youngest movement of logical positivism. We shall also find later on in the chapter on Logical Positivism how Peirce's principle of determining meaning by ascertaining its consequences has entered in a new form into the central conception of meaning in that school. Dewey has also associated himself with the logical positivists in producing the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, by writing a monograph on the Theory of Valuation.

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[1] *Chance, Love etc.* p. 306.
[2] *Monist* XV. 2, quoted by Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, p. 5 f. n.
[3] *Pragmatism* pp. 54-5.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 54.

The pragmatic method has also been utilized in social and political fields. As Hocking says, "There was a strand of pragmatism in Tolstoi's philosophy. Mussolini has recently acknowledged that he owes much to Nietzsche and William James for his method of reaching his political beliefs. They led him to discard 'pure reason' or '*a priori* principles', and to adopt those policies which work out best in practice: the true policies are the expedient policies: this is political pragmatism".[2]

But what has come to be known as the pragmatic school in philosophy is confined to the few thinkers who made most of the pragmatic method in solving philosophical problems. The chief among them being James, Schiller and Dewey, our account of pragmatism here will be a presentation of the views of these thinkers under the heads, (1) The Psychological Background, (2) Theory of Knowledge (3) Logic, (4) Theory of Reality and (5) Morality and Religion.

2. The Psychological Background

The psychological works of James furnish the background of pragmatism. James breaks away from rationalistic psychology which was based on the assumption of mind being a permanent spiritual substance lying behind all mental phenomena. He approaches the study of mind in an empirical way, considering man, in the light of biology

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[1] *Vide* Schiller's, Mutivalued Logics and others, *Mind*, Oct. 1935.
[2] W. E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, p. 144.

and physiology, as an individual organism developing a body and experience by its constant struggle for adjustment to the environment. 'Mind' thus becomes a name for human experience changing and growing along with the body in the process of time and it is, therefore, a fit object for experimental study. But though agreeing to a certain extent with earlier empiricists James differs from them in some very important respects. First of all, he does not accept their theory that mind or experience is ultimately composed of *atomic* sensations which are externally related by certain laws of *association*. On the contrary he holds that experience is primarily a *seamless* and gapless stream of *continuous* consciousness, and sensations are but the bits chosen and abstracted by the mind out of this stream in the interest of life. Secondly, mind is not a passive *tabula rasa*, but essentially *active* and *selective*, the different phases of the mind being nothing but the efforts of the individual organism to safeguard the various interests of life in its struggle for existence. The basic character of mind is will and not passive thought, action, not cognition. Knowledge is a process serving the purpose of life. Thirdly, what follows from the above, perceiving is not representing or copying reality, but *rather* responding to and *reacting* on reality, which also is changing and changed by mind.

James points out five important characters of 'thought' (by which he means "every form of consciousness indiscriminately")[1]. (1) Thought is *personal*. It is always experienced to be related to an individual who thinks. (It is not, therefore, impersonal nor absolute as the absolute idealists hold. It arises to serve the purpose of the individual and to secure its ends in the changing circumstances of life). (2) Thought is, in *constant change* (it is not an unchanging entity lying beyond and behind all changes, as some absolute idealists hold). (3) Thought *is sensibly continuous*—no change is abrupt and all states, though separated in time, are felt to belong to the same self. (The self is not, however, conceived here as an abiding entity existing behind the changing states of thought. It is a name for the *stream of consciousness* of which every ought is a current. The idea of a stream carries the as of change as well as of continuity without the pposition of an unchanging entity which is necessary for ose thinkers who take a disconnected view of experience d want, therefore, something, other than the dis-ntinuous bits of experience, to explain continuity. ames repeatedly points out the mistake of this latter view, nd calls attention to the fact that we *feel* every state of xperience emerging, without any gap, out of a previous xperience, and itself gliding, without any break, into the ext experience. Even when a man recovers from a fit of nconsciousness he *feels* no gap separating the state just efore the fit and that just after it. These two states are felt as continuous, the gap being only inferred from objective signs showing lapse of time.[1] Experience is, herefore, said to be *sensibly* continuous).

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[1] *Principles of Psychology*. Vol. I, pp. 224f.

James's view of mind would be found thus to be at variance with the three basic conceptions of the self: that of the spiritualist who regards it as an unchanging substance, that is, as a soul, that of the transcendentalist like Kant who regards it as a synthetic principle lying above time and the changing experiences, and that of the empiricist like Hume for whom the self is nothing but a 'bundle' of sense-experiences.[2] The bundle theory misses the flowing continuity which experience can always be felt to be, and it leads to the hypothesis of an unchanging substance or a principle which can tie the bundle into a unity, though such an hypothesis is not at all satisfactory since the unchanging cannot enter into the time series to be able to unite the changing states. James thus shows that the three common views of the self are based on a distorted view of the stream of experience, which taken fully at its face value would account for both its contents and their inter-relations. (4) Thought possesses the function of knowing and its objects appear to be independent of itself. (The object is not felt to be identical with the consciousness of the object, as some idealists hold. We note here the realistic trend of James's thought.) (5) Lastly, thought is *interested* in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and *welcomes* or *rejects*, that is, chooses from among them all the while.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 237-8.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 342ff. and p. 370.

The selective nature of human consciousness is shown by James in different ways.[1] To begin at the bottom, senses themselves are but organs of selection. Out of the infinite chaos of movements going on in the outer world, each sense organ picks out and responds to those which fall within its specific range, and shuts out the rest. Then, attention picks out again only some of the sensations worthy of notice at the moment suppressing all the rest. Interest of the perceiver regulates attention. "Millions of items of the outer order are present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. *My experience is what I agree to attend to.* Only those items which I notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies in every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness impossible for us even to conceive."[2] This selective activity is ignored, James notes, by the English empiricist school, even by Spencer, the biological empiricist. All of them look upon the perceiver as a passive receiver of external influences. Perception, and even memory and conception are selective in another respect. One or some of the many aspects of the object perceived are selected by the mind as *the* representative of the thing. Thus, for example, we notice, remember and think of the circular shape of the coin, its frontal view, as *the* shape of it, though different shapes are presented by it from different angles. The selected aspect of the thing is made thus to mean the entire thing,—it is clothed with a meaning the interpretation of which regulates the dividual's response. Going further up, James notices the selective activity of reasoning. Mind draws different conclusions from the same premises under different circumstances in accordance with the changing interests of practical life. The aesthetic consciousness shows, again, great selective activity. The artist finds in the world beauty and ugliness, harmony and disharmony, scarcely noticed by the ordinary man. Lastly, moral consciousness shows in a supreme way the role of choice without which morality loses all meaning. Thus the selective activity of the mind is found in its divergent phases.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 284ff.

[2] *Ibid*. pp. 402-3.

While cognition is itself a form of mental activity and is also a preparation for overt action, emotion, according to James, is identical with certain physiological movements, internal and external, which accompany the perception or thought of the object exciting the emotion. It is not a fact, he elaborately argues, that there is anything like a state of consciousness coming in between the perception of the exciting fact and the bodily changes which characterize an emotion. On the contrary, "*the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* is *the emotion*".[1] Emotion is reduced, without residue, to bodily changes or 'reverberations' produced by the exciting fact on the 'sound board' of the body, and biologically considered these changes are the "weakened repetitions", the surviving remnants, of instinctive movements which were once useful, to the distant ancestors, for meeting the exciting situation. Cognition, will and emotion are all thus found to be different kinds of active processes ultimately connected with some necessity of life or another.

It is this dynamic, purposive, biological view of mind which lies at the back of pragmatic thought. Perry, a devoted pupil of James and now himself an eminent philosopher of America, admirably sums up James's conception of mind as follows:— "If we assemble these various aspects of mind, we can picture it in its concrete wholeness. The organism operates interestedly and selectively within its natural environment; and the manifold elements thus selected compose the mind's content. But this content when viewed by itself, exhibits characteristic groupings patterns and conjunctions. these the knowledge process is the most striking. B the body is the original instrument of selection and the source of individual bias, so bodily states and bodily orientation will be the nucleus of each individual field of content".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* vol. 2. p. 449.

3. The Theory of Knowledge

(1) *The two-fold Anti-intellectualism.*

Pragmatism is chiefly a theory of knowledge, a new conception of the nature, meaning and function of the knowing process. It is a revolt against intellectualism or rationalism of the Absolute Idealist, and is, therefore, often described as anti-intellectualism. But it is necessary to understand what this description really means. There are two different meanings, implied by intellectualism though they are not usually ditinguished. Intellectualism may imply the *epistemological* theory that intellect or reason is the means of *knowing* reality. In this aspect it is opposed to mysticism and immediatism which we find, for example, in Bergson, and even in Bradley. Most Hegelians are intellectualists in this sense as they hold that philosophy, the highest perfection of *reason*, is the source of the knowledge of Reality. Intellectualism may imply also a theory of *reality* which holds that reason or intellect is the basic character of the mind, and that *Reality* (which is mental) *is rational* in nature. This theory also is found in the average Hegelian and very remarkably in Mctaggart (who tries to reduce will to thought), but not in Royce or the Italian absolutists (who regard activity or will as the basic nature of mind and Reality), and not even in Bradley (who holds Reality to be of the nature of pure, unmediated experience). Anti-intellectualism also may bear, therefore, two meanings, epistemological and metaysical. We should ascertain here in which of these two senses it is applicable to pragmatism.

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[1] Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 355-6.

Pragmatism is epistemological anti-intellectualism in a special sense. For though it does not distrust the intellect like Bergson and does not hold that reality can be known only by mystic intuition, it does distrust the purely theoretical work of the intellect which leads to abstractions falsifying the real nature of experience and indulging in theories dissociated from practical life. Pragmatism insists on intellect being treated as an instrument biologically evolved for better practical adjustment, and, therefore, it is not to be valued for its own sake. Knowledge is treated as a plan or preparation for action, rather than a revelation of reality. In a word, pragmatism denounces the ambition of the intellect to outgrow its original practical *role* and its attempt to set up the independent ideal of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. It subordinates the intellect to the will.

Pragmatism is metaphysical anti-intellectualism too, in a double sense. It denies first of all that *intellect* is the basic character of the mind. Mind is essentially a dynamic process by which the individual organism tries for adjustment to the environment or for changing it according to its own purpose. Will, rather than thought, is the basic nature of our mind. Secondly, pragmatism also denies that *reality* is of the nature of reason (or intellect) as the Hegelian thinks it to be. Reality, too, is a changing, dynamic process. The panlogism of the Absolute idealist conceives the universe as a system determined through and through by the laws of reason, and even change or progress is conceived as a dialectical process invariably taking place according to its fixed law of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The result is the conception of a 'block universe' as James calls it.[1] Pragmatism, we shall see later, is a revolt against this static metaphysics.

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[1] *Vide The Will to Believe*, p. 292: "In the universe of Hegel—the absolute block whose parts have no play, the pure plethora of necessary being with the oxygen of possibility all suffocated out of its lungs—there can be neither good nor bad, but one dead level of mere fate."

Absolute Idealism was the philosophical upshot of a period of scientific thought which conceived nature to be completely regulated by inexorable laws, and the universe to be rigidly determined in its constitution so that if its basic principles were discovered they would lead one logically to a system of truths as certain as geometry. Pragmatism is the philosophical outcome of the new era of science which has replaced the static view of nature by a plastic and dynamic one, and which has come to realise the possibility of so many alternative interpretations of the world from different angles of vision. "There are so many geometries, so many logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each one of them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us. We have scientific laws now treated as so much 'conceptual short-hand', true so far as they are useful but no farther."[1]

The first reaction of this breakdown in the older conceptions of scientific truth is agnosticism, total despair about the possibility of knowledge. Pragmatism is a kind of recovery from this stunning effect, and an attempt to discover a *modus vivendi* out of the total ruin of faith. It is thus a via media between absolute cocksureness and total despair, between rationalism and agnosticism. Its solution is humanism which is a form of empiricism. It consists in showing that though our knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality may be impossible, we can have knowledge enough for our practical life, and moreover, that knowledge biologically considered, is meant for nothing more than being a human instrument for life's activity, and that even reality in so far as it concerns man is what comes within his experience. Cocksureness and agnosticism are both replaced thus by humanism, and absolutism by relativism. To understand this new theory of knowledge more fully we shall have to consider in some detail the nature and function of knowledge, and the conceptions of truth and error.

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[1] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 58.

(2) *The Nature and Function of knowledge*

Knowledge, according to pragmatism, is rooted in experience. But the meaning of experience is not always unambiguous[1] and it requires, therefore, a little discussion as to the exact sense in which 'experience' is understood by the pragmatist. Though the English empiricists insist that experience is the basis of knowledge and the foundation of their philosophy they do not always clearly state what they mean. For most of them experience means sense-experience alone. James also begins his empiricism by admitting sense-experience as the only ultimate source of knowledge and sensible things as the only realities directly known. The function of sense-experience is, he then holds, to resemble reality. As he says in a paper, *The Function of Cognition* (1884),[2] "Contemned though they be by some thinkers, these sensations are the mother earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last limits, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the mind. To find such sensational *termini* should be our aim with all our higher thought." Again, "These percepts, these *termini*, these sensible things, these mere matters of acquaintance, are the only realities we ever directly know."[3] But James gradually modifies[4] this position and takes a wider view of experience to include within it not only sensation, but also the higher mental activities generally classified under conception. He also gives us the earlier view of "percepts as the only realm of reality", and treats "concepts as a co-ordinate realm." In the final phase of James's philosophy experience becomes an all-inclusive term in which not only perception and conception, but also our feelings of activity (such as sustaining, persevering, striving)[5] anticipating, expecting, fearing, doubting, and all moral, aesthetic and religious feelings—in short everything that we can directly feel, and has practical consequences, is included.[1] He likes to call this view *radical empiricism,* and the all-inclusive stuff *pure experience.* "To be radical," he says, "an empiricism must neither admit into constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."[2] Though at times James says[3] that there is no logical connection between pragmatism and this radical form of empiricism. and that one can be a pragmatist without being a radical empiricist, we find, in actuality, that his own pragmatic faith develops to its final form in and through such empiricism, and it is difficult, as well as unnecessary, to keep these two distinct in an account of his pragmatic philosophy. In fact, in course of his exposition, and his replies to the critics of pragmatism we find him, again and again, taking his stand on radical empiricism. He also admits later that the "pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail"[4] and he explains the former in terms of the latter and *vice versa.* It is necessary, therefore, to state here the distinctive characters of this radical empiricism.

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[1] The interested reader may refer to an article, *What is Empirical?* by J. Loewenberg *Jour. of Phil.*, May 28. 40.

[2] *Vide, The Meaning of Truth,* pp. 1-41.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 39. [4] *Ibid.* pp. 39-40, Note.

[5] *Essays in Radical Empiricism,* p. 183.

James himself sets forth very clearly three of its basic points thus, "Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion."

"The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist *ad libitum,* but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate)".

"The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more nor less so, than the things themselves." "The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure."[1]

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[1] *Pragmatism,* p. 80.

[2] *Essays in Radical etc.* p. 42.

[3] *Vide* Preface to *Pragmatism, IX.*

[4] *Vide* Preface to The *Meaning of Truth.*

It should be noted in the above statement that James does not deny the existence of things beyond our experience, and consequently radical empiricism is not solipsism.[2] He only urges that as philosophers cannot possibly discuss things which they cannot experience (taking 'experience' in the widest sense), they should wisely recognize this fact and agree on the practical rule that discussion must be in terms of experienceable facts. The postulate does not, therefore, amount to a theory of the non-existence of the unexperienceable. The objective world which enters the pale of philosophical discussion is the world experienced around us, and the *real* also is that which is real for experience (as distinguished from what experience itself rejects as unreal). As a pragmatist James, as well as Schiller and Dewey, finds it useless to speak of reals which lie beyond experience and do not make any difference in experience.

Another point of great importance in the above description of radical empiricism is that experience does not simply reveal things but also their connections. Experience, as we saw also in his psychology, is felt as a seamless, jointless, continuous flow. It is only by abstraction and by the analytic work of intellect on concrete and pure experience that terms are separated out of it and given a sort of independent existence. The English empiricists proceed in this abstract manner and, therefore, light upon the disconnected contents of experience which they find it difficult to re-combine into the unity of one individual mind. The rationalists, on the other hand, starting from a similar static and disconnected view of experience and feeling the inadequacies of the empiricists' explanations of relations, invent "trans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual categories and powers, or Selves".

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Vide Essays in Radical Empiricism,* IX and X.

If "empiricism had only been radical and taken everything that comes" within experience no such artificial theory would have been necessary for explaining the interconnections among objects.[1] The ordinary empiricist abstracts from the continuous flux of experience, sensations of chairs, tables, pens, etc. and fails to notice that whenever such objects are perceived they are perceived as related by intermediate connectives, which along with these objects form one world of experience. It fails to observe that every one of our experiences has a *fringe* or edge which continuously shades off into another experience and that we have thus even from the beginning a continuous whole of experience.

But while James is so emphatic about the unity and continuity that mark the experience of an individual he is equally aware of a feeling of discontinuity and disunity. Continuity is experienced between the different experiences in so far as all of them belong to the same stream of consciousness constituting *oneself* or person, and also in so far as the different objects experienced e.g. the contents of a room, appear to be connected and placed 'next to next' forming a continuous chain of objects. On the other hand, discontinuity is experienced when I try to pass from my experience to that of my neighbour, "to pass from a thing lived to another thing only conceived",[2] or when my eyes pass from the group of qualities, called a cat, moving in the room to the non-moving chairs and tables (or from the green curtain to the white wall) or when I try to pass in thought from the perceived to the unperceived beyond me. Continuities and discontinuities then "are absolutely coordinate matters of immediate feeling". "Prepositions, copulas, and conjunctions, 'is', 'isn't, 'then', 'before', 'in', 'on', 'beside', 'between', 'next', 'like', 'unlike', 'as', 'but' flower out of the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and adjectivities do, and they melt into it again as fluidity when we apply them to a new portion of the stream".[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 43-44.

[2] *Ibid.* p.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 95.

It is seen, therefore, that this view of experience is different from the monistic theory of one all-pervasive experience or consciousness advocated by absolute idealists. It is, on the contrary, a pluralistic view which emphasizes the existence of *different* experiences. While rationalism "tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts", empiricism "starts with parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order".[1] As an empiricist James espouses this second view and gives a warning against the monistic interpretation of 'pure experience'. "Although for fluency's sake" he says, "I myself spoke early in this article of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say there is no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are 'natures' in the things experienced. If you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of, the answer is always the same: 'It is made of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not'. *Experience is also a collective name for all these sensible natures*, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for 'being') there appears no universal element of which all things are made".[2] James's view is thus clearly pluralistic, and he likes to call it a *mosaic* philosophy.

Neither should one suppose that it is a kind of pluralistic idealism. Experience, for James, is a *neutral* entity which is neither mental nor material. In his celebrated article 'Does consciousness exist?',[3] he affirms that consciousness is "the name of a non-entity, and has no right to a place among first principles".[4] But though denying consciousness as an entity of this kind, James does not deny it altogether. To avoid such misinterpretation he adds, "Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being (similarly there is no 'activity of consciousness as such'), contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a *function in experience* which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is evoked. That function is knowing".[1] Experience is neither subjective nor objective if it is considered by itself and without reference to other experiences. It is *neutral* as such. But when an experience, say of a room, is considered (by a new *retrospective* experience) in relation to, that is in the context of, the other experiences of the individual it is called subjective, and when it is considered in relation to other parts of the house it is objective. The same entity, the room-experience, belongs, therefore, to two series. "The puzzle of how the one identical room can be in two places is at bottom just the puzzle of how one identical point can be on two lines. It can, if it be situated at their intersection; and similarly, if the 'pure experience' of the room were a place of intersection of two processes, which connected it with different groups of associates respectively, it could be counted twice over, as belonging to either group, and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it would remain all the time a numerically single thing".[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 41-2.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 26-7.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 1-38. (Reprinted from *Jour. of Phil., Psy. and Scientific Methods*, Sept. 1, 1904).

[4] *Ibid.* p. 2.

James differs, therefore, both from the absolute idealist who believes that the duality of the subject and object is fundamental, and requires an absolute to overcome it, and from a realist, like G. E. Moore, who also accepts this dualism and leaves it there.[3] He appeals for this purpose to different kinds of experience, perceptual and conceptual, and shows that there is no initial duality between the mental state and the object. When I perceive a room or remember it or imagine it, it is just the room which appears and there is no additional appearance of the consciousness of the room. This consciousness is nothing but a description of the presence of the room in the group or stream of experiences constituting my biography ; it is the room in the context of other experiences of *mine*. The 'that' of the room, which is initially, a neutral experience is related to the apperceptive mass of my life-long experiences. It is then that we say, "We *know what* it is". But at the same time we also locate the room in a spatial surrounding, where it has existed for many years, and in that context it is spoken of as being outside the mind, in the external world.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 3-4 (our italics)

[2] *Ibid.* p. 12.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 5-7.

Pure or neutral experience, James says in another place, is the name of "the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that, which is not yet any definite what, tho' ready to be all sorts of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects that don't appear, changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught. Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation".[1]

This attempt to explain every phenomenon as pure experience or as its derivative, and the abolition of the radical dualism between thoughts and things has to face some serious objections, which James tries to meet.[2] The most important objection is: If the same pure experience (taken twice in different contexts) appear now as thought and then as things, how could there be such a radical difference between the attributes of the two kinds of phenomena? "As thing, the experience is extended, as thought, it occupies no space or place. As thing it is red, hard, heavy, but who ever heard of a red, hard or heavy thought?" In reply, James points out that thought and things are not so different as Descartes and others try to show. On the contrary there are many common attributes. For example, both are related to time, can be compared, arranged and so on. Again we often describe thoughts by adjectives applied to things, thoughts are said, for example, to be beautiful, interesting, confused, general, particular and so forth. Feelings are often described also as cold, warm and ugly. Even extension is not absent in thought. Without extension how could we picture in thought a foot-rule or a square yard? All these examples would go to prove that there is a good deal in common between the subjective and the objective. The two worlds differ not by their opposite attributes, but by the relations in which these stand among themselves. What we call objects or things of the outer world maintain a rigid, invariable, active kind of relation among themselves. What we call thoughts or subjective phenomena, do not do so. The objective fire always burns the objective stick, the objective water puts out the objective fire, the objective pin always pricks the objective body. But the mental fire may or may not burn the mental stick. We can imagine a fire being set to a stick, and still think of the stick remaining unburnt. Similarly we may think of water being blazing, a pin being run into the body and yet no pain being felt and so on. Similarly physical extensions are experienced always as excluding one another and maintaining fixed distances. But mental extensions show no such stubborn relation. (We can imagine an elephant shrinking into the size of an ant, can think of New York standing on the Thames next to London and so on.) The experiences which arise through sense-perception generally have a determinate order of relations, and experiences arising in imagination generally show a lack of such relations. Therefore, they are classed apart though both kinds are nothing but experiences. These experiences are different not in their intrinsic natures, but in respect of the relations they bear among themselves. James does not find any reason, therefore, for treating them as intrinsically different. The experiences, perceptual and conceptual, are by themselves nothing more than *phenomena* appearing before us, and they by themselves (unrelated to other phenomena) do not bear on their faces any sign of either subjectivity or objectivity. A fire appearing in perception and one in memory or imagination equally present themselves as phenomena without marks of the subjective or the objective.

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[1] *Ibid*. pp. 93-4.

[2] *Ibid*. pp. 27f.

But it may be asked : Are we not inwardly aware of our consciousness, apart from objects present to it? James replies that he does not find in internal perception any such phenomena, but on the contrary, he feels breathing and other internal activities always going on, out of which, most likely, philosophers constructed the fictitious entity they call consciousness. 'Spirit' etymologically also points to the idea of breath.[1] Moreover, even dualists like Moore admit that consciousness is diaphanous[2] or transparent. When we perceive or imagine a table, it is the table that is present to the mind, and not any consciousness of it, just as when we see through the glasses we see the object and not the glasses.

This, in brief, is the radical empiricism of James. We shall find later how his thought, especially his neutralism, influences Bertrand Russell and the American neo-realists. Russell replaces the term 'neutral experience' by 'neutral entities' to exclude the monistic and idealistic suggestions that the former is apt to give in spite of James's intentions to the contrary. Though pluralistic and naturalistic, James unlike ordinary empiricists, is not a materialist. Again and again he warns his readers against a materialistic interpretation of his empiricism. It is true that in his *Psychology* and later works he tries to explain consciousness and self in terms of physiological experiences, and goes to the length of replacing Kant's 'I think' by 'I breathe'.[3] What still stands in between his position and materialism is his neutralism, his theory that matter like mind is also a construction out of neutral experience. Experience as it appears in all its diversity, particularity and interrelatedness is the stuff, or better the entities, which we must accept at their face values. It is a phenomenalist doctrine which does not pretend to show wherefrom experience arises, but studies what it is, so far as it appears to us. The difference

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 37. [2] *Ibid.* p. 7. [3] *Ibid.* p. 37.

that is made between the subjective and the objective -
this theory is nothing more than a pragmatic one. We do
distinguish, as we have seen, between the real fire and the
imagined one, because the first *produces some effects* like
heat and burning which the latter does not.

James points out a "distinction between knowing as verified and completed, and the same knowing as in transit and on its way." In *knowledge by acquaintance* or immediate knowledge alone we have the completed process of knowing. All other cases of knowledge are only potential knowledge, that is a process which can lead towards but has not actually reached, its terminus, some immediate knowledge. In short, non-presentative knowledge is, befor verification, only the beginning of a chain of processe which when completed could be called, as a whole, th process of knowing. And we can say, even at the begin ning, that we know the object, just as at the very beginnin of a journey towards London, one can say, "I go t London". Knowing *about* an object is thus the name o a *transitive process* leading *towards* an *expected* terminus It is a sort of '*ambulation*' to or towards a terminus.[1] N alternative theory can give a more satisfactory account o it. Even by admitting the mind's mysterious power o transcending space and time one cannot avoid the questio of verification. If any claim of thought proves false o verification then mind's power of transcendence is itsel falsified.

This pragmatic empiricism of James is furthe developed by Dewey. He brings out more clearly th biological character of knowledge. Though James out grows the static empiricism of Locke and Hume in hi dynamic conception of the mind, the shadow of the ol empiricism can still be seen in his retention of sensatio as the ideal of knowledge. Sense-perception for him, as fo Locke, is not only the starting point, but also the *terminu* of higher reflective thought which, as we saw, must pro gressively lead to a sense-acquaintance with the object, c what is connected with it, to be true. Dewey shakes o his last vestige of sensationalistic empiricism and develops what he likes to call experimental *empiricism.*[1] We can see here a full application of the biological conception of knowledge combined with the new conception of physical qualities which have been gaining ground in the writings of present day scientists like Eddington.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 142.

According to the new scientific conception, the qualities of physical objects are not conceived as properties already existing in the objects, but as consequences of certain *intentional operations* made on them. Hydrogen is described as a colourless, tasteless, odourless and inflammable gas. According to the notion of all previous scientists and most philosophers, empiricists or rationalists, this description means that hydrogen has a fixed nature and these properties exist in it already; they are only revealed by sense-perception (with or without the help of *a priori* mental contribution). Knowing is then only accepting what is given to the mind by the object. But according to the new experimental conception of knowledge the above description of hydrogen is only a statement of the consequences of certain experiments or intentional operations performed on the gas. It means that *if* the gas is placed before the eyes it does not produce any re-action, if it is put before the nose no reaction is felt either, *if* it is put on the tongue even then no reaction is made, but *if* a burning stick is introduced into the test-tube containing the gas it catches fire producing a luminous glow before the eyes. The so-called properties of the object are then the names of some re-actions it produces or fails to produce when acted on with a view to find out these reactions. *Knowing then goes forward by doing.* Nature in this conception is not ready-made reality whose properties are accepted by knowing, but 'a moving whole of interacting parts' which has to be actively interrogated in order that it can be controlled for human purposes. The attitude of acceptance is thus replaced by that of control and the attitude of discovery by one of experimenting.

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[1] Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty,* p. 108 (and also the foot-note).

[2] *Ibid.*, Chap. V. (Ideas at Work), *passim.*

It will be readily seen that this new scientific attitude quite fits into the dynamic, biological theory of knowledge which James formulates but the far-reaching implications of which he does not himself bring out. Dewey applies it to his theory of education ('learning by doing'), as well as to his theory of knowledge in general. The ordinary text-books of Inductive Logic draw a hard and fast line of distinction between observation and experiment, the former being described as a passive onlooking and the latter as an active search guided by some idea. Dewey points out that even in ordinary observation or perception, there is an underlying active, though inarticulate, search for the possible consequences of our actions on objects. This conception emerges clearly out of the biological view of knowledge as an *instrument* for successful adjustment of life to the environment. When an object happens to be in the vicinity of an animal, it sets a practical problem, namely, how is it to be treated? Is it to be avoided or cared for? Is it harmful to life or helpful or indifferent to it? To decide on the necessary path of action, the animal strains its eyes, and gets by this active and intentional operation on the object the reaction of colour-vision. This re-action or vision is a *datum* leading to further operations, like smelling, licking, scratching, pushing or pulling, and each of these determines for the animal what we call its knowledge of the object. It must be noted that in this gradual process of accumulating experience each single experience creates an attitude of the animal towards the object, and this experience and attitude become gradually modified by each succeeding experience.

Human knowledge, in spite of its great complications and rich outward decoration, is like animal knowledge at bottom. Seen in this light a sensation would no longer be considered as a revelation of existing truth, but as merely the consequence of a certain kind of intentional operation by the human organism on the environment. It is only a *challenge* for further operation and experimental investigation, and thus it is also an instrument for further activity. Knowledge, like a scientific experiment, is thus always guided by a purpose that directs the operation which brings forth the consequence or reaction called knowledge. It is *tentative and provisional*; and is subject to constant modification with the progress of purposive investigation.

Conceptual thinking is no exception to the rule that governs perception. Our thinking is only a preparation for future action. We think in order to find out what results would ensue from what kind of action. It is, therefore, a kind of rehearsal of future action in course of which different courses of action are covertly gone through and their results are anticipated and choice is made of the course calculated to give the best result. It is like the action of an engineer who draws alternative provisional sketches of the building to be constructed, chooses one out of them, and makes that the plan for directing the construction of the building.

Each one of our thoughts is a plan that actually or potentially directs our actions. Concepts are symbolic substitutes of possible operations and their consequences. They are the vehicles of thought. The universality of a conceptual symbol is nothing more than its vagueness, its remaining detached from any particular situation and referring indefinitely to different possible ones. To ensure success in overt acts man finds it convenient to go over in mind, through symbols, the different steps and anticipated results. Such thinking is only symbolic operation. "By means of symbols, whether gestures, words or more elaborate constructions, we act without acting. That is we perform experiments by means of symbols which have results which are themselves symbolized, and which do not therefore commit us to actual or existential consequences. If a man starts a fire or insults a rival, effects follow; the die is cast. But if he rehearses the act in symbols in privacy, he can anticipate and appreciate its result. Then he can act or not act overtly on the basis of what is anticipated and is not there in fact. The invention or discovery of symbols is doubtless by far the single greatest event in the history of men. Without them no intellectual advance is possible and with them, there is no limit set to intellectual development except inherent stupidity."[1]

The so-called *a priori* mathematical principles and formal reasoning are based on such symbolic operations. They appear to have no connection with the particulars of empirical experience and performed activities because the special sciences which have developed them have no *immediate application* in view. "Independence from any specified application is readily taken to be equivalent to independence from application as such"[2] and this fallacy is the source of "*a priori* rationalism" and an "idolatrous attitude toward universals." We shall also see later that the failure to understand the universal applicability of the pragmatic view of truth as a form of utility is also traceable to this fallacy.

It should be further mentioned that according to this experimental empiricism knowledge is not *retrospective*; it is wholly *prospective*. For knowledge, as we just saw, is not a mere copying or revelation of any pre-existing reality. It is an adventure, a preparation for future action. Of course, our past experience contributes a large share to our present knowledge, but the past is simply utilized in so far as it can help us for achieving the future end. Mere retrospective musing is an aimless rambling in the domain of past experience, possible only when the mind does not strain to know and act, but wants relaxation. It does not surely deserve to be called knowledge. We know to live, and as we live forward we must also know forward. "*Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest.* We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid"—as James says.[3]

This new experimental conception of human knowledge is claimed by Dewey to be a *real Copernican revolution*, which is among the few great achievements of the human mind. It is a reversal of all previous ways of thinking. Kant showed that philosophers previous to him, empiricists and rationalists alike, thought that in knowing mind must conform to the object, but he shifted the centre from the object to the mind, just as Copernicus shifted the centre of the solar system from the earth to the sun. But Dewey points out that Kant's achievement was not really a revolution worthy of the name; he simply makes explicit what was implicit in previous thought. For, though Kant holds that in knowing the object must conform to the inner nature of the mind, he still retains the idea that the mind has a determinate, pre-existing constitution, and assumes, like traditional thinkers, "an inherent correspondence subsisting between *intellectus* and the structure of Nature—the principle so definitely stated by Spinoza".[1] Experimental empiricism works a far deeper revolution, for it shows that both the object and the knowing mind lack fixed nature and both emerge out of an experimental *effort*. There is, therefore, no fixed centre for knowledge. "There is a moving whole of interacting parts; a centre emerges wherever there is effort to change them in a particular direction." In this theory the mind is a part of the world, and is "marked off as a mind by the fact that wherever it is found, changes take place in a *directed* way." Knowing is thus changed from "an outside beholding to knowing as an active participant in the drama of an on-moving world".[2] "In short, there is a change from knowing as an aesthetic enjoyment of the properties of nature regarded as a work of divine art; to knowing as a means of secular control—that is, a method of purposefully introducing changes which will alter the direction of the course of events".[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 145-6. [2] *Ibid.* p. 148. [3] James, *Pragmatism*, p. 53.

We see, then, that for Pragmatism knowledge is not passive, but active; it is not a copy of pre-existing reality, but rather an anticipation of future experience; and it is thus an instrument for practical life; it is necessary for imparting efficient direction to our future activity. Knowledge for its own sake is, therefore, a misleading maxim; it is only a loose way of describing those cases of knowledge the practical application of which is too remote or indirect to enter immediate consideration. Neither is activity extolled for its own sake. As Dewey says, "Action, when directed by knowledge, is method and means, not an end. The aim is the securer, freer and more widely shared embodiment of values in experience by means of that active control of objects which knowledge alone makes possible."[1]

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[1] *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 274.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 277.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 98.

(3) *The Conception of Truth.*

Pragmatism is known for its conception of truth more than for any of its other contributions to philosophy. When the pragmatic method was first enunciated by Peirce, it indicated a revolt against logical hair-splitting devoid of practical consequence. This method, in general, consisted in holding that the meaning and validity of distinctions in thought must be tested and justified by their practical consequences. Applied to the particular case of distinction between truth and falsehood it would similarly resolve it into practical differences: "Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in one's actual life?"[2] Thus the truth of a belief, according to Peirce, must be tested by its practical consequences. It should be clearly understood that this theory is primarily for *testing* truth and not for defining it. Truth, holds Peirce, is tested by practical consequences ; it does not necessarily *consist in* these consequences, as some pragmatists later on seem to hold. The difference between these two views lies in this, that the former is quite compatible with the correspondence and even the co-herence theory of truth. Satisfactory practical consequence may be regarded as a test of truth even by one who believes that correspondence or coherence is the essence of truth. In fact Peirce was something of a Platonist[3] and believed in real 'essences' and 'kinds', so that he could quite accept the view that the truth of a belief consists in the correspondence that the belief has to these reals, but whether there was such correspondence or not could be ascertained by testing the belief in practice.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 38.

[2] *Pragmatism,* p. 200.

[3] *Chance, Love and Logic,* pp. XXXf.

With the increasing influence of biology on the pragmatic theory of knowledge, the conception of knowledge and truth also gradually changes. As we saw, knowledge comes to be conceived not as a 'mirroring' or 'copying' of pre-existing reality, but as the biological instrument for efficient activity ; as conscious response to the environment or as a plan for future action, as a prospective process rather than a retrospective one.

Now if knowledge is considered in this biological setting, its reference is to the future end ; and no question of its correspondence to, or copying of, facts can arise. In other words, all that is relevant to ask with regard to the soundness of a response or a plan of action is whether it is practically satisfactory and serves the purpose and secures the end. The soundness or the truth of a knowledge becomes, therefore, dependent on practical efficiency or utility.

It should be clear from the above that 'truth' is not used by the pragmatist in the sense of reality, as is very often done by other schools. It is not conceived as that which knowledge attains or grasps, but as an adjective of knowledge that works in life. Moreover, it is not a fact independent of human application and evaluation. It is the product of human estimation of the usefulness of knowledge. Just as a thing is called heavy or light, long or short, to express the effects of human measurements, similarly knowledge or belief is called true or false to express the effect of human valuation of it. By itself it would neither be true nor false. So even as a quality, truth is relative to human purpose and valuation. Truth is, therefore, man-made. The process of evaluation is the verification of knowledge in practice, and truth is the product of this verifying process. Truth emerges when a belief is verified, that is found to be sound and reliable in practice. Verification of the belief is thus equivalent to the truth of the belief. As James puts it : "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process: the process, namely of its verifying itself, its veri-*fication*. Its validity is the process of its valid-*ation*."[1] "Truth is *made* just as health, wealth and strength are made in the course of experience".[2] It should be remembered, however, that sometimes knowledge is declared to be true after it has been actually verified and found useful. But sometimes it is judged to be true even in anticipation of full, actual verification. In such a case truth would mean *verifiability* which is taken on trust. "Truth *ante rem* means only verifiability".[3]

We find thus that reference to particular facts of experience constituting verification is absolutely necessary for judging knowledge to be true. Only, reference may be either open or suppressed, either immediate or deferred. It follows then that there can be no universal or absolute truth which is true irrespective of any particular circumstance, any more than there can be any universal weight or length without any reference to particular units and circumstances of measurement. Truths are thus bound to be particular, relative and, therefore, subject to change. A bundle that weighs one hundredweight at the equator, will weigh more at the poles, provided it is weighed with a spring balance. The idea that it is 1 cwt. would, therefore, be true with reference to particular places and a particular type of balance for measurement. The Ptolemaic theory that the earth is the centre of the solar system was true for certain purposes, in so far as it could explain the phenomena that came under its author's observation, but ceased to be true when it failed to explain satisfactorily some other phenomena which, along with the previously observed ones, could be explained by the Copernican theory. Thus old truths give place to new ones, old scientific theories make room for more satisfactory ones.

Is there then no necessary truth? What becomes of truths regarding relations among ideas which even Hume admits to be necessary? On this point the older pragmatic views seem to differ from the more recent ones. For we find

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[1] *Pragmatism*, p. 201. [2] *Ibid.* p. 218. [3] *Ibid.* p. 220.

James siding with Hume and saying, "Relations among purely mental ideas form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute or unconditional...... Truth here has an 'eternal' character."[1] The cause of this fixity is thus explained by James, "Our ready-made ideal frame-work for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our sense-experiences."[2]

But James appears, in this respect, only to be a link between old empirical ways of thinking and the ultra-pragmatic biological and experimental views of later thinkers such as Schiller and Dewey. He is, therefore, rather compromising. The other two thinkers take the more extreme view we already discussed, namely that knowledge (ideas, concepts, theories) always represents some adventure, and is a plan of action ; it is tentative and experimental through and through. So Schiller tries to show that even truths regarding relations of ideas, such as two and two are four, are also conditional, being relative to particular facts of experience which generate and justify such ideas. Two things and two things make four things *only if and when* the things added retain their separate existences. Two small drops of water added to two such drops will make one big drop and not four. Or, as Schiller wittily puts it, two lions and two lambs would not justify this abstract statement.[3] Even a statement like 'A square is not circular' is *conditionally true*, for it depends on the particular meaning of 'square' intended by the speaker. For, says Schiller, some London squares are really circular.

According to Dewey also there can be no eternal and necessary truth. He does not believe in a fixed "structure of our thinking" like James; for him all thinking, as we saw, is only experimental. Pure thinking, like that of mathematical relations, is only a symbolic operation.[4] The symbols used, though ultimately originating from experience, are abstracted from particular facts of experience and from application, in such a manner as to make them appear altogether *a priori* and universal. Ideas "are not innate properties of mind corresponding to ultimate prior traits of Being, nor are they *a priori* categories imposed on sense in a wholesale once-for-all-way, prior to experience so as to make it possible". "Prior experience supplies the conditions which evoke ideas and of which thought has to take account, with which it must reckon."[1] Like Schiller,[2] Dewey[3] also regards axioms as postulates, rules by following which action has always attained success.

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[1] *Pragmatism*, pp. 209-10.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 210-11.
[3] *Studies in Humanism*, p. 9.
[4] *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 145.

Absolute certainty is, therefore, nowhere to be found in any sphere of human knowledge. Probability takes its place. Even scientific laws are only probable. What passes in the name of absolute certainty is only the highest degree of probability possessed by knowledge the consequences of which have never proved disappointing, either in covert symbolic operation or in overt action.

In spite of the minor points of difference due to personal deviations, pragmatists generally hold that the truth of a process of knowledge consists in its verifiability, in theory or practice, in the light of the consequences that follow from it. But here a difficulty is felt. The consequences of such a mental process may be of different characters; and it is necessary to distinguish them clearly. Pragmatic writers do not stick to the same sense of 'consequence' and 'verification' in their writings. Hence verifiability itself proves an ambiguous description of truth. Perry points out very clearly five important, but different, modes of verification which pragmatists are found to have in mind in different contexts. These are named by him, "verification by perception, consistency, operation, sentiment and general utility."[4]

The possibility of different modes of verification sets a problem, to which Perry very pertinently draws our attention. If in any case the results of the different modes of verification do not tally which of these should be given preference? "Pragmatism," says Perry, "is dangerous in so far as it co-ordinates and equalizes verification by perception and consistency with verification by sentiment and subsequential utility."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 160.

[2] *Logic for Use*, pp. 161f.

[3] *Logic*, pp. 10 and 141.

[4] *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 205. *Vide* also W. E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 156f., for a three-fold meaning of the 'working' of a belief,—cash value, harmony and higher values.

In solution of this problem pragmatism would, however, point out[2] that the process of truth-making is continually going on in our experience and the truth-claim of each belief, necessary for life, is being tested by its application to the different spheres of life, perceptual, logical, emotional and practical. It may be pleasant to believe, for example, that the news of the death of a dear friend is false but this pleasure would be out-balanced and drowned by the series of unpleasant and disappointing experiences that would follow if one acted on this belief. The consequences of our belief on the different sides of our experience thus produce by mutual interaction a resultant satisfaction or dissatisfaction which alone determines the value, truth or falsity, of that belief. James contends that we could not conceive that "true ideas would ever have been sorted out from false or idle ones, save for the *greater sum of satisfactions*, intellectual or practical, which truer ones brought with them."[3]

If the interpenetrating nature of experience be true we cannot keep distinct, except by abstraction, the satisfactions arising from the intellectual and the non-intellectual modes of verification. A belief is true to the extent it is useful for securing harmony, by its agreement with new perceptual experience or with the already acquired fund of experience, or by its leading to successful operations in life or by its tonic effect on life. The pragmatist admits degrees of truth, and truth that is satisfactory in one way is 'true in so far forth'[4] and that which is satisfactory in every way is true 'in the maximal degree'.[5] The actual maximum is, however, always relative and shifting.

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[1] *Present Phil. Tendencies*, p. 213.
[2] *Pragmatism*, pp. 59-80.
[3] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 159 (our italics).
[4] *Pragmatism*, p. 73.
[5] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 158.

We may refer in passing, in this connection, to the question of the exact *relation between truth and utility*. James tells us while describing truth, "You can say of it either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these uses mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name of whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the name of its completed function in experience. True ideas would never have been singled out as such, would never have acquired a class-name, least of all a name suggesting value, unless they have been useful from the outset in this way."[1] It will be noticed in the above passage, that towards the beginning (in the first two sentences) James seems to identify 'true' and 'useful' completely; in the middle he seems to make a distinction between the two, and at the end he seems to make the true depend on the useful. The precise relation between truth and utility remains, therefore, rather ambiguous.

It is generally supposed that pragmatism equates truth to utility, makes utility the essence of truth. But Schiller very strongly opposes this interpretation. He says, "It must be admitted, nay, emphasised, that to say that *all truth must work* and *be useful* is not, strictly, to define it at all. It is to insist on a very important and vital requirement which has been unfortunately overlooked; but it has not the *form* of a definition. It does *not* make 'truth' *convertible with* 'what works', nor *identify* it with 'usefulness', though from the earliest days this false conversion has been falsely foisted upon Pragmatism. The blunder in formal logic which it involves must be debited to its critics, who have never been able to quote from a representative pragmatist any passage which committed it, though it is common in popular and hostile expositions."[2] We do not know if Schiller took into account the first two sentences in the passage quoted above from James's *Pragmatism*. One who reads them (specially the first sentence, 'it is useful because it is true, and 'it is true because it is useful') would probably remain unconvinced by Schiller's disclaimer and would not allow this debiting transaction in the presence of such clear instructions to the contrary.[1] But textual interpretation apart, Schiller thinks (in conformity with the last sentence of James in the quoted passage) that truth is made by utility in the sense that it is because of its utility that we can call an idea a true idea. As Schiller says, "This use is, quite literally, the *ratio essendi* of truth. No truth can come into being, no truth can be asserted, unless it has been judged useful for some purpose. This use *precedes* its publication, and is unaffected by whatever may befall it later."[2] This is what James and Schiller would like to call the *genetic theory of truth.*[3] Truth is so called not because of an inherent essence, but because of its origin, which is use. Seen in this light utility though the generator of truth does not form any part of its connotation or definition (just as fire does not enter the definition of smoke).

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 204.

[2] *Logic for Use*, p. 157.

Is there then any sense in which James's assertion that an idea is useful because it is true, and true because it is useful, can be judged compatible with this position, that truth is not identical with utility though connected with it intimately in point of origin? The only way of justifying James and reconciling him to a certain extent with Schiller seems, to us, to understand the relation in the same way as that between triangularity and three-sidedness (or between equiangularity and equal-sidedness). We can say that the figure is three-sided because it is triangular, or that it is triangular because it is three-sided. Yet, three-sidedness is not identical, in essence, with triangularity. In the same way, truth and utility are the two aspects of a complex mental process. Truth is only the truth-claim with which the process begins and utility is the success it attains when such a process is put to use and the claim is tried. The presence of the one is the mark of the presence of the other.

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[1] The interested reader may refer to a journal controversy on this point between Schiller and L. S. Stebbing in *Mind, Nos.* 83, 84, 86, 88, 89 (1912).

[2] *Op. Cit.* p. 159.

[3] *Pragmatism*, pp. 65-6, *Logic for Use*, p. 157.

The middle part of the passage from James supplies this clue. The truth claim of an idea is accepted because of its utility, and its utility can be discovered only because of the truth claim (without which no verification process would start). Even when the truth-claim is justified it, of course, becomes a stronger truth; but this latter is also nothing but a stronger claim of truth, that is a greater claim for future utility.

Our justification of James would seem to be rather strained, but that is all that, we think, can be made out of a confusing mass of statements which would emphasize the very close relation between truth and utility and yet not allow a complete merging of the two. We must also note that even this strained explanation would not *completely* remove the difference between James and Schiller. For Schiller would not accept James's *double* assertion (useful because true, and true because useful) since according to Schiller some useful things (*e.g.*, methodological fictions) are not true, though all that is true is useful.

The close relation between truth and use (in the widest sense of theoretical and practical use) enables the pragmatist to declare that "true is only *one species of good,* and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. *The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons*".[1] Thus truth is regarded as a *value.* The truth-claim of a cognitive process is only its value-claim, the claim that it will be useful for life.[2] This should be obvious from the fact that we call a true argument also a *good* argument.

The pragmatic theory of truth has been very much criticized by different thinkers;—Bradley, Moore, Russell, Pratt and many others. James and Schiller lived long enough to answer them, and they tried to stick to their guns to the end, though Dewey seems to have grown a little apologetic, trying to avoid the name pragmatism in his latest writings.[1]

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[1] *Pragmatism,* pp. 75-6.

[2] *Logic for Use,* p. 43.

It is sometimes asked: If truths are truth-claims how can the pragmatist distinguish between truths and lies which also always claim to be true? Dewey points out that truth is *warranted* assertibility.[2] Schiller goes elaborately into this question.[3] He shows that truth is only 'one sort of truth claim'. He classifies truth-claims into the following kinds:—postulates, axioms, methodological assumptions (*e.g.* "any principle, hypothesis, or suggestion that promises to serve as a guide" in successfully tackling a complex situation), methodological fictions (*conscious* assumption of something, which is known to be not exactly true, but true or good for a practical purpose, *e.g.* representing on a map the distance between two places by a straight line, though the earth's surface is really not plane), fictions (*e.g.* legends), jokes and lies. None of these is a truth, as such. It is only when a truth-claim is verified that it becomes a truth proper, though that truth is still a claim of further truth, since the process of verification is never final. A lie, fiction or joke is distinct from truth since its truth-claim does not stand the test. It is also shown in this connection by Schiller that whatever is useful is not true, since even a methodological fiction, which is known to be fictitious, is useful.

(4) *The Refutation of non-pragmatic theories of Truth.*

Schiller attempts to establish the humanist conception of truth[4] by showing the errors and inadequacies of some current notions, such as (1) truth as a property of judgments and propositions, (2) truth as apprehension of reality, (3) truth as necessity of thought, (4) truth as intuition, (5) truth as correspondence with reality, (6) truth as independent of us and (7) truth as coherence.

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[1] *Vide* his Preface to *Logic* (1938).

[2] Logic, p. 4 *et passim.*

[3] *Logic for Use*, pp. 160f.

[4] *Ibid.* Chap. VII.

As regards the *conception of truth as property of judgments and propositions*, he points out that broadly speaking "truth and falsity are incidents in cognitive enquiry"[1] and they are common, therefore, to all aspects of it, and not simply confined to judgments and propositions. For example, we can speak of the truth and falsity of even postulates (which are 'a sort of imperatives in laying the foundations of scientific systems') perceptions, problems, issues and other phases of the cognitive enquiry which are neither propositions nor judgments proper. On the other hand even propositions are not always subject to truth and falsity which apply only to propositions which are *actually* held, that is when they become judgments of individuals.

The *conception of truth as apprehension* of reality is too formal to serve as a criterion by which one could distinguish between truth and falsehood, since even a false judgment claims to know some reality, and we cannot accept or reject such a claim without verification.

The *conception of truth as a necessity* of thought points rather to a psychological than to a logical origin of truth, as it is generally believed to be. "Is it really a good reason for calling anything true that we cannot help thinking it?" How can one force his opponent to accept something because *he feels* forced in thought to accept it? Moreover, necessity is conditional, not absolute even in the case of a syllogistic argument (which is the best example of necessary thought), since the truth of the conclusion is subject to the condition of premisses being true.

The *view that truth is ultimately based on self-evident intuitions* is also open to similar objections. Sometimes what appears self-evident turns out to be false, and we must therefore fall back upon some criterion other than self-evidence with which we can distinguish between true and false intuitions. Self-evidence, like necessity, is psychological rather than an objective, logical character. Moreover even a so-called self-evident or intuitive truth like two and two make four is conditional, because it is "dependent on and deducible from the system of common arithmetic with its postulates and definitions and rules of addition".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 117.

The *conception of truth as correspondence* with reality is really very ambiguous. It leaves undecided whether thought is to correspond or conform to reality, or reality to thought, whether 'correspond' means to copy or to agree with or anything else, and whether reality is to be taken as something within or beyond experience. Ordinarily this theory is interpreted to mean that truth consists in a relation of correspondence between a mental state and a transcendent reality. The theory is not acceptable in this form. "I cannot compare a thing within my ken with another which transcends it, to observe whether they 'correspond', or whether the former is a good copy of the latter. I can never know the house as it is, since I know it only as it appears to me, *i.e.* to my senses."[2] Thus "Truth has, in fact, been rendered impossible and unknowable by definition."

But if correspondence which constitutes truth is "alleged to hold between contents of the field of knowledge, between the perceptions of various senses, between sense-perceptions and memories or thoughts, between the thoughts and perceptions of one man and those of another, between 'theory' and 'practice', etc.", then "no exception need be taken to it."[3] For then we can apply this theory to test truth. We can verify, for example, our *memory* of a house as having six windows by *seeing* if it is really so, *i.e.*, by noting the *correspondence* between memory and perception.

If however correspondence is taken to mean 'copying', the theory is not acceptable. As we saw, the function of a true idea is not copying reality, but successful working or giving satisfactory lead in life. The absurdity of the copy theory becomes obvious, as James points out, in cases of the idea of a past time (which is no more), of power (which is but a potentiality), of spontaneity or freedom (which cannot be fixed by any static copy).[1] We saw in course of our study of pragmatic psychology that knowledge in every form is selective and purposive, and even in perception the mere top of a table may be made to stand for the whole table, the mere bark of a dog (or even the word 'dog') for the animal. Knowledge is, moreover, prospective rather than retrospective. The copy-theory is, therefore, not acceptable. Correspondence is acceptable only if it is taken in the *pragmatic* sense of agreement within actual experience, the progressive and harmonious leading imparted by a true idea.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 127.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 130.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 129.

[1] *Pragmatism*, p. 212.

But correspondence so interpreted, observes Schiller, seems to shade off on the one side, into the coherence theory and on the other into the humanist theory of harmony and verification. The intellectualist *theory of coherence*, as employed by Formal Logic and Absolutist metaphysics, is however an untenable development of the notion of coherence. "The truth is, of course, that the real coherence of thoughts, and the only coherence that should be called 'logical' (because it is the only sort which has logical value in actual thinking), is the coherence created by their relevance to the interests and purposes of some thinker."[1] The intellectualist fallaciously abstracts a concrete state of cognition from its actual setting and purpose, and conceives co-herence as a static relation of harmony among abstract mental states. Such co-herence cannot be regarded as an unfailing character of truth, since even a good piece of fiction shows marvellous coherence among its different parts. But if coherence be understood as perfect harmony among *all* experiences, it can be true only of an ideal system like the Hegelian Absolute, not of any actual human mind where there is harmony as well as discord, and where every new discovery is a kind of surprise and shock to existing ideas. If complete systematic coherence is demanded of truth as is done by Joachim, for example, then all human truths will turn into falsehoods, and the human distinction between truth and falsehood will become meaningless. Nor is it possible to declare in advance without further verification that an idea will always remain true just because it is coherent with present experience. The need for verification is thus felt at every turn in the determination of truth; and no chance of finality is seen regarding any conception of truth.

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[1] *Logic for Use*, p. 139.

The conception that truth is independent of human mind which underlies many of the well-known theories of truth is based on untenable assumption like ultimate facts or Reality altogether independent of human manipulation, and the fixed relations of such objects with our ideas. But all facts and reals are provisional and relative to human purposes, and subject to human organization. Independence can be, at best, in relation to this, that or a third experience, but not all experience. Anything wholly independent of human purpose and experience would transcend human knowledge and can never be known.

These criticisms of the different ideas about truth bring out the provisional, relative, progressive, empirical characters of truth. Truth as the humanist conceives it bears all these marks, and he describes truth, *from different points of view*, with their help. As Schiller says, "We can define truth—(1) formally as *logical value*; (2) psychologically, as *satisfaction of a cognitive purpose*; (3) materially, as *a truth-claim that works* and is useful: (4) empirically, as *dependent on the consequences* of taking it as true".[1]

(5) *The Conception of Error.*

The problem of error is important for pragmatism, as for any other kind of philosophy, because error is inseparably related to truth, and "because the theory of error becomes the touchstone of all theories of truth".[2] Error, like truth, should be discussed not abstractly but in its concrete biological context. And considered thus, it is found that like truth error concerns our beliefs which are tentative, experimental and purposive. If the truth-claim of a belief becomes verified it is accepted as truth, and if it is rejected, it is regarded as an error. It is, therefore, always by reference to a particular use and purpose that a belief can be called false. Just as there is no absolute truth, there is no absolute error. Even a statement like 'The square is round' is not universally false. It is false in a geometrical context, but may be true as a description of a round square in London. "In short, no one can foresee whether the most palpably 'false' propositions will not some day figure as 'truths' in contexts and purposes which as yet no one anticipates". As every cognition is particular, so also must be its value. And error like truth is a value of cognition; "only it is a negative value." Error is a "failure of our knowledge to attain its '*object*', in the sense of its *aim*." It differs from ignorance in that it is "the rejection of a positive claim", whereas ignorance is mere 'vacuity'. It differs from self-contradiction in that whereas the latter, on detection, is felt to be unmeaning, the former is shown to possess a wrong or misleading meaning.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 153.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 175.

Metaphysicians who forget this pragmatic nature of error, make error independent of its particular context, knower and purpose and dehumanize it, like truth, into something absolute and objective. Owing to this mistaken notion, even Plato finds himself puzzled and fails to account for error. The paradox of error that perplexes him is that "We must simultaneously both know and not know the object about which there is error". This situation is not baffling to the pragmatist, because, he understands that the same cognition may be knowledge (*i.e.* of a desired kind) with reference to some person, context or purpose, and may not be knowledge (of another desired kind) for some other person, purpose, etc. The same cognition is taken as knowledge by one who does not detect its discrepancy and as an error by one who does so.

The absolute idealist who also abstracts errors from concrete situations and dehumanizes truth to make it dwell only in the Absolute fails to account for error. Every finite cognition according to him must be erroneous, and the distinction between human truth and human error becomes meaningless. But what is more dangerous for him, if the Absolute is to be all-inclusive it must include also the

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 177.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 188.

errors of finite minds, and would thus be itself full of errors. And if on the other hand it is contended that all errors are transformed and perfected into truths in the Absolute then the problem of error itself becomes a false one, there being no error in Reality, the all-inclusive, completely harmonious whole.

The realistic account of error is also beset with difficulties. Realism at first tries to explain truth "to be the apprehension of the real as it is, and error its contamination by subjectivity." But this position is retracted by more cautious realists who fear that this assigns to the mind the power of influencing knowledge, and infecting it, in every case, by its subjectivity. To avoid this they think of cognition as the relation of mind as such with objects as such (*per se*) and think that the relation is wholly determined by the object. And then they altogether fail to explain error. Because if there be such relation there will be knowledge, and no error, and if, on the other hand, there is no such relation there is no cognition at all, and again no error can arise then. Realism has, therefore, to end in the same puzzle that perplexed Plato : Error at once involves cognition and yet no cognition, how could that be ? This paradox is overcome when one realizes with the pragmatist that knowledge is not objectively determined and that it is on the contrary a subjective experiment with the object and the object itself is at least partly the product of subjective selection, and is relative.

4. Pragmatic Logic

The pragmatic theory of knowledge described above calls for a thorough-going reformation of the outlook and theories of traditional logic. This work is undertaken by Schiller in his *Formal Logic*, and *Logic for Use*. Dewey's logical works, mentioned before, are also pragmatic in nature, but he always shows a tendency to associate himself with Peirce and other objective scientific inquirers than with James and Schiller. In his recent great work, *Logic*, he not only fights shy of the name 'pragmatism', but also avoids reference to Schiller and his works on pragmatic logic. This is a very curious fact. The academic reason for such repugnance that an outsider can guess is perhaps that Dewey considers Schiller as one of those reformers of logic whom Dewey thinks to have "disastrously compromised their case by basing their logical constructions ultimately upon psychological theories that reduced experience to mental states and external associations among them, instead of upon the actual conduct of scientific inquiry."[1] We shall follow here mainly the account of Schiller, the frank and avowed champion of pragmatism in logic, and occasionally refer to Dewey's views.

Pragmatism regards reasoning also in its concrete, biological, psychological setting, as only an experimental instrument developed for securing practical success in life. It emphasizes the biological significance of reasoning and does not like to divorce the science of reasoning either from psychology or from practical consequences, and matters of fact. Bearing in mind that 'ideas are plans of operations to be performed', that 'concepts are synonymous with corresponding sets of operations', that words are only symbols for carrying on experimental covert activity, and that reasoning is only a rehearsal of the steps and consequences of possible actions, pragmatists naturally regard *formal logic* as a barren abstraction and verbal hair-splitting which has forgotten the practical purpose to serve which it has come into existence.

Logic is thus regarded as an empirical science in every respect. No *a priori* principle is required, Dewey points out, if experience is regarded in its original interconnected and complex nature, and not regarded as being composed of simple atomic elements. "Atomistic empiricism and rational *a priorism* are correlative doctrines". The first paves the way for the second, as Hume does for Kant, and Mill for Green. If experience be conceived to be disconnected and atomic in structure, interrelation of experiences can only be conceived by reference to supra-empirical synthetic principles.[2] The so-called *a priori* necessities of thought, Schiller points out,[3] are not really needs of thought, but of *life*, and their function is biological. We cannot dispense with them because without them we cannot *predict* and *control* the conditions on which our life depends. Psychologically we begin life with an attitude of experiment and in order to start life we must be *willing to believe* something and try if it works. Whatever is thus provisionally accepted as a basis for work is a postulate. The postulate is "the most primordial form of truth-claim".

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[1] *Logic*, p. 81. [2] *Logic*, pp. 153f. *Logic for Use*, p. 53.

An axiom is also a postulate which has been tried and found satisfactory and indispensable. As Schiller puts it, "An 'axiom' should be conceived as a fully verified postulate which serves as a principle for a fully established science. When a postulate reaches this stage its logical character has already been transformed. It is no longer a merely human demand upon nature. It no longer depends on our desire to uphold it, but rests securely on the solid mass of scientific facts it has been instrumental in eliciting. So it can defy its critics by blandly requesting them to provide a substitute that will account for the facts in other and better ways."[1] But very few postulates attain this secure status, and even when they do they retain it only so long as they continue to be satisfactory as instruments of control and prediction; they are never too secure to be discarded if necessary. Such then is the nature and status of the *first principles* on which logic, like any other science, can legitimately hope to be founded. Formal logic ignores these facts and aspires to build a grand structure on *a priori* principles. The security it attains thereby is merely verbal, and not factual. Schiller tries to expose the verbalism and hollowness of formal logic in its different aspects and suggests the necessary reforms.

Beginning with terms Schiller shows that formal logic forgets that *terms* are mere symbols that stand for *personal meanings* in concrete situations in life. The consequent fallacy is that it comes to believe that words have some fixed meanings irrespective of the persons who use them and of the situations in which they use them. Thus originate, what Schiller calls, impersonal, verbal or dictionary meanings of words. Ambiguity is then regarded as a danger because it imperils the formal accuracy of arguments. Formal logic forgets the important truths that 'verbal meaning is only potential', that 'no form of words has any actual meaning until it is used', that 'ambiguity does not matter, it is only another name for the plasticity of language' and that, therefore, the real meaning of a word is the personal meaning in which it is used by a particular speaker in a particular context.[1] Formal logic neglects the 'relevance' of meanings to concrete situations, but humanist logic regards *relevance* "as one of the great pivotal notions on which real reasoning hinges."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 161.

The effect of this is a wrong conception of propositions and a confusion between *proposition and judgment.* As each word in a proposition is *capable* of alternative dictionary meanings, the proposition itself is also capable of many alternative meanings, and we do not know what particular meaning should be attached to it unless we refer to the intention of the speaker who uses it in a particular context. A judgment on the other hand is a particular, concrete act of human thought, and is not at all ambiguous. It is the specific, personal meaning the speaker has in mind when he uses any proposition in a concrete situation. 'Judgment is a personal act.'[3] A proposition turns into judgment by shedding its ambiguities and assuming an unambiguous meaning. It is a great confusion, therefore, to think, as formal logic does, that a proposition is only a verbal transformation or expression of a judgment, and that the two are otherwise identical.

'The biologic of judgment' (*i.e.* the biological conception of it) is discussed by Schiller to show that judgment is the end of deliberation which is started in the rational animal when his habitual unthinking responses fail to meet a new, intricate situation. As an animal man is equipped with reflexes, instincts, impulses mostly determined by in-

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[1] *Ibid.* Chap. IV.

[2] *Ibid.* p.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 193.

herited habits, and most of his actions and reactions in familiar situations are performed quickly with their aid and without any fore-thought. It is only when a new situation confronting man raises a *problem* (which however is not so unfamiliar and intricate as to paralyse thought and action) that man begins to enquire, doubt, hesitate, think or deliberate on the possible alternative ways of action for meeting the *problematic situation*. The process of deliberation ends in decision or judgment. But judgment is never final, it is a tentative decision, is 'essentially experimental'. "The 'subjects' of the various judgments we tentatively formulate are all extracts from the total situation which strike us as significant: the 'predicates' all indicate experiments with these subjects which seem to us worth trying."[1]

But the original experimental character of judgment tends to be forgotten when by repeated use we find it dependable. The uncertain nature of judgment can be seen from the fact that when seeing a yellow substance we judge, 'This is a mango', our judgment is precarious and is based only on the expectation that its other unperceived characters, such as taste and smell, will also be experienced if the thing is tasted and smelt. The perceived colour and shape are treated as symbols for the unperceived characters.

Being an expectation and anticipation, judgment is a truth-claim. If the claim is borne out by subsequent operation and experience, it stands verified, and becomes a truth; if not, it is an error. Truth and falsity primarily concern, therefore, a judgment and not a proposition which is a potential judgment. "A proposition", says Schiller, "is never more than *potentially* true, it becomes actually true if it is used in a suitable context, but then it turns into a judgment".[2]

Judgment is described in many works on formal logic as involving a reference to reality. But 'reality' is taken in such a vague or objectionable sense that such a description, to be accepted, must be understood as subject to the following four conditions,[1] namely that (1) the reality referred to is a 'real-for-us' by which we are confronted in a vital situation; (2) the reality is something particular and concrete, not vague and general; (3) the real is "immanent in experience and relative to cognitive process", not a transcendent archetype of experience, (4) and lastly, the real is only provisional and may undergo transformation. Judging by these conditions Schiller finds that Bosanquet's definition of judgment as "the reference of a significant idea to a subject in reality by means of an identity of content between them" is "a very master-piece of vagueness", since it leaves it undecided whether the real is immanent or transcendent, formal or physical. Again he finds Bradley's definition of judgment as "the act which refers an ideal content (recognised as such) to a reality beyond the act" bolder and clearer, but untenable. Because it destroys the human meaning of judgment by taking reality in a transcendental sense, identifying it with the Absolute whole which is clearly beyond finite human experience.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 200.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 118.

Like Schiller, Dewey also describes judgment in biological, experimental terms, as 'the settled outcome of inquiry'. He also distinguishes judgment from proposition in a similar way; the "content of the latter is intermediate and representative and is carried by symbols ; while judgment, as finally made, has *direct* existential import".[2] He also holds that judgment is individual.

Inference is regarded by the pragmatist as originating, like judgment, out of a vital situation and as having solution of life's problems as its object. Both judgment and inference, says Schiller, "are essentially experimental and purposive, and aim ultimately at the control of experience. Only, inference is more circuitous. It prolongs the experiment. It delays action. It tests a truth-claim, not directly by acting on it, but by the aid or mediation of other judgments first. Thus the pragmatic 'consequences' relevant to a truth-claim in an inference are primarily *other* judgments: though ultimately the value of the whole thought-process is decided, as before, by its application or working."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 226-9.

[2] *Logic,* p. 120.

The formal logician is perplexed by the dilemma regarding syllogism, namely that, if the conclusion gives what is not contained in the premises, it is not absolutely certain, and if it gives what is contained in the premises, it gives no new information. The pragmatist does not experience this difficulty because he boldly accepts the first horn of the dilemma. "All our reasoning", says Schiller, "is hypothetical and experimental. We are not absolutely sure either of the truth of the premises or even of the meaning of our terms in the contexts in which we try to use them. But we are free to try if we are willing to learn." The premises are so many hypotheses and the conclusion is the expected consequence which we draw in a spirit of adventure in the *hope* of learning something new by trying it in life. "Hence we may claim the utmost latitude in experimenting with hypotheses, provided they entail observable consequences which test them."[2] The result obtained in the conclusion is sufficiently novel, if it is novel to the person who draws it.

The ideal of absolute certainty set up by formal logic is regarded by the pragmatist as a 'wild goose chase'. "Our reasoning need *not* be valid to be valuable, a good proof need not be coercive to be persuasive and even convincing, and a truth may grow more probable and certain throughout the ages, without ever becoming absolute. On the other hand, our thought must be authorised to run risks, to show enterprise, to aim at ends, and to satisfy demands; it is not the *safest*, but often the *boldest*, thought that is crowned with success. For in adventures of thought, as of the battlefield, fortune favours the brave."[3]

The experimental nature of inductive reasoning is too well-known to require further proof. All scientific theories are only human hypotheses and are acceptable so long as they work. Inductive generalization is admittedly an enterprising leap from the known to the unknown. While traditional logic conceives the whole of logic in the light of formal deductive reasoning, and tries sometimes even to reduce the inductive process to a syllogistic form,[1] pragmatic logic on the other hand conceives an inductive leap as the very pivot and prototype of logical thinking and tries to formulate the whole of logic after it, reducing even deduction to a mere tentative step in the adventures of thought, whereby the possible consequences of an hypothesis can be visualized. Dewey's conception of Logic as 'the theory of inquiry', as we already stated in the introductory section of this chapter, tries to knit together the different topics of logic around this conception of thought as a biological, experimental adventure.

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[1] *Logic for Use*, p. 268. [2] *Ibid.* p. 285. [3] *Ibid.* p. 319.

The value of such voluntarist logic, Schiller claims, lies in its protest against futile verbalism and vicious abstraction which have made logic a bugbear or a laughing stock, and in its ability to give the philosopher a charter of freedom that will emancipate him from thraldom to a sterile intellectualism, and enable him to experiment freely, run risks and try alternatives in order to find a philosophy that "satisfies to the full the demands of his whole soul."[2]

5. Theory of Reality

Pragmatism is primarily a method, and a theory of knowledge, and not a theory of reality. The pragmatic method may be applied, and it has been, to the solution of metaphysical problems by different thinkers with different results. It is, therefore, idle to look for any definite theory of reality in the pragmatic school. What we shall discuss in this section would be rather the metaphysical tendencies observable in the two great and avowed pragmatists, James and Schiller.

James's conception of reality is rooted in his notion of experience, we have discussed before. It is the reality which we know by direct acquaintance, "that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in."[3] This reality is, therefore, what is within our experience, and not what transcends it. As Schiller says, it is a 'real-for-us'. That which is beyond experience is as good as non-existent for us, unless it enters in any way into our experience, can be used, spoken of and referred to.

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[1] *Vide* Dr. P. K. Ray, *Deductive Logic* and Keynes, *Formal Logic.*
[2] *Logic for Use,* p. 455. [3] *A Pluralistic Universe,* p. 218.

James distinguishes this reality into three parts.[1] The first part of reality is "the flux of our *sensations*", the second consists of "the *relations* that obtain between our sensations or between their copies in our minds", the third part of reality consists of "*previous truths*" (the previous attested experiences). If what we mean by reality can be analysed into these three parts, it is our next business to see how little of this reality is independent of the human mind. Sensations are of course "forced on us, coming we know not whence", and just to this extent they are beyond human control. But it depends on us to *which* of the in-coming sensations we shall attend. Our minds 'exert an arbitrary choice' in including, omitting, emphasizing, and ordering the sensations, and also in determining their direction, foreground, background and context. So the relations among sensations also are determined to a large extent by our minds. And previous truths in the light of which we interpret the sensations were also once derived from the first two kinds of experiences just shown to be controlled by the mind ; and which of these previous experiences would be applied in the interpretation of the present sensations also depends on the mind. So James says, "We receive in short the block of marble, but we carve the statue ourselves."[2] What we say about reality "depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The *that* of it is its own ; but the *what* depends on the *which* ; and the which depends on us."[3] As a concrete illustration of such human determination of reality James gives the adjoined figure[4], which can be treated as star, or as two big triangles crossing each other, or as six equal triangles hanging together, etc. Though the *that* given in sensation is the same, the *what* is determined by human treatment,



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[1] *Pragmatism*, pp. 244-5.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 247.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 246.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 252.

even the number of the sensed object is a matter of human choice. And what is more instructive, all these human treatments of the 'sensible *that*' are true. We at once understand that there may not be any inconsistency in there being many truths about what is ordinarily regarded as the same reality. The so-called 'given' reality is an ambiguous stuff which can be variously treated by the mind according to its own interest, purpose and choice, and it thus gives rise to diverse realities. Man is thus found to be the maker of realities and truths. Reality is not found by us ready-made, but *it is made by us*. This fact adds a tone of dignity to our position, a sense of responsibility to our action, a robust optimism to our life.

The Humanism of Schiller is an elaboration of this view.[1] Following Protagoras he tries to show that man is the measure of reality; in fact, he is in very important senses, the creator of it. Hegel conceived the great idea of, "the cosmic process as one with the thought-process", but he spoiled it by dehumanizing thought and making thought an abstract principle devoid of particular peculiarities that attach to it in its concrete working in life. Looking at thought or knowing in the concrete, Schiller discovers at least five different ways in which knowing matters to, changes and causes, truths and reals, changing both the knower and the objects known. First of all, by purposive analysis of the given flux of sensations, and interested selection out of them the human mind chooses and makes real objects of interest and inquiry. Secondly, by the influence of conscious and unconscious human preferences the objects are subtly pervaded by human meanings, and are thus thoroughly humanized. Thirdly, knowledge, when applied in action, alters the world around man. Fourthly, in some cases, human knowledge, in the form of opinions, affects and alters the ideas and behaviour of fellow human beings. Fifthly, "knowing always alters the knower, and as the knower is real and a part of reality, reality is really altered" thereby. All these points go to prove that the view that knowledge does not make nor change reality, but simply discovers or reveals it, is not at all true.

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[1] Vide *Studies in Humanism*, the chap. on "The Making of Reality."

In spite of these arguments Schiller, like James, believes in the existence of an unknown reality, that is, in something that is *given* to, or just enters, the human mind before the mind acts upon it. This he sometimes calls 'real reality' and conceives it, after the ancient Greek thinkers, as *hule*, a plastic, ambiguous, virgin stuff ; 'a mere potentiality' which is not yet true or false, but 'destined to develop into reality' when treated by the human mind. The 'initial reality' is a living, responsive matter. This view is thus akin to 'hylozoism'. But in so far as reality is said to enter into active relation with human experience and to be the work of the human mind, Schiller's view can also be called 'panpsychism'. But by whatever name it is described, he observes, humanism stands "for interpretations of the lower in terms of the higher", for the attempt "to make the human and the cosmic more akin, and to bring them closer to us."[1] Humanism is also a form of animism.[2] For, it interprets all realities as possessed of human meanings. "We all suppose", says Schiller, "all events and all experiences to 'have a meaning'; this is the great animistic postulate that stirs us up to 'understand' the world".[3]

Is humanism then idealism? Schiller points out[4] that the opposition between idealism and realism is the 'ultimate antithesis of intellectualist metaphysics'. Humanism can be a mediator between the two and incorporate, in a 'higher synthesis', what is valuable in both. Absolute idealism and realism coincide on the important point that ultimate reality is independent of our knowledge which has only to conform to it, the absolute thought or the absolute fact. But in truth, reality and experience are correlated." The mind can no more be real without a 'real world' of *some sort* to recognize and know, than the real world known can be real without a mind to know it".[5] Humanism tries to preserve both sides of this important truth and cannot, therefore, go under any of the old, one-sided views, realism or idealism. It may be called '*personal idealism*' to distinguish it from 'absolute idealism', as well as, extreme realism. But it can also be called realism in so far as it rejects solipsism, like naive realism, as pragmatically unsatisfactory. The belief in other minds is the postulate of every man in society, and solipsism is refuted by the success of this postulate in life.[1] The study of dreams, Schiller points out, has a lesson for both, extreme realism and extreme subjectivism. For while it suggests that the world of waking experience may be itself a consistent dream, and therefore, not absolutely real, on the other hand it shows that to know dreams as dreams we must be aware of some superior reality.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 448.
[2] *Humanism*, p. 289.
[3] *Logic for Use*, p. 50.
[4] *Studies in Humanism*, chap. XX (Dreams and Idealism).
[5] *Ibid*. p. 488.

But on the whole, Schiller confesses, humanism tends more towards idealism than to realism. As he says, "If, nevertheless, it may seem that the balance finally inclines somewhat, to the 'subjective' side, because, after all, it is still held to be possible that every individual soul may some day 'awake' to find the reality of its world with all its works abolished for it overnight, the fault lies, not in our theory, but in the actual facts."[2] But humanism is not, as we saw, solipsism. For, it recognises that the pragmatic truth and the pragmatic reality must be socially acceptable: hence it cannot be *merely* personal.

James, as we saw, also tries hard to hold the balance even between idealism and realism. Though he tries to show that reality, that we can speak of and describe in philosophy, must in many respects be dependent on the human mind, he still retains belief in a 'dumb', 'evanascent', 'aboriginal' stuff, as the 'ideal limit of our minds', which is 'just entering experience' and has not yet been interpreted. But we only 'glimpse it, but we never grasp it'. It is a mere 'that' and not yet a 'what'.[3] Of course even the 'that' is then experience; but not necessarily subjective (or objective). It is *neutral* in character. In the wider sense of idealism (the attempt to xeplain the lower in the light of the higher), both James and Schiller are, however, idealists or spiritualists as we already explained.

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[1] *Humanism*, p. 264.

[2] *Studies in Humanism*, p. 484.

[3] *Pragmatism*, pp. 248-9.

As to the metaphysical problem of the one and the many[1], pragmatism sides with pluralism rather than monism, though in its usual qualified way. Experience, on which James founds his pragmatism, is, as we saw, no 'general stuff'; it is of a particular nature in each case and is just what it appears, flatness, brownness, heaviness and so on. This pragmatic empiricism regards, therefore, parts and particulars as the primary facts, and takes the whole as a 'being of the second order'. Moreover, every bit of experience that we can point to is itself found to be composed of parts; "nothing real is absolutely simple", "every smallest bit of experience is a *multum in parvo* plurally related".[2] Pragmatism is thus genetically wedded to the pluralistic outlook.

But this does not mean that James does not admit that in many respects the world may not be regarded as one.[3] In fact, he admits that the world of experience is one in so far as it can be called a universe or one world, or experience, or being. It is one again as the different parts of it hang together, remain inter-connected and form one *chain* of events influencing one another. But at the same time it is also many in so far as it is composed of many parts and there are also experienced discontinuities and disconnections among them. In fact experience is a *concatenation*, a chain-like process, of different particulars, and is thus both one and many. Looking at the world in this way James observes, "The great point is to notice that the oneness and the manyness are absolutely co-ordinate here."[4] The oneness of the world, and its manyness "obtain in respects which can be separately named", and, therefore, the world is "neither a universe pure and simple nor a multiverse pure and simple".[5]

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[1] *Vide Pragmatism*, Lect. IV, and *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Chaps. VII and VIII.

[2] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 322

[3] *Pragmatism*, loc. cit.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 188.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 148.

But why then does pragmatism side with pluralism, rather than advocate both pluralism and monism in different respects? The reply is that monism, in the conception of the chief monists, is an extreme and rigorous view which neither admits of degrees, nor makes any provision for the reality of multiplicity in any way. And pluralism includes anything other than this extreme view, any theory that denies the truth of monism. Consequently the view that tries to do jusice to both unity and multiplicity falls within this wide range of pluralism (or non-monism). Thus pragmatism has to seek shelter under a catholic type of pluralism which does not insist on the total disjunction and discreteness of things, and is even prepared to acknowledge unity among things provided "you grant *some* separation among things, some tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one another, some real novelty or chance, however minute."[1]

This position is, moreover, openly accepted as a provisional hypothesis in the light of up-to-date empirical findings which may be upset one day by future experience.[2] Besides, the grounds on which such pluralism is based are intellectual rather than mystical. Mystic experience, James admits, does mostly favour a monistic view of the world.[3]

Pragmatism is often described as anti-metaphysical. We can see for ourselves from the foregoing discussion in what sense this criticism is valid. If metaphysics is taken as having for its subject-matter trans-empirical reality and *a priori* principles, pragmatism is of course opposed to such metaphysics that is busy about the unattainable. But if the object of metaphysics be to study reality within the reach of experience, of any and every kind, pragmatism warmly welcomes it and participates in its task.

6. Morality and Religion

The pragmatic method and attitude have far-reaching applications and implications in the fields of morality and gion, as elsewhere, and an account of pragmatism would be incomplete without some discussion on these points.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 160. [2] *Ibid.* p. 161. [3] *Ibid.* pp. 151-6.

(1) *Pragmatism and Ethics*

As to the relation of pragmatism to morality we can at once see in a general way how intimate it must be. Pragmatism furnishes, what Schiller calls,[1] the ethical basis of metaphysics, by making will, conduct and practical consequences the basis of human life, and its values. Dewey shows that knowing is a kind of doing and James declares that even "truth is *one species of good*, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. *The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief*"; it is "what we *ought* to believe".[2] Even facts and reals, Schiller contends, are forms of goods or values; they are facts and real because of being good for some human purposes.[3]

Ethics, in its wider sense of the science of the practical, is thus the most fundamental of all sciences, according to pragmatism. But in addition to this general relation, specific applications of the pragmatic method to the solution of definite ethical problems are also possible; and they have been partly illustrated by the pragmatic writers. Everywhere they insist that ethical questions should be settled not by reference to any *a priori* principles and standards but by their practical bearings, by consequences empirically observed in life.

The very first result of the pragmatic approach to ethics is the denial of eternal and transcendental values, the abstract idea of the ultimate good. The idea, for example, that all human goods, actually realized, are good in so far as they approach more and more the ideal of perfection (which however can never be attained in finite experience) is rejected by pragmatism on the same ground on which it rejects the conception of transcendental truth. All goods are immanent in human experience, and attainable here and now; and they are good as means of securing good, desirable consequences in life. All goods are thus instrumental, and, therefore, there is nothing intrinsically good, i.e., for its own sake without reference to the practical consequences it produces. It also follows logically from 'this test of consequences',[1] that there is *no one* ultimate good to which all the rest are affiliated as means. Ethical pluralism goes hand in hand with metaphysical pluralism in the experimental empiricism of the pragmatist, for whom neither any good nor any truth is final; everything is provisional and acceptable in so far as it proves operationally satisfactory. There are many goods, and all are imbedded in specific particular experiences, such as of "health, vigour, business, education"[2] and other cultural and social values, all justified by their valuable consequences.

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[1] *Humanism*, Essay. I

[2] *Pragmatism*, pp. 75-7.

[3] *Humanism*, p. 10.

But while rejecting the transcendental theory of values and dragging values down to the level of humdrum human experience, the pragmatist does not expose himself to the fallacy, committed by previous empirical moralists like Mill, namely of identifying value with what is *actually* valued. *Dewey points out* that there is a gulf of difference between what is actually desired, and what is thought desirable on reflection of consequences. To ignore this distinction is like holding that whatever happens to be *eaten is eatable.* We call a thing eatable only by watching the consequences it produces when eaten. A judgment of value is, therefore, based on the *test of consequences* acquired by experimental dealings with the thing.

Thus we notice that while basing ethical values on experience pragmatism does neither abolish the distinction between the 'is' and the 'ought', nor identify the good with immediate pleasure. This, we should also notice, is due to its prospective rather than retrospective consideration of things. The good, like truth, lies not in its conformity with the pre-established facts of experience but rather in its capacity for future desirable consequences. Ethics should help man regulate enjoyment in the light of the scientific knowledge of consequences, and not simply formulate theories.

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[1] Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 265. [2] *Ibid.* p. 261.

The ideal state of affairs would demand an intelligent and enlightened control of life in all its aspects in the light of scientific discoveries. "The issue involves nothing less than the problem of the directed reconstruction of economic, political and religious institutions."[1] And the reconstruction must fully utilize scientific knowledge. In a recent small book on *Freedom and Culture*[2] Dewey discusses in this light the problem of international understanding for securing and maintaining peace, freedom, democracy and all the values that civilization has taught man to prize.

James and Schiller apply the pragmatic method to the solution of the very important ethical problem of free-will. They point out[3] that purely on theoretical grounds and *a priori* principles it is impossible to decide the question, there being equally strong arguments on both sides. But when we take into consideration our concrete experiences, as well as the consequences that would follow for life if freedom or determinism were true, we find that the balance definitely turns towards freedom. First of all, we have a definite 'self-luminous and self-justifying' 'sense of freedom',[4] we feel that we *can* do certain things if we will. Secondly, such words[5] as 'should', 'ought', 'can' would lose their meanings if there were no choice in human action, if everything was completely determined. Thirdly (and this is the strongest pragmatic ground), belief in determinism spells pessimism;[6] man is made a mere instrument, powerless to decide his fate and improve his lot. On the other hand free-will "pragmatically means *novelties in the world*, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the past". "It holds up improvement as at least possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion of possibility is born of human ignorance, and that necessity and impossibility between them rule the destinies of the world." "Free-will is thus a general cosmological theory of *promise*"[1] and free-will "has no meaning unless it be a doctrine of relief."

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 247. [2] Pub. G. Allen and Unwin Ltd. (1940).

[3] *Pragmatism*, pp. 115-21, and *Humanism*, Essay XVI.

[4] *Some Problems of Phil.*, p. 139, and *The Will to Believe*, p. 153.

[5] *Humanism*, p. 292.

[6] *Pragmatism*, pp. 118-21.

Pragmatism, while it denounces pessimism for its depressing effect on life, does not accept the popular notion of optimism which is apt to make man lazy and indifferent by creating a sense of guaranteed security. Pessimism which thinks "the salvation of world impossible" and optimism which "thinks the world's salvation inevitable" are both rooted in determinism, the doctrine that the destiny of the world is completely pre-ordained. Believing in free-will and the utility of human enterprise pragmatism holds naturally a position midway between these two extreme views, namely, that the world is such that improvement or salvation is *possible* ; that the world can be *made better*, if man so likes and exerts his free-will. This doctrine James calls meliorism (melior = better) to distinguish it from pessimism (pessimus = worst), and optimism (optimus = best). "Midway between the two", he says, "there stands what may be called the doctrine of meliorism, tho' it has hitherto figured less as a doctrine than as an attitude in human affairs. Optimism has always been the regnant *doctrine* in European philosophy. Pessimism was only recently introduced by Schopenhauer and counts few systematic defenders as yet. Meliorism treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become."[2] That meliorism is not an unfounded doctrine will be accepted by all who daily cherish ideals of self-improvement and social reform and realize the ideals, at least in part, and show thereby that the world can be really made better.

(2) PRAGMATISM AND RELIGION

The application of the pragmatic method to *problems of religion* is also based on the test of consequences. Beliefs in God, design and immortality which have been challenged or ridiculed by many intellectualists on grounds of insufficient theoretical evidence, are accorded by the pragmatist a rightful place in the life of man on grounds of salutary effects for life. Faith, in the broadest sense, is upheld by him as the very first condition of human life. Scepticism and agnosticism are shown as results of barren rationalism based on abstract logic-chopping. They do not *work* in life. Even the sceptic has to live in faith, in so primary and basic acts as breathing (believing negatively that the air breathed is not harmful), in eating (believing that the food will nourish and do no harm), in walking (believing that the next step taken will be supported by the earth) and so on. Practice, as even Hume admitted, is the greatest cure of scepticism.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 119.

[2] *Pragmatism*, pp. 286-7.

The rationalist may take pride in his scepticism. He may think that though uncritical belief, as an animal tendency, operates in human life, reason is the supreme gift of man, and it should never abdicate its right to supremacy; reason should keep animal faith in check and never allow it to spoil the purity of critical thought. To such rationalists Schiller points out that "at bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of Faith".[1] How does the rationalist know that reality is rational or knowable by reason, or that reason is a safe instrument of knowledge, before trying to know, that is, before applying reason in life in the faith that it will work? "Without Faith, therefore, there can be no Reason, and initially the demands of 'Faith' must be as legitimate and essentially as reasonable as those of 'Reason' they pervade."[2] In other words, faith also must be given a trial in life on the same ground on which reason is given, and if it works, if it is verified and strengthened more and more by the experiences of life to which it leads, it becomes rationally acceptable. If any faith does not stand this pragmatic test it is rejected as spurious. *Genuine* religious faith, like a scientific hypothesis, is an inquiring, critical and self-verifying process based on a definite kind of experience and is not afraid of the light of truth or criticism.

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[1] *Humanism*, XVIII.

[2] *Ibid.*

Science and genuine Religion are thus not antagonistic, but very much allied. "Both rest on experience and aim at its interpretation: both proceed by postulation, both require their anticipations to be verified."

In his classic essay entitled *The Will To Believe*. James elaborately discusses this question of "our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced."[1] He shows that the choice between having religious faith and going without it is a *living*, *unavoidable* and *momentous* choice, and that one who chooses to go without such faith for want of sufficient evidence does take as much risk as one who adopts the faith in the hope of obtaining future verification; for the former runs the risk of losing an estimable prize that faith may bring. A choice that vitally affects life and stirs man's feelings is a live one. The choice between believing and disbelieving God is such a one. An unavoidable or forced choice is a choice between two exhaustive alternatives between which there is no third course left open, so that not to accept one alternative means automatic acceptance of the other. Between assuming an attitude of faith towards religious matters and doing without it there is no third alternative. Even suspense of belief here practically means to go without the effects and advantages of belief, and it is, therefore, in the same boat as disbelief, in practical consequence.[2] The attitude of the sceptic is to suspend judgment and his motto is "Better risk loss of truth than chance of error."[3] But he does not realize that he is running the great risk of never being able to attain the truth of religion, if there be any, and all its practical blessings in this life and in future, by denying himself the spirit of adventure by which alone truths can be attained. He suffers, if religion is true, just as much as the positive disbeliever does.

A choice is not trivial but momentous if its consequences are very important for life, if the stake is of unique value.

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[1] *The Will to Believe*, etc., pp. 1-2.

[2] *Ibid*. pp. 2-4.

[3] *Ibid*. p. 26.

Religion "offers itself as a *momentous* option. We are supposed to gain even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good."[1] So it is not a matter that can be trifled with.

It may be said that to choose religion on such grounds is to be influenced by passions that rule over irrational aspect of human nature. James points out that even the choice of irreligion is ultimately guided by a passion. For while insecurity and insufficiency of evidence are realized by the believer and the sceptic alike, the first is passionate enough to run the risk of error in the hope of truth, the second has the opposite passion of risking truth for fear of error. Nay, the sceptic is positively guided by an irrational rule of conduct in shutting the only door by which a certain kind of truth might have the chance of entering experience and becoming verified.

There is thus ample justification of the *will to believe*, that is of the right to believe under such circumstances. James sums up the essence of this claim thus :

"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open', is itself a passional decision,—just like deciding yes or no,—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth".[2]

In another essay entitled *Reflex Action and Theism*, James, in the role of a teacher of physiology, tries to show that God affords the most adequate object of the three departments of the mind. The three departments are sensory impression, reflection and action. They correspond to the sensory nerves, the brain and the motor nerves, the triadic structure of the nervous system.

In our work-a-day life neither our sensible nature nor thought nor volition realizes maximum potentiality. Only a part of the total influence coming from the external world is selected and translated into knowledge; we attend only to that part of it which interests us at the moment, and only a part, therefore, can be translated also into action, and our volitional nature is not, therefore, fully satisfied; it demands fuller outlet for its pent-up energy. Under the pressure of our will and emotion our cognitive faculties constantly select and order the facts of sense in different ways, yielding now a scientific, now a poetic, now some other picture of the world. But none of these efforts succeed in giving stable peace or satisfaction to the active aspect of our life. The picture that theistic thought draws of the world is also an attempt made to satisfy our volitional nature. But it proves to be the most satisfactory one. For it takes the whole world, the sum total of all that is presented to sense, and interprets it as a responsive power answering to the call of our heart and will. It satisfies the whole of our perceptive, reflective and active nature and establishes a stable harmony among these. Theism gives the most satisfactory solution, because "Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living *thou, with whom the whole man may have dealings.*"[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.* p. 11.

This theistic picture that our thought draws of the world is no more arbitrary than the scientific, or any other picture that mind chooses to draw out of the given plastic sensible world. On the contrary it is the truest, as it is the most satisfying to the will at the instance of which and to satisfy which our cognitive nature works. God is thus "the most adequate possible object for minds framed like our own"[2] that is, framed of a triadic nature. Religion is the total reaction of such a mind to God.

Regarding the exact nature of God, pragmatism in consistency with its conception of relativity, keeps an open mind. In his *Pragmatism* and *Varieties of Religious Experience* James permits the possibility of a variety of conceptions of God suiting different temperaments, their satisfactoriness being relative to the respective minds.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 126-7 (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 115.

[3] *Pragmatism*, 300-301.

But he points out that the conception of God compatible with the pluralistic faith of the pragmatist should lie between naturalism and absolutism, and he is inclined to accept in addition to the supreme power, God, the possibility of various other superhuman forces responsive to the needs of man and co-operating with him for the salvation of the world. This would appear to be a species of *polytheism*. But James remarks that "the original polytheism of mankind has only imperfectly and vaguely sublimated itself into monotheism, and monotheism itself, so far as it was religious and not a scheme of classroom instruction for the metaphysicians, has always viewed God as but one helper, *primus inter pares*, in the midst of all shapers of the great world's fate."[1] Pragmatism "can be called religious, if you allow that religion can be pluralistic or meleoristic in type".[2] But it does not want to be dogmatic, every one has to decide for himself what form of religion will work best with him, because "evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences."[3]

The belief in God, however inferior it may be, is a *promise*, in our trials and tribulations; "it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved" and persuades us to believe that "tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things".[4] It possesses "an extraordinary tonic and consoling power". And in whatever form that belief comes it practically means " 'God's in his heaven; all's right with the world'.—*That's* the real heart of your theology, and for that you need no rationalist definitions."[5]

In *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, A Study in Human Nature, which was the outcome of the Gifford Lectures delivered by him (at Edinburgh in 1901-2), James discusses in great detail the psychological, biological, and philosophical aspects of the various religious phenomena that have obtained in different ages and lands. Through a long and tortuous course of historical considerations which show the versatile scholarship and the wide and penetrating sympathies of a noble and great mind. James comes to the same conclusion as we have briefly stated above. Religion is primarily a matter and necessity of life. It is a biological reaction[1]—a conception, which we shall find later, enters into Bergson's conception of religion as well. James tries to show that we can and should distinguish between the basic nucleus of religious beliefs and the additional intellectual, metaphysical doctrines foisted on them, which he calls over-beliefs.[2] It is about the latter that there are conflicts and battles of opinions. But regarding the basic beliefs there is a wonderful unanimity. Feeling and conduct of religious men possess striking similarity, though their thoughts and words vary. "When we survey the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there; but the feelings on the one hand and conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives."[3] The theories, being variable, are secondary; the essence of all religions must be looked for in this unanimity of feeling and conduct. The conduct again is an expression of feeling. The religious feeling in so far as the intellect can grasp and express it is analysable into a feeling of uneasiness, "a sense that there is *something wrong about us* as we naturally stand", and a solution or a feeling of relief, "a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers".[4]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 298.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 300.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 109.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 106.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 132.

From this it would appear that there is a great truth, holds James, in what Professor Leuba says,[5] namely that "God is not known, he is not understood; he is used" in life; that "Not God, but life, more life, a larger richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion. The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious impulse."[6] Religion is thus at bottom biological.

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[1] *Op. Cit.* pp. 51-2, 503-5. [2] *Ibid.* p. 504. [3] *Ibid.* p. 504
[4] *Ibid.* p. 508. [5] *Monist,* July, 1901.
[6] *The Varieties, etc.,* pp. 506-7.

The philosophical question of the *existence* of God is irrelevant to this practical, biological attitude. Dewey tries to show that the heart of religion is, as Schleiermacher holds, the '*sense of dependence*'; and the religious attitude is a sense of the possibilities of realizing an ideal, and its devotion to this ideal does not depend on "the proof of its antecedent existence", but on its ability to provide a satisfactory basis on which the religious life can depend and progress.[1] Belief in the existence of God starts, like other beliefs, as a provisional postulate for life.

James criticizes the different kinds of attacks made on religion by persons who try to discredit it by showing its low origin, such as unbalanced hysterical mind, unhealthy nerves, perversion of the sexual instinct and the like. He points out that such attempts are as childish as would be the attempt to refute the value of a scientific discovery or an industrial commodity by showing up the author's neurotic constitution. The origin is no criterion of value. Value must be ascertained by its satisfactory results. For determining the value of a religion we must judge it by the inner happiness, the serviceability, the consistency with other ideas. Moreover, just as religion can be traced to certain bodily and mental circumstances of persons, disbelief can similarly be traced to certain other conditions and criticized by its origin; and the issue will thus remain unsettled.[2] "The plain truth is to interpret religion one must in the end look at the immediate content of the religious consciousness."[3]

The philosophy of religion to be fruitful must collect, observe, compare, and frame hypotheses on, such facts of immediate religious consciousness. In a word it should adopt the same procedure as the other empirical sciences, and it should, therefore, be a science of religions. The status of this science would then be as respectable as that of the physical science; and even for those who have no religious experience of their own it would be what optics is for the blind.[2] But if instead of this empirical scientific procedure, the philosophy of religion "assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone, or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts"[1] (that is from facts other than those present to the consciousness of the religious individuals) it can no doubt raise grand *a priori* systems, as Hegelians have done, but then it travels away from the concrete facts of religion towards the unreal region of abstraction and verbalism. It fails to convince one of the truth of religion. Its "formulas are like stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument, they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality."[2] "In all sad sincerity", says James, "I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless."[3]

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[1] *The Quest etc.*, pp. 288-91.

[2] *The Varieties*, etc., Lect. I.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 12 f. n.

[4] *Ibid.* 456.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 433.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 457.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 455.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON

1. Introduction

Among philosophers of the present age none has received so high a recognition and enjoyed so great a popularity in and outside the philosophical world as the French savant Henry Bergson (1859—1941). Originality of philosophic insight, first-hand knowledge of science, particularly Biology, power of exposition and, above all, an exquisite literary style combined to secure for him a unique position in the modern world of culture. It is no wonder, therefore, that his works should be translated into so many languages and he should be awarded a Nobel prize—a unique honour for a philosopher.

The philosophy of Bergson reflects the same spirit of the times as Pragmatism with which it shares its attitude of revolt against Absolute Idealism, particularly against intellectualism, and block conception of the universe. William James was delighted to see, towards the close of his life, the rise of the new dynamic philosophy of Bergson, and welcomed its able advocacy of the dynamic and anti-intellectualistic point of view, which he himself had been trying to establish against absolutism.[1]

The study of Biology left a permanent impression on Bergson, and moulded his metaphysical outlook. While the materialist tries to interpret the whole world—matter, life and mind—in terms of matter alone, and the idealist in terms of mind alone, Bergson attempts to understand everything in terms of life. The root idea of Bergson's thought is the life-force which we feel throbbing within us. The world of matter lying extended before us and ideas appearing within our mind are understood as products of the same life-impetus or vital impulse (*elan vital*). Like materialism and idealism, the vitalism of Bergson is, therefore, a kind of monism. But it has a special advantage over the other two. The gulf between matter and mind is so wide that the reduction of any one of them to the other appears to be absurd and forced. But life which stands mid-way between matter and mind, is closer to both, and the attempt to understand these in terms of life seems, therefore, to be comparatively easier. In fact modern physics by reducing matter into energy, and modern psychology, by its attempt to explain mental phenomena in terms of physiological reactions or unconscious tendencies, only render the Bergsonian hypothesis more probable and acceptable. If what appears as inert matter is the manifestation of energy,[1] the barrier between such matter and living matter is not insuperable, and if what appear as ideas are the products of actions or tendencies, not themselves conscious, the distinction between life and mind ceases to be fundamental. Thus the cumulative evidence of physics and psychology points to an ultimate reality of the nature of energy by which both physical and psychical phenomena can be explained without much difficulty. Bergson's philosophy of *elan vital* or life impulse as the basic reality is, therefore, in harmony with the general trend of modern science, and in some respects Bergson may be regarded as the forerunner of modern tendencies.

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[1] *Vide A Pluralistic Universe*, Lect. VI.

It should be noted however that the vitalism of Bergson is nearer to spiritualism or metaphysical idealism than to materialism. For, as we shall find hereafter, life possesses even in its primitive forms some rudimentary marks of spiritual activity; and consciousness in its most general aspect is co-extensive with life.[2]

In fact in many places Bergson describes the original force as a current of consciousness or as supra-consciousness.[3] Life manifested in different organisms is thus conceived as the result of a struggle of the force of consciousness in and through the environment of matter. Consciousness is freedom and matter is determination. Life is consciousness struggling to overcome the impeding and determining influence of matter and express itself in creative activity. Bergson's vitalism assumes, therefore, a form of spiritualism with this difference that unlike its ordinary adherents, Bergson conceives the spirit as essentially a force or impulse rather than reason or thought and, therefore, views the universe as a flux and not as a static or pre-determined system. Bergson's philosophy resembles idealistic philosophy also on the point that unlike Realism, it attempts to study reality from the stand-point of the whole which is regarded as organic, and more fundamental than the parts. But Bergson does not conceive like idealists the organization within the whole in terms of reason or thought, but literally in terms of life. The parts are related in the whole of reality just as different tendencies acquired by past habits mingle into one peculiar bend in a living organism.

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[1] *Vide Matter and Memory*, pp. 264-5.

[2] *Mind Energy*, p. 8.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 21, and *Creative Evolution*, pp. 191, 275, *et passim.*

The dynamic conception of reality which we find more and more in present-day scientific philosophers like Whitehead, first appeared in modern times perhaps in the philosophy of James. But Bergson develops it in an original way, and the influence of Bergson on Whitehead and other subsequent thinkers can be clearly seen in many important respects.

Every form of dynamic philosophy must be necessarily based on the reality of time. It has, therefore, to investigate carefully the conception of time, and examine critically the many classic doctrines demonstrating the illusory character of time. Bergson's philosophy of change too is based on a particular theory of time and we must understand it very clearly before we can hope to grasp his peculiar point of view.

2. THE CONCEPTIONS OF TIME AND CHANGE.

The problem of Time is almost as old as Philosophy. Some thinkers have attempted to uphold the reality of Time, others have condemned it as a mere appearance too full of puzzles and contradictions to be real. But all agree that time consists in the *succession* of *homogeneous* moments which do not differ from one another in respect of character or quality. The well-known objections raised by the Eleatics in ancient days and by Bradley in recent times, arise from this conception. Kant also conceives time in the same way, and holds that it is a mere subjective form of intuition, essentially a human way of looking at things and, therefore, has no place beyond the world of appearance, in *things-in-themselves*. The conception of change wedded to such a conception of time is nothing more than that of succession and replacement of state by state; and it has to succumb to the same kind of destructive criticism. Motion, too, is conceived according to this idea of time, as the occupation of different positions in space at successive instants of time, and it becomes thus a source of endless puzzles and paradoxes, as Zeno, Bradley and many others point out.

This popular conception of time underlies our practical outlook on the external world with which we have to deal in daily life. Mathematics, mechanics and other sciences of practical utility naturally accept it and build their theories on it. So Bergson sometimes calls it mathematical time. It is good for all practical purposes. But when we penetrate deeper into the conception and try to understand its meaning and implications logically, we are confronted with the difficulties referred to above.

With the critics of this mathematical conception of time Bergson is at one; and he too agrees that such time cannot be accepted as real. But he differs from them to hold that it is really a mere spurious product of a real time which it implies and stands on, and of which we fortunately have an intimate, though neglected, experience in every day life. This genuine time he calls *duration* (duree). Thus while denying time in the ordinary sense, Bergson admits it in another way, nay, as we shall see, he makes that the very essence of Reality. It is necessary to understand how this new idea is reached from the work-a-day conception of time.

We ordinarily suppose that events take place in time in the internal world as well as in the external. According to

Bergson, the states in the mind of course succeed one another. But things in the external world are perceived as *simultaneous*, and as extended in space, outside one another. They are *present* all *together*. There is thus neither past nor future in space, and therefore, no succession. The external world is the simultaneous togetherness of many objects existing side by side. The so-called successive states of the external world are nothing but different simultaneous presentations of the world arranged successively by the mind. If we deduct mental activity there would be nothing left but simultaneity and the external world would be devoid of time or succession.[1]

It is clear then that time as an order of succession has its roots in the mind. The mind retains its experiences and it separates them and sets them one after another whenever we are aware of succession. Though succession would not exist without mind or consciousness, it does not follow that every form of consciousness arises in the form of succession. Bergson takes great pains to investigate the different states of consciousness, and is convinced after an elaborate enquiry that there are two aspects of our mental life, a superficial one, and a deeper one. In its superficial aspect it consists of sensations, emotions, thoughts, etc., which are separated, isolated, named and arranged one after another. Succession belongs only to this superficial aspect. But in its deeper aspect the different experiences of the mind are inseparably intermingled, they interpenetrate and form one concrete whole, in which no element is outside another and the elements are not, therefore, arranged in any order of succession.[2] In every intense experience, 'a violent love', 'a deep melancholy', a burning passion, or any other thing of the kind, there is a feeling of our entire existence being churned and stirred. Our whole being is moved in a way too deep for expression. The peculiarity of such an experience is that the more intense it is the more do we fail to isolate its elements, bring it under a definite class, and label it with a familiar name. The reason is that here every aspect of our existence permeates the rest and imparts to them its own colour. We have thus an undistinguished multiplicity of elements blending into a moving whole whose intensity is due to the cumulative force of the interpenetrating elements.

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[1] *Time and Free Will*, p. 120.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 129.

Such an intense experience reveals the basic nature of our self, it shows our existence in its entirety. We find here what real movement, growth, change and duration are. That there are change and growth in such a deep feeling is amply proved by its moving character and its manifestations. And as there is change there must also thing about it is that there is no succession here, but be time through which it endures. But the most striking interpenetration. So the time or duration of such a feeling cannot surely be an extended series of experiences coming one after another. The elements do not exist here isolated and outside one another to be able to form an order of succession. Time here is another name for continuous development of a multiplicity of elements constantly running into one another, the process of unification going hand in hand with multiplication. Bergson, therefore, identifies it with the deeper reality which we experience within us. Real time is better named duration, because while ordinarily time suggests succession, duration suggests the enduring and continuous character which belongs to real time.

The superficial aspect of the mind, in which there appears succession of sensations, emotions, thoughts, etc., is the one with which we lead our practical life. It is a selective abstraction from the deeper, entire mind. Life requires for its success concentration of attention on particular aspects of experience. A man on a busy street, for example, must isolate from his total experience the sound of a motor horn, fix it before his mind and behave towards it appropriately, or he would be crushed to death. The exigencies of practical life require, therefore, the breaking up of his entire, concrete experience into fragments, and the treating of them as discrete states or objects.

Again, man is essentially a social creature, and he must be able to communicate his feelings to others through language. But language would be impossible if words did not carry fixed meanings. The necessity for communication acts, therefore, as a very powerful force in making man isolate and split up his experiences into fixed patterns and label them with words having fixed meanings. He has thus to disregard the changing and mobile character of experience and treat it as something rigid and immobile. For example, the first impression of a particular house, a man or a dish changes a good deal with experience, and yet we call it by the same name fixing our attention on its comparatively abiding characters and disregarding its changes. Language thus makes us gradually insensible to the changing aspects of experience, and has consequently a great influence in solidifying the mobile reality for us.[1] It is thus that our deeper experience which is a complex, continuous, unbroken flux turns into discrete and isolated states and images outside one another.

The relation of externality among different elements of experience, thus generated, means the birth of extension out of what was originally unextended. Though the intensity found in our deeper experiences of love, hope, beauty, etc., derives its force from a multiplicity of elements mingling together, this multiplicity, we saw, exists undifferentiated. But extension consists in a differentiated multiplicity the elements of which stand outside one another. The differentiation of the undifferentiated is, therefore, the process by which the extended is born out of the unextended. If the intensity of the deeper mental life can be called tension, extension would be *de*tension or relaxation.

The ordinary conception of time as the succession of homogeneous or similar moments is based on the pattern of space, the moments being set *outside* one another. That is clearly shown by the fact that we generally represent time in our mind with the help of a straight line the different parts of which stand for the past, the present and the future. Several consequences follow from this spatialization of time. We imagine time to consist of similar instants, just as a line consists of similar points. Thus time comes to be viewed as a homogeneous length. We also think that time can be measured like space, and adopt different units for its measurement. The most fatal consequence of spatialization, however, is that we come to believe that the past is left behind, and is dead and gone, and the future lies ahead, and therefore the present is all that is left, and is of any consequence. The concrete unity of an unbroken whole of real time is thus sundered into abstract, independent instants, and their continuity is lost in a discontinuous collecton of *successive* moments.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 181.

With this abstract, spatialized, conception of time we try to understand change and movement in the external, as well as in the internal world, and, therefore, miss their real nature. Change of a mental state or of a material object is conceived as a series of states succeeding one another. Motion is similarly pictured as the successive positions of some thing on a line at different instants of time. But change and movement so conceived are only spurious symbols. For they are static. The mere repetition of different states or positions cannot constitute change or motion. There must be something *continuing* and *developing* through the different states to unify them into one process of change, or there would be only a discrete and discontinuous multiplicity.

This difficulty is felt by many thinkers. But instead of revising their false notion of time as succession, they try to get over the difficulty by supposing permanent substances. Thus a permanent unchanging ego is supposed in order to explain the unity and continuity of mental states, and permanent material substances are imagined to understand external changes. But Bergson points out that the addition of unchanging substance to a series consisting of unchanging units cannot produce change or movement; never can "solids strung upon a solid make up that duration which flows." "What we actually obtain in this way is an artificial imitation of the internal life, a static equivalent which will lend itself better to the requirements of logic and language, just because we have eliminated from it the element of real time."[1]

It is not possible to measure real time. For it is an unceasing development of new and ever-growing characters, and not a repetition of identical contents necessary for counting and measuring. Moreover, the multiplicity of phases it contains cannot be separated into discrete elements without destroying its essential nature. Hence no measurement is possible of real time or change.

"Now, just for this reason, science cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative element of time, duration, and of motion, mobility."[2] The so-called measurement of time or duration is simply comparison of duration with duration, for example, the duration of a meeting with that of the duration of the motion of the hands on the dial of the clock, or with the motion of the sun in the sky. In such comparison the mind notes the simultaneity of the durations compared. The so-called measurement of velocity is simply the measurement of the path traversed during (*i.e.*, simultaneous with) a period of time, and not of the real act of moving. It is seen thus that what is really measured in the name of time or motion is nothing but space, and its characteristic feature, simultaneity.

The paradoxes raised by Zeno and others regarding motion are due to the confusion between the act of moving and the path traversed by the moving body. The path is infinitely divisible, but not the act or process, and it is a mistake to attempt to establish a complete correspondence between the two. The interval which separates two neighbouring points on the path is infinitely divisible, and if motion consisted also of parts like those of the interval itself, the interval would never be crossed as Zeno rightly contended. But in fact every act of motion is a simple indivisible act which can cover a certain span of space all at once.

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[1] *Creative Evolution*, p. 4.

[2] *Time and Free Will*, p. 115.

We are now in a position to understand the exact meaning of time and change in the dynamic philosophy of Bergson. For him, we find, time does not mean succession, and change does not mean mere succession of states,—the replacement of one state by another. But *time is duration* which is the nature of real change itself. "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation"[2]

Every present experience is felt as a duration. It is, as James says, like a 'saddle-back', and not like a 'needle-point' or a 'knife-edge'. It has, as Bergson says, one foot in the past, another in the future.[3] The past, all that "we have felt, thought and willed from our earliest infancy is there leaning over the present" and "it is felt in the form of tendency."[4] The future also is felt as the tendency *towards* which the present leans. So if we consider the three dynamically as felt tendencies or impulses we can understand how they can interpenetrate and form one moving and growing whole. What is intuitively felt as a dynamic whole is analysed by the intellect into successive static ideas and distinguished as the past, the present and the future, placed outside one another.

The different aspects of Bergson's philosophy centre round this conception of Time or Change and we can indicate here how the problems, which underlie philosophy, arise. If reality is change, how are we to understand matter and mind, the two patent types of reality, and their interrelation? How again are we to understand the history, origin and development of the universe? How is Reality known, and what should, therefore, be the method of Philosophy? Lastly, is there any place for morality and religion in this system of thought? We shall discuss these prob-

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 112f.

[2] *Creative Evolution,* p. 5.

[3] *Matter and Memory,* pp. 176-7.

[4] *Creative Evolution,* p. 6.

lems in the subsequent sections under the four heads: (1) Matter and Mind, (2) Creative Evolution, (3) The Method of Philosophy, (4) Morality and Religion.

3. Matter and Mind

(1) *What really is matter?*

When we try to understand Reality as change, the very first difficulty we feel is: How can there be change without some substance, mental or material, which changes? But such a question reveals that we are meaning by change, what it ordinarily means, the *state* of some reality. Change, we have seen, means, for Bergson, not an abstract state or succession of states, but the concrete growing process of organization, which is the nature of Reality itself. The error of conceiving change as succession is sought, in vain, to be supported by a second error, the supposition of a static substance to unify the successive. But as soon as the first error is given up, the need for the second disappears. In other words, the concrete conception of change as a growing process of development and conservation, a duration which 'swells as it advances', is a self-sufficient conception of Reality; it dispenses with the supposition of a subratum lying behind change.

The ordinary conceptions of matter and mind, therefore, require revision. Bergson undertakes this task in his *Matter and Memory*, and subsequently in other works.

It is a common belief that when we open our eyes or touch objects we perceive matter all around us. But really what we perceive are images. Matter is an aggregate of images, colour, shape, resistance, etc.[1] Berkeley did a real service to philosophy by exploding the myth of a material substance having primary qualities, and by showing that matter is an aggregate of perceived qualities. But his mistake was to reduce them to mere ideas, and "place matter within mind, and make it into a pure idea." The difficulty of such idealism is that it fails to explain the fixed laws operating among images, laws which science discovers and successfully uses to foresee future events. If the images were absolutely dependent on the mind, how could there be inexorable laws, beyond our control governing images? The images constituting matter must, therefore, be independent of our mind. But the realist commits the opposite kind of mistake by going to the other extreme and holding that matter is not only independent of the mind, but also the cause of images, and that it is itself something different from them. We have no evidence for the existence of such a mysterious entity, nor does common sense support the assertion that matter is other than colour, resistance, etc Rejecting these two extreme views Bergson accepts the middle position, in consonance with common sense, that matter is an aggregate of self-existing images (that is, images which are independent of the perceiving act which reveals them). In other words, "matter is precisely that which it appears to be",[1] it is just the appearance presented to our senses, and set out in space side by side. It is out there where it is perceived, and not in the mind.

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[1] *Matter and Memory*, Introduction, *et passim*.

We have two different kinds of description of matter in Bergson's work. The one given above we may characterize as the external view of matter, that is matter as it is perceived by us through the senses. In addition to this, there is another which may be called the internal view. This latter draws our attention to the movement, inwardly felt, at the root of the images that appear as matter outside us. Matter, from this point of view, is described as a movement inverse to that of life.[2]

The two movements, inverse and direct, we can constantly feel, oppose and complement each other. Disintegration of the one basic reality or flux, and re-unification of the disintegrated fragments are continuously going on. We have, for example, a complex undifferentiated unity of feeling which explodes into a series of discrete and successive words that try to express the feeling. Again, as the words are heard one after another they generate impressions which blend together into one organic whole of consciousness conveying one meaning. The first is the disintegrating movement which Bergson likens to the unrolling of a coil, the unwinding of a spring, the explosion of a rocket and the descent of a body, whereas the second is compared to enrolling, winding, compression and ascent. The first is matter and the second is mind, in their basic aspects. The superficial aspect of mind in which discrete mental states succeed one another is the result of mind's descending tendency, and is the subtle beginning of its materialization. In external perception this tendency is fully materialized. The tension and unity of the basic mind give way to relaxation or extension or detention, as Bergson likes to name it.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 80.

[2] *Creative Evolution*, pp. 268-5.

What we perceive through senses, namely the isolated objects existing in space outside one another, serve the purpose of practical life. They constitute the field and plan of possible actions. The sight, touch, smell, taste and other qualities into which we can analyse an external object are nothing but the *possible* reactions we shall have if we act on the environment. They show, therefore, in advance the effects that would result from virtual or eventual, that is, possible action of our body on the environment. Our body is the centre of action; the image of this body we perceive is an image of this centre. And all images of objects are found to vary in relation to this central image, and depend on it. It is clear then that perception is not a revelation of reality. It is only a plan of the virtual action of our body on the environment and the expected reaction. It has no speculative value. "Our perception", says Bergson, "indicates the possible action of our body on others."[2] "The bodies we perceive are, so to speak, cut out of the stuff of nature by our *perception*, and the scissors follow, in some way, the marking lines along which *action* might be taken."[3]

(2) *The Practical Nature of Perception and Thought*

That perception and thought are fundamentally practical in purpose is also shown by Bergson from physiological considerations.[1] In primitive organisms there are not two sets of organs for perception of the environment and for reaction to it. The contact of an external object with the surface of a primitive organism is marked by an immediate reaction. Perception of and action on the environment here coincide; perception *is* reaction. In higher animals the sensory apparatus is, of course, differentiated from the motor. But in them also we find that in case of reflex actions the energy received by the senses from the environment is immediately transmitted by sensory nerves to the motor nerve, leading to an immediate reaction of the body on the environment without perception. The sensory mechanism is thus found here also to be an instrument of action, rather than knowledge. Perception arises only when and in so far as, such automatic reaction is not adequate for adjustment, and there is room for choice and hesitation. In such cases the energy received by the sense is transmitted by sensory nerves to the brain whence again it is diverted to a chosen motor path to be acted out. Here perception precedes action, furnishing a plan of possible action. But though perception is here distinct from real action, it is itself a kind of covert action rehearsing real action in advance. It is describable, therefore, as virtual action. It shows the possible directions of action.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 250.

[2] *Matter and Memory*, p. 310.

[3] *Creative Evolution*, p. 12.

Consciousness which we find in perception and thought, is, therefore, described as "the light that plays round the zone of possible action". "It signifies hesitation or choice. Where many equally possible actions are indicated without there being any real action (as in a deliberation that has not come to an end), consciousness is intense. Where the action performed is the only action possible (as in activity of the somnambulist or any reflex action), consciousness is reduced to nothing". "From this point of view, the consciousness of a living being may be defined as an arithmetical difference between potential and real activity. It measures the interval between representation and action."[2] The practical nature of perception and thought is thus abundantly clear.

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[1] *Matter and Memory*, Chap. I. [2] *Creative Evolution*, p. 152.

The same basic need or power which chooses and carves material objects out of the Flux, also creates a centre through which the selection is effected. This centre is our body. Our body consists of sensory and motor apparatus, and is provided with a central organ, the brain. The sensory mechanism simply receives and transmits external influence to the brain which, acting as a central telephonic exchange,[1] directs the energy either along a special motor path, or arrests it and breaks it up to be distributed among all the motor centres. In the latter case we have conscious perception and thought.

(3) *Consciousness not produced by the brain nor parallel to its state*

From this it follows that *consciousness is not produced by the brain,* as materialistic psychologists hold. Consciousness is only arrested or potential *energy*, which is received, selected and retained by the brain, and not created by it. It is, therefore, original in this sense, and prior to the selective action of the brain.

The disadvantage of the materialistic hypothesis is that though it believes that consciousness is a new kind of fact, not originally present in the external world, nor in the changes made by it in our body, still it has to say that at the end of a series of changes in the brain, all of which are non-conscious there suddenly comes into existence this altogether new kind of phenomenon, by a sort of *deus ex machina*.[2] Another difficulty of the materialistic hypothesis is that it has to hold that the idea of the world perceived, depends upon the brain, which is absurd, since, the first consists of the totality of images, whereas the second is only one image forming a part of that totality, and "it would be absurd that the container should issue from the contained".[3]

The advantage of Bergson's hypothesis, on the contrary, is that he conceives the external world, the physiological changes and perception all in terms of vital impulse or energy, so that there is no problem of the magical appearance of an altogether new kind of phenomenon. Besides, this energy he conceives to be at bottom nothing but a force of consciousness, capable of carrying over, like our memory, the past into the present.

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[1] *Matter and Memory*, p. 19.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 15.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 35.

It is very often urged in favour of materialism, that if consciousness were not dependent on the body, particularly the brain, how could we explain the fact that injury to certain parts of the brain impairs certain psychic powers? How is it, for example, that damage to the third left frontal convolution of the brain results in the forgetting of articulate speech movements? Does it not point out that word-memory is dependent on a particular part of the brain?[1] Does it not show that impressions of past experience are stored up in the brain, and memory means the revival of these?

Bergson points out that if we accept the materialistic hypothesis we fail to explain *how* from unconscious impressions in the brain conscious *memory could at all arise.* On the contrary, his hypothesis experiences no such difficulty. For, according to him whatever happens is conserved by the basic Reality in us. Memory, as it functions in us, is nothing more than the selective application of past experience to present action. Our brain is an instrument of selection. With its help we can recall or get out of the whole store of past experience conserved in Reality, the part that is of practical use at the moment. Damage to this instrument means impairing the apparatus of selection and practical application. We can thus explain very easily why there is a close relation between the brain and some psychic powers like memory, without admitting that the brain is the generator of these powers. *The brain is a selector rather than a generator.* "Such is the brain's part in the work of memory: it does not serve to preserve the past, but primarily to mask it, then to allow what is practically useful to emerge through the mask."[2] The brain is thus the organ of attention to practical life. It is only the mechanism of recall, and not a store of *ideas*. It simply stores motor *habits*.[1]

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[1] *Mind Energy*, p. 50.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 57.

In a similar manner Bergson tries to explain also sleep, insanity, and apparent loss of consciousness in swoon. Basic consciousness is not wanting in such cases. What is wanting is the proper functioning of the apparatus by which this consciousness is selectively applied to practical life.

The dualistic hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism must also be rejected, if this explanation is true. Though we have a close relation between the brain and our practical consciousness of every form, we have no reason to admit that changes in the brain are parallel to those in consciousness, or that the one has a point-to-point resemblance to the other, any more than we should think that just because a coat hangs from a nail and falls down if the nail is taken off, the coat must resemble in every point the nail,[2] or that because the music of an orchestra is directed by the movements of the conductor, it must correspond to these movements, in every detail. Against parallelism, there is, moreover, the *prima facie* objection that nature does not suffer any superfluity, and it is unlikely that "nature has indulged in the luxury of repeating in the language of consciousness what the cerebral cortex expresses in atomic or molecular movements . . . . . A consciousness which is only a duplicate, unable to intervene actively, would have long since disappeared from the universe, supposing it had ever been produced. Do we not see that our actions become unconscious in the degree that habit renders them mechanical?"[3]

Considerations, such as these, make Bergson conclude that mind is not dependent on matter, that consciousness is neither produced by, nor even adequately expressed by changes in the brain and the body. But we should remember that 'consciousness' (or 'mind') has been used by him in at least two different senses, not always properly distinguished, namely, the basic consciousness which he identifies with Reality, and its fragmentary manifestations through selective mechanisms like our brain designed for successful practical life. The basic consciousness does not possess, therefore, any of the ordinary functions like thinking, willing, feeling to which we generally confine the word, consciousness. The basic mind resembles and anticipates rather the unconscious of Freud.[1] Why should then Bergson at all call this consciousness?

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 73. [2] *Matter and Memory*, Introduction, xi.
[3] *Mind Energy*, p. 72; *vide* also pp. 189f, forfurther arguments.

The reason is that Bergson regards memory as the basic character of mind or consciousness. Consciousness, he says, "signifies, before everything, memory."[2] Memory is conservation of the past. So what Bergson means by identifying Reality with consciousness is that Reality conserves everything that happens just as our mind does its past experience. We have seen that Bergson's conception of Time or Duration involves this idea of conservation of the entire past and its penetration into the present. So, to say that Reality is conscious is but another way of saying that it endures and preserves the past.

But in addition to memory, consciousness has also another function, that is anticipation. Consciousness not only retains the past, but tends towards the creation of something new, the future. "To retain what no longer is, to anticipate what as yet is not,—these are the primary functions of consciousness".[3] And Reality in so far as it endures not only retains the past but carries it over through the present towards a future. Hence Reality can be said to be consciousness both because of its conservation of the past and its creation of the future.

(4) *Dualism or Monism?*

Bergson sometimes speaks in the dualistic manner as though there were two ultimate realities, matter and mind; and sometimes he speaks, like a monist, of one ultimate force of consciousness, current or activity, or even of a common centre from which all actions spring.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 107f.n.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 55.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 5.

A sympathetic reader will not fail to realize that there no real contradiction; Bergson really speaks from two ferent points of view. His dualism is a provisional arting point. As a scientific empiricist he observes facts he finds them without and within himself. In the world tside he surveys life in the different paths of evolution ind in all of them an internal force of life or conscious-ess struggling to express itself through a resisting stuff, atter. The struggle is sometimes unsuccessful, as in xtinct animals, sometimes slightly successful, as in lower rms of life where consciousness dimly manifests itself, nd sometimes the success is quite conspicuous, as in man here consciousness lords it over matter. But everywhere here is the struggle between *two* forces. Looking within e observes that there are also two opposite tendencies, ne of unification and integration, the other of differentiation nd diversification. The existence of two forces is thus evealed in both kinds of observation. "Consciousness and atter appear to us, then, as radically different forms of existence."[1]

But Bergson does not rest with this apparent dualism. As a metaphysician he tries to overcome it with the supposition of one ultimate principle underlying the two pposite tendencies. Thus he observes: "We may surmise, that two realities, *matter and consciousness, are derived om a common source.*"[2] This surmise is based on the consideration that both consciousness and matter, in its asic internal aspect, are tendencies or actions, though they are of opposite natures. The "same kind of action s going on everywhere, whether it is that which is unmaking self or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself"[3] and, therefore, as *action* or movement they come under the same category. Moreover both are creative, in so far as they evolve something out of the past. Whereas consciousness is the forward tendency of creation, matter s creation that uncreates itself.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 13.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 18 (our italics).

[3] *Creative Evolution*, p. 262.

This supposition of one basic principle is also supported by an intuitive insight into our own being. There we notice the genesis of extension by the relaxation of intensity, the genesis of the divided, extended matter by the differentiation of the undifferentiated psychic unity. Matter is thus found to be the "congealed parts"[1] of the vital current, and nothing foreign to it.

Of course, we have still to remember that the one principle contains within itself the two tendencies. Though this principle must initially be in an undifferentiated form, it is capable of differentiation by the relaxation of its tension. But what name should we give to that "principle that has only to let go its tension,—may we say to *detend*,—in order to *extend*"? "For want of a better word we have called it consciousness", says Bergson. But he warns us that the word should not be taken in the sense of "the narrowed consciousness that functions in each of us".[2] "To get to the principle of all life, as also of all materiality" we must go further back. Turning our finite consciousness homeward we have to plunge back into "pure willing", the pure impulse from which our narrowed consciousness and perception of matter emerge. That pure impulse can be called consciousness because consciousness, even in its wider meaning, implies, as we saw, the primary functions of memory and anticipation, that is choice, which involves the utilization of the past for the creation of a new future; and the ultimate principle also possesses this basic creative function.

We can imagine this principle of pure activity as the source and centre of all creation in the universe, and call it God. "God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely."[3] Bergson generally calls this principle vital impetus, *elan vital*, to suggest its dynamic and living character.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 252.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 250.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 262.

4. Creative Evolution

(1) *Mechanism and finalism both unsatisfactory*

If Reality be conceived as a creative force charged with the entire past in the form of tendencies and if it freely chooses new forms of expression every moment, we have to revise our ordinary notions of causation in Nature and evolution of the universe. Two contending views of causation are generally found, namely mechanism and finalism, and neither of them is compatible with this dynamic conception of Reality.

Mechanism is the theory of causation generally accepted by physics, chemistry and other sciences dealing with static things and unchanging states. The mechanistic explanations "hold good for the systems that our thought artificially detaches from the whole."[1] The success of these sciences in the practical world have encouraged even other sciences like biology and psychology which deal with the living, to attempt mechanistic explanations of life and mind. According to the mechanistic theory whatever happens is completely determined by the totality of causal conditions preceding it, so that if we know this sum of conditions completely we can predict what effect would take place. "The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past as the calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that *all is given.* On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance to a superhuman intellect capable of making the calculation."[2]

Thus we see that according to this theory every effect is predetermined; there is no room for choice. The present is nothing new; it was already contained there in its determining antecedents. That we cannot see the future is due to our ignorance of the complete set of antecedents which determine it. The past, present and future are, therefore, the ideas of an imperfect mind, and they do not exist for the omniscient. In a word, time does not really exist. "For time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it *does* nothing, it *is* nothing. Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 39.

Ibid. p. 39-40.

We have seen that duration is the very essence of Reality, and that Reality freely evolves at every moment out of the past, which it conserves and utilizes, a future which is something new. As reality rolls on, like a snowball, it adds to its content, "it swells as it advances". Like the trunk of a plant it retains and expands its past into new forms as it grows. There is no possibility, therefore, of the past as such being repeated in future; it is new at every moment. This novelty we saw is due to a choice or spontaneity which freely uses the past to evolve an unforeseeable future. We are inwardly aware of such spontaneous creation when we feel how our personality shoots into new directions and how our consciousness expands. It is the "most indisputable" experience we possess, and if Reality grows in the manner of our consciousness, or rather if this underlying consciousness in us is the Reality of "the very substance of the world in which we live", in favour of which supposition we have had such strong arguments, we cannot accept any mechanistic explanation of the world's evolution.

The mechanistic explanation suits, of course, the detached and fragmentary view of reality, and, therefore, our practical purpose. But it does not suit any synthetic view of Reality as a whole. A small portion of a curve isolated from the whole, may appear straight, but the curve seen as a whole can never be so mistaken.

Like mechanism, *finalism* (or teleology), the other theory of causation, also fails to explain the evolution of the world. "The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibnitz, for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is again useless. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that *all is given.* Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in front of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past."[1] And again here, in this radical form of finalism, the omniscient mind already foresees the future, since it is pre-arranged. There is thus no room for spontaneity, and this theory also is incompatible with the nature of Reality of which we have such an unshakable knowledge in our consciousness.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 41.

Finalism is impressed by the harmony, the nice adaptation of means to ends, observable in the world, and feels the necessity of thinking that the world must be made and controlled by an omniscient and omnipotent Mind, with a previous conscious plan, just as houses are made by human beings. But Bergson points out that the harmony we observe in the world is "far from being as perfect as it has been claimed to be."[2] There is rather an impulse to achieve harmony, by adaptation and adjustment, than harmony actually achieved. We can observe so many cases of conflict and struggle among species and individuals, where harmony yet remains to be attained. This points to the existence of rather a common force impelling things from behind and struggling for adjustment, adaptation and harmony, than a creator gradually unfolding a pre-arranged harmonious plan. This latter supposition would be incompatible with the presence of disharmony. "Harmony, therefore, does not exist in fact; it exists rather in principle; I mean", says Bergson, "that the original impetus is a *common impetus*, and the higher we ascend the stream of life the more do diverse tendencies appear complementary to each other. Thus the wind at a street corner divides into diverging currents which are all one and the same gust. Harmony, or rather 'complementarity', is revealed only in the mass, in tendencies rather than in states. Especially (and this is the point on which finalism has been most seriously mistaken) *harmony is rather behind us than before.* It is due to an *identity of impulsion* and not to a common aspiration.''[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 41-42 (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 53.

(2) *Creation from a common vital impetus.*

Bergson thus comes to think that the evolution of the world can be satisfactorily explained neither by the accidental collocation of dead circumstances, as mechanism supposes, nor by reference to a perfect, pre-arranged plan. but by admitting a common living force which is striving to express itself along divergent paths and striving constantly for balance and harmony. This force he calls the vital impetus, the *elan vital.* It is identical with the basic Reality or Force underlying all manifestation.

The hypothesis that basic Reality is a living impetus explains more satisfactorily the causation of the world than any of the alternative suppositions. Both mechanism and finalism are anthropomorphic conceptions. For, both hold that like a human handicraft, the world comes into being by the *combination* of materials with or without previous plan. Human manufacture always proceeds from the many to the one; the many parts are compressed or combined into one object. But the reverse is really the process of the evolution of living beings in nature. There is the *explosion* of the one there into the many and not the combination of the one into the many. ''Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division.''[2] The one cell divides itself and produces the many. The one seed bursts into the many leaves, trunk and roots, just as the one undivided tendency to move the hand produces the different successive positions of it. We find, therefore, that as the direction of evolution is from simplicity to multiplicity, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, it is better understood as the expression of a basic life force or vital impetus which divides its energy along divergent paths as it advances, than as the product of many factors combined mechanically or teleologically, as mechanism or finalism believes.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 53-4 (our italics).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 94.

Another advantage of this hypothesis is that it can explain the harmony we observe in a living organism or in Nature as a whole without supposing a pre-arranged scheme and without ignoring the appearance of unforeseen novelty. There is harmony in the many constituents of a living whole, according to this theory, because they are the expressions of the same simple act or tendency which has split itself up into the many. "Nature's simple act has divided itself automatically into an infinity of elements which are then found to be co-ordinated to one idea, just as the movement of my hand has dropped an infinity of points which are then found to satisfy one equation."[1]

(3) *Inadequacy of the Darwinian and other biological Theories.*

A third advantage of Bergson's theory is that it can explain the evolution of the different living species more satisfactorily than the theories of Darwin and other biologists. To understand this contention we have to discuss briefly these *biological theories of evolution,* and their difficulties. As we shall see all these scientific theories (with the negligible exception of some form of Lamarckism) imitate physics and chemistry in trying to explain evolution mechanically. Bergson takes a crucial example and shows that all these mechanistic hypotheses fail to explain it and thus break down there. The example chosen is the evolution of the same kind of extremely complex organ, like the eye, under very different circumstances, in two widely different kinds of animals like man and mollusc, such as a Pecten. "We find the same essential parts in each, composed of analogous elements. The eye of the Pecten contains a retina, a cornea, a lens of cellular structure like our own. There is even that peculiar inversion of retinal elements which is not met with, in general, in the retina of the invertebrates."[2] But the wonder is that "molluscs and vertebrates separated from their common parent stem long before the appearance of an eye so complex as that of the Pecten" and we cannot, therefore, hold that the common organ is inherited from the common ancestor that possessed it. How can such a coincidence be explained mechanically?

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 97.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 66.

Mechanism proceeds on the causal theory, that "the same causes produce the same effects". It is, therefore, baffled in such a case, since the antecedent circumstances are so different. It could be explained as a chance coincidence, if the effect to be explained, the eyes, were a simple thing. But it is so complicated, and consists of so many thousands of nicely adjusted cells that such a supposition would be highly improbable. As Bergson says, "That two walkers starting from different points and wandering at random should finally meet, is no wonder. But that, throughout their walk, they should describe two identical curves exactly superposable on each other, is altogether unlikely. The improbability will be the greater, the more complicated the routes; and it will become impossibility, if the zigzags are infinitely complicated. Now, what is this complexity of zigzags as compared with that of an organ in which thousands of different cells, each being itself a kind of organism, are arranged in a definite order?"[1]

Such an impossibility crops up at every turn as we examine the mechanistic biological theories of evolution in the light of the above crucial example. Take for example *Darwin's theory*. According to it different kinds of living beings arise from a common parent-stem by mechanical adaptation to different environments. The influence of the environment, he thinks, acts *indirectly*, that is by *elimination* of these characters which are not suitable for that particular environment and the consequent automatic retention of the useful characters. Thus small and insensible changes occur, and the *gradual accumulation* of such changes during long periods gives rise to wide differences among the different branches which once originated from the same stock. But such a supposition cannot explain the evolution of an eye even in one animal, not to speak of its explaining the similarity of the eyes of two different kinds of animals. The evolution of the eye according to this process must be supposed to take place by the gradual and successive evolutions of its different parts. But that would be impossible according to Darwin's own principle, since each part being by itself useless would be eliminated by the process of natural selection when it would make its individual appearance; and no possibility would be there for the retention and accumulation of complementary parts. The impossibility increases manifold when we try to understand the appearance of similar organs in the two different kinds of animals. As Bergson puts it, "How could the same small variations, incalculable in number, have ever occurred in the same order on two independent lines of evolution, if they were purely accidental? How could they have been preserved by selection and accumulated in both cases, the same in the same order, when each of them, taken separately, was of no use?"[1] Thus Darwin's hypothesis of evolution by the automatic principle of selection and gradual accumulation of small accidental changes proves unsatisfactory. It points to the need of some principle or 'genius' which can guarantee the preservation and accumulation of complementary changes capable of producing a complex but harmonious organ like the eye.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 60.

Some biologists (Bateson, Hugo De Vries and others) try to diminish the absurdity of Darwin's hypothesis by offering a modified version of it, on the strength of some experiments. In their view the accidental changes bringing about new structures are not gradual. A "new species comes into being *all at once by the simultaneous appearance of several new characters*, all somewhat different from the previous ones".[2] Now, if we try to explain the crucial instance cited above with this modified theory our difficulty decreases in one way as we can conceive the evolution of the eye by a fewer number of successive changes but it increases in another way . For, we have then to explain how, accidentally, exactly those elements come into existence which can harmonize together to form an eye. "How, especially, can we suppose that by a series of mere 'accidents' these sudden variations occur, the same, in the same order,—involving in each case a perfect harmony of elements more and more numerous and complex,—along two independent lines of evolution?"[1] So here also mere accidents would not do; there still remains the necessity of some principle to secure the "convergence of simultaneous changes" and "continuity of direction of successive variations."

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 68.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 66 (our italics).

Leaving aside these two forms of the theory of accidental variations (slow or sudden) generating a new structure by the negative influence of elimination by selection, we may consider next another kind of theory advocated, for example, by Eimer who takes great pains to show, in the light of physics and chemistry, that variations take place not accidentally and by the negative influence of environment, but that they are produced on the living organism by the direct and positive influence of the environment. This view is called the *theory of Orthogenesis* since it maintains the *straight influence* of the external environment. It holds that "transformation is brought about by the influence of the external on the internal, continuously exerted in the same direction, and not, as Darwin held, by accidental variations."[2] Heat, light and such other factors of the environment produce physical and chemical changes on the living body and thus cause variations directly on the body.

But this theory also being essentially mechanistic can explain only the causation of similar effects by similar external circumstances. But how can it explain the formation of the same complex structure like the eye under so different physico-chemical conditions as we can notice in the cases of a man and a Pecten? The only relevant and common external influence that can be cited in both cases is light, but the other circumstances are so different. The "egg of the mollusc cannot have the same chemical composition as that of a vertebrate" and the circumstances under which the two branches have evolved are widely different. How could the same kind of complex effects then result? The shortcoming of this theory points again to the necessity of admitting "some inner directing principle to account for this convergence of effects."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 70.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 61.

We come finally to the only other important theory of evolution that remains to be considered, namely that of *Lamarck, and his modern followers.* This theory differs from that of Darwin, on two important points. While the Darwinian theory holds that "the essential causes of variation are the differences inherent in the germ borne by the individual and not the experiences or behaviour of the individual in the course of his career"[2] and that characters acquired anew by the individual cannot be inherited by its descendants, the Lamarckian theory, on the contrary, holds that the living individual possesses "the power of varying by use or disuse of its organs, and also of passing on the variation so acquired to its descendants".[3] Among the modern followers of Lamarckism there are some who think that variation is caused by an "effort of the living being to adapt itself to the circumstances of its existence," and that this effort is not the "mere mechanical exercise of certain organs, mechanically elicited by the pressure of external circumstances", but that it also implies "consciousness and will".

This theory, Bergson thinks, is the most satisfactory of the different forms of evolutionism. It can "account for the building up of identical complex organs on independent lines of development. For it is quite conceivable that the same effort to turn the same circumstances to good account might have the same result, especially if the problem put by the circumstances is such as to admit of only one solution".[4]

But even this theory is not fully adequate. It can explain 'a mere variation of size', but scarcely 'a change of form'. "That an organ can be strengthened and grow by exercise nobody will deny. But it is a long way from that to the progressive development of an eye like that of the mollusc and the vertebrates".[1] An effort that can account for such development must be far deeper than the mere superficial one we make in our volition, for such effort is not found to be capable of producing such radical change. Moreover, the effort of an individual would be too inadequate to account for the continuation of changes in descendants, as well as, for the piling up of succesive differences in the same direction through generations so as to lead ultimately to the formation of a complete complex organ like the eye.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 80.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 90.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 80-81.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 81.

Weismann has pointed out that as only the *germ-cells* of the parents can carry down hereditary traits, and as these cells are very rarely changed by changes in the somatic cells composing the outer body, acquired characters which are changes effected in the outer body have no chance of being inherited by the descendants. This is a strong argument against the Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characters. But the evolution of an eye can be possible only through the development, continuation and accumulation of successive variations in the same direction. How has it been possible? Does it not point again to the existence of a deep-seated force or tendency underlying both germ-cells and somatic cells, guiding and directing them along the lines of evolution, and supplying thus also the basic bond between these apparently disconnected kinds of cells?

"So we come back," says Bergson, "by a somewhat round about way, to the idea we started from, that of an *original impetus* of life, passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. This impetus sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species. In general, when species have begun to diverge from a common stock they accentuate their divergence as they progress in their evolution. Yet, in certain definite points, they may evolve identically; in fact they must do so, if the hypothesis of a common impetus be accepted".[1] The eye is caused by the presence of a similar tendency on different lines of evolution. Vision, we saw previously, is nothing but the planning of possible action on the environment. This particular way of dealing with problems arising from environment, rather the capacity for this kind of planning, we may suppose, was implicit in the original life impetus which has the freedom of acting in different possible ways. It is no wonder then that different animals, developing under different conditions, but sharing the same original impetus should have similar plans of action for solving similar difficulties.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 82.

According to this hypothesis an organ is only the outward development of an inward impulse to act or plan action. The simple impulse grows by self-division, into a complex organ, and so the different parts of the organ must necessarily be mutually complementary and must function harmoniously like one object. We open our eyes and see things. The act or function is so simple. But the mechanism of vision is extremely complex. We fail to understand how the infinite details of such a complex organ arise successively, get co-ordinated and act in unison, so long as we think, as mechanists or teleologists, in terms of manufacture, that is, production of objects by the bringing together of different independent parts. But when we think in terms of living organization, that is, think of the evolution of living organs taking place by division and dissociation of one act or impulse, we can understand very well how the complexity of an organ and the simplicity of its function can go together. If hundred pieces of arcs of different sizes and shapes can be put together to form one complete circle, it would be a wonder. But the wonder would cease if we were told that the different pieces were originally the parts of the same circle drawn by one simple and continuous movement of the hand.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 92-3.

We find thus that Bergson's hypothesis of the original impetus, *elan vital,* can explain the evolution of the universe more adequately than those of mechanists and teleologists.

(4) *The divergent paths of Evolution—Torpor, Instinct and Intellect*

In the living world, as we can observe it now, the vital impetus struggles to manifest itself through different kinds of material environment. The result is the evolution of life along three chief paths, namely those of plants, lower animals and human beings. In plants the consciousness implicit in the original impetus has not been able to overcome the resistance of matter to any appreciable extent. It is still in a state of sleep or torpor, but not altogether non-existent. In lower animals consciousness has partially liberated itself from the overpowering influence of its material body and environment. This fact is indicated by its power of sensation and movement. But activity is caused here more by instinctive reaction than by reflection and choice; and consciousness is not fully manifested. In man we find consciousness triumphing over matter especially in intelligent action preceded by deliberation, choice and free movement. "Vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence" are then the three main *tendencies* by which we can broadly distinguish three chief paths along which life has evolved.

We should not, however, think that these are the only three lines of evolution. The paths along which the original impetus of life has divided itself are innumerable. The progress of life is not like that of a solid cannon ball along one straight line. Life proceeds rather like a "shell which suddenly bursts into fragments which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on".[1] Plants, animals and men represent only the lines along which life has evolved with conspicuous success. But there are paths along which life has not been so successful in its attempt to adjust itself to the environment. In some cases the forward movement has been checked; in some it has been diverted or turned back, and in some again life has become altogether extinct. Evolution does not always mean, therefore, progress but sometimes retrogression, as well. Progress or continual advance is there only in the main, and along the few successful paths.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 103.

It should also be clear from the above that the idea that evolution takes place in a straight line, and that plants, animals and human beings occupy higher and higher rungs of the same ladderlike course of evolution, must be abandoned. The course of evolution is rather like the growth of a tree, in which the trunk that shoots out of the seed, grows into different branches, each of which grows in its turn along different twigs and so on. Plants, animals and men represent the different branches of the tree of life; and not the lower and higher parts of the same branch. The difference among these branches is rather of kind, than of degree.

It is of course true that these divergent lines of evolution possess similarities, owing to their common origin and it is dfficult to draw clear lines of demarcation among them. But they can still be distinguished by certain dominant *tendencies*. Plants can assimilate some of the substances lying around them, *e.g.* air, water and especially, carbon and nitrogen in the mineral form. So movement becomes unnecessary for self-preservation; and there is no cause for the awakening of consciousness which lies, therefore, in a state of torpor or sleep. Animals cannot, however, assimilate minerals directly. They have to go about in *search* of food as they do not find it in their immediate neighbourhood, and consciousness is needed to direct such motion. Animals thus grow the sensori-motor mechanism, the apparatus for receiving influences from outside and for transforming these influences into movements that can satisfy their needs.

Instinct and intelligence are the two different forms of the same original life-impulse trying to adjust itself to the environment. They do not, therefore, show any sign of complete separation. On the contrary, they are found existing side by side in the same animal complementing each other. For example, insects while building their abodes instinctively show apparent signs of intelligence in the choice of material, place, time, plan, etc., and on the other hand, human beings while speaking with intelligence, use the internal organs of sound instinctively. Thus instinct and intelligence are complementary in character, and they accompany each other. Yet the distinction between these two is too fundamental to be ignored. The distinction between the two branches of animals, namely, arthropods and vertebrates, is based on this distinction between instinct and intelligence. Insects belong to the first branch, and men to the second. Instinct predominates in the former, whereas it is intelligence which tends to predominate over instinct in the latter.

We saw that instinct shows much less of choice and consciousness than intelligence. But there are also some other characteristics by which they are most sharply distinguished. First and foremost among these is the peculiarity that while instinct deals with living tools, intellect uses artificial tools made of dead matter. In their instinctive adjustment to the environment insects, like bees and ants, are found to use only the living organs forming parts of their bodies, whereas man, in his intelligent efforts for adjustment, uses tools which are made by him out of dead matter. Man is essentially a fabricator or manufacturer. Instead of calling him 'homo sapiens' we should rather characterise him as 'homo faber.'[1]

It should be noted in this connection that some animals "that rank immediately after man in the matter of intelligence, the apes and elephants", are also sometimes able to use artificial tools, but still there always remains a gulf of difference between such use and human use of tools. There is a 'radical difference' between 'animal consciousness, even the most intelligent, and human consciousness'.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 146.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 278.

The second point of distinction between instinct and intelligence is that while the former deals with and knows *matter*, the latter deals with and knows only *forms*. This follows from the above. For, "If instinct is, above all, the faculty of using an organised natural instrument, it must involve innate knowledge (potential or unconscious, it is true) both of this instrument and of the object to which it is applied. Instinct is therefore innate knowledge of a *thing*."[1] On the other hand, intelligence appears when new situations arise and instinct fails to cope with them. "The essential function of intelligence is therefore to see the way out of a difficulty in any circumstances whatever, to find what is most suitable, what answers best the question asked." It has, therefore, to judge the *relation* between *any* situation, and the means of utilizing it. It thinks of such relations in the general way: if such be the case, *then* such must be the means of dealing with it. And this is but *formal* reasoning which distinguishes the intellect from other forms of consciousness. Bergson concludes, therefore: "Intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form; instinct implies the knowledge of a matter."[2]

In this connection Bergson also mentions the advantages and disadvantages of instinct and intelligence as forms of activity. This helps us to understand further the distinction between them. The advantage of instinct is that it "finds the appropriate instrument at hand: this instrument which makes and repairs itself, which presents, like all the works of nature, an infinite complexity of detail combined with a marvellous simplicity of function, does at once, when required, what it is called upon to do, without difficulty and with a perfection that is often wonderful." But its drawback is that it is not flexible, and it fails, therefore, to deal with changed situations. The advantage of intelligence, on the other hand, is that its instruments, which are artificially made, admit of infinite variations that can cope with changing situations. But its drawbacks are that it cannot work so immediately, as it has to hesitate and choose between possible alternatives. Moreover, the instrument involved by the intellect is imperfect, and its use needs special effort, and sometimes causes troubles.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 158.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 1.

These various characteristics make it possible for us to distinguish the two divergent branches into which the original life-impetus develops in the animal kingdom, and there is no justification for regarding instinct and intelligence as things of the same kind differing only in complexity. They are clearly found to be two different modes of activity evolved by the original impetus for solving life's problems in different circumstances.

(5) *The basic features of creative Evolution*

We can now sum up the long discussion of this section. The evolution of the world can be best understood as a creative process producing divergent forms of beings out of one basic dynamic principle, an original vital impulse. This one principle, undifferentiated in the beginning, evolves, by a continuous series of explosive acts of self-differentiation, perpetually new forms of existence. Such evolution is truly creative because it freely brings into existence novel forms, which could not be predicted from their antecedent conditions even by an omniscient mind. There is no repetition here of the already existing, because the world as a whole, and in each of its living parts, is constantly growing, that is, swelling as it is advancing. This theory rejects all mechanist theories of evolution, which fail to explain the novelty, unity and harmony which we find in creation. It also rejects teleological views of creation which too fail to account for genuine novelty and the discord which is found in the world along with harmony. By supposing *one* original impulse at the back of all, the theory of creative evolution can account for unity and harmony, and by supposing the spontaneous disruption of the same principle it can also account for novelty, diversity and discord.

Bergson's theory of creative evolution, we shall find later on, anticipates the basic contention of the theory of emergent evolution, put forward in more recent times by some realistic thinkers, namely that the process of evolution gives birth to *new* forms of existence. But novelty for Bergson is not merely a more complex organisation or interrelation of elements previously existing in the matrix as the theory of emergent evolution holds. Creation of novelty is more thorough-going; it is the birth of something altogether new. Moreover while emergent evolution is *interrelation* of the *many* basic elements in new ways, creative evolution consists in the birth of the many new forms by the *diversification* of the *one* basic creative energy. Again, whereas emergent evolution places God at the end of the process, creative evolution puts God at the beginning, identifying it with the original impulse that drives the world from behind.

It should also be mentioned that Bergson's theory of creation is totally different from the ordinary idea of creation out of nothing. Bergson goes thoroughly into the concept of nothing to show that there is no 'absolute nothing,' that nothing is only relative and provisional, a mere absence of the *desired thing*, not absence of *all* things. We cannot even imagine absolute non-existence, since such an effort will at least imply the presence of the imagining consciousness that witnesses the non-existence. So creation must logically presuppose the previous existence of something else other than the present world, and not a total void.[1]

5. The Method of Philosophy—Intellect and Intuition

It is generally agreed that the object of philosophy is to know reality, reasoning is the instrument and experience supplies the data. But there is a great difference of opinion among philosophers as to the exact kind of experience on which the notion of reality must be based. For empiricism experience is primarily sense-awareness. All knowledge, according to it, originates from sense-experience; mind as intellect is the activity that relates the data, supplied by sensation, in different ways, and leads thus to the development of knowledge. All that we can hope to know must be, according to this view, in terms of sense-perception.

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[1] *Ibid.* Chap. IV.

Bergson also claims to be an empiricist, since, like the empiricist, he tries to build his theory on experience. But, as we have seen, sense-experience, for him, is neither the only, nor the basic kind of experience. There are different levels of experience or consciousness, such as the undifferentiated flux of innermost experience, the disintegrated appearance of this basic experience in the superficial mind in the form of discrete mental states as revealed by introspection and lastly sensuous experience which represents the fully disintegrated, spatialized and externalized form of the same basic experience. Reality is identified by Bergson with the first, the basic experience. Sense-awareness cannot give us any knowledge of reality. It only reveals the abstract, static fragments of reality, arranged in the form of space and spatialized time. It is, by its nature and origin, meant for supplying plans for possible action, and not for yielding any knowledge of reality as it really is in its undifferentiated flowing character. However much the intellect might try to piece together the fragmentary information about reality given by sense-perception or internal perception, it cannot giv[illegible] us [illegible]y idea of real change or duration which is the natu[illegible] o[illegible] reality, even as pictures of the different positions [illegible]ving object cannot give us, when put together, [illegible] of motion.

The intellect only carries forward a[illegible] c[illegible] the process of disintegration begun by s[illegible]a[illegible] the interest of practical life; and thus there [illegible]pe[illegible] us the static world of matter in space. The [illegible]te[illegible] of mind and the materiality of things" [illegible] correlated aspects of the same inverse [illegible]en[illegible] "The more consciousness is intellectual[illegible] matter spatialized."[3] We cannot, theref[illegible]

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[2] *Ibid.* p. 188 (also *The two Sources of Moralit*[illegible]

[3] *Creative Evolution*, p. 217.

the nature of reality through sense and intellect which present only static, fragmentary and misleading appearances of it.

How then can reality be known? The matter is not so hopeless as it seems. Because reality is identical with the basic flux of experience, the *elan vital*, which is the very foundation of our existence. We fail to grasp it because of our tendency to action which gives rise to the whole range of disintegrating process, consisting in feeling, willing, sensation and intellection. If we can somehow stop this practical tendency, and turn our superficial mind, homeward, it is quite possible that we might be able to plunge back into the basic flow of life and immediately feel it by being one with it. The windy stress of practical life raises the waves of internal states and the ripples of external perception out of the ocean of life or basic consciousness, and to the extent that we can stop it we can get back the undisturbed, undivided ocean itself. The immediate awareness that we obtain thus of this basic reality by living it is called by Bergson *intuition*.

It is this intuitive experience on which philosophy must build its conception of the original reality. The method of philosophy must therefore be different from, in fact just opposite to, that of science. Science is interested in the practical world of matter, and it rightly pursues, therefore, the downward process by which this world, and the intellect which apprehends it, are formed out of the original flux. Intellect is, therefore, the fit instrument of scientific discovery. It is a mistake to think, as most philosophers do, that philosophy should follow the method of science, either by basing its concepts on scientific ones, or by carrying forward the intellectual work of science. On the contrary, its task should be "to remount the incline that physics descends, to bring back matter to its origins, and to build up progressively a cosmology which would be reversed psychology".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 217.

"Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the whole", the "ocean of life, in which we are immersed", "whence we draw the very force to labour and to live", and from which both matter and intellect originate.[1] Our intelligence can then be "reabsorbed into its principle" and "may thus live back its own genesis." Intellect thus gives place to intuition and we have a direct knowledge of the innermost spring of all life and existence. We then feel that reality is an unbroken tension or duration which continuously changes and swells as it moves on. In such an effort we have to gather all the dissipated aspects of our being into the central impulse from which they spring.

Philosophy based on intuition can, therefore, understand both the downward and the upward processes of reality, it can take us up to the secret source of life, and also let us down to experience the process of creation by the relaxation of life's tension. It makes us feel directly that extension comes into being by the relaxation of tension, and that, therefore, matter is only the inverse movement of life. Every great philosophy of the world is based on some intuition of the basic reality. But intuitions are so fleeting that we generally have only occasional glimpses of reality. The various systems are based on such fragmentary glimpses, which are supplemented by different kinds of intellectual interpretation and elaboration. If intuition "could be prolonged beyond a few instants", it "would not only make the philosopher agree with his own thoughts, but also all philosophers with each other". "The object of philosophy would be reached if this intuition could be sustained, generalized, and above all, assured of external points of reference in order not to go astray. To that end a continual coming and going is necessary between nature and mind."[2]

It will be noticed in the last statement that though the intuitive method is primarily subjective, it is possible to check it by reference to objects. By alternate movement of attention inward to the psychic base and outward to the manifested world of nature the philosopher can trace the relation between the two. Moreover, philosophers must compare notes, and can thus check each other's impressions to make philosophy still more objective and acceptable. Bergson realizes that the philosophical "enterprise cannot be achieved in one stroke; it is necessarily collective and progressive. It consists in an interchange of impressions which, correcting and adding to each other, will end by expanding the humanity in us and making us even transcend it".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 202.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 252.

Far from being a subjective fancy, philosophy, as Bergson conceives it, is thus a co-operative activity, which can grow by the contribution of succesive generations. And though each philosopher can live, by intuition, only that part of the original impetus which is manifested through his own being, mutual comparison and elimination of personal peculiarities enable philosophers to grasp the universal characters of the basic reality.

The philosophy that is based thus on the intuition of life underlying all existence, "does not only facilitate speculation; *it gives us also more power to act and live.* For, with it, we feel ourselves no longer isolated in humanity, humanity no longer seems isolated in the nature that it dominates." "All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death." [2]

It is necessary to understand clearly how intuition as a method of knowledge is related to and distinguished from instinct and intellect. Instinct works, as we saw, with the living natural organs of the body, whereas intellect works with artificial instruments made of inert matter. Instinct is aware of the nature of life, whereas intellect has knowledge of inert matter. Intuition which also knows life must, therefore, be akin to instinct rather than to intellect. Instinct deals with life, undistorted, so also does intuition. But the distinction between the two is that whereas instinct is bent on action, and its awareness of life is of a dim, unconscious kind, intuition is bent on knowledge alone, and it is fully conscious of life. Bergson says, threfore, that if "the consciousness that slumbers" in instinct can be aroused "it would give up the most intimate secrete of life". In other words intuition that is capable of knowing the living reality is nothing but instinct rendered fully conscious. As Bergson puts it, "by intuition I mean instinct that becomes disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and enlarging it indefinitely." [1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 202.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 285-6 (our italics).

Whereas intellect "goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it", intuition leads us to "the very inwardness of life." [2] It can, therefore, be called *empathy* in the sense of knowing something by being one with it in feeling.

It is necessary, however, to remember that though intuition is very different from intelligence, they are also intimately interdependent. Intuition cannot be what it is without the help of intelligence. From intelligence 'must come the push', the incentive to knowledge, without which intuition would remain a mere instinct "riveted to the special object of its practical interest."[3] "There are things (*e.g.* the clear knowledge of ultimate reality) that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them (unless the push comes from the intellect)."[4]

But the intellect not only helps the conversion of instinct into intuition, it can also supplement the work done by intuition, by interrelating its glimpses of truth into a consistent system of philosophy. The intellect is, before anything else, the faculty of relating things. When it is used to interrelate the impressions of *particular* objects obtained by sensation it constructs out of them the clear cut concepts of inert material objects. By a further extension of its application in the same external direction are obtained the systems of sciences, like physics, dealing with matter in its different *general* aspects. It is *with regard to such a use* of the intellect that Bergson repeatedly says that the intellect solidifies life, generates matter, deals with solids, gives the plans of possible action and so on. But though this is the ordinary use we make of the intellect, it is not the only possible use. The faculty of relation can equally be made to serve intuition, by piecing together the intuitive glimpses of our innermost reality. Thus the intellect can supplement the work of intuition and help us to obtain an intuitive view of reality. We can thus have the philosophy of the universe with its fluid concepts. [1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 186. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.* pp. 187-8.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 159 (the explanatory clauses within brackets ours).

It will be evident from this, that the ordinary criticism that dumb intuition cannot yield any philosophy and that the intellectual treatment of intuitive knowledge would again falsify the notion of reality, is all based on a misunderstanding of Bergson's real intention. We must admit that Bergson's frequent and one-sided emphasis on the solidifying and materializing work of the intellect, and on the opposition between intellect and intuition is apt to generate such wrong impression. But if we read between the lines (and especially his mature work, *Creative Evolution*), we cannot fail to realize his real meaning, obscured, sometimes, by his impetuous style.

Both intuition and sensation give us mute experiences which cannot be cast, without the intellect, into concepts and built up into consistent systems, and the cogency of the systems again cannot be demonstrated, without intellect. Bergson admits the importance of intellectual activity for intuitional philosophy. He says, "Dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts and so be propagated to other men; but all it does, often enough, is to develop the result of that intuition which transcends it."[1] Intuition and intellect are not, therefore, opposed by nature; they are rather different, and may be mutually supplementary. The opposition which Bergson really means to emphasize is between intuition and intellect that follows the lead of sense perception. *It is in this sense that Bergson is an anti-intellectualist.* Whenever he condemns the intellect, he tacitly means the intellect in its usual capacity in practical life, intellect working on data supplied by sense perception, and completing its disintegrating, downward tendency.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 187.

It may be asked, however, how does an intellectual philosophy based on intuition differ from an intellectual philosophy based on external perception? In reply Bergson would point to his own philosophy of creative evolution. He would ask us to note how the mechanistic and finalistic notions of causation based on the moulds of external perception are replaced in it by the fluid concept of creative evolution on the strength of intuition. "Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical casuality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the vital process. Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation." The intellect following the lead of intuition can yield a true philosophy of the spiritual, interpenetrating, ceaseless flux which is the nature of basic reality.

6. Morality and Religion

(1) *Closed and Open Morality*

In his last great work, *The two Sources of Morality and Religion*,[2] Bergson extends, with still greater confidence, his philosophical method to the study of moral and religious phenomena to show how an intuitive plunge into the stream [illegible] moral geniuses and religious mystics to break through the narrow circles of customary morality and traditional religion.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 251.

[2] Published in 1932. References are to the English trans. by Audra and others, pub. by Macmillan, 1935.

Inquiring into the basis of moral obligation Bergson finds that though man is intelligent, lays down moral maxims and adduces argument in support of his action and moral convictions, the ultimate source of his obligation does not lie in the intellect. The unaided intellect can scarcely exert any pressure on the will. The ultimate forces that determine action are instinct and emotion.[1] The intellect, even where it apparently guides the will, really subserves these primary forces, by supplying concepts and arguments to organize and support these non-rational urges which prompt our actions in an unobserved way. In addition to these two forces, there is a secondary one, that approaches instinct in respect of its power of constraining the will. That is habit. A deep-rooted habit can move man as blindly as an instinct moves an insect. The feeling of pressure or constraint that man has in what is usually known as moral obligation is the result of the cumulative force of his social habits.

If we go down to the very nature of life, we find that "life is a co-ordination of disciplined elements among which the work is divided, in fact that the social underlies the vital".[2] Nature has planned and organized life in the form of a society. A uni-cellular organism is a society composed of individual elements whereas a multi-cellular organism is a society composed of many societies. Moreover, we find that in all forms of life the interest of society or the whole is always upheld by nature even at the expense of the constituent individuals.

Comparing the two great lines of evolution, instinctive and intelligent (the arthropod and the vertebrate) we notice, however, a difference in the manner in which this interest is safeguarded. In the case of the former (*e.g.* ants and bees) the individual works by instinct for the preservation of the society even at the sacrifice of its own life. Here the individual scarcely knows its separate existence, it is instinctively moved by the common interest of the ant-hill or the hive. Discipline, solidarity and organization are secured by nature through instinct. But coming to the other line we find that the growth of intelligence tends "to break up social cohesion"; each individual feels that he has a separate existence of his own, is free to choose his path of action and guide his destiny. So the human society is not exactly like that of insects in which the constituents are instinctively held together. It is really a society of free individuals who find it to their advantage to subordinate their own interests to that of the society.

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 28.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 98.

Though man is intelligent, instinct in him is not altogether absent, "it is eclipsed".[1] Instinct for self-preservation is present in him, as in other lower beings. Under its influence, intellect teaches man that though theoretically he can completely ignore the interest of society and work only for his own pleasure, it will not be ultimately even to his own best interest; the preservation of society is necessary even for self-preservation. Intellect or reason teaches man to restrain the purely selfish motives, and evolves rules of conduct to harmonize his interest with that of society. Thus there comes into existence the moral code of a society. The individuals born into it are educated by the social atmosphere and also by training to obey these moral rules. By constant repetition the habit of commanding and obeying become deep-rooted. The force of habit constrains the will to perform these duties automatically with a sense of obligation. The interest of society is thus safeguarded by social habits and the disruptive tendencies of the intellect are checked by its own maturer teachings.

All moral duties then are, in the last analysis, nothing but duties of the individual to his society; moral pressure is nothing but social pressure and "the verdict of conscience is the verdict which would be given by the social self".[2] Social claim is thus found to be the real root of obligation.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 100. [2] *Ibid.* p. 8. [3] *Ibid.* p. 14.

The intellect not only lays down moral codes in support of social obligation but also formulates religious myths and theories and sets up the notion of a moral God "to prohibit, to prevent, to punish" all immoral, that is anti-social, acts, to reward the virtuous and thus to protect the social order.[1]

The morality of which we have spoken so far is *limited to one's own society.* That this is so appears clearly at the time of war. For societies at war, "Fair is foul and foul is fair".[2] Society itself demands, for its own existence, that its members should violate the moral laws in dealing with its enemies. It is quite clear, therefore, that the morality which Nature demands of man is not 'absolute morality' but a relative one, confined within one's society and prompted by the instinct of self-preservation. Bergson, therefore, calls this social morality *closed morality,* and distinguishes it from open or absolute morality which inculcates unrestricted love for all men.

Social or closed morality cannot widen into absolute morality by mere gradual transition with the progress of thought, as many are inclined to suppose. But here, as elsewhere, action alone cuts the knot that thought cannot unloose. There have been some moral geniuses, some exceptional men, who have broken through the closed circle of morality, in a manner that thought could not anticipate. They have taken a headlong plunge into the undivided stream of life itself to feel their identity with it. They become imbued with love for all existence, and therefore, for all humanity. They liberate morality from its limitation to a particular society, and lay down moral maxims which apply to all men. There arises thus *open morality* which prescribes duties of all men to all men.

"In all times there have arisen exceptional men, incarnating this morality. Before the saints of Christianity, mankind has known the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel, the Arhats of Buddhism, and others besides. It is to them that men have always turned for that complete morality which we had best call absolute morality".[3] The process by which this morality spreads among other men is not one of pressure and obligation, as in the case of social morality, but one of appeal, aspiration and imitation. The very presence of a saint is sufficient to fill us with respect and admiration. Even an account of his life appeals to the highest sentiments of our soul and charms us into a kind of discipleship. We feel a peculiar joy in imitating him as a model. It is thus that the contagion of his universal love and respect for all mankind is caught by our souls. Like a master musician who enthrals the listeners' ears, makes them dance to the tune he plays, and fills them with the emotion his music incarnates, *a moral genius* captivates our souls with the new music of his perfect morality and draws us after him into his unbounded love that we also *may* express it in action. It is in this way that the higher morality spreads its influence over all and comes to supervene on merely social morality, by the strength of its appeal, attraction and inspiration. Whereas the force behind closed morality is the social *instinct*, that behind the open one is *emotion*, particularly love. And as we said previously like instinct emotion also can directly act on the will and mould our life.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 101-4.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 20.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 28.

If there were no exceptional men human societies would have remained closed. Bergson remarks, therefore that whereas social morality is the intention of nature, open or dynamic morality is the special contribution of man, a result of his creative effort. [1] But the creative act of '*a genius of the will*' is, on a deeper view, a part of the creative evolution of life itself. So all morality, closed or open, is ultimately due to the vital impetus.. This makes Bergson think that "all morality, be it pressure or aspiration, is in essence biological".[2]

The intellect subserves the intuition and emotion of saints as it does the social instinct of the ordinary natural man. And thus philosophy comes to support absolute morality by demonstrating the brotherhood of man through the fatherhood of God, and the unity of human nature based on a common reason. But all this is possible for the intellect only when it has been enlightened and inspired by the mystic's intuition of unity and love for all humanity. Left to itself the intellect could at best produce a philosophy stabilizing further the static morality of the closed society.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 50.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 82.

(2) *Static and Dynamic Religion*

Like the two kinds of morality, there are the two types of religion derived from the same two sources. Static or outer religion derived from the providence of nature and dynamic or inner religion derived from the mystic intuition of man. There is, therefore, an intimate connection between closed morality and static religion which are indistinguishably mixed up in the popular mind. Open morality and dynamic religion are similarly connected very closely. On the other hand, like the two kinds of morality the two kinds of religion are also found blended in most cases and can be isolated only by theoretical analysis.

Static religion may also be called *natural* religion. "It is a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence." [1] Intelligence, the glory of man, is also the source of two kinds of follies. It shows him the possibility of swerving from the social line and trying for selfish ends even at the cost of society;—a thing unknown in societies moved by instinct where "the interests of the individual are inexorably co-ordinate with and subordinate to the general interest." Secondly, intelligence enables man to anticipate his future with the result that he feels uncertain about the success of his efforts and is also depressed by the thought of death. Selfishness thwarts social solidarity, and anxiety for the future impairs individual effort and ultimately also for social enterprise. Both of these are against the intentions of nature. But it is nature that ordained instinct in one line of evolution and intelligence in another as the two different ways of solving the same problem of successful practical adjustment and maintaining life. It is, therefore, impossible that nature should not devise some means also for remedying the undesirable effects of its own tool on society and individuals. Intelligence is unconsciously made to make amends for its subversive tendencies by inventing myths to preserve the natural order: social integrity and individual security. *Religion is thus born of the myth-making function of the mind*—a function which resembles more instinctive activity than conscious planning. It is a kind of activity by which hallucinations and phantasies are created in the mind. Nature which made man intelligent, makes him entertain also superstitions to counterpoise the dangers of knowledge. Bergson cites the example of a lady who was about to step into the empty pit of a lift out of order, mistaking that the lift was there and who was saved from imminent death by the hallucination of a man pushing her back.[1] The example shows how hallucination can be a beneficent defensive mechanism of nature for the protection of her creatures.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 175.

Mythological beliefs in supernatural laws, spirits and deities originate in a similar way for the protection of the social order by checking the selfish, anti-social tendencies of the intelligent individual. These objects of wonder, fear and worship are gradually clothed with personality and human qualities and represented as the guardians of the city, country or nation. They are there to prohibit, prevent and punish all violations of the moral code of the society. Thus the first function of traditional religion "directly concerns social preservation". "Looked at from this first point of view, *religion is then a defensive reaction* of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence."[2]

Again, while all creatures are mortal, none except men know that they must die. The other creatures carry along the forward movement of life with perfect tranquillity till they succumb to death. But the image of death constantly dogs man and slows down in him the movement of life. Nature cannot tolerate this undesirable interference from human intelligence. "To the idea of inevitable death she opposes the image of a continuation of life after death"; intelligence itself is moved instinctively or unconsciously to imagine immortality of the human soul. The effect of the knowledge of death is neutralized. "Looked at from this second standpoint, *religion is the defensive reaction of nature* against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death." Religion, with its theory of immortality, becomes an assurance against depression caused by the thought of death.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 99.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 101 (our italics).

Another source of discouragement to man is his knowledge that his efforts are thwarted by unfavourable circumstances beyond his control. The feeling of helplessness gives rise to the phantasies of both evil and helpful supernatural forces. Man is persuaded by his instinctive desire for success, to believe that he can get over obstacles by worshipping, and courting the help of, the benign forces. By a kind of wishful thinking these forces are also believed to be the stronger, and sometimes as omnipotent capable of vanquishing the forces of evil. Thus there arises the myth of the Omnipotent God and the necessity of worship. All religious beliefs arising in this way can be described as "*the defensive reactions of nature* against the representation, by the intelligence, of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired".[1]

Bergson considers the different kinds of religious phenomena presented by comparative religion, and tries to show in the light of this psychological biological method that all traditional religions are based on mythological beliefs which the human mind is pressed by nature (*i.e.*, instinct) to entertain in order to counterpoise the dangers of intelligence and to preserve the balance of human society. Religion originating from such social need is *infra-intellectual*, since it arises from the instinctive level of the mind. It is called *static* because it tends to promote social solidarity, and keep man confined to his closed society. That such religion, like closed morality, is based on a narrow social outlook becomes clear also at the time of a war when each nation appeals to its own God for victory.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 117 (our italics).

Dynamic religion is born of the mystic's intuition of and identity with Life. It is supra-intellectual. It is the achievement of human genius bent upon going beyond social order and beyond the intellectual view of things by taking a plunge into the living source of all existence, the vital impetus. When the mind develops and grows critical, it refuses to be led by the myths of traditional religion. But the loss of faith in religion means the return of diffidence and anxiety. To get rid of these and gain confidence in life, the progressive mind which has left behind the security of mythological beliefs resorts to a new source of strength. The intellect being the source of anxious thought as well as of fictitious comfort, attempt is made to stop both by dismissing the intellectual view of reality. This is like getting rid of a bad dream by waking up and realizing that the fear was imaginary and the necessity of resorting to imaginary help also did not exist. Such realization is possible for a soul "strong enough and noble enough to make the effort" of thrusting back intellect and taking an intuitive plunge into the original impetus of life, the ultimate reality. We know that "all around intelligence there lingers still a fringe of intuition, vague and evanescent". The mystic intensifies this intuition and consummates it in action. His soul is "content to feel itself pervaded, though retaining its own personality, by a being immeasurably mightier than itself, just as iron is pervaded by the fire which makes it glow. Its attachment to life would henceforth be its inseparability from this principle, joy in joy, love of that which is all love. In addition it would give itself to society, but to a society comprising all humanity, loved in the love of the principle underlying it".[1]

In actuality we have a mixture of static and dynamic religions in every land. Even the mystic has to express the inexpressible in the intelligible language of static religion. The conception of one universal God for all men shows, for example, a blending. The universality of the life impulse intuited by the mystic is combined with the idea of the god of static religion, and there is the resulting conception of the Omnipresent, Omnipotent Deity loving all creatures.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 181.

Bergson distinguishes two kinds of mysticism, incomplete and complete. The first is found, according to him, in the mystics of Greece and ancient India. These mystics go as far as contemplation, ecstasy and vision of God, the ultimate principle, "suspending the critical functions of intelligence"[1] by intense meditation or hyponosis or some other means. In thought and feeling they are absorbed in the ultimate, but their will still remains outside. They do not "reach the point where, as contemplation is engulfed in action, the human will becomes one with the divine will".[2] They like to remain entranced by the vision of God, and dare not descend to the life of action. For they think that "Action is a weakening of contemplation"[3] The second kind, that is complete mysticism, can be found in the great Christian mystics. They are absorbed in God not only in thought and feeling, but also in will. God thus acts through the mystic soul. There is a "super-abundance of life. There is boundless impetus. There is an irresistible impulse which hurls it into vast enterprises".[4] The complete mystic thus participates in God's creative activity and His love for the creatures. His life is, therefore, devoted to the task of transforming humanity from the natural to the spiritual or the divine. Material obstacles melt away before the mystic's enterprise; for, "the super-abundance of vitality which it demands flows from a spring which is the very source of life".[5]

In this connection Bergson considers some of the chief objections to the mystic method and its value for philosophy. It is true that mystic experience means nothing to the man who has no experience. "But we also meet with people to whom music is nothing but noise . . . No one would think of accepting this as an argument against music".[6] Like the traveller's account of an unknown land, the mystic's account of his uncommon journey can be provisionally accepted, since verification is potentially, if not actually, feasible in this as in the other case. If experience is the only source of knowledge and the intellect has to depend on experience, there is no reason why mystic experience should be left out and the science of spirit should not be cultivated as assiduously as the science of nature, based on sensuous experience. Bergson is, therefore, a strong supporter of Psychical Research, and the scientific study of mystic experiences. In support of the objectivity of mystic experience Bergson frequently refers to the striking unanimity that exists, in respect of essentials, among the mystics of all lands and ages who "join hands across the centuries" and "unite into a divine city which they bid us enter".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 191.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 188.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 189.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 198.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.* pp. 210-211.

Bergson does not "believe in the fatality of history".[2] Man is free to mould his own destiny and, therefore, also of the universe. The creative impulse at the bottom of all life is free. To the extent that man can identify himself with the basic impulse he can enjoy freedom. The complete mystic enjoys perfect freedom.

Now if man can gain freedom, it follows that he can guide the course of events. "Men do not sufficiently realize that their future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first of all whether they want to go on living or not. Theirs the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely to live, or intend to make just the extra effort required for fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods."[3]

7. CONCLUSION

We shall conclude our account of Bergson with a few remarks on his final position. All through his long philosophical career we observe the steady and continuous unfolding of the same generating vision. His views on morality and religion are in the main, its logical outcome.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 53.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 253.

[3] *The Two Sources, etc.*, p. 275.

But there is an important point on which he seems not only to go beyond the position of *Creative Evolution*, as he himself notes,[1] but to give it up. The disintegrating tendency by which perception and intellect, on the one hand, and matter and space, on the other, come into existence arises from practical necessity as Bergson repeatedly told us in his previous works. Intuition and 'dissolving back into the whole' are possible, he used to hold further, only by suppressing action,[2] by making instinct disinterested.[3] But his conception of complete mysticism, in which mystic intuition of reality and vigorous action for humanity are to exist side by side, appears to be inconsistent with that previous position. If the mystic soul grasps reality through intuition, and, therefore, sees things simply,[4] the question arises as to how far the unbroken vision of reality can furnish the basis for a life of action, which, according to Bergson, needs the breaking up of the vital impetus, the absolute whole, into static fragments according to practical needs.

It is true, Bergson's conception of the path of complete mysticism is one of gradual approach to the final ideal of 'total' union of soul with God,[5] and until that goal is reached the mystic's will 'remains outside' of God. During this period the effort is made by the will 'to find its way back to God'[6] and this must be done through work that can take the will God-ward. But when the 'final phase' of total union is reached and the mystic is 'alone with Him who is Alone', it may be, as Bergson contends, that 'there is boundless impetus', yet the question remains how that impetus can be canalized and reduced to human activity unless the mystic again comes down to the human level? This inconsistency seems to follow from Bergson's inability to decide the exact status of the complete mystic. Sometimes he speaks of the complete dissolution of the mystic in God, and denies personal immortality, but sometimes again he speaks like a good Christian of the retention of his personality.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 219. [2] *Creative Evolution* p. 12. [3] *Ibid.* p. 186.
[4] *Two sources*, p. 198. [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.* p. 197.

Another point of inconsistency, that will scarcely strike a Christian reader, is noticeable in Bergson's confinement of open morality practically to the human world. If the same life principle underlies all living beings, one who has identified himself with it and rent through the closed pale of social morality cannot stop once more at the boundary of the human species. His love must be as wide as life, and he must recognize his duties *explicitly to* the subhuman world as much as to the human. Otherwise the so-called open morality is not absolutely open.

The explanation of these inconsistencies is perhaps to be found, to use the words of Bergson used in another context, in "the narrow intellectual frame" of Christian thought and tradition within which Bergson's philosophy grew. Even the openest philosophical soul cannot shake out completely racial and religious leanings. No wonder, therefore, that with all his dialectic grandeur Hegel must conclude that Christianity of the particular Roman Catholic type prevalent in Germany is the supreme religious moment of the Absolute or that Bergson should employ his intuitive insight to facilitate the conclusion that Christian mysticism is the completest—even at the cost of self-consistency. No wonder again that Bergson's open morality should halt at the barrier of humanity, since human duties to lower animals receive so little recognition in Christianity.

A student of Buddhism will find that Bergson's classification of all ancient Indian mysticism under the incomplete type betrays his ignorance of Buddha's and his followers' intense activity for the liberation of all beings. A student of ancient Indian philosophy, specially of the Upanisads, Jainism and Buddhism, will again read with amusement the bold but ill-informed assertion of Bergson, "Humanity had to wait till Christianity for the ideal of universal brotherhood"[1] and will perhaps feel tempted to retort, "And yet with two thousand years of its existence it could not advance beyond that to the idea of the unity of all existence and the duty of man to all living beings, so explicitly recognised elsewhere even two thousand years ago." Dewey rightly points out the narrowness of the scope of European Philosophy and concludes, "seen in the long perspective of the future, the whole of western European history is a provincial episode".[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 62.

If we disregard such points, Bergson's philosophy is a masterpiece of art which unfolds with beauty and harmony one abiding vision of Reality as a living force. The logical value of such a vision is that of an explanatory hypothesis. It is acceptable to the extent it explains the different kinds of human experience. If the lines of supposition arising from different fields of experiences tend to meet somewhere, then the common point of intersection would represent *the* one supposition which would satisfactorily explain all experiences. Bergson thinks that this method of intersection supports his basic idea of an *elan vital.*[2] Materialism and Idealism also would make similar claims. We, therefore, have alternative systems of thought arising from different basic suppositions. The claim of each has to be judged by an examination of the internal co-herence,—the straightness of the various lines of subsidiary suppositions, and the exact point of intersection. The criticism of Bergson, as of any other philosophy, should not, therefore, be why he adopts the root idea of a vital impetus, but rather how far this idea consistently explains the different phases of experience, including, of course, scientific observations. Though there has been no dearth of adverse criticisms of James and Bergson in books and journals, the significant fact remains, though not always recognized, that the dominating tendencies of the greatest contemporary thinkers have mostly countenanced the dynamic, biological view-point of James and Bergson, as will be found later on in the philosophies of Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and especially Whitehead.

It should be noted that the criticisms against Bergson have been chiefly due to misunderstanding caused by two kinds of defects in his style of writing. One of these is unbalanced emphasis, verging on exaggeration, arising from his passionate description of things. This we noticed in respect of his anti-intellectualism, which is really not so uncompromising as it would appear at times to be. The other defect consists in the use of words in two opposite senses, without giving the reader sufficient warning. Time, mind, consciousness, matter, etc., we have seen, are used in this way creating the impression of self-contradictory assertion. The chief cause of this last defect lies in the oscillation between the two standpoints, the apparent and the real. As he sometimes says, the mystic uses the words of ordinary persons, but the meanings are transfigured. It is due to this reason, for example, that Bergson seems to assert that time is false and yet time is the only reality. But sympathetic readers would make necessary allowance for these shortcomings to grasp the underlying meaning of this really great thinker. They would then marvel at the new insight he has attained and made available for the modern western world—the insight into Life which unfolds from behind the serial succession of states and rolls up again all that is unrolled to push forward to ever new forms, Life which includes all temporal series and yet transcends them to be one with Time eternal.

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[1] Constem. Am. Phil., Vol. 2, p. 26. [2] *Mind Energy*, p. 4.

CHAPTER VI

REALISM

1. Introduction

Modern realism is essentially an epistemological doctrine and should be carefully distinguished from the ancient metaphysical theory of the same name associated with Plato. Plato's problem concerns the metaphysical status of a universal. What is a universal? Is it a mere name, or a mere concept or a reality? Affirmative answers to these three questions are known respectively as nominalism, conceptualism and realism. The last is Plato's. But the problem underlying modern realism in its widest form, is whether the object of knowledge in general, and of perception in particular, is dependent on the knowing mind or independent of it. If the object is said to be dependent on the knower or to be a mere idea of his mind, the reply is known as epistemological idealism. If, however, the object is regarded as a reality distinct from and independent of the knower, the reply is named epistemological realism. Modern realism is epistemological realism. It is, therefore, distinct from Platonic realism, and diametrically opposed to epistemological idealism. It is not, however, incompatible with *metaphysical* idealism, which is a reply to an altogether different question, namely: what is the nature of ultimate reality? Materialism holds that ultimate reality is material, whereas (metaphysical) idealism holds that it is mental or spiritual. Metaphysical idealism is, therefore, sometimes also called spiritualism. Now, one who holds that an object known is independent of the knowing mind may still hold that that independent object is spiritual in nature. Hence he would be epistemologically a realist, though metaphysically an idealist. Among modern realists there are some who are idealists in metaphysics,[1] though most of them are either materialists or dualists or neutralists or sceptics, as we shall see later on. "Knowledge, according to the realist," says Laird, "is always the *discovery* of something with which the mind is *confronted*. The mind is, therefore, *distinct* from its object."[1] But realism, like idealism, admits of various types and degrees, because the object may be held to be either wholly independent of and distinct from the mind or to be partly so, and that to different extents. Santayana says, "The minimum of realism is the presupposition that there is such a thing as knowledge; in other words, that perception and thought refer to some *object*, not the mere experience of perceiving and thinking. The maximum of realism would be the assurance that *everything* ever perceived or thought of existed apart from apprehension and *exactly* in the form in which it is believed to exist: in other words. . . there is no such thing as error."[2]

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[1] *Vide*, J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, Chap. XIX (Hegelian Realism), p. 264, "both Hegel and the English Hegelians are sound realists".

Realism is revived in modern times through a re-action against absolute idealism, mainly neo-Hegelianism, which culminated in the philosophy of Bradley in England. The philosophy of Bradley, with its subtle but destructive dialectic, dealt a mortal blow to common-sense and Science by showing the world, accepted by them, to be an unreal appearance full of contradictions. But the prestige of Science was by that time too deeply rooted in the world to yield to metaphysical criticism. On the contrary the fact that metaphysics came to conflict with Science, was regarded as an indication of some defect in metaphysics itself. This led to various counter-attacks on idealistic metaphysics, and realistic movements, in support of common-sense and Science, came into existence. Metaphysical idealism, we have seen, is not necessarily antagonistic to realism. Unlike Bradley, most absolute idealists do grant to objects reality and existence distinct from the knowing mind. But their conviction that the world is an organic whole, in which all things are internally related and interdependent stands in the way of giving to objects an altogether independent existence as extreme realists woulld like to have for them. This is the main reason why realists attack not only epistemological idealism, but also metaphysical idealism of the general type of absolute monism.

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[1] Laird, *Realism*, p. 214 (our Italics)

[2] Santayana, *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 163 (our Italics).

The outlook of the realists is mainly pluralistic. Ultimate reality is vested, according to this view, in the particular objects of experience, in parts, rather than in wholes which, for them, have only a secondary, derivative existence. The method of modern realism is, therefore, chiefly critical analysis. Synthetic construction of philosophical views of the universe as a whole has generally been regarded either as impossible or as fruitless. Only a few realists like Alexander, Whitehead and Santayana have attempted to build constructive systems.

The realistic attitude, however, is not a new one in philosophy. Realism, says the realist, is the instinctive belief of man and it is, therefore, as old as man. Modern realism draws its sustenance from the different forms of ancient realism. Aristotle's philosophy contained important elements of realism, and was revived in the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologiae.* The philosophy of St. Thomas again is revived in modern times by Roman Catholic thinkers. Neo-Thomism thus comes into existence and through it the realism of Aristotle filters down to modern thought. Again, Kantianism admitted also of a realistic interpretation; and the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid was also there to support realism.

Modern Realism has flourished most in Great Britain and America. The Cambridge philosophers, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, have been the leaders, and modern founders, of realistic philosophy in Great Britain. Their influence crossed the Atlantic and helped also the foundation of American realism. But these British thinkers themselves were influenced by some German realists. The debt of modern realism to German thought is, in a sense, double. German idealism aroused, by way of re-action, the realistic attitude of thought, whereas German reailsm also positively helped it with its own method of overcoming idealism.

2. Realism in Germany

To understand the development of modern realism we should therefore take into account the realistic movement which began in the continent and specially in Germany[1] during the end of the last century and the beginning of the present. Külpe, Höffding, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, among others, may be mentioned as the forerunners of contemporary realism. But the last three deserve special notice.

Franz Brentano (1838-1907) derived from Aristotle and scholasticism the view of *mind as "intentional"*. He stressed the objectivity of knowledge. According to him the characteristic of psychical activity is "*to be directed primarily on objects, which may either exist or not exist*; and only secondarily, in retrospect, upon itself".[2] Knowledge necessarily involves *two factors*, the mental act and the object to which it refers.

Alexius Meinong (1853-1921), a student of Brentano, developed a branch of philosophy called the "theory of objects" (*Gegenstands-theorie*), which is different from psychology and epistemology as well as metaphysics. The object according to this theory is what can be referred to or thought of. So it is wide enough to include not simply a physical thing which exists and qualities, numbers, propositions which merely *subsist* (Bestehen), but even the 'round square'. Meinong holds therefore, that even a mental act of merely assuming (without belief) has got some complex object. 'The white horse' or 'that the horse is white' are both objects, the former in the narrower sense and the latter in the wider.

Meinong distinguishes again between the *object* and the *content* of the mental *act*. The content is always existent in the mind (hence called *Inhalt*) like the act of the mind. It is present and psychical. But the object may be non-existent, past or future or physical, provided only that it is what the mental act is directed to. Knowledge is thus found to involve three factors, act, content and object.

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[1] *Vide* Perry, *Phil. of the Recent Past*, p. 205f. W. T. Jones, *Contemporary thought of Germany*, *passim*; Ruggiero, *Modern Phil., Part I*; Brock, *Contemporary German Phil.*, S. Z. Hasan, *Realism*.

[2] Perry, *Phil. of the Recent Past* p. 206.

To distinguish an ordinary object from the object of reference or supposition, Meinong calls the latter an objective. "An objective is something *thought of* as existing or referred to its place in the real world. An objective is thus, if we insist on regarding it by itself, epistemologically an abstraction."[1]

Another contribution of Meinong is his 'theory of value' (Werth-theorie), which he also helped into recognition. His view is that "value appertains only to 'objectives', or is the content of feeling when this is mediated by judgments or assumptions. The measure of the value of an object is the pleasure and pain felt on the assumption of its existence or *non-existence* . . . . Values have, in other words, that peculiar non-existent objectivity which is so basic a feature of Meinong's whole philosophy".[2]

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) also is influenced by Brentano. He formulates a new branch of philosophy called "phenomenology" which means a descriptive study of consciousness, *i.e.* consciousness-of-objects.

Phenomenology is a new attitude and method regarding the study of philosophical problems. The method is to intuit objects revealed immediately by consciousness and study them as *objects of consciousness*. This method differs from subjectivism which would regard objects as but forms of consciousness itself. It also differs from the naive realistic attitude of regarding objects of consciousness as existents. The phenomenological attitude is to view objects as mere objects, just as they are revealed, by suppressing the tendency to refer objects, beyond themselves, to a space-time world of existence. This method claims *a priori* certainty for its results as there can be no doubt about what appears before consciousness, if it is taken merely as a phenomenon or appearance immediately present to consciousness. The method is applied to Logic, Ethics and other branches of philosophy, and thus shown to be capable of constructing an *a priori* science of every class of objects of consciousness.

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[1] L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, p. 89.
[2] *Perry, Phil. of the Recent Past*, p. 208.

Brentano, Meinong and Husserl have one important point in common. All of them try to show that knowledge or consciousness does not know itself; it means, refers to or holds before itself something other than consciousness. We shall see how British and American realists utilize this distinction recognized by the German thinkers.

Husserl discovers phenomenologically the *three factors* in consciousness, *viz.*, act, object and content. But he introduces many other minor distinctions. Describing the phenomenon of consciousness as an apprehension of meanings he distinguishes the following six factors:

(1) The 'I' *who* means (2) his meaningful *attitude*, (3) the *datum* with which he means (4) the *way* (as sign or revelation of object) in which he takes the datum, (5) he must mean *something* (the sense of his meaning) and (6) he must mean this *of* something (the object).[1]

3. Realism in British and American Thinkers

The two chief forms of realism prevalent in Great Britain and America are neo-realism and critical realism, each of which acquires slightly different forms in different thinkers. The main point of difference between these two forms consists in their different replies to the epistemological question, whether the object perceived is numerically identical with (*i.e.*, one and the same entity as) the object as it is (unperceived). Neo-realism answers this question in the affirmative, holding that the two are one. This view is, therefore, known as epistemological monism. Critical realism (feeling the difficulties of monism in cases like error, memory, etc.) answers the question in the negative, holding that the object perceived and the object existing are two different entities. This theory is known, therefore, as epistemological dualism. Both hold, however. with the German realists that perception reveals some object other than the perceptual consciousness. Neo-realism accepts the two-factor theory of Brentano, whereas critical realism holds the three-factor theory of Meinong. Critical realism, growing out of the criticism of neo-realism, comes later into the field. Of British thinkers, G. E. Moore, Alexander and Russell (in some stages of his philosophical career) are regarded as the pioneers of Neo-Realism. In America the co-operative work, *The New Realism*, produced by the joint speculation of Holt, Marvin, Montague. Perry, Pitkin and Spaulding (pub. in 1912 by Macmillan, New York) gives this movement a definite shape and status. Critical realism, on the other hand, has been similarly presented in a joint work called *Essays in Critical Realism* by Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars and Strong (Pub. in 1920 by Macmillan).

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 210.

Another form of modern realism, in addition to the New and the critical, worth mention, is Relativistic or Functional Realism as formulated, for example, by J. E. Boodin. New and Critical forms of realism assume the reality of substances and qualities independent of perceivers. But functional realism, following contemporary physical theories, holds that all things, perceivers, substances and qualities, are mutually interdependent,—that everything is the function of, that is, determined by, all the other things in the universe. It holds that "things exist only in fields, in mutuality with other things and that they have properties only in their dynamic interrelations."[1] This view is realistic in that it holds that the object revealed in perception is real. But it does not hold, like other kinds of realism, that the object is independent of the perceiver. The object perceived is, on the other hand, the function of and, therefore, dependent on the precipient as well as the entire environment. For, every reality is determined by everything else in the universe. Functional realism is, therefore, a kind of relativistic realism.

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[1] Boodin, Functional Realism, *The Phil. Review*, March, 1934.

4. Moore's Refutation of Idealism

The beginning of neo-realism is traced in the writings of G. E. Moore (1873-). He leads the revolt of British empiricism and common-sense realism against German transcendentalism and absolutism. As a Professor at Cambridge, he has influenced, by his teaching and writings, the course of philosophical thinking in England in a unique way and brought into existence the realistic outlook of thought. sometimes called 'Cambridge philosophy'. His writings are few, and most of them are short papers and essays. But some of these are philosophical landmarks. His careful analysis of the statements of issues, his meticulous intellect, his transparent sincerity and his honest anxiety to ascertain truth, rather than come to a conclusion or assert his own view, have made him an object of ardent imitation by a rising generation of philosophical thinkers at home and abroad. His style of writing, in spite of some defects, has set a model, and has, as we shall see, led to the foundation of a philosophical method and school, Logical Positivism, which regards logical analysis of language as the sole function of philosophy.

Among his writings, *The Refutation of Idealism* (an article published in *Mind* in 1903)[1] has exerted the greatest influence towards the foundation of modern realism. We shall briefly sum it up here.

Moore points out in this article that all forms of idealism are based on one ultimate premise, namely, '*esse* is *percipi*' (to exist is to be perceived or experienced). Though idealism is not based *only* on this single premise, yet this forms *one* of the links in the chain of arguments advanced by an idealist to prove his theory. If any premise in a chain is proved false the conclusion becomes inconclusive, though all other premises may be sound. Moore tries to show the inconclusive character of idealism by showing the untenability of one of its premises, *viz.*, '*esse is percipi*'.

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[1] Also included in his *Philosophical Studies.*

A noteworthy feature of Moore's method of philosophical discussion is to analyse the statement of a problem or theory into its alternative meanings and to consider the alternatives one by one. This method is applied here. '*Esse is percipi*' is shown to be analysable into different meanings each of which is found to be unacceptable and therefore the dictum itself becomes untenable.

Taking '*percipi*' first, Moore shows that its original meaning is sensation. But most idealists would mean by it, not sensation only, but also thought: so that it comes to signify experience, in all its forms. Even if '*percipi*' is taken in this one sense, the copula of the proposition, 'is', admits of at least three different meanings, namely, (a) complete identity of the meanings of subject and predicate; (b) partial identity, the connotation of the predicate being a *part* of that of the subject; (c) the mere inferability of the presence of the predicate from the presence of the subject (*i.e.*, whatever has S has P also).

If the proposition '*esse is percipi*' is taken in the first sense of the copula it comes to mean that the meanings of *esse* (to exist) and *percipi* (to be perceived) are identical, and the two terms are absolutely synonymous. The proposition would then be a definition of *esse* and 'an extremely bad definition'. *Esse* and *percipi* are not synonyms; the first sense is not, therefore, tenable.

Taken in the second sense, the proposition would mean that *percipi* (to be experienced) forms only a part of the meaning of *esse* or reality (just as animality forms a part of the connotation of man in the proposition, all men are animals). But in that case from *percipi* reality or existence cannot be inferred (just as from the presence of animality in a being, humanity cannot be inferred to be present in it). This would mean, that the fact of a thing being an object of consciousness does not signify its existence. Existence then would be something more than the mere fact of becoming an object of experience. Thus the second meaning will be repugnant to the idealist.

The third meaning is the only one that remains and is of any importance. According to it though the meaning of reality (*esse*) is not constituted by that of *percipi*, but by something else, say x; yet there is such an inseparable relation between that x and *percipi* that x cannot exist without *percipi* (just as smoke cannot exist without fire). This meaning would support then the idealistic contention that wherever there is *esse* there is *percipi*. In short though the idealistic attempt to identify *esse* with *percipi* is repelled by the rejection of the first meaning, it has a chance to demonstrate, by accepting the third meaning, the inseparability (though not identity) between *esse* and *percipi*.

But even this meaning is not acceptable. The proposition, according to this meaning, must be necessary and synthetic, because it asserts a *necessary* connection between the two terms, *esse* and *percipi*, which have *distinct* meanings.

Now this proposition can be necessarily true and irrefutable only if it is self-evident. But if it were self-evident no reasoning would be either necessary or possible. The idealist however tries to support this proposition with reasoning. This shows that he is not himself sure of its self-evident nature.

The reasoning sometimes adduced in support of '*esse* is *percipi*' is that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject'. This proposition then is supposed to be necessary because its opposite is inconceivable. But a proposition whose opposite is inconceivable is known commonly as an analytic proposition. But *esse* is *percipi* in the third sense, was shown to be a synthetic proposition previously. Thus the idealist would commit a sort of self-contradiction by holding that the same proposition could be at the same time both analytic and synthetic. The third sense is also then untenable.

The idealist maintains that the subject and the object are necessarily connected because "he fails to see that they are distinct". When the idealist thinks of 'yellow' and when he thinks of 'sensation of yellow', he fails to see that there is 'anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former'. Therefore, the idealist asserts the identity between an idea and its object. But it should be noted that if the two were absolutely identical, assertion of identity would be pointless and if they were distinct they could not be identical also.

The idealist would, of course, retort by saying that the idea and its object form an organic unity, and they are both identical and distinct. But this Hegelian principle of organic unity used conveniently for justifying the truth of two contradictory propositions, is criticized by Moore as a mere attempt to glorify a type of fallacy by "erecting it into a principle" and giving it a name.

Moore points out in conclusion that '*esse* is *percipi*' is seen to be false as soon as it is seen that 'to exist' (*esse*) and 'to be perceived' (*percipi*) are two distinct terms like 'green' and 'sweet', and cannot, therefore, *be* necessarily related together.[1]

Moore also tries to show in some other ways that the existence of an object is different from the consciousness of it.

(*a*) It is known to all that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green. But this difference is in respect of the *objects* (blue and green) of the sensations and not in respect of sensation which is a form of consciousness common to both. It follows then that there must be two distinct elements in every sensation, (*i*) consciousness in respect of which all sensations are alike, (*ii*) something else, the object, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. Hence it is wrong to identify the *object* with the consciousness of it. If an idealist says that blue is the same thing as sensation he identifies one part of a complex whole (namely 'sensation of blue') with *another* part which is distinct from the first. But if he says that blue is the same thing as the sensation of blue, he identifies a part with the whole. In both cases, therefore, he holds something absurd.

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[1] Modifying this early view Moore now concedes that there are some cases like a 'toothache' whose existence does consist in being perceived. *Vide* p. 653 of *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (where he replies to his critics).

(b) But the idealist may point out that though the object (blue) may not be identical, with the sensation (of blue), it is inseparable from the sensation being a *content* of the sensation. Moore shows that the object of any knowledge cannot be regarded as its content. Blue is surely a content of a blue flower as blue is contained within the flower as one of its qualities and constituents. But such a relation does not exist between blue and the awareness of blue. (When we see a blue flower, we see that the *flower* contains the blue and the flower is blue, but we do *not* feel that our *perception* similarly contains the blue, *i.e.*, that the perception is itself blue.

Some would hold that to be aware of an object is to have an image of it in the mind; hence what we are aware of is contained in the mind. We cannot get, they would point out, beyond the circle of our own ideas. Moore points out "that to have a mental image of an object is not the same thing as *knowing* the existence of an object. (When one is *aware* of a tiger, he does not think that it is contained in his mind, as a mere image but believes in its existence outside the mind). "There is, therefore, no question of how we are to get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations. Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle". The object of any knowledge, worth the name, is not, therefore, a content of that knowledge.

This conclusion Moore further strengthens by indirectly showing the absurdities that follow from its denial. If what we know is not an object outside knowledge, but a content of knowledge, then we cannot assert the independent existence of even knowledge or the self. For knowledge then cannot be shown to be separable from and independent of the knowledge of knowledge, and the self cannot be shown to be existing independent of the knowledge of the self. Not to allow the object its independence of the knowledge of it is, then, to deprive idealism itself of its own grounds. If idealism avoids this suicidal conclusion and holds that knowledge and self can exist independently of the knowledge of them he must concede that other objects of knowledge also can exist independently of the knowledge of them. Thus unknown objects also can exist.

What is *known* then is the *object*, not a content of knowledge. If, however, the word, content, is used to mean simply 'what is known' (and not what is contained in knowledge), then the content is nothing but the object of knowledge.

Moore concludes, therefore, that the idealistic premise '*esse is percipi*' is wholly untenable. Existence of objects is something very distinct from the experience of it; and there is no reason even to think that existence is inseparable from experience. On the contrary the evidence for the independent existence of objects is as strong as that of experience—the evidence being knowledge which directly reveals the existence of both.

The Refutation of Idealism, the salient points of which we have tried to set forth above, produced both negative and positive results. On the negative side it had a crushing effect on idealism. Reply to it was difficult not simply because of the great merits of Moore's writing—the endless subtle reasons, distinctions and alternative meanings discovered by his acutely analytic mind—but also because of his cumbrous method of developing arguments, in which the main issues and conclusions are blurred and sometimes obliterated by a lot of long anticipatory defensive reactions, provisions, qualifications and circumlocutions. Though Moore's article was published in *Mind* in 1903, the attempt to answer it and refute Realism was made in that journal as late as 1934.[1] On the positive side, Moore's article incidentally lays down some of the cardinal points of modern realism specially of the neo-realistic type. These points should be clearly noted here to indicate the position of Moore and his relation to previous and subsequent thinkers.

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[1] By W. T. Stace in his *Refutation of Realism.*

(a) He shows, first of all, that the object of every kind of knowledge is independent of that knowledge. Following the German realist, Brentano, he stresses the distinction between two necessary factors, the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

(b) But he does not hold, like Meinong, or like Locke, that in knowledge the mind is immediately aware of a content distinct from the object. He rejects the three-factor theory of knowledge. On the contrary he holds that the object existing is what is known by the mind without any other medium. He lays down, therefore, the central thesis of Neo-Realism, namely that the object known is identical with the object existing.

We shall presently see how these points are elaborately developed and sometimes modified too, in the American school of New Realism. Russell, another great thinker of the Cambridge school, also influenced the growth of neo-realism. But his views had been so unstable that they sometimes lent support to neo-realism, sometimes to its critics. We shall defer, therefore, the statement of his philosophy to another context. In striking contrast with Russell's, Moore's main point of view has remained pretty steady all through his long career. His faith in common sense philosophy, in its least sophisticated form, has persisted in the midst of new scientific discoveries and changing fashions in philosophy, barring a few minor changes and hesitations found in his later writings which we shall notice later in the chapter on sense-data.

5. The American 'New Realism'

(1) *Its Relation to Naive Realism, Dualism and Subjectivism.*

New Realism, as conceived by the six authors of *The New Realism*, already mentioned, is, broadly speaking, "a return to that naive or natural realism"[1] which was abandoned previously owing to its inability to explain dreams and illusions. The authors point out: "historical significance of the new realism appears most clearly in its relations with 'naive realism', 'dualism' and 'subjectivism'. The new realism is primarily a doctrine concerning the relation between the knowing process and the thing known; and as such it is the latest phase of a movement of thought which has already passed through the three phases just indicated".[2]

Naive Realism "conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be . . . Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented . . . Consciousness is thought of as analogous to a light which shines out through the sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower".[3] This theory is however handicapped by its failure to explain error, illusion, dream, relativity of perception with respect to space, time and personal factors.

Pressed by these difficulties naive realism gives way to dualism, as found in Descartes and Locke, for example. According to it, "the mind never perceives anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or states. But as it seems impossible to account for the order in which these ideas occur by appealing to the mind in which they occur, it is held to be permissible and even necessary to infer a world of external objects resembling to a greater or less extent the effects, or ideas, which they produce in us. What we perceive is now held to be only a picture of what really exists".[4] Consciousness is no longer like a light, but rather a canvas or plate on which objects get represented.

Error is explained by it easily as being purely subjective. But dualism cannot justify itself because it cannot demonstrate the validity of the inference of an external object from the mental picture since according to it the external is *never* perceived, and, therefore, there is no means of knowing that the mental picture at all corresponds to an external counterpart.

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[1] *The New Realism*, p. 10 (1922 Edition).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.* p. 4.

It is thus that dualism is pressed to give up external objects altogether and confine itself absolutely to ideas of which alone there is immediate awareness. We find thus that Berkeley and Hume construct a philosophy of *subjectivism* out of the dualism of Locke. Kant and the post-Kantians, in some respects or other, further this subjectivist tendency.

New Realism is, therefore, interested in showing the errors and inadequacies of both 'dualism' and 'subjectivism' in order to demonstrate that these are not acceptable as any improvement on naive realism.

It is, therefore, polemical. But it develops also a constructive line of thought, a realistic theory of immediate awareness of external objects, trying to avoid the errors and defects of Naive Realism.

(2) *Criticism of Subjectivism.*

The authors of *The New Realism* find it possible to generalize some wrong assumptions and errors of subjectivism, common to different idealistic thinkers. By exposing these fallacies they try to prove the fallacious nature of all idealistic doctrines. The chief among these are mentioned below.

(a) *The fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament.* This fallacy was first pointed out and given the name, by Perry in an article entitled "The Ego-centric Predicament", in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, in 1910. This article was received by realists with great approbation, and soon became classic on the subject. Its place has been very near Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*, along with which it is often mentioned as stemming the tide of idealism.

The ego-centric predicament means the rather inconvenient situation in which a philosopher finds himself when he sees that his knowledge of objects centres round his ego, or self. If he has to know whether objects exist, and if so, how they exist, he has to relate them to his self, make them the objects of self's knowledge. So it is not possible for him to know the existence and nature of things unknown and unrelated to the self. Perry points out that an idealistic philosopher like Berkeley unfairly makes out an argument, in favour of idealism, from this predicament. The difficulty or impossibility of proving the existence of things unknown by the self is used by the idealist as a proof for the non-existence of unknown objects. This argument of the idealist is called by Perry argument from the ego-centric predicament, and he points out that it is fallacious. The fallacy consists in a generalization made on the basis of the method of agreement, unsupported by the method of difference. It is true that objects which can be mentioned as existing are observed to be objects known by the self (otherwise they could not have been mentioned at all). But this is simply observation of agreement in presence. It can prove nothing, unless agreement in absence is observed, that is to say, unless some objects which are not known by the self are observed to be non-existent. But such negative instances are not possible and no conclusion can, therefore, be drawn with certainty.

Instead of arguing inductively from the ego-centric predicament, the idealist sometimes expresses this predicament as a self-evident analytic proposition and deduces subjectivism from it. Thus nothing can *be known to* exist unless it is an object of knowledge (the predicament). Therefore, nothing can exist unless it is an object of knowledge (subjectivism deduced). The premise here is a bare tautology, and not objectionable. But the conclusion does not follow from the premise except by the fallacious omission of an essential part of its predicate (namely 'be known to').

Thus neither inductive nor deductive argument can be led from the ego-centric predicament in favour of subjectivism without committing some fallacy.

(b) *The fallacy of exclusive particularity.* This fallacy arises when one thinks that a term which is found to belong to one system must particularly belong to that system *only* (*i.e.*, exclusively). That it is an error would be clear from the facts that the same point B, might belong to more than one straight line such as ABC, DBE, FBG, etc., and that the same person may as much belong to two or more intersecting classes such as 'the republican party', 'the captain of industry', etc. (A person who is a father is also at the same time a son, brother, master, servant in other relations).

Subjectivism commits this fallacy when it argues that because things known are objects of knowledge, they are the *exclusive* possession of the mind, independent of which they cannot exist. It ignores the possibility of a thing being at the same time related to the mind as object and also existing in the external world.

(c) *The fallacy of definition by initial predication.* This fallacy is a sequel to the last one. Something is viewed *first* in one of its various possible aspects, and then by a fallacy of exclusive particularity, that aspect is regarded as being essential to it. The "initial characterization becomes definitive and final". (It is a very common human habit. A child who first comes to know a male adult in its father, calls other such adults also father, or thinks that every such person must be some one's father, and on seeing such a person asks, "Whose father is he?"). The subjectivist commits this fallacy by trying to define a thing as an object of knowledge, and to interpret the universe in terms of human consciousness, under the impression that as we are first acquainted with things as objects of our consciousness, every reality *must be* the object of some consciousness.

(3) *The programme and notable features of New Realism*

Turning from this polemical aspect of New Realism to its constructive programme we find that it lays down the following general principles according to which philosophical discussion should be conducted. (a) The scrupulous use of words, (b) clear and definite definition of the meanings of words used, (c) analysis or "careful, systematic and exhaustive examination of any topic of discourse", (d) regard for logical form, *i.e.*, for the logical principles discovered by the new mathematical logicians and obedience to them in philosophical discussion, (e) division of the question to be discussed into the different problems it involves, (f) explicit agreement, *i.e.* explicit statement as to how far the views of others are accepted, (g) the separation of philosophical research from the study of the history of philosophy.

The following are claimed by the neo-realist as the main features of New Realism: (a) The "most notable feature of a realistic philosophy is the emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology. This means that the nature of things is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge"[1] but things must be studied in the objective way, in their objective setting.

(b) Realism rejects anti-intellectualism and along with it all mystical philosophies. It depends on analysis and accepts nothing as unanalysable, indefinable and simple, before applying analysis and finding it really unanalysable.

(c) New Realism tends to pluralism by rejecting two of the chief grounds of metaphysical monism, namely that all relations are internal and that knowledge is universally present in all existence.

(d) Rejecting subjectivism, New Realism holds that cognition, which is not universal, is generated by certain conditions like all other phenomena in space and time. In every case of knowledge, there are the object and the subject which are interrelated in certain ways like any two other objects. The subject-object relation is nothing unique and mysterious. Besides, this relation *discloses* the characters known and does *not produce* or modify them. The knower and the known pre-exist the external relation of knowing. Even in cases of illusion and hallucination what is known is not made by knowledge, but is a product of already existing conditions like the body, the object, etc.

(e) New Realism holds again that "*the content of knowledge, that which lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically identical with the thing known*".[2] All the media of immediate knowledge have only the effect of producing immediate knowledge;

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 32.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 34, (our italics).

they do not, therefore, stand in between the subject and the object. These media do not form any class of entities qualitatively or substantively different from other entities. "In other words, things when consciousness is had of them become themselves contents of consciousness; and the same things thus figure both in the so-called external world and in the manifold which introspection reveals."[1]

This view, holding as it does, that the object known and the object as it is are one and the same, is known as epistemological *monism*. It is opposed to epistemological dualism according to which the object known and the object as it is are two entities.

(f) Analysis and conception are regarded as means of access to reality and not as transformation of it. The "*neo-realist is also a Platonic realist*", in so far as "He accords full ontological status to things of thought as well as to the things of sense, to logical entities as well as physical entities, or to subsistents as well as existents".[2]

Vitally connected with the basic features of neo-realism there are some cognate problems which are discussed by the different neo-realists in their essays. We should consider them one after another, at some length, because of their great importance.

(4) *The external nature of Relation*

New Realism, we have seen, favours epistemological monism and consequently it tries to show that knowing does not change the object, but grasps it as it exists independently. But to establish this view the new realist has to refute the view of idealists like Bradley and Joachim who, we have found, hold that all relations change the terms. For, if the idealist view were true then even knowledge relation, being internal like other relations, must be admitted to change the object which it relates to the subject. Epistemological monism would then have been impossible.

Neo-realists, therefore, try to refute this internal view of relations. Now, the idealist's view, as quoted above, is a

[1] *Ibid.* p. 35.

[2] *Ibid.* (our italics).

universal affirmative proposition, 'All relations modify the terms'. This can be refuted either by showing the truth of its contradictory 'Some relations do not modify the terms' or by its contrary 'No relations modify the terms'. Cautious realists like Moore choose the first alternative, whereas the more enthusiastic American neo-realists generally choose the second alternative.

As Moore has shed much light on this problem clearing many of the ambiguities involved in it, his view is often referred to and quoted by the others with approval. We shall first state his view briefly here for a better understanding of the problem and then state the views of the American neo-realists.

In an essay on "External and Internal Relations"[1] Moore discusses the subject in his unique analytic way trying to ascertain the different meanings of the internal view and showing how far and in what sense it can be accepted, and why and in what sense it must be rejected.

If the view, that all relations are internal, means that 'no relational facts are completely analysable', then, he says, the contention may be accepted. For, then it simply means that a relational complex is not identical with the analysed constituents. The truth of this contention is evident from the following example. The relational complex 'A is the father of B' is analysable into the constituents, A, B, and fatherhood, which three also are the constituents of a different complex, 'B is the father of A'. If these complexes were identical with their three identical constituents, they would have been identical with each other, which is not the case. It follows, therefore, that a complex of *related* terms is not the same as the terms and the relation between them *separated* by analysis.

But this acceptable meaning of the internal view is of very little moment to the idealist. It is scarcely more than a truism; for it only means that terms related are not terms unrelated. Besides, this does not prove that all relations are internal in *every* sense.

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[1] Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 276f.

A more important meaning of the internal view, Moore suggests, may be, "'All relations modify their terms". Now this statement itself is ambiguous and can be given different meanings, which must be separately considered.

If it means that all relations *literally* modify the terms, just as the relation of a wax to a flame modifies the wax, the proposition cannot be accepted as universally true, because of the many obvious exceptions which we can observe.

Leaving the natural sense of modification, it is possible to interpret it in the secondary sense of 'making different'. Then, the proposition, "All relations modify their terms" will mean "All relations make their terms different". In support of this meaning the following example may be cited by the idealist. If A is the father of B, it is found that relation of fatherhood makes A different, because A who was not previously the father of B, becomes so now.

Regarding this interpretation of the internal view, Moore first points out a fault in the statement. Even if the above example and argument be granted to be true what they prove is that a *relational property*, not relation itself, modifies a term. A is different because he is *father of B*, and A is father of B, because of his relation (of fatherhood) to B. 'Father of B', the term which modifies A, is, therefore, a property which follows from the relation of fatherhood. Such property can be called relational property, and it is this *property* following from the relation then, but *not* the *relation* itself, which directly causes the difference in the term.

For a clear understanding of Moore's distinction between 'relation' and 'relational property', we may consider this: A is father of B, and A is father of C also. Fatherhood is the relation possessed by A, in both the cases; but the property following from this common relation is different in each, because in one case the father, A, is characterized by the property of being the father of *B*, in another A has the property of being the father of *C*. Hence a property following from a relation is different from the relation. It should be noted, however, that this distinction made by Moore, valuable as it is, does not essentially affect the internal view. In spite of this distinction the idealist can say, "Relations change their terms, though not directly, but indirectly through properties generated by them."

The idealist view as amended, should then be expressed thus: "All relational properties make terms different". It is this universal proposition, in its final form which Moore examines and rejects by showing some exceptions which disprove its universality. He points out that 'different' admits of two meanings, 'qualitatively different' and 'numerically different'.

By qualitative difference Moore means change in essential qualities (without which a thing ceases to be itself). By numerical difference is meant becoming *another* entity. If then anything becomes qualitatively different it must be numerically different too. But the converse may not be true. (Two new shilling coins, made in the same way, are numerically different, being *two*, but not qualitatively since both possess the same essential qualities required of a shilling.)

The Idealist holds the proposition in both the senses. He supports his position by examples like the following. A particular whole would be different, both qualitatively and numerically, if it were not 'composed of a particular part', and 'composed of a part' is a property which follows from the relation which the whole has to its parts. So the whole is made different by a relational property. But Moore points out that it would be too hasty to generalize from this that relational properties always make terms different in every way. For, a part related to a whole would not be at least numerically different from what it is if it ceased to be a part of the whole. (A thread taken out of a cloth does not cease to be thread, nor does it become *another* thread, and is not therefore either qualitatively or numerically different, it being counted *as* the one and the same thread). Such an example then proves that it is not true to hold universally, that in all cases relational properties make the terms *both* qualitatively and numerically different.

It is thus seen that the internal view is not tenable in every sense of it, and in every case of relation, though it is true in some cases and in some sense. In cases where relation is not internal, it must of course be external.

Some of the American neo-realists are apt to go a step further and try to show that the internal view is *never* true. Therefore relation is always external; terms, as such, are not changed by any relation.[1] This external view is maintained by them mainly on the following grounds.

(a) The chief reason why an idealist believes that all relations are internal is that he looks upon the universe as an *organic whole*, things in it being organically and necessarily related. The ideal of an internal relation at the back of his mind is then an organic relation. He thinks that the relation of the part of an organism to the whole is such that the part would altogether cease to be what it is if it is separated from the whole. But this idea of the inseparability of an organic relation is not universally supported by facts of experimental zoology and surgery. Pitkin cites the following examples to disprove the popular notion.[2] The anterior half of a frog surgically separated and joined to the posterior part of another has been found to live and thrive in the new position without loss of its previous characters. Again it has been found that when the tail of a fish is cut off, a new one is grown. The first example shows that the part of an organism does not *necessarily* depend on a particular whole, where it happened to be, and it is not inseparable from the whole. The second example shows that a whole does not necessarily depend on a particular part which it happens to possess. Even an organic relation is not then necessarily inseparable and internal.

Now if the inseparability of an organic relation itself turns out to be a myth, the entire theory of internal relation, built by the idealist on its model, becomes an unsupported guess. He cannot argue any longer, 'All relations are organic and therefore internal'.

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[1] *Vide*, *The New Realism*, p. 479, arts. 4-6; Spaulding holds that "both a term and a relation are (unchangeable) elements or entities", which suggests the universality of external relation, though earlier on p. 167 he contents himself with a more qualified view.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 422-4.

(b) In spite of the above argument the idealist may try to show in another way the internality of a relation by showing that when a term is separated from another to which it was related it becomes different. He may cite an example like this: the arm of a chair when separated from the chair becomes different, because it ceases to be the arm of that chair. The neo-realist points out that this argument propounds *only a verbal proposition*—a truism that proves nothing. For the conclusion simply means that a part separated from the whole is not a part of the whole, or in a general way, a term unrelated is not a term related. The point, which being proved, internality of the relation will be proved is whether the separated term loses its identity.

(c) If the internal view is true then everything would be modified in innumerable ways by its innumerable relations to other things. This is the conclusion which is actually accepted by some idealists. But if this conclusion be true *it would be impossible to know what a thing itself is.* One cannot even state and prove then the internal view. Because one can say that terms undergo change when related, only when one knows what the terms themselves were without relation.[1]

(d) If the internal view be true then knowledge relation, like other relations, must be said to modify the object. *Then truth can never be said to be attained,* because as soon as truth becomes related as an object to some mind it is modified; and truth in itself is not grasped. Whether the internal view is true, whether even idealism is true, cannot then be ascertained. The internal view then either remains unproved or becomes self-contradictory. The external view of relations is thus found to be presupposed by every system which claims to be true.[2]

By refuting thus the internal view the neo-realists try to establish the external view. As the denial of each form or interpretation of the internal view gives a corresponding external view, there can be as many forms of the external view as of the internal.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 165f.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 479.

It is important to understand in this connection the relation of internal and external views to the problems of knowledge and reality. The internal view, as Spaulding points out, has two motives. In *epistemology* it is employed to check realism and monism by showing that the object known is constituted by its relation to the mind, and cannot be independent of the subject. The independent existence of the object cannot, therefore, be proved, and even if there is such an object it is not identical with what is known. In *metaphysics*, the internal view is employed to prove a kind of monism by showing that things found in this world are related in such an inseparable way that what they are is due to their mutual relations. Hence the reality of an individual object depends on the whole system of interrelated objects. Absolute reality belongs, therefore, to the system as a whole, not to its parts which are only relative to and dependent on the whole. On the other hand the external view has just the opposite motives. In epistemology it is used to prove both realism and monism. If all relations are external, then the knowledge relation must be so.[2] Hence the thing known is not modified by being thus related to the knower. Hence it cannot be said to depend, for its existence, on knowledge; it is independent of the mind. Besides as we know this unchanged object, what is known is identical with the object existing independently. In metaphysics again this external view is used to disprove absolutism that is based on the internal view. If things are not changed by their interrelation, they have all their independent existences. Their reality is not, therefore, dependent on any whole. On the contrary the whole, which is nothing but a collection of individuals, depends on them as its component parts. Thus in metaphysics the external view tends towards pluralism.

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[1] *Vide* author's article, 'The concept of difference in relation to the problem of external relation', *Philosophical Quarterly*, April, 1941.

[2] *The New Realism*, p. 479.

(5) *The Neo-realistic theory of Perception and Consciousness*

It has been pointed out in the last section that the knowledge relation is external according to Neo-realism. Perception then must have an object independent of the perceiving consciousness, and that object cannot be modified by being known—*i.e.*, it is known as it really is. Perception is a relation, of an external type, between the subject (or a living organism) and an object; and none of these two are altered by this relation.

This position is established by overcoming *three* kinds of opposition to realism, which Montague calls (1) The Psychological Argument, (2) The Intuitional Argument and (3) The Physiological Argument.[1] The first, or Psychological argument against realism is that "The mind can have for its *direct object* only its own ideas or states; and external objects, if they exist at all, can only be *known indirectly* by a process of inference, of questionable validity and doubtful utility". Against this Montague points out: "This principle is fallacious because a *knowing process is never its own object*, but is rather the means by which some other object is known. The object thus known or referred to may be another mental state, a physical thing, or a merely logical entity." Neo-realism, therefore, holds that 'ideas' cannot be said to *stand in the way* of the knowledge of objects; they do not stand between the subject and the object. On the contrary the subject's having ideas of the object means its having knowledge of it; and when such ideas are generated by the presence of the object, the subject has direct knowledge of it.

The second argument, the intuitional one, chiefly found in Berkeley has two forms which are stated and refuted by Montague thus:—"The first consists of a confused identification of a truism and an absurdity. The truism: *We can only know that objects exist, when they are known.*

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 474-5 (our italics).

The absurdity: *We know that objects can only exist when they are known.* The second form of the argument derives its force from a play upon the word, 'idea', as follows: Every '*idea*' (*meaning a mental process or state*) *is incapable of existing apart from a mind; every known entity is an 'idea'* (*meaning an object of thought*); therefore, *every known entity is incapable of existing apart from a mind.* It is to the failure to perceive these fallacies that idealism owes its supposedly axiomatic character.'"[1]

The third or the Physiological Argument is "Because the sensations we receive determine what objects we shall know, therefore the objects known are constructs or products of our perceptual experience. The fallacy here consists in arguing from the true premise that sensations are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the external world to the false conclusion that they are therefore its *ratio fiendi* or *essendi.*'"[2] In other words, what is proved by this argument is that sensations are only the means of the *knowledge* of the objects and not the ground of the existence of objects.

Knowledge is regarded by Holt and some other neo-realists not as a passive reception of sensations, but rather, biologically, as a response. The subject is that which responds and the object is that which is responded to. Therefore, like James, they hold that "the difference between subject and object of consciousness is not a difference of quality or substance, but a difference of office or place in configuration".[3] The Cartesian opposition between mind and body is thus overcome.

Sometimes, however, these realists describe consciousness as a 'searchlight'.[4] The advantage of this analogy for the neo-realist lies in the suggestion that as a light does not modify the object it reveals, so also the mind does not change the object it knows.[5] The analogical conception of consciousness as light is to be found in Indian Philosophy also, in Sankhya and Vedanta in particular. But all neo-realists do not believe like the Indian thinkers that consciousness is a non-physical phenomenon which transcends space and time. On the contrary, the dominant tendency among the American neo-realists is to treat 'consciousness', 'thought', 'subject' etc. as natural phenomena belonging to the space-time world. Most of them adopt the behaviouristic hypothesis and extend it to the explanation of knowledge. The knower or the subject is conceived as an organism that responds to physical stimuli and is selective in its response. Holt sometimes describes consciousness as a 'specific response' to extra-organic objects which by virtue of being thus responded to become the field of objects in consciousness.[1] Consciousness is also sometimes spoken of by him as a cross-section of neutral entities that subsist in the universe, the cross-section being made by the selective response of the organism.[2] This amounts to a complete denial of consciousness by identifying it fully with its objects, placing it in space out there, where objects exist.[3] Montague, however, does not support this behaviouristic theory of consciousness. He holds that consciousness is not behaviour, it is "the relation of self-transcending implication, which the brain-states sustain to their extra-organic causes".

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* p. 476.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 358.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 251.

As we have seen already, all neo-realists accept the theory that perceived objects are directly present to the mind (without any mediating idea). But the process of this direct presentation is differently described by the different writers. According to Holt the extra-organic object is perceived by way of being responded to by the organism. According to Pitkin the external objects produce on the brain some effects which may be called projections of the objects on the brain. Montague points out that to think of perception as a response is to expose oneself to the criticism to which behaviourism is rightly subjected, for treating consciousness as a behaviour. Again, to think that the object is known through its projection on the brain is to hold virtually that we are directly aware of these brain-projections, and not the objects outside. And this would be a lapse into epistemological dualism.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 481. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 371-3. [3] *Ibid.* p. 353.

Holt seems to avoid this dualism sometimes by holding that "the objects of which we are conscious are within the brain"[1] just as the expression on a man's face is really present on his photograph. But this scarcely improves the situation. Montague, therefore, holds that we must admit some sort of "Self-transcending implication which the brain-states sustain to their extra-organic causes". Consciousness is this relation of implication. The brain states which are the effects of an object, imply the object, just as every effect implies its cause. Pitkin points out, however, that this conception of self-transcending implication raises some serious difficulties. Why, for example, should not the effect imply its proximate cause (the physiological state just preceding) rather than a distant cause? And how is it that instead of becoming aware of the immediate neural change we become aware of a distant cause like the object? Moreover, implication does not always become confined to effects and causes, it may be found even between two events not causally connected, such as the triangle and its three angles, where the relation is of whole and parts.

So we find that though all the American neo-realists believe in the direct awareness of a perceived object, and aim at epistemological realism and monism, they cannot find any unanimous solution of the further problem how (psychologically, physiologically and physically) such awareness becomes possible. This failure and lack of unity open the doors to critics like the critical realists who find it easy to overthrow neo-realism. But the greatest difficulty that neo-realism has to face is, as we shall see later, the explanation of error.

The influence of James is quite clearly seen on the neo-realistic theory of consciousness. With their behaviouristic tendency and their attempt to abolish the distinction between acts and objects of consciousness by reducing acts to objects, and both to neutral entities with different offices, neo-realists like Holt differ from the British neo-realists like Moore. In fact Holt openly rejects Moore's "view that consciousness and its objects are distinct existents".[1]

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[1] *The New Realism*, p. 481.

But Holt's objective theory of consciousness, whatever else it may be, is the strict logical outcome of the neo-realist's objective attitude relentlessly pursued. If we must objectively study every reality including consciousness, then what we can grasp of consciousness would be nothing more than its objects. Holt compares, therefore, consciousness to light. Just as when we suppose that we see light we really see nothing but illuminated objects, similarly when we think of consciousness we really have before us nothing but the objects known.

Holt does not, however, consistently sustain this objective attitude all through and sometimes he is found to lapse into old habits of thinking. This explains why he, and Pitkin, sometimes speak of consciousness in terms of activity ('specific response', 'the tendency to adjustment', etc.), and sometimes again in terms of object ('grasp of neutral particulars', 'projection field', etc.), and thus waver, between 'act' and 'object' in their choice of imagery.

We have described in a general way the more important aspects of the American school of neo-realism. In what follows now we shall try to give the gist of each of the six essays in which the six thinkers have attempted to present the most important theories on which their philosophical outlook is based.

(6) *Emancipation of Metaphysics from Epistemology*

Emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology forms, as we saw, a notable feature of neo-realism. This is elaborately shown in the first essay written by W. T. Marvin. He discusses the wrong ideas which lead philosophers to make the theory of knowledge the basis of the theory of reality.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 371.

Since Kant's critical philosophy, epistemology is accorded priority to metaphysics and it is supposed to be fundamental to metaphysics chiefly owing to the following mistaken ideas :—"First, the theory of knowledge is logically prior to all other knowledge; secondly, one can by a direct study of the knowing process infer the limits of possible knowledge; and thirdly, the student of epistemology can give us, independently of all other sciences, a theory of reality".[1]

To remove these wrong ideas it is pointed out by Marvin, "(*a*) first, that the theory of knowledge is one of the special sciences, that it studies knowledge as a natural event and in virtually the same way and by the same methods as biology studies life or physics light; (*b*) secondly, that as a special science, it assumes the formulæ of logic and the results of several special sciences, such as physics and biology; (*c*) and finally, that logic, metaphysics, and some existential sciences are logically prior to the theory of knowledge". In short, "metaphysics is logically prior to the theory of knowledge and that it is not peculiarly indebted to this science either for its problems or for their solution".[2] It is asserted by New Realism on these grounds that "metaphysics is by right free and independent of epistemology and should at once proceed to emancipate itself entirely from the dominion of this science".[3]

It should be borne in mind, however, that behind the apparent reasons explicitly adduced by New Realism for the emanicipation of metaphysics from epistemology, there is one important psychological reason also. It is through the priority of epistemology that metaphysics came to subjective conclusions. By shutting out epistemology, Realism only tries to shut out the possibility of subjectivism.

By rejecting the priority of epistemology, Neo-Realism rejects 'criticism' and is, as Marvin himself admits, "*consciously* and deliberately dogmatic".[4] He remarks, therefore,

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 49.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 50.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 95.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 51 foot-note.

"chiefly and perhaps only in this respect is neo-realism a return to seventeenth century philosophy".[1] i.e., to the precritical days of Descartes and others.

This attitude towards epistemology is not confined only to the New Realist. We find it also in Bergson. Denying the truth of the critical view that the possibility of knowledge can be found only by discussing the theory of knowledge, he holds, "I see only one means of knowing how far I can go: that is by going."[2]

Dogmatism of these modern thinkers should, however, be distinguished from that of the seventeenth century. While the latter is naive or unconscious, the former is conscious and born of the criticism of epistemology itself.

(7) *The Realistic theory of Independence*

We have seen already that what distinguishes realism from idealism is the former's assertion and the latter's denial of the independence of an object of knowledge. Moore tried to refute idealism by showing that consciousness and its object are distinct and should not be regarded either as identical or as inseparable. New Realism similarly "asserts the *independence* of the experienced on the act of experience; or of the sensible and intelligible properties of things on the operation of sensation and intellection."[4]

But the word 'independence is ambiguous: there may be independence of different kinds and degrees. It is, therefore, very necessary to define and understand clearly the notion of independence. R. B. Perry undertakes this task in the second essay of the New Realism under the title 'A Reallistic Theory of Independence'.

Independence means the denial of dependence. We are to understand whether the sort of dependence denied by realism regarding the object of experience is a dependence of the kind of (1) general relation or (2) whole-part relation or (3) exclusive causation or (4) implying or (5) being exclusively implied.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* [2] *Mind-energy*, p. 2.

[3] *Vide* Laird, *Knowledge, Belief and Opinion*, Chap. III, for a more compromising realistic view on 'The Place of Epistemology in Philosophy'.

[4] *The New Realism*, p. 104.

These are the five kinds of relation which, Perry shows by a long discussion, can be said to involve dependence. The whole depends on its parts for its existence, though not *vice versa.* Something causally depends on another if the first is caused or determined only by the second, and can never exist without the second, which is its only cause. The logical relation of implication holds between two propositions, *a* and *b*, when they are so related that if *a* is, *b* is (*e.g.* If a figure is an equilateral triangle, it is equiangular). In such a case there is dependence of *a* on *b*, *in the sense* that *a* cannot be true without *b* being true. If *b* is false, *a* must be false, hence the truth of *a* can be said to depend on that of *b*. But the truth of *b* does not imply the truth of *a* necessarily; hence *b* cannot be said to depend on *a* in the sense in which *a* is dependent on *b*. If however the relation between *a* and *b* is such that *only if a* is, *b* is (*e.g.* only if a triangle is equilateral, it is equiangular), then *b* is implied exclusively by *a*, and its truth then depends on that of *a*. In such a case *b* depends on *a*. Implying and being exclusively implied are then cases which involve dependence. In addition to these four cases of dependence, Perry provisionally agrees to keep general relation also as a plausible case of dependence.

Though Idealism affirms the *dependence* of objects on mind, yet it does not take any pain to define it. To prove dependence idealism thinks it sufficient to show any relation between mind and object. But Realism maintains that "the mere presence of knowledge as a relation cannot be used to argue dependence". To prove that the object of consciousness is dependent on consciousness, one of the four specific kinds of dependence must be shown. Therefore, it must be proved either that the object is a whole which contains consciousness as a part, or that the object implies or is exclusively implied by or exclusively caused by consciousness.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 113 and 117.

Perry points out that there are many objects, simple and complex, internal and external, about which it cannot be shown that they depend on consciousness in any of the above senses. A simple entity is one which cannot be analysed into further component entities. A complex can always be analysed into component elements, which in the ultimate analysis must be simple or partless. It follows, therefore, that while complexes can be treated as wholes depending, for their existence, on the simple elements as their ultimate parts, simples cannot be treated as wholes and cannot be said to depend on any parts. For the same reason we cannot think of a simple entity as being caused, or made by combination of parts, though we can think of a complex object, say a table, as being so made. Moreover, a simple does not imply either another simple, or a complex, for if we are given only a simple object we cannot infer with certainty either the existence of any other simple with which it will co-exist, or any whole which the given simple will make by combining with other simples. If, for example, we are given a term we cannot infer from it either any other term or a proposition. Implication (says Perry following Russell) is essentially a relation between two propositions. Propositions are complexes. Therefore a simple cannot also be implied. Hence it is that dependence, in any of the four tenable senses, is not compatiable with the notion of a simple.

From this general proposition, the specific proposition can be deduced, namely that simples cannot be dependent on the consciousness by which they are known. This conclusion also follows from another consideration. Simple elements are *discovered* by consciousness as it goes on analysing a complex till its analytic activity is stopped, not arbitrarily but by the simplicity of each simple component. This shows that simplicity which resists further analysis and compels the analysing consciousness to stop, cannot be dependent on that consciousness.

Simples of some kind or another must be admitted by all to avoid infinite regress. Empiricists admit simple sensory qualities (*e.g.*, colour, touch, etc.) and rationalists also admit simple categories or 'logical indefinables' (*e.g.* quality, quantity, relation, etc.). It follows, therefore, that there are at least some objects, namely simple ones, which cannot be said to depend on consciousness.

Though this particular negative proposition, 'some objects are not dependent on consciousness', is enough to refute the idealistic universal proposition, 'All objects are dependent on consciousness', Perry does not stop here. He goes on to show further that some complexes also are independent of consciousness.

To give the finishing stroke to idealism, Perry tries to show that even an internal existence, a mental state, or the subject is independent of consciousness in a sense. A mental state or the subject can exist without being known, as there can be consciousness without self-consciousness. This shows that to that extent it is independent of consciousness of the secondary kind.

It should not be thought, however, that Perry wholly denies that there is anything subjective or 'dependent on consciousness'. He stops short of the 'pan-objectivism' which his more enthusiastic neo-realistic colleagues like Holt try to achieve. On the contrary he points out that there are a large number of complexes which owe their existence to the human consciousness—imagination, selection, desire and the like. Among such complexes are to be found mental constructs, values, works of art, history, society, life and reflective thought.[1]

We should remember that all the arguments of Perry to prove independence prove, if accepted, only epistemological realism. They disprove epistemological idealism, not metaphysical idealism, as they only go to show that many objects exist independently of the consciousness which knows them, and that it is, therefore, untrue to say that the existence of every object depends on its being known. But these arguments do neither prove nor disprove the thesis of metaphysical idealism that the nature of an object is spiritual or conscious. Perry's example of the possibility of the existence of the self or a state of consciousness without being made the object of a secondary consciousness, may be cited, for his own purpose, by a metaphysical idealist to prove, from another angle of vision, that though something may be independent of the knowing consciousness, it can still be itself a self or consciousness.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 136-44.

(8) *The Realistic defence of analysis.*

Analysis, the method which Moore spontaneously used for philosophical discussion, becomes consciously chosen, as we have seen, by the American neo-realists as their official method. But this method has been repeatedly condemned, by many ancient and modern thinkers, as incapable of revealing the nature of reality or even as giving a positively false picture of reality. The New Realists find it necessary, therefore, to meet these objections. E. G. Spaulding undertakes this work in the third essay of the volume under the title 'A defense of analysis'.

Spaulding defends "*analysis* as a method of knowing which *discovers* entities or *parts which are real* in quite the same sense *as are the wholes* which are analyzed." This position is called 'Analytical Realism'.[1]

The realistic view, that analysis is *discovery* of independently existing or subsisting parts in wholes. is opposed by mystics like Bergson, Bradley and others.

In general reply to this view Spaulding points out that "all the attacks on analysis are made of methods which themselves involve analysis or are analytical". Hence analysis cannot be condemned *wholesale*, even though it may be rejected in some cases.

Another criticism of analysis is that analysis is not final; the parts analysed may be further analysable. This contention is true. But this does not falsify analysis. Parts, so far found out, are to that extent real parts of the whole.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 155 (our italics).

A third type of criticism is based on the wrong impression that realistic analysis of a whole gives only the terms in which no cognizance is taken of the 'organizing relations'. In reply to such criticism, it is stated that analysis, according to realists, is the process by which the whole is exhausted "up to the end that it reaches", and reveals *not only the parts*, but *also* their properties, "*and* the relation relating the parts, and the possibly specific properties of the whole". So the criticism does not apply to the realist, nor does it affect the value of analysis rightly conceived.

Before condemning analysis wholesale, one should patiently consider if the same criticism applies to all kinds of analysis. There are *two general kinds of analysis*: formal (*i.e.* conceptual) and experimental (*i.e.* material). Examples of the first would be the analysis of the path of a projectile, of the flow of electricity, or of time, etc., where parts are only discovered and left *in situ* without affecting their physical positions. Examples of the second kind are the analysis of chemical compounds actually, not simply mentally, into their components. Though one can say that material analysis distorts reality by actually separating its parts, he cannot say this of formal analysis.

On these and other grounds Spaulding concludes that analysis, as analysis, cannot be condemned as giving a distorted view of reality. If analysis is rightly conceived there is no valid objection against it. On the other hand it is through analysis that philosophers can study reality. The critics of analysis themselves unconsciously use it for their own respective purposes.

(9) ✓ *The Neo-realistic theory of error.*

If, according to the neo-realist, the object known is identical with the object as it is, then how can we explain errors and illusions where surely we cannot assert this epistemological monism. Neo-realism, therefore, owes an explanation of error.

This task is undertaken by two writers. In the fourth essay of the volume, W. P. Montague discusses 'A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error', and in the fifth, E. B. Holt writes on 'The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World'. We shall state their views together under this section. Holt and Montague attempt to explain error; but they come to disagree leaving a permanent rift in the school that began with a unanimous programme, and thus exposing it to the opponent's attack.

Of these two writers Holt is more desperate in his defence. His attempt is to show that error of any kind does not prove the existence of any subjective interference, nor even much of physiological distortion. Error is due to contradictory facts and laws which exist in the objective world. One law says 'up' another says 'down' and the one even reduces the effect of the other to zero. Contradiction which the subjectivist attributes to knowledge or the knowing mind is only a patent fact of the *objective* world.

The difficulty that ordinary people feel in thinking of an illusory object as belonging to the objective world is due to what Holt calls the *"brickbat notion" of physical object*:[1] *i.e.* that an object has some permanent, unvarying predicates which are always true of it under all conditions. "How can the same stick be both straight and bent?" they would ask, because they think that the stick must have only *one* character, which is revealed in ordinary veridical perception. But Holt points out, with the help of his theory of consciousness as selection, that the physical universe contains both the contradictory characters, and the organism or the knower only selects one of these under a particular set of conditions.[2]

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[1] *The New Realism*, p 371.

[1] *Cf.* Russell's theory of objects as systems of perspectives.

But how can two contradictory things be both real, as they must be if they are objective? The reply given by Holt is that both are not real, though both are objective. To be objective and to be real are not the same thing; (for, a mirror image which is objective is not real) and similarly to be false does not mean to be subjective (for, a mirror image which is false is not subjective). A distinction must be observed between reality and objectivity (or subsistence).[1] By reality observes Holt, "we seem to mean the thing most remote from contradiction", though Holt confesses, "As to what reality is, I take no great interest."[2] All things that are objects of knowledge *are* (or subsist), they have 'being' or *subsistence.* No question of reality arises regarding merely subsistent objects. When we assert any proposition about them, the question of truth and falsity arises. No object of knowledge asserts its own reality. It only becomes a content of consciousness. A golden mountain appears as an object of imagination, without there being any assertion of its existence. Assertion of reality may generally co-exist with the object, but the object is different from that assertion, as a term (like 'this object') is from a *proposition* (like 'this object exists').

By analysing different kinds of error in great detail Holt shows that error is not subjective. Errors of space (*e.g.* perceiving a thing farther, nearer, smaller, larger, distorted, double, etc.), errors of time *e.g.* perceiving things earlier, later, etc.), errors concerning secondary qualities (*e.g.* perceiving other shades of colour, touch, etc.) are all examined fully, and it is shown that such illusory experiences are explained by physical and sometimes physiological conditions. Many of these errors can be actually produced by a suitable arrangement of such objective conditions. Therefore, it is gratuitous to suppose that such errors are produced by the subject or knowing mind. Subjectivism is not established in any way by illusory experience.

The New Realism, p. 367 and 258.
Ibid. p. 366.

If one asks: "How can realism pretend to assert the reality of the colour, sound, and so forth which are vividly present in the dreams of a person sleeping, it may be, in a box no bigger than his coffin?", Holt would reply as follows: "Realism, I say, can assert this because the nervous system even when unstimulated from without, is able to generate within itself nerve-currents of those frequencies whose density factor is the same as in ordinary peripheral stimulation."[1] So even hallucinations are explained without the assumption of subjectivity.

But, it may be asked, are not the errors of thought subjective? In reply, Holt asserts that "*all errors are cases of contradiction or contrariety.* One has met error who has experienced that A is B, and that the same A is not B"[2] "A thought, then, which negates another thought is neither more nor less significant than a physical law which negates another law. The problem of error, as that of 'reality', is in no way involved in the problem of knowledge."[3]

An explanation of this last astonishing remark is found in Holt's statement, "But the experiencing (of an error) is not the significant fact, and that all errors are knowledge is true merely by definition, since contrariety or contradiction is called 'error' only when it occurs in some person's field of consciousness. The actual problem in the contradiction or contrariety itself: What is he significance of a universe that holds such things?" In short, he asserts that even the objects of erroneous thinking have a place in the all-inclusive universe of subsistence or objectivity, as they are *objects* of some consciousness. They are selected by thought out of that universe of objects. They are called erroneous just because they do not harmonize with other objects, similarly selected, to which thought tries to relate them.

Holt concludes that all contents of consciousness are objects that *subsist* in the universe, though all may not

Ibid, p. 352. *Ibid*, p. 361.
Ibid, p. 365-6.

be real. This position is not opposed to Realism. For, according to Holt "*the gist of realism is not* to insist that everything is real, far from it, but to insist that everything that is, is and is as it is".[1] What realism insists on is "that every content, whether term or proposition, real or unreal, subsists of its own right in the *all-inclusive universe of being;* it has being as any mathematical or physical term, or proposition has being; and that this being is not subjective in its nature".[2]

Naturally enough this view does not find support even from all the other colleagues. Montague submits a note of dissent on Holt's theory of consciousness and that of error. He rejects the behaviouristic tendency of Holt's realism. He also rejects Holt's suggestion that "contradictions are objective and related after the manner of opposing forces", and hence rejects also the conclusion "that these objective contradictions constitute the content of an erroneous experience and cause its occurrence". "The unreal object or content of an error," Montague says, "*subsists* extramentally but it does not contribute in any causal manner to its being apprehended. It is the nature of the unreal, or merely subsistent, to be sterile of consequences. It can be known but it cannot cause itself to be known, and apart from being known it has no efficiency. The non-existent bent stick cannot cause us to perceive it, but an existent straight stick, partly immersed in water, can produce, by reason of the different refracting powers of water and air, an effect upon the eye and brain of the same kind as would have been produced by a stick that was really bent, with the result that a non-existent bent stick becomes the object of an (erroneous) apprehension."[3] The brain-state, the effect, makes us aware of its cause, the external object, by the process of self-transcending implication. Every object has this power of self-transcendence and can thereby point to its effect, cause and co-existent objects.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 359, (our italics).

[2] *Ibid*, p. 366, (our italics).

[3] *Ibid*, p. 481.

To understand this theory of Montague the following consideration will be helpful. That a cause takes our mind to its effect, an effect to its cause, and any object to coexistent objects, is commonly admitted by all. At the sight of dark lowering clouds we think of rain, on hearing the hooting of a horn we think of a motor car, at the sight of the head of a man peeping through the window we think of the other parts of his body. In all these cases the mind passes from one object to another beyond it. There is, therefore, transcendence which is but another name for passing beyond. But how is this to be explained? The common, philosophical view, as for example, Locke's, explains this transcendence as being due to mind's power of association of ideas with ideas. The mind associates the idea of the cloud with that of rain, and when the one arises in the mind the other also is revived. But a realist, who likes to explain things more by objects and their properties than by the mind, points out that there must be something in the very nature of the cloud itself which makes us think of the rain, why, otherwise, should not a mouse make us think of the rain? That is to say, our ordinary speech is literally true, when we say the cloud reminds me of, or takes my mind to, the rain. If this is admitted then Montague's theory also is admitted in its essence. For the plain version of his technical expression, 'every event has self-transcending implication', is that every event has the power to imply (or make us think of) some other event—beyond itself. Montague only tries to work out the full logical implication of the common belief in a realistic way supporting it with some plausible physical and physiological hypothesis.

Montague tries to explain error realistically without supposing any subjective or ideal interference, simply with the help of physical and physiological conditions.

The knowledge situation is conceived by Montague as an 'epistemological triangle"[1] the three corners of which are the three elements, namely (1) the actual external object (Oe), (2) the cerebral state generated (Oc) and (3) the object perceived (Op). Now the second (Oc) implies (*i.e.*, makes us aware of) the third (Op). In simple cases, if the same effect (Oc) is caused only by the cause (Oe), then from the effect we may correctly know, by implication, its cause (Oe). Here Op and Oe will be identical. But it may be that the same effect is due to different causes in different cases. In such cases Op is not necessarily the same as Oe, and error may, consequently, arise. Montague, therefore, says: "*The source of error in other words is due to the plurality of causes* and to the counteraction of effects."[1]

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[1]. *Ibid*, p. 286.

We find, then, that according to Montague error consists in the misleading suggestion given by a brain state (which is producible under different physical and physiological conditions by different physical objects) as to the particular physical object which has caused it in a particular case. The bent stick lying entirely on the ground, and with normal physiological conditions, gives rise to a brain-state which is also produced by a straight stick partly immersed in water and the same physiological conditions. In both cases our mind is led from the brain-state to a bent stick as the external cause. The first would be a case of knowledge, the second of error.

(10) *The Realistic implications of biology*

"The strongest influences against realism today emanate from the biological sciences," says W. B. Pitkin, the writer of the sixth essay, 'Some realistic implications of biology.' Hence the realist must consider the evidence of biology for and against his creed.

Three kinds of thinkers try to disprove, he observes, realism in different ways by biological arguments. The first line of attack is represented by Hans Driesch's Gifford lectures, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, where he tries to show that life can be explained as dominated by mind. His theory is *idealistic vitalism*. The second line of attack is found in Bergson, who 'proceeds from psychology to biology', and interprets life processes in the light of the immediate data of consciousness, as a continuous flux, the expression of a 'vital force' that can be inwardly intuited. The philosophy of Dewey follows the third line. He is partly realistic, in so far as he grants the reality of the biological situation consisting of the agent, environment and reaction; and also regards perception as a natural event which is not created by the perceiver. But higher forms of knowledge, theories, ideas, etc., are, according to him, constructions of the thinker.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 298, (our italics).

Pitkin tries to refute these anti-realistic interpretations of biology by advancing a constructive realistic theory of life-processes. He tries to explain the different aspects of these processes in terms of objective physical laws and physical factors. He wants to show thereby that no idealistic or vitalistic or purposive explanation of life is necessary.

All the anti-realistic explanations of life, he points out, are based on the assumption that every organic reaction somehow transforms the stimulus qualitatively. He analyses reaction into different kinds, *e.g.*, adjustment, selection, conduction, resistance, reception, retention, etc., and shows by examples that nowhere qualitative transformation can be proved to exist. On the contrary, the cause can be in most cases traced in the effect. The specific theory that in perception the organism changes the stimulus and, therefore, the percept cannot be identical with its physical cause remains, therefore, unproved.

The theory of internal relation, which is the basis of most anti-realistic views, is generally based on the analogy of organic relation. Pitkin shows that the "doctrine of 'internal' relations finds absolutely no confirmation in biology. This is the irony of fate; for those who accept the doctrine build it into a metaphysic which they call 'organic'." Such a conception is based on a popular idea of the inseparability of a part from a living whole (*e.g.*, the heart from the body). But facts of the following kind discovered by experimental zoology and surgery oppose this popular belief.

(1) "R. G. Harrison grafted the anterior half of a frog of one species on to the posterior half of a specimen of another species, and has successfully reared young frogs from the combination. Each half preserved the peculiarities of its species, and *there was no trace of any mutual influence between the halves.*" This shows that organic parts do not necessarily depend upon the whole.

(2) "Many animals possess an astonishing regenerative power. Cut off a fish's tail, and a new one grows; and oddly enough, the larger piece you remove, the more rapid the new growth—within certain limits of course." This would show that organic wholes can dispense with some parts, and do not depend upon all individual parts for their total specific organic character.

For the explanation of perception in an objective way, Pitkin chooses the analogy of projection, and in all seriousness pushes the analogy by attempting to apply the geometrical laws of projection to the projection of objects in perception. He utilizes this hypothesis for a realistic explanation of error. The essence of this elaborate attempt of his is that as an object is observed to cast many different kinds of shadows on a screen, by laws of projection, under different objective conditions and some of these projections may be distorted out of all similarity with the original object, in the same way it is possible to understand how an object can, by the laws of projection, generate a percept on the percipient organism, and how some of these percepts may be distorted by objective conditions even without any subjective interference.

This projection theory of perception may be a plausible hypothesis so far as visual percepts are concerned. But one is left in doubt as to how it can be extended to other kinds of perception, and how Pitkin would explain with its help errors of touch, sound, smell, etc., and the errors of mediate knowledge.

The behaviouristic tendency of neo-realism, found in Holt, is also observable in Pitkin as he tries to replace consciousness by the objective imagery of 'projection field'. But his theory of projection is not accepted even by all of his colleagues.

(11) *The self-refuting aspects of neo-realism*

We have tried to present in the foregoing pages the neo-realistic philosophy in all its important aspects, placing ourselves, as far as we could, at its own point of view. The brief criticism which we shall attempt now will be also from the neo-realistic point of view—a kind of self-criticism. The question that we shall ask ourselves here is not how far this philosophy is consistent with other systems of philosophy, but how far it is self-consistent in working out its self-chosen programme, methods and assumptions, and in criticising its opponents.

We may judge it first in the light of its programme. It has honestly tried to stick to a major part of it in respect, for example, of (a) analysis and "exhaustive examination" of topic, (b) regard for logical form, (c) division of a question into the different questions it involves. But regarding two very vital points, namely, the scrupulous use of words and clear definition of words used, it proves disappointing. The disappointment is all the greater because it criticized its opponents so bitterly for not observing these rules and thereby raised high hopes.

'Consciousness', 'Reality', 'Subjective'—all key words on which the soundness of realism hangs—are used in a way not at all consistent with the rules of the game laid down by neo-realism itself. We have observed already the different meanings in which consciousness is used—not only by the different thinkers—but also by the same thinker in course of the same essay. We have also seen that Holt who discusses error shows an explicit reluctance to define reality without reference to which error can scarcely be understood. Again we find that he uses the word 'subjective' (*e.g.*, 'being is not subjective'), but says he "can attach no meaning" to it.

Emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology also formed an important item in the programme of new realism.

But when we find that the neo-realist replaces the simple commonsense view of the physical world by a highly complicated one just to suit his monistic epistemology, we feel again that he is acting against his own counsel.

We may see next how far neo-realism has itself avoided the fallacies it discovered in idealism. The fallacy of exclusive particularity and that of definition by initial predication, both of which are found to vitiate the exclusive subjectivistic outlook, can equally be traced in the exclusive objectivism of the neo-realist. From the fact that objects known to us happen to be objects of knowledge we cannot conclude that they must be only objects and cannot also be themselves subjects. In his one-sided objectivism the neo-realist then commits the fallacy of exclusive particularity. The attempt to define all things including consciousness in the objective way, and to adopt the objective method as the only method for the discovery of truth because man is primarily objective in attitude, can be shown to involve the fallacy of definition by initial predication.

The fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament, it is true, vitiates subjectivism. It is true again that this argument consists in taking advantage of a methodological difficulty. But while the neo-realist accuses his opponent of this blunder, he himself forgets the lesson it teaches. He sees only one side of the predicament and ignores the other. The predicament that the knowledge situation involves is, on the one hand, the difficulty that we cannot point to or mention anything except what has become *related to an ego*, and on the other it is also the difficulty that we cannot point to or mntion anything except what becomes the *object* of knowledge. Perry notices only the first half of the predicament and points out that it is unfair for the idealist to argue from this that nothing exists without being the object of such knowledge. But the idealist can point out on the other hand that the neo-realist commits the opposite fallacy by arguing from the other side of the predicament that since nothing can be mentioned or pointed out except what is an object of knowledge, objects are the only kinds of reality that exist. He can imitate the realist's phrase and name the neo-realists' blunder 'the argument from the objecto-centric predicament'.

In all fairness it must be admitted of course that the theory of neutral reality tries to do some justice to both sides. But the attempt to explain consciousness away in terms of objects shows that neutralism has not taken full possession of the neo-realistic mind.

One stock criticism of idealism repeated by Perry and other neo-realists is that idealism propounds a truism in holding that objects known to exist cannot exist unknown. But one is surprised to find, after this, a neo-realist like Holt announcing with great polemic zeal that the gist of realism is "to insist that everything that is, is and is as it is".[1] The offended idealist gets here a chance to exclaim "Two blatant truisms rolled into one!"

Idealistic philosophy is nicknamed 'obliteration philosophics',[2] since it explains the world away. But the picture of the world that Holt draws obliterates no less the world of common sense, and gives his opponent again a chance to return the compliment.

In all these respects then the neo-realist fails to follow the maxims he would like his opponents to learn. Of the fallacies mentioned by him, that of exclusive particularity is the most fundamental. If its subtle and far-reaching implications were understood and followed as is done, for example, in the Jaina Philosophy of India, the neo-realist would have been catholic enough to entertain the possibility of other points of view, and would have been less aggressive, and more tolerant. The psychological reason for these shortcomings perhaps is that his sole thought is to overthrow idealism, rather than evolve a self-consistent system of philosophy.

But even if all these defects be ignored, there still remains the sense of disappointment that with all its

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[1]. *The New Realism*, p. 359.

[2]. *Ibid*, p. 356.

'scientific' and 'logical' tactics neo-realism fails of its ultimate purpose, the saving of realism. The pan-objectivism which it invents to defeat subjectivism reduces the physical world into a chimera of real and unreal objects. Both idealism and commonsense realism are thus involved in a common ruin.

If we remember, however, that neo-realism is the first attempt to uproot a powerful and deeprooted philosophy, we can understand why it should display so much zeal and vigour, and occasionally hold some one-sided and extreme views, on which some of its youthful exponents, now in their sixties, look back with amusement.[1]

6. The American Critical Realism

(1) *The Reaction against Neo-realism*

The Essays in Critical Realism written jointly by seven American philosophers (Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars and Strong) presents a criticism of American neo-realism and also contains constructive suggestions of great importance. The critical realists try to avoid epistemological idealism on the one hand and the defects of neo-realism on the other, by developing a theory of realism based on epistemological dualism, the three-factor theory of knowledge.

Neo-realism set out with the plea of defending common-sense realism. But the theory of 'subsistence' and 'pan-objectivity' which it puts forward in order to refute subjectivism is far removed from the common-sense view of the world. Common-sense realism believes that objects perceived are *real*, they are not merely subsistents but existents. Besides, common-sense does not admit that objects, imagined, dreamt, fancied, disbelieved and incapable of being conceived belong to the same objective universe like objects of uncontradicted perception. Common-sense does distinguish between the physical object and the imaginary one; and the physical world according to it contains only the former kind.

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[1] *Vide Philosophy*, April, 1937. 'The Story of American Realism' by Montague, and 'Contemporary British Realism' by Laird.

[2] See *ante*, Section 8 of this Chapter.

The epistemological monism of some of the neo-realists makes it necessary, as Lovejoy points out, "to crowd into the so-called physical world all the weird and jarring creatures of hallucination, delirium, dream, illusion, and imagination, until that world became the objectified sum of all nightmares, where tables, trees, ghosts, gorgons and hydras and chimeras dire, straight sticks that are bent and round coins that are elliptical, things present and things to come, the drunkard's pink rats and the physicist's colourless atoms and electrons, all dwell together in the same space and time, when no man perceives them".[1] In short, neo-realism "while nominally preaching a return to naive-realism, in fact adhered to a highly sophisticated metaphysical theory".[2]

Similarly neo-realism comes into conflict with Science to satisfy which it is so eager. Physics speaks of the finite velocity of light. From this it follows that light takes some time in passing from the object seen to the observer. Therefore, what is seen is an object of a previous moment, and not identical with a present physical object. So the epistemological monism of the neo-realist (that is that, what is perceived is identical with a present physical object) cannot be maintained. The object cannot also be said to be directly perceived as it belongs to a past moment. The object of the previous moment is not necessarily the same as that of the present, for it may have changed its qualities.

To avoid this difficulty, some British supporters of monism like Dawes Hicks would hold that "the wave motions, the retinal image, the nerve change, the cerebral disturbance" are of course necessary conditions of visual perception, but "the conditions involved in the genesis of the cognitive act" are not identical with "the conditions involved in that act's relation to the object".[1] In short, Hicks contends that because light starts from an object earlier, it does not follow necessarily that we should know the object of the earlier moment and not the object of the present moment. Such defence of monism would lead to conclusions that would subvert the laws of physics and astronomy. For, if the stimulus of the earlier moment can give us information of the object as existing in a subsequent moment, it would mean that if (during the time lapsing between the starting of the stimulus and its reaching the observer) the object has changed its colour, say from blue to red, or has altogether become extinct, the observer will perceive this present state, not the previous one. But this means that the stimulus of a blue kind can excite a sensation of red, and stimulus of an existing object can inform us of the extinction of the object. Thus the causal connection between stimulus and sensation becomes altogether quixotic.

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[1] *The Revolt against Dualism*, p. 76.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 55.

Such then are the absurdities to which the epistemological monism of the neo-realists is logically led.

In addition to its conflict with both common sense and Science, Neo-Realism fails to achieve its chief object, namely the replacing of the dualism of the mental and the non-mental by a monistic 'pan-objectivism' (to use Lovejoy's phrase). There are two main ways of proving monism. Some neo-realists—the American mostly—try to show that the so-called subjective phenomena, like dream objects, illusory appearances, etc., are not made of the subjective stuff of fancy, but belong to the same physical world as percepts and are equally objective; they are, of course, entities subsisting *in addition* to ordinary physical objects. This is the position, we have seen, supported by Holt. Against this view Lovejoy points out: (1) The dream objects and illusory appearances are *private* and *not public* like ordinary physical objects, and it is difficult to assign to them the objectivity of ordinary physical objects. (2) They do not obey physical laws operating in the physical space-time world. (3) The admission of such additional entities would reduce the physical world to a fantastic one, not acceptable to any science.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 68.

Again, there are other neo-realists like Alexander and Laird who would believe that the so-called subjective phenomena, though belonging to the physical world, are not additions to ordinary physical objects; they are only dislocated parts of these physical objects. Alexander says: "The world of illusion *is the same* as what we call the real world, but dislocated, its parts taken from their proper places and referred amiss. That dislocation is the mind's own work. Illusion is due to the intrusion of the mind's own idiosyncrasies into the apprehension of reality. But it *does not create*, but only *rearranges* what is already there......... Thus all the materials of illusory percepts are real."[1]

But this attempt also raises serious difficulties, as Lovejoy points out: What is the exact meaning of 'dislocation' or 'referring amiss' in respect of physical objects? Is it a psychological act or a physical one? It cannot be a physical act. For then we have to suppose that when one dreams an object made out of parts of two physical objects, either the parts have been physically removed from their old places, or that the parts while existing in their old places, can exist in the places to which mind refers them. Both these alternatives are absurd. Dislocation and re-arrangement cannot, therefore, be a physical act; it must be a kind of mental duplication of physical characters. But this would mean a lapse into a dualism of the physical and the mental, and negation of the attempted identity between the so-called subjective and the physical.

Neo-realism thus fails to achieve its objective, and the failure is hastened, and in a way acknowledged, by some members of the school, like Montague, who resorts to the three-factor theory of knowledge or what he calls the 'epistemological triangle', distinguishing the cerebral act from the object perceived and the latter again from the external object. Critical Realism of the American group only continues and develops this dissenting tendency.

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[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, pp. 216-7 (our italics).

The failure of epistemological monism paves the way for a return to epistemological dualism. The critical realists assert that the identity of the object perceived with the physical object is untenable. Even Mr. Russell, once an epistemological monist, admits, with his characteristic open-mindedness, in one of his later writings that the falsity of epistemological monism is "as certain as anything in Science can hope to be".[1] He even comes to believe that the perceived phenomena are very often only 'convenient' fictions—mere 'constructs', which do not reveal to us the world as conceived, for example, by subatomic physics.

The chief problem for Critical Realism is the explanation of perception. Critical realists explain external perception as a result of the interrelation of three factors: (a) a physical object, (b) a psychical state and (c) a datum. What we are directly in touch with in perception is not the physical object, but the datum, which is the content of the perceiving mind. The datum acts, therefore, as a mediator between the subject and the physical object. The identity of the perceived object and the physical one is, therefore, denied by the critical realists. Memory disproves the identity between the content and the object. As Rogers says: "Now, how are we going to render plausible the claim that when I remember a past object, the object is there bodily and identical with the memory?"[2] Critical realism is thus epistemological dualism.

Truth and falsity are conveniently explained by this doctrine as agreement and disagreement, respectively, between the datum and the object.

The epistemological dualism of the critical realists attempts to steer clear of the difficulties arising on the one hand from subjectivism which reduces the physical object to the mere datum, and on the other hand from neo-realism which reduces the datum to the physical object or ultimate reality. It avoids, therefore, both subjectivism and objectivism.

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[1] *The Analysis of Matter*, p. 196.
[2] *The Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 130.

Having discussed the difficulties of neo-realism and the general scheme of the critical theory of knowledge we shall now try to give the gist of each of the seven essays contributed by the writers of the co-operative volume, *The Essays in Critical Realism.* We shall find how the different authors try to prove, explain and maintain critical realism in all its aspects.

(2) *The Approach to Critical Realism*

In his essay with this title Durant Drake shows how the theory of critical realism arises out of the existing views.

He observes that there are two familiar starting points for knowledge, the objective and the subjective. According to the first, we can start from the physical existents, because they are the data directly given in experience. According to the second, what are directly given in experience are the mental states, not the external objects. But neither of these "correctly describes what we have to start with, what is given" in immediate experience. Critical realism exposes the error in each of these views and points out a third view which combines the insight of both.

(a) *Refutation of subjectivism.* (i) It is doubtful if pure subjectivism is really accepted by any one. Belief in unexperienced objects, as also in the independent existence of experienced objects, is universal. (ii) We instinctively feel that the data of perception are the characters of real objects, and react to them even in sleep "as if they had an existence of their own." (iii) This instinctive belief in the physical world is practically inevitable, and is pragmatically justifiable. (iv) Subjectivism is confined to what appears in experience. It can only describe such appearance, but cannot explain it. It cannot answer "Why should our sense-data appear and disappear and change just as they do in the abrupt fashion?" (v) If a subjectivist believes in other minds external to his, he should, for the same reason, believe also in external objects; or he should be a complete sceptic and cease to believe everything other than his mind. (vi) Even if it is assumed that the data are mental states, it does not follow that there is no other kind of existence as Perry's discussion on the egocentric predicament has shown.

(b) *Refutation of objectivism.* (1) Objectivism is falsified by the many examples where it is found that the data are not only adequate aspects of external objects but also very different from what is believed to belong to objects. (ii) The mechanism of perception on which epistemological monism and objectivism of the neo-realist are based is mainly of two alternative forms as we find, for example, in the selection theory of Holt and the projection theory of Pitkin, respectively. According to the first, all the qualities which we seem to see in objects are really there, we only select some at a time. This theory is untenable. When a colour is seen by you and me from the same side of an object, ether-waves from the object themselves come and affect our organisms, *we do not select them* to affect the organisms. If there are different effects on the two persons, it can be explained as due to differences produced in the organisms. The differing sense-data cannot be said then to belong to objects outside us. According to the projection theory, the "sense-data are produced by organism, and spatially projected into the object at the moment of perception". This theory lacks evidence. We do not know of any projection mechanism in the organism. "Perception is a one-way process proceeding from the outer source of radiation to the organism." But if 'project' means 'imagine something out there', then we cannot say that the projected quality is really there.

So we find that neither of the two theories can really justify the monistic view that objects are there just as perceived. Objectivism fails to explain perception.

(c) *Objections to the neo-realistic conceptions of the world.* Following the implicit logical implications of naive realism, neo-realists like Holt reach an absurd conception of the physical world. It is held that all the contradictory appearances we have in perception really belong to the world. Holt tries to justify this position by asserting that the physical world is actually made of contradictory objective contents and cites the examples of forces and laws which oppose one another. Drake points out that "opposition of forces or laws is not really a case of contradiction; these laws or forces are really but *tendencies*, which are not *actualized* simultaneously."[1] Though one law says, 'Up' and another says, 'Down', they never make an object go up and down at the same time. Mixtures of opposite forces produce one kind of quality or effect at the same time. The existence of diverse incompatible sense-data in the physical world is, therefore, unproved.

(d) *The status of sense-data.* Criticising the subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of the data of perception Drake states his own view.

The existing object as such does not get within our consciousness. We only immediately apprehend some characters or data and *imagine* them to be out there, and implicitly believe them to be existing in objects. This imagination is immediate, and, therefore, not a kind of inference. In *this* sense alone objects can be said to be directly perceived, perception being a kind of instinctive imagination.

This dualistic view that objects experienced are not identical with objects existing has the advantage of being able to explain all kinds of consciousness such as conception, memory and introspection uniformly. The monistic view fails to explain how in memory a past extinct object can actually be identical with the present datum of memory, or to explain how the other side of the moon can actually be identical with the thought of it.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

(e) *Mental states versus Data.* Drake tries to show why mental states, in addition to objects, data and organisms, must be admitted and also what the relation among these is.

Mental states must be admitted to exist because nothing except consciousness can make us aware of the data. A brain state cannot reveal the data, because it is itself unconscious. The data must be different from the brain state since we cannot think that these states are red or round while the data are so. The data must also be different from the mental states because one and the same essence or datum can be revealed by different mental states such as vivid sensation, faint sensation, memory. The data cannot be regarded as qualities of mental states, since when we have for the perceptual datum a character complex like "a round-wheel-about-three-feet-in-diameter-moving-away-from-me-and-now-between-this-house-and-the-next", the mental state cannot be regarded as round, etc.

(3) *Pragmatism versus the Pragmatist*

Arthur C. Lovejoy tries to show, in an essay with the above title, that true pragmatism is realistic and it is quite in harmony with critical realism. But the spirit of pragmatism is not realized by all pragmatists. They give diverse accounts of pragmatism. This confusion is mainly due to two conflicting motives being mixed up by James who tries to be both an anti-idealist (or realist) and radical empiricist. The 'fundamental and essential insight of pragmatism' is found in Dewey's description of pragmatism as "a philosophy of man as agent, and as reflective agent, in a physical and social environment". This is obviously realistic implying, as it does, a belief in a real objective situation in which man is placed and is required to adjust himself.

But this legitimate realistic basis is blurred by the identification of pragmatism with James's radical empiricism which holds that philosophy "must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced".[1] The strict logical consequence of this empiricism is denial of all non-experienceable or trans-experimental objects (such as past existents, other selves, unperceived objects) and confinement to experience of the present moment. All this is opposed to the realistic foundation of pure pragmatism.

Lovejoy points out that it is this influence of radical empiricism which makes pragmatism, even in Dewey, exclude retrospection from the pale of knowledge. "How can the present belief jump out of its skin and dive into the past?"—asks Dewey. Consequently all knowledge, worth the name, is, for him, of the nature of anticipation; and the past, "the finished and the done with is of import as affecting the future". Lovejoy points out that this view confuses between import and important. The past may not be important, but this does not make it devoid of import or meaning.

Lovejoy tries to show what true pragmatism, unmixed with empiricism, should recognize. It should admit:

"(a) That all 'instrumental knowledge' is, or at least includes and requires, 'presentative' knowledge, a representation of not present existents by present data;

(b) That, pragmatically considered, knowledge is thus necessarily and constantly conversant with entities which are existentially 'transcendent' of the knowing experience, and frequently with entities which transcend the total experience of the knower;

(c) That if a real physical world having the characteristics set forth by natural science is assumed, certain of the contents of experience, and specially the contents of anticipation and retrospection, cannot be assigned to that world, and must therefore be called 'psychical' (that is experienced, but not physical) entities;

(d) That knowledge is mediated through such psychical existences and would be impossible without them."[2]

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[1] *James, Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 42.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 76.

Lovejoy remarks, therefore, "the doctrine commonly put forward as 'pragmatism' may be said to be a changeling, substituted almost in the cradle. I have here had the privilege of proclaiming the rightful heir and pointing out the marks of identity. I invite all loyal retainers to return to their allegiance. If they will do so, they will, I think, find that there need be—and, over the issues which have been here considered, can be no quarrel between their house and that of critical realism."[1]

(4) *Critical Realism and the Possibility of Knowledge*

James Bisset Pratt gives under this title a lucid account of critical realism in all its important aspects.

Pratt begins the discussion with an historical survey pointing out that "some sort of dualistic theory of mind and its objects has been common since the dawn of human thinking". Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Kant all held it in some form or another. But exaggerated dualism, specially in the latter thinkers, paved the way for idealism and scepticism, always at the cost of common sense realism. Neo-realism tries, therefore, to replace dualism by monism with a view to rescue realism. It shows that there are no ideas at all. We know objects, not through ideas, but directly. Hence there is no room for either idealism or scepticism or agnosticism.

In spite of its great service, neo-realism fails to explain error and many other things, because it fails to distinguish the three necessary factors of knowledge, namely, mental states (like sensations), their meanings (data), and existing objects (like physical objects). Neo-realism abolishes the distinction between psychical states and physical objects, and fails to convince common sense. Critical realism tries to avoid the mistakes of neo-realism as well as the exaggerated dualism of Locke's type.

Pratt then undertakes an analysis of conception and perception to show how Locke and the neo-realists are mistaken, the former in denying knowledge of external objects, the latter in identifying data with external objects and in ignoring psychical states altogether.

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[1] *Ibid*, pp.80-81.

(a) *Analysis of Conception.* In conceiving anything the following three factors are involved. (i) We have "a collection of revived images of various sorts—visual, auditory, verbal, with various slight kinaesthetic sensations due to incipient tendencies to reaction." But these images are not the same in every thinker. If different thinkers are asked to think of the same object, say, a square table, they will have different images of the object. (ii) Even though these images or psychic states are different, all will convey the same meaning, as all will stand for the square table. Therefore a distinction must be made between the meaning of the mental states and these states themselves. The states are discovered by introspection, the meanings are *directly* given or conveyed by these states. In conception, the states are the machinery of thinking which reveals meanings. As directly given, meanings can be called data. (iii) In addition to these two factors, there is present in conception (especially of physical objects and very faintly in logical ones) an outer reference.

Thus, "When I think of the moon I can distinguish (i) images of various sorts; (ii) a meaning or datum not to be identified with my introspectively discovered images; and (iii) a conscious outer reference of this datum (not of the images) to a point of space thousands of miles distant from the earth."[1]

(b) *Analysis of Perception.* All these factors are also present in perception, though it needs a little introspection and reasoning to discover them. First, sensations or psychic states can be distinguished, here also, from their meanings. "It is a commonplace of psychology that one perceives a table-top as having four right angles, but that the sensuous images by which one perceives it are of obtuse and acute angles. The characters meant and the characters sensed in perception are thus by no means identical, although it must be noted that the two groups come much nearer to coinciding than they do in conception. In most cases of perception, except that of the visual type, in fact, *all* the *sensed* qualities are included within those *meant*, though even here the two groups do not absolutely coincide, since the qualities which we mean usually extend out beyond those which we sense."[1] In pure sensation, if any, there is only feeling, "we simply live through or have experience", there is no meaning, and hence no datum. Thus sensuous *image and meaning are distinguishable* in perception, though here they tend to be fused together.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 91.

Again, we can distinguish between the datum and outer reference (the attribution of the datum to some existent outer object). Outer reference "may be regarded as a part of the datum or meaning of perception, but is an easily distinguishable part". This is proved by the fact that in cases of "pseudo-hallucination", we may "have the full quota of psychic images with their perfectly definite meaning or datum, and yet not attribute this datum to any existent spatial object".[2] (In day dreams, it may be noted, we have images with meanings, but no belief in, or reference to, external existing objects.)

Image, meaning and outer reference are thus found in perception also. Following naive realism or common sense, neo-realism identifies the datum with the object: "but there is no reason why common sense, which is merely primitive philosophy, should have the final decision". "Various important considerations, moreover, such as the differences between the data of different perceivers and between those of the same perceiver at different times, and the facts of error and illusion, force the serious thinker to modify considerably the snap judgment of common sense."

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid*, p. 92.

(c) *The possibility of knowledge.* Pratt considers then the possible charge that critical realism makes knowledge impossible. It is said that as this theory does not admit that objects are identical with the data but holds that the objects transcend the data, objects are not grasped by the mind at all; knowledge is thus impossible. How can mind go beyond its content to know the object! Pratt points out that *transcendence must be admitted,* on the evidence of experience, to be an undeniable fact about the mind.

The monist who holds that the mind can know only its own content, and therefore, thinks that the object, to be known, must be the content of the mind, virtually holds that the mind can know only what is within it. 'An undesirable conclusion would follow from this position, namely that the mind does not know anything external to it. Denial of the mind's power of transcendence, rather than the admission of it, is thus found to lead one to scepticism. In accepting transcendence "critical realism simply writes down transcendence as one of the facts of the world, just as the physicist writes down X-rays as a special sort of fact." In referring to past or future events, experience of others, in inferring things not within the contents of present mental states, etc., one must admit that the mind goes beyond or transcends its own present contents. When the doctor knows the headache of his patient from the latter's description, it would be absurd to think that the headache existing in the patient becomes a content of the doctor's mind, this would mean that he himself gets headache. The possibility of knowledge is then understood as soon as mind's power of transcendence is recognized.

(d) *Is Perception Direct or Indirect?* Even if knowledge is possible, the critic may say, it must be indirect if the object as such is never present to the mind. Is not perception also indirect then? Pratt answers that whether perception is direct or indirect will depend upon what is meant by 'direct perception'. If 'direct perception' means "the identification of object with content, then certainly, for the critical realist perception is not direct." But such identification having already been shown to be improbable, the only tenable sense of 'direct perception' is perception of the object with the help of the datum. The underlying reason for calling such perception indirect is that the critic thinks that the datum being present directly in the mind *it* must be said to be directly perceived. and so the *object*, which is perceived *through* this datum, cannot also be said to be perceived directly. But this is a misunderstanding. *The datum itself is not perceived as such*, it only makes the object perceived (just as eye-glasses are not seen, but the object is seen through them). The existence of some medium or instrument, such as the sense organ, the nervous system, is admitted to be necessary for direct perception even by the neo-realist. The critical realist only adds two more factors to this list of instruments necessary for perception, *viz.* the mental state and the datum. This difference does not make perception indirect. But if in spite of this the critic persists in calling perception, as conceived by the critical realist, indirect, the latter would not "quarrel with the designation".

(e) *How knowledge is tested.* Another question asked about the critical view of knowledge is, "Since the object is no part of psychic content, how can we be sure that we are not mistaken?" Pratt answers, "When the question arises whether one's perception is veridical or illusory, critical realism points out that one has several practical tests which taken together are sufficiently decisive and trustworthy. First, one appeals from one of the senses to the others. If they mutually confirm one another, the veridical nature of our perception is strongly probable. But we need not rest satisfied with that. One may appeal to other persons. For a still further test one watches the supposed object function. If it works out consistently with all the rest of one's experience, and with the experience of all other observers, one concludes finally that it is no illusion, that one is dealing with an existent object." Coincidences of the results of so many different tests cannot be explained away as so many mere chance coincidences, except by "a mad lover of doubt".

(f) *How the existence of external objects can be established.* If external objects are never grasped by the mind directly, how can we be at all sure that they really exist? The tests described may show that our knowledge works; but that gives no guarantee that objects supposed by knowledge do really exist. To answer this doubt Pratt shows that belief in the existence of external objects is instinctive and spontaneous. But this instinctive faith is also justifiable by a reasoning of the following kind. "The task of Philosophy is to construe the facts of experience in the most reasonable manner, and the construction which the solipsist gives to them must surely be called fanciful in the extreme. To refer to no other aspects of the situation, the fact that each one of us finds such large masses of information, so many answers to questions, so much resistance to one's efforts, such new experiences, from what appears to be an outside and independent world, and not to be accounted for by anything that one finds within oneself, makes the solipsistic view altogether preposterous."[1] Thus the inborn belief in the external world is also justifiable by reasoning, though it is "too fundamental and spontaneous to be based on any form of reasoning."

(g) *The Nature of Ultimate Reality.* Though critical realism is thus assured of the existence of the world, it is not sure of its ultimate nature. The question is regarded by it as "much too difficult to be settled in an easy and *a priori* fashion. The disagreements of philosophers upon it from the time of Thales down would seem to indicate much the same conclusion. In fact, the critical realist as such has no exhaustive theory upon the subject. For critical realism does not pretend to be metaphysics. It is perfectly possible for the critical realist to be a panpsychist, a metaphysical dualist, a Platonist, or an ontological idealist of some other type."

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 107-8.

(5) *The Problem of Error*

Arthur K. Rogers tries to show in an essay with this title that the problem of error is easily solved by critical realism, whereas other chief theories like absolute idealism, neo-realism,—and pragmatism of some form also—experience a lot of difficulties.

According to critical realism truth and error can be easily explained thus: "When we 'know' an object, we are assigning a certain 'essence'—a character or group of characters—to some reality existing independently of the knowledge-process. And as truth is the identity of this essence with the actual character of this reality referred to, so error stands for the lack of such agreement, and the ascribing of an ideal character to what we are mistaken in supposing to be real, or the ascribing to a reality of a wrong character instead of a right one."[1]

(a) *Criticism of Objective Idealism.* But objective idealism or absolutism cannot offer such a simple solution. Its explanation and description of error are all complicated, confusing and repugnant to common sense, as will appear from the following considerations.

Error is described by these idealists as nothing but *partial truth.* This is obviously opposed to the commonly accepted view of error. If it is stated that it rained yesterday, we would, in every day life, either regard it as wholly true or as wholly false, according as it really had rained or had not. Common sense finds then such a view of error altogether unintelligible.

Bradley's contention that every error must contain some truth, "since it has a content which in some sense belongs to the universe", is also untenable for a similar reason. "To hold that I am partly right about its raining yesterday because there is such a thing as rain in this world, would be to confuse plain meanings by unprofitable subtleties."

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[1] *Ibid,* pp. 117-8.

Closely connected with the above theory of error, there is the reverse side of the idealist contention, namely, "All human *truth* is partial error". The plausible meaning of this is that when one judges, for example, that it rained yesterday, his judgment is not the whole truth about yesterday. But *this is confusion between truth and reality*, and between 'whole truth' and 'wholly true'. It is true that this judgment is not the whole truth about yesterday (during part of that day there might not have been rain there); but there is no doubt that the judgment is wholly true (if it did rain at any time yesterday).

Bosanquet tries to justify the partial nature of human truth by pointing out that a schoolboy's knowledge of a historical fact is not so true as that of a trained historian, because the former does not realize the many implications which the latter does. Similarly, as the finite human mind cannot know everything about a fact, human judgment cannot be said to be fully true. *This argument confuses truth with certainty.* The content and meaning of a judgment may vary with extent of knowledge about a matter; and along with it the degree of certainty may also vary. But given a particular meaning, a particular judgment (like the school boy's) must be either wholly true or wholly false.

Truth is described by some absolute idealists as *systematic coherence.* This view is based on certain assumptions. The idealists try to reduce every thing to system, and hold that things are entirely determined by the system of which they are the members. Again they treat description, theory and explanation of reality as identical with reality. Moreover, they identify truth with such description, etc., of reality. The result is that truth is identified with reality, too. As reality according to them is a system composed of different elements which harmoniously cohere in it, truth also comes to be a coherent system or, what appears to them to be the same thing, systematic coherence. Rogers exposes all these confusions, and asserts that the realist is reasonable enough to see that things possess at least certain characters of their own apart from any system to which they may belong. A system cannot be what it is but for what its members are: unless "every thing were what it is, nothing would be what it is."

There can, therefore, be a judgment about an aspect or part of reality apart from the whole system of reality. And such judgment is wholly true or false according as it corresponds to that part of reality or not. The question whether that judgment (which clearly intends to refer to that particular part of reality) is true of the *whole* system of Reality is irrelevant.

(b) *Criticism of Neo-realism.* The neo-realist fails to explain error mainly because of two reasons, his monistic identification of content with object, and his attempt to deny the subjective. The objection against monism is that it cannot explain how the memory image of the past object can be said to be identical with the object. The denial of the subjective is unacceptable, since knowledge cannot be explained merely in terms of physical causation or physiological reproduction. There is the factor of *belief* in knowledge which is irreducible to objective terms.

To be consistent with monism neo-realism holds that even in illusion what appears to the perceiver is identical with some object in the physical world. This amounts to saying that illusion is not illusory; it is as good a fact as anything else. But then there will be no distinction between truth and error.

To be consistent with the denial of the subjective, a neo-realist, like Holt, sometimes explains error with the help of the theory that perception is a kind of physiological duplication or reproduction of the physical object, so that illusory object is also a physiological duplicate and, therefore, not subjective. But this theory has to give up monism, as the physiological duplicate which is here the content is different from the external object. Besides, this explanation ignores the factor of belief without which there can be no error, and which cannot be explained all objectively.

To give a place to the illusory objects in the objective world, the neo-realist takes recourse to the metaphysical theory that the universe is composed of neutral entities of the nature of logical terms and propositions which possess subsistence or beinghood. Rogers points out that this theory is unsatisfactory. The fact that I can describe things only in logical terms does not imply that things are logical in nature, any more than the fact that I can describe things only with words implies that things are made of words.

Holt has tried to explain away error by identifying it with contradiction. This is not acceptable; for, if it were true, each of a pair of contradictory propositions would be false. This view ignores also the subjective element of belief; there is no error *unless* two contradictory things *are believed* to be positively related. Besides, the contradiction of one belief by another is only "the indication of an error, it does not constitute the error."

Montague's treatment of error, though based on the admission of consciousness, is also unsatisfactory, because he identifies consciousness with causation without sufficient reason.

(c) *The Pragmatic view.* There is no objection to the pragmatic view of error correctly understood. But Schiller's pragmatic interpretation is not tenable because he misses the common sense notion of error, namely that "*error is revealed, not created, by its consequences.*"

Critical realism finds it easy to solve the problem of error because it makes a distinction "between the something as an existent, about which I have a belief, and the something, as an intellectual content or meaning or essence which I believe about it". Error is explained, therefore, *not* as having "a meaning before the mind, something which we believe, but in wrongly supposing that this characterises a real". In other words "error is the incorrect ascription of an essence to an existence".

(6) *Three Proofs of Realism.*

In an essay with this title George Santayana offers the biological, psychological and logical proofs of realism, after discussing by way of introduction the definition of realism.

(a) *Definition of Realism.* He observes that epistemological realism admits of various degrees. "The minimum of realism is the presupposition that there is such a thing as knowledge: in other words that perception and thought refer to some object not the mere experience of perceiving and thinking. The maximum of realism would be the assurance that every thing ever perceived or thought of existed apart from apprehension and exactly in the form in which it is believed to exist: in other words that perception and conception are always direct and literal revelations, and that there is no such thing as error." Hence almost every theory of knowledge will fall within this wide range of realism.

Santayana points out that realism involves two questions which are not incompatible, but complementary, and necessary for its thoroughness. "One, what measure of independence or separate existence shall be ascribed to the object? and the other, what degree of literalness and adequacy shall be claimed for knowledge?"

Therefore, realism is the "union of two instinctive assumptions, necessary to the validity of knowledge: first, that knowledge is transitive, so that self-existing things may become chosen objects of a mind that identifies and indicates them; second, that knowledge is relevant, so that the thing indicated may have at least some of the qualities that the mind attributes to it." To illustrate this point Santayana observes: "A portait, to be a portrait, must be distinct from the sitter, and must at the same time somehow resemble or be referred to him...... So knowledge could not be knowledge at all unless it was a fresh act, not identical with the object, and it could not be true knowledge unless in its deliverance, it specified some of the qualities or relations which really belong to that object."[1]

These two points create two distinct tendencies in realism, "the one tends to separate appearance from substance only in existence; the other tends to identify them only in essence." But neither this identification nor the separation can be absolute, else the theory of knowledge would prove the impossibility of knowledge. There are consequently two kinds of realism inseparable from each other; "they may rise and fall reciprocally, like the pans of a balance", and "are like those pans necessary to each other: if either disappeared, the other would collapse."

In this connection, Santayana lays down clearly his *notion of essence*, or datum as distinguished from existence.

"By 'essence' I understand a universal of any degree of complexity, and definition which may be given immediately, whether to sense or to thought."[2]

Essence is universal while existence is individuated by its space-time location and relations. There is an identity of essence between two peas, in so far as there are some elements common to both, such as colour, shape, similarity, etc., but the existence of each pea is distinct. The essence is what is common, again, to a physically existing pea, its percept, its memory image, etc. Santayana says, therefore, "An essence may appear in any number of instances without forfeiting its identity; it may now have the ideal status of an object of intuition, and again the material status of the form of a thing. It is precisely this identity, this amphibious but incorruptible quality, that distinguishes an essence from any fact and makes essence (as Socrates discovered) the key to the problem of knowledge."

It is, therefore, that Santayana and other critical realists hold that what is grasped by knowledge of any kind is the essence of the object, and not the object as existing in all its spatio-temporal particularity.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 165.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 168 f.n.

After this preliminary discussion Santayana goes on to the three proofs of realism.

(b) *Biological Proof of Realism.* In this section Santayana examines animal behaviour in its biological setting and shows that such behaviour implies the truth of epistemological realism in both its aspects, namely that knowledge is transitive and that knowledge is also relevant.

That knowledge is transitive means that knowledge does not know itself, but aims at something beyond itself, the object. The child crying for the moon points at it, stretches its arm towards it and gazes at it. Its glances converge with ours. All these facts show that its knowledge has for its object something other than its mental state or image, in fact, here, something beyond his body. These facts are also noted in an animal's behaviour in pursuing, touching or recoiling from surrounding objects.

That knowledge is relevant means that the content which is directly present to the mind in knowledge, resembles at least in some respects, the object at which knowledge and behaviour aim. This is proved by the fact that the animal's behaviour or reaction to the environment is *successfully* based on such knowledge of the environment. Otherwise life would be impossible.

From these considerations Santayana concludes that "animals have relevant and transitive knowledge of their environment; so that realistic knowledge is but another name for vital sensibility and intelligence."

(c) *Psychological Proof of Realism.* Santayana here points out the inherent inconsistencies found in the kind of idealism which is based on psychological criticism of science and common sense.

This idealism denies the existence of "physical, metaphysical and religious object" on the ground that objects known are not independent of knowledge. Now, if this ground were true, the existence of mind and ideas, apart from the knowledge of them, could not be asserted, as is done by the idealist. So idealism is inconsistent in denying the transitiveness of knowledge in the realm of physics, metaphysics, etc. and asserting it in the realm of psychology. Another inconsistency is that while in theory the idealist denies the external world, in practice he acts as though there was the world. Yet another inconsistency, noticed in both empirical and transcendental idealism, is the belief in time. A consistent idealist should maintain that 'the past and the future exist only in the present idea of them.' Consistent idealism, in short, must be nothing short of 'solipsism of the present moment', both in theory and practice. But such doctrine is scarcely found in any idealist. Psychological criticism implies then the truth of realism, rather than that of idealism.

(d) *Logical Proof of Realism*. In this proof Santayana shows that Logic, which deals with concepts and their relations, must admit that these objects of logical thought are really independent of thinking. The object immediately present to logical thought is an essence. Essence is independent of the consciousness that reveals it: its revelation fluctuates, comes and goes because of the unstable nature of the human mechanism and the circumstances which make revelation possible, but the intrinsic nature of the essence revealed is changeless. Because of this abiding nature of essences, they possess some *necessary* relations among themselves, as is evident from the cases of necessary truths we find in logic and geometry.

Essences are revealed in sensation as well as in abstract logical thinking. But the essences which are the data of sense are mixed up and clothed by our instinctive animal tendencies with some existential, space-time characters. In pure logical thought our animal tendencies, our practical attitude towards objects, are more or less suspended. We can contemplate, therefore, essences without imputing any alien elements to them. This is why logical thought can reveal essences in their purest forms.

Logic is thus found to be based on the realistic assumption that essences, with which it deals, have a status independent of knowledge.

In conclusion Santayana observes: "It appears from these various considerations that all reasonable human discourse makes realistic assumptions; so that these proofs, as I venture to call them, are necessarily circular: without assuming realism it would be impossible to prove realism or any thing else. What I endeavoured to show is merely that biology, psychology, and logic require and fortify this assumption, not that a person willing to dispense with biology, psychology, and logic need be a realist. You cannot prove realism to a complete sceptic or idealist; but you can show an honest man that he is not a complete sceptic or idealist; but a realist at heart. So long as he is alive his sincere philosophy must fulfil the assumptions of his life and not destroy them."[1]

(7) *Knowledge and its categories*

In his essay under this caption Roy Wood Sellars describes first, the three stages of modern realism and then the nature of knowledge.

(a) *The three stages of realism.* Neo-realism (in Great Britain) was a reaction against Berkeley and Hume. It was an attack on 'subjective idealism or mentalism'. By neo-realism "knowledge was largely identified with perception and perception itself was interpreted as an intuition of non-mental characters. The result was an analysis of knowledge into mental act and non-mental object." This first phase of realism had a disastrous effect on 'the second of realism' which developed in America. For, American neo-realists made "an attempt to eliminate the supposed mental act of intuition in favour of pan-objectivism." There was also "a bid for an alliance with the behaviourism of the consciousness-fleeing sort.'' These first two waves of realism ''worked on the assumption that all knowledge can be only literal presence in experience and to awareness of the object known''. Critical realism rejects this assumption, and ushers in the third phase of realism. It points out that what is intuited in perception is not the object as existing, but some character-complexes through which the object becomes perceived. It is, therefore, epistemological dualism. Epistemological monism, Sellars remarks, is not very far from Berkeley's position. The datum present to knowledge is, according to both, the ultimate reality; the mental content is the object. Only the content or idea is turned into an independent entity by the monistic realist.

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[1] *Ibid*, pp. 183-4.

(b) *The nature of knowledge*. Critical realism holds that man has the inborn belief that he knows physical objects. It shows by analysis that physical objects, though known, are not known immediately; they are not intuited. What is intuited is the content (essence of the object) and knowledge of the physical object is nothing but the ascription of this content to some physical *existent* or something existing in space and time. This ascription is interpretation of the object in terms of the immediately intuited content; and it is automatic, so that the knowledge of the physical object cannot be said to be inferential either. Perception of existing objects has then a place mid-way between intuition and inference. It may be called direct knowledge as compared with inference.

Critical realism is 'synoptic', because it is based on the good points of many views. It agrees with subjective idealism in stressing the importance of 'mental activity', it agrees with ''naive realism in its belief that the physical thing is the direct object of knowledge.''

It deserves the name of critical realism ''in that it appreciates the nature of knowledge more critically in the light of the act of knowledge and of the actual conditions of human knowledge.''

From all these discussions Sellars concludes: "To know a thing is therefore not to be the thing. Nor is to know the thing to have a copy-like reproduction of the thing. What, then, is knowledge? It is the recognized possession by the mind of the 'form' of the thing, that is, its position, size, structure, casual capacities, etc. It is the mediated grasp of these features of the thing which are reproducible. To know these is to know the thing."[1]

(8) *On the Nature of the Datum*

"Six different views as to this," points out C. A. Strong, in this essay, "have succeeded each other in the course of modern philosophy: (1) That the datum is the real thing; (2) that it is an ideal representative of the real thing; (3) that it is an ideal thing, psychological in its nature; (4) that it is an ideal thing, logical in its nature; (5) that it is a thing of psychological nature, but real; (6) that it is a thing of logical nature, but real —naive realism, representationism, psychological subjectivism, logical subjectivism, psychological objectivism, logical objectivism."[2]

The view which Strong recommends is different from all these six. It is that the datum is the *logical essence* of the real thing. By the 'essence' of a thing Strong means "its what divorced from its that, its entire concrete nature, including its sensible character, but not its existence."

Strong establishes this conclusion by showing in three sections that (1) data are not the real things themselves, (2) data are not psychological in nature, and (3) data are not existence. The six views, stated above, are based on one or another of these three, and fall with them.

The data are not the real things themselves, because we know their nature depends on the organism, the constitution of the sense organs, etc. If they were the real things perceptual error would have been impossible.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 218.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 223.

The data are not psychological in their nature, that is they are not the mental acts, since we do not perceive the act, but the content of the act, the datum. When "we see our faces, we do not see our seeing of them, we see only faces." Seeing, the psychological act, is not then the datum.

The reason why the datum cannot be said to possess existence is proved by the fact that it has an unchanging, universal nature unlike things existing in space and time subject to their limitations. The data (say, of a table) remain the same whether the object exists now or has passed out of existence.

(9) *Conclusion*

Compared with *The New Realism*, *The Essays in Critical Realism* is more convincing and less ostentatious. The arguments of the critical realists are straightforward and well-balanced. There is enough of critical analysis, as well as utilization of scientific data, but scarcely any attempt to overawe the plain philosophical reader with an array of technicalities. All this is intelligible in the light of Hegel's dialectic. While idealism is the thesis and neo-realism is the antithesis, critical realism is a synthesis which tries to balance its views by taking what is best in both. The historical position of critical realism makes it, as its exponents state, an eclectic philosophy. Hence we find that it avoids extreme views—the defects of one-sided idealism and realism. On the whole, it succeeds remarkably well in its defence of realism without committing excesses. The cumulative effect of the different essays written by the critical realists generates a strong momentum in favour of the central theme.

There are, as pointed out by Drake in the opening essay, some differences among them. But these differences, though important in their own sphere, scarcely affect the main position of critical realism, namely that the data are neither mental states, nor physical objects.

There are, however, certain causes of misapprehension in the various writings, and they have given rise to criticisms. We may notice here some of these.

Though the datum is emphatically distinguished from the mental state it is sometimes called by some writers mental, ideal, etc. There arises, therefore, an apparent contradiction. But this contradiction disappears when we remember that the datum is said to be mental in the sense that it appears in the mind; it is not external to the mind being a content of the mind. It is at the same time non-mental in the sense that it is not the mental state itself, but different from it as being the entity revealed by that state. The datum is said to be ideal, to distinguish it from the actual; 'ideal' does not mean subjective here. Another puzzle is caused by the two kinds of statements, such as 'the data are not actual portion of the object perceived' and 'the data are in part genuine aspects'. But it is not wholly irremovable. The first statement means that the data as caused by the actual portions of the object are not identical with them. The second means that in so far as the data in veridical perception are partly caused by the portions of the object (and partly also by other factors like the sense, nerves), they partly stand for some genuine casual properties belonging to the object. There is then no opposition between the two statements. The conflict can also be resolved in another way. The datum is what we *instinctively believe to be* the genuine aspects of the object and the belief is pragmatically justified in all normal cases. On the other hand the datum is *discovered by critical reflection* not to be the actual portions of the object. Hence the two statements may be taken from two different points of view, and their opposition ceases.

Doubts have been felt again by some critics as to how a datum can be called a universal.[1] They point out that when we perceive a man, for example, the datum is of a particular individual; it is not a universal. The contention is true in one sense; the percept of a particular man is not universal as compared with the concept of man in general. But this percept, the datum, is universal as compared with the object, the man existing at that particular space and time. Because unlike that object, the datum (the appearance of the man) is not attached to any space and time, since it (the same appearance) can be repeatedly perceived or recalled at any other place and time, and that even after the object has perished. So the universality of a datum is justified in this sense. The justification is based on the fact that 'universal' is a relative term.

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[1] For the status of the universal *vide* J. B. Pratt's *Personal Realism*, Chap. IV.

We should note here that in spite of much opposition between neo-realism and critical realism regarding the relation of the datum to the object, there is also a great underlying similarity between the two views which is apt to be ignored. Though a neo-realist like Holt identifies the datum with the physical object, he admits, in order to explain the possibility of illusion, that the object has a logical being, mere subsistence, and does not necessarily possess existence or reality. The critical realist virtually holds the same position when he says that the datum possesses essence, a logical being which is different from existence or reality. The real difference then lies in a metaphysical presupposition of the two views. According to neo-realists at least some objects (illusory ones) of the physical world possess only subsistence (=essence), whereas according to critical realists *all* objects of the physical world possess existence. In short the one consents to call even the merely subsistent physical, the other does not.

An interesting consequence follows from this. With reference to the problem, 'Is the sense datum identical with a physical *reality*?', the neo-realist (of Holt's type), like the critical realist, is forced to be a dualist, for he has to answer it in the negative in view of erroneous perception. But if the question is put in a different way: Is the datum identical with the subsisting object?—the critical realist, like the neo-realist, can give an affirmative answer and both would then be monists. Actually, however, the question is put in a general way 'Is the datum identical with the object?' without specifying the exact meaning of 'object'. The neo-realist gives an affirmative reply, taking 'object' to mean a subsistent entity, while the critical realist gives a negative reply taking 'object' in its ordinary meaning of a physically existing entity. The two apparently opposite replies are once more seen to be not really opposite.

Lastly we should remember that unlike neo-realism critical realism does not commit itself to any particular metaphysical view regarding ultimate reality, except what is presupposed by its epistemology. As Pratt points out: "critical realism does not pretend to be metaphysics. It is perfectly possible for the critical realist to be a panpsychist, a metaphysical dualist, a Platonist, or an ontological idealist of some other type."

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SENSE-DATA

The problem of sense-datum, which we have partly discussed in connection with American Critical Realism, has been one of the burning questions in contemporary discussion, and it is necessary to consider in a separate section the views of some of the greatest thinkers of the day.

'Datum' means what is given. 'Sense-datum', therefore, means what is given to sense or what appears in sensation. Naive realism believes that what is given to sense, when perception takes place, is the physical object itself. So it does not feel the need of any special word like 'sense-datum' as distinguished from the physical object. On the other hand epistemological idealism (which denies that something is *given* from outside in perception) also does not require any such word. The necessity of this term is felt most by those who, for some reason or another, believe in the reality of the object of sense-perception, but at the same time feel also that the object as ' externally existing is not always given *as such* in sensation; so that, the external reality has to be distinguished from what is *given to sense,* or the *datum* of sense. Let us consider the views of some important realists, who make this distinction and also the grounds for their respective views.[1]

1. G. E. Moore (1873-)

Moore discusses the problems of sense-data in different articles, some of which are included in his *Philosophical Studies.* His views are not always strictly identical, nor are they expressed categorically. In his own peculiar style of thinking and writing, he puts forward his conclusions in a tentative, problematic, conditional manner, qualifying what he states with endless provisos. In one of his later writings, entitled, Some judgments of Perception[1], he discusses the problem, and we can see his views about the matter.

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[1] For a brief critical account of the chief views, vide L A. Reid's *Knowledge and Truth* chaps. 6 and 7.

Though he is always unwilling to give formal definitions of terms, he gives in that paper a long list of judgments like 'That is an inkstand', 'That is a table-cloth', 'This is a finger', 'This is a coin', etc., and tells us that if we want to define sense-data we can do no better than say that "*Sense-data are the sort of things, about which such judgments as these always seem to be made*—the sort of things which seem to be real or ultimate subjects of all such judgments."[2] He also attempts to clear this idea further, by reference to Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. An object known by acquaintance is directly presented in perception as such. The colour of the inkpot as seen, its hardness as touched, etc. can be said to be objects with which we are directly acquainted. Sense-data are what are thus 'Directly apprehended'.[3] Again when on perceiving immediately only a part of the inkpot, say a part of its surface, we have a judgment about the whole inkpot, such as 'This inkpot is made of glass', the knowledge of the inkpot contained in the judgment would be obtained by description. Knowledge by description depends ultimately on knowledge by acquaintance.

From the above, Moore also draws the conclusion that when we know an inkpot through a perception of some part of it, the object of the perception is not simply the part immediately presented, nor simply the whole inkpot (unmediated by the part), but both. The judgment of perception like 'This is an inkstand' is both *about* the sense-datum (like a colour patch immediately presented) and also *about* 'the inkstand'. There is a blending here of two kinds of knowledge, that by acquaintance and that by description. The first is included in the second, as a part in a whole.

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[1] Published in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. 1919-20 pub. since in *Phil. Studies* pp. 220-252.

[2] *Phil. Stud.* p. 231-2.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 178, The Status of Sense-data

Now, in reply to the question "What is the status of the sense-datum in relation to the mind and the physical object?" Moore holds that the sense-datum or the sensible (as he prefers to call it in an earlier paper, "The status of sense-data"[1]) is distinct from the act of seeing. The entity which is experienced, Moore is never tired of repeating, "is never identical with the experience".[2] Moreover, Moore believes that sensibles, known, for example, in the perception of objects like inkpots, exist even when they are not experienced. This belief is instinctive, and has great force even in the face of contrary arguments. As to the relation of the sense-datum to physical objects, Moore, on the whole, is for identifying the data with parts of physical objects. In the judgment 'This is an inkstand', which is based on the perception or 'direct apprehension' of a colour patch, the sense-datum or the colour patch is identical with a part of the surface of the real inkstand existing in the physical world. In support of this view, Moore appeals to our everyday unchallenged judgments. On seeing an object twice, we very often say "We have seen the same part of the same object". Similarly on seeing a part of an object and then touching it we say, "We have seen and touched the same thing". If the first and second sense-data were not both identical with one another by being identical with the same part of a physical entity, then such judgments could not be explained. If what was seen were merely colour sensation and what was touched were only a tactual sensation and both were merely mental or physiological states, the one could not be identified with the other. The sense-data are, therefore, *somehow*, identical with the physical object.

The most fundamental objection to this view, Moore anticipates, is furnished by cases where sense-data of the same object are perceptibly different whereas the corresponding physical object is not believed to be different. A large tree looks, for example, smaller as we walk away from it. A round coin appears elliptical as we look at it from an oblique position. In such cases it may be asked "If the sense-datum were identical with the corresponding physical object, how could the same physical entity be identical with different or unequal sense-data big and small, round and elliptical?"

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 171.

[2] *Ibid* p. 169.

In reply to such objection, Moore states that it is based on the assumption that even without any difference in the object, sense-data can really be perceptibly different. But this assumption is not at all certain; on the contrary, Moore feels that under such circumstances the sense-data are *not perceived* to be different, but only *perceived to seem* to be different. Moore says: "What now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which corresponds to a tree, which I am seeing, when I am a mile off, may not really be perceived to be smaller than the one, which corresponds to the same tree, when I see it from a distance of only a hundred yards, but that it is only believed to *seem* smaller........................"[1] In short, Moore maintains that just as things are perceived to be red, blue, round, etc., similarly sometimes they can also seem to be red, blue, round, etc. And the second kind of sense-data involves as "ultimate or unanalysable" a relation to objects as the first or normal kind (all sense-data being uninferred, directly apprehended objects of perception, which are not produced by conscious synthesis of simpler parts). This solution of Moore has the effect of removing the objection by pointing out that the same object, in the same part, does not really appear as different, but may only *seem* sometimes to be different. The other effect of this theory would be that sense-datum by itself is not misleading; even the seeming sense-datum in so far as it only *seems* to be different from the normal, does not generate any false judgment. Moore inclines to the view (once very emphatically held by Russell) that what is really directly apprehended is not liable to error. For instance, I may

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 245.

"judge with regard to an animal which *I see* at a distance, that it is a sheep, when in fact it is a pig. And here my judgment *is certainly not due to the fact that I see it to be a sheep*, since I cannot possibly see a thing to be a sheep unless it is one. It is not, therefore, a judgment of perception *in this sense*"[1] Moore suggests that there may be inference present in many perceptual judgments, and "the amount and kind of inference" involved in such judgment is "no bar to the truth of the assertion" that they are the judgments of perception.[2] Moore seems, therefore, to agree with Russell that the errors of perceptual judgments are really due to inferences, and 'knowledge by acquaintance' (or 'direct apprehension' as Moore calls it) is free from error. Sense-data, which are the objects revealed by such awareness, are, therefore, not erroneous.

It is thus, then, that Moore would try to defend his view that sense-data are parts of physical objects. Judgments about sense-data are judgments about the corresponding physical objects and *vice versa*. So Moore concludes, "At the present moment, I am rather inclined to favour the view that what I am judging of this presented object is that it is itself a part of the surface of an inkstand—that, therefore, it really is identical with this part of the surface of the inkstand."

This monistic position is, however, modified by Moore more recently in his personal statement in *Contemporary British Philosophy*.[3] Though he still continues to feel certain about the reality of sense-data and material objects, he comes to realize the possibility of three alternative views regarding the relation of sense-data to material things. One of these is of course the monistic view, previously held by him, namely that sense-data are identical with parts of the surfaces of material objects. But Moore realizes now that this view is open to some objections, specially because there are such experiences as seeing double. How can both the images or sense-data of an object be identical with the object, without being identical with each other and thus ceasing to be different.[1] A second view attempting to meet the objections to the first is to hold that the sense-datum is a manifestation or appearance of the material thing, and the relation between the two is "an ultimate and unanalysable relation."[2] To this view also there seem to be very grave objections, "chiefly drawn from a consideration of the question how we can possibly *know* with regard to any of our sense-data that there is one thing and one thing only which has to them such a supposed ultimate relation; and how, if we do, we can possibly *know* anything further about such things, *e.g.*, of what size or shape they are."[3] If these two views are rejected, only one other alternative remains. This third possible view is based on Mill's conception of material things as "permanent possibilities of sensation". According to it sense-data are a set of 'hypothetical facts' which are perceived under specific conditions as possessing certain mutual relations. (The sense-data of colour, size, shape, etc. of a supposed object like a hand, which are found interrelated are all facts perceived when specific conditons of perception are fulfilled.) "When I know such a fact as 'This is a hand', I certainly do know some hypothetical facts of the form 'If *these* conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum of *this* kind, which would have been a sense-datum of the same surface of which *this* is a sense-datum." But even this third view, Moore shows, is open to some objections. It is doubtful whether we can think of the aforesaid conditions of sense-data without thinking of the existence of *material things*. It is doubtful also whether we can account for any intrinsic relation among the different sense-data (say of a hand) if these are conceived as hypothetical facts.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 226. [2] *Ibid.* p 227.

[3] Vol. 2, *A defence of common sense*,

These three possible views about sense-data Moore entertains as plausible alternatives. But in view of the objections to which each of them is open, he fails to accept any of them as certain or even nearly certain. Though he continues to believe in the reality of sense-data and material things, and thinks that sense-data are *of* material things, he does not know how this relation of sense-data to matter and the relation of sense-data among themselves can be analysed without difficulty.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 220.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 221.

[3] *Ibid*

2. Bertrand Russell (1872-)

Russell is one of the earliest English writers to use the term 'sense-data'. His views regarding sense-data, like his other views, undergo changes in which four chief stages can be marked. These stages correspond to his successive works (1) *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), (2) *The External World* (1914), (3) *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), and (4) *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927).

In the *Problems* he clearly gives the meaning of the word thus: "Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known *in* sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, *but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation*". (p. 17).

Distinguishing thus, a sense-datum from sensation Russell, on the other hand, tries to show that the *datum is also distinct from the physical object* which generates it. A table that gives rise to the different sense-data like colour, shape, touch, sound, is not itself immediately known by us. We are *acquainted* directly only with the appearance of the table, namely the sense-data which are immediately intuited. The table itself is known indirectly—by a kind of inference. "The real table, if there is one, *is not immediately* known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known". "We cannot say that the table is the sense-data or *even that sense-data are directly properties* of the table". (p. 17). But why does Russell say that sense-data are not even properties of the real physical object, the table? The reason, he gives, is based on a consideration of the physical and physiological conditions without which a mere table could not cause the sensation of colour, sound, or any other datum (pp. 55-56). The table may be described, of course, *by means of the* sense-data thus: The table is "the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data" (p. 74), meaning by the 'cause' of course *one* of the causes, or the main cause. But such knowledge of the table or any physical object would necessarily be mere '*knowledge by description*' as contrasted with the direct 'knowledge by acquaintance' which we have of the sense-data.

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[1] *Vide* his reply to critics (specially p 637) in *The Philosophy of G E. Moore* (Lib. of Living Philosophers Series), 1942.

Though the physical object is not known directly we have an 'instinctive belief' (p. 37) in its existence and "All knowledge......must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left" (p. 39).

"In one sense it must be admitted that we can *never prove* the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences" (p. 34). "There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole life is a dream......". But although this is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true...........". On the contrary, the hypothesis of the existence of the external world is a *simpler hypothesis* than the one that there is no external world. It explains the causation of our sensations more simply. It is also in harmony with our usual instinctive belief in the external world. Hence the existence of the external world becomes more acceptable.

Thus, we find that Russell tries to hold a position between naive realism and subjective idealism. This position is very near phenomenalism. "The one thing we know about it", he says about a physical object, "is that it is not what it seems" (p. 24). Russell stops short of phenomenalism by admitting that a descriptive, indirect knowledge of the physical world is possible. But this reservation, it may be noted, does not harmonize with his conception of the relation of knowledge by description to that by acquaintance. The former, he holds, is ultimately reducible to elements *derived* from the latter. This being so and the sense-data known by acquaintance also being not applicable to the physical object, as Russell admits, how can there be even a descriptive knowledge of a physical object?

As to the problem of error, Russell holds that such problem does not at all arise with respect to knowledge by acquaintance. Because the mere presentation of sense-data or any other immediate objects does not involve belief. Truth and error pertain to our belief: "truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact" (p. 190). A mere immediate presentation is devoid of dualism, and there is no question of correspondence here. It is only when we draw inferences, logical or psychological, from the sense-data (or the immediately presented) about facts corresponding to them, the chance of error arises. "A mind which believes, believes truly when there is a corresponding complex not involving the mind, but only its objects" (p. 202). Where objects are not supposed or believed to correspond to our sensations there is no room for belief nor, therefore, for truth and error. Even "when we dream or see a ghost, we certainly do have the sensations we think we have..........." (p. 30). Knowledge obtained by acquaintance is always self-evident. Our sense-data are always certain, being self-evident; but when we pass from perception of them to judgment about them, it may be possible in this process to commit an error (p. 214).

In *Our knowledge of the External World*, Russell carries a little forward his analysis of sensation and physical objects in the light of modern physics. In this, as he admits (p. 8, preface), he agrees with the views of Whitehead, his collaborator, expressed in the *Principia Mathematica*. On the one hand, he tries to replace here common sense notion of the physical world (which he tried to justify in the *Problems*) by the physical notion of it, so that the world of solid permanent entities yield to the world of mobile, changing processes. On the other hand, he tries to amend the precarious dualism between the data and physical objects (which he supported in the *Problems*) by trying to show that the sense-data are not mere appearances of external objects, they really reveal these extra-mental objects. Physical objects of the external world are not, of course, known directly in single perceptions. The different sensations we have of them from different points of view or under different conditions give real, but partial glimpses of the external objects. The conception of the external object can, therefore, be obtained by synthesizing or by systematic interrelation of the different perspectives or aspects. *A physical object thus comes to be conceived as a system of perspectives.* But it should not be supposed that such a system consists only of aspects actually perceived by some one; it contains also possible aspects or what Russell calls 'unperceived perspectives' (p. 95). In this way he comes to hold: "The system consisting of all views of the universe, perceived and unperceived, I shall call the system of 'perspectives', and I shall confine the expression 'private worlds' to such views of the universe as are actually perceived" (p. 95).

It is thus that Russell concludes that the external world can be *logically constructed* out of sense-data, actual and possible. Construction is *not a kind of inference* from premises to conclusion, it is rather a kind of synthetic supposition or hypothesis. Russell finds here the difficulty of inferring objects, *never perceived*, from the perceived data. This difficulty he felt in the *Problems* as well; but there he sought to tide over it by accepting 'instinctive belief' (reminiscent of Hume) as the primary source of our belief in the external world. But even there, he is of opinion that the instinctive belief is supported by inference, by which he seemed to mean nothing more than hypothesis. For he asserted that it is a simpler hypothesis to believe in the reality of physical objects. That this hypothesis is not of the ordinary inductive kind, but deserves a special name, is now realised by him under the influence of Whitehead, from whom he learns, as he admits, that the whole conception of the world of physics is a *construction* rather than an inference" (p. 8.).

By giving up the belief in *crass matter* and accepting Whitehead's view of the physical world as a logical construction, "a wholly new light is thrown on the time-honoured controversies of realists and idealists" (p. 8).

In *The Analysis of Mind,* Russell tries to reconstruct his theory of Mind, in the light of more modern physics, which makes matter less material, and the pragmatic, behaviouristic conception of mind which makes mind less mental. He utilizes James's conception of neutral stuff as the fundamental reality which is neither mental nor material at bottom. This view is called by Russell, following H. M. Sheffer, 'neutral monism' in a later work.[1] This enables him to agree with the orthodox Neo-realists regarding their conception of mind and knowledge. (pp. 5-6). He concludes, "Mind and matter alike are logical constructions; the particulars out of which they are constructed, or from which they are inferred, have various relations, some of which are studied by physics, others by psychology" (p. 307). Formerly, under the influence of Brentano, Russell used to refute Idealism by emphasising the distinction between perceiving and the percept, the seeing and the seen. Perceiving, seeing, sensation were believed then to be psychical as opposed to the physical percept. Now his neutral monism helps him to hold that the distinction between psychical and physical is not fundamental. Sensation is as much a natural event as the object sensed. While a star is a group of neutral particulars associated with the place in the sky where the star is, my sensation of the star is nothing other than this very group associated with where I am, or more precisely, the group as related to my nervous system. (pp. 129-30).

He realizes now like James and the neo-realists that there is no contradiction in thinking that the same reality may belong to different systems, just as the same point may belong to different lines.

From this he concludes: "If we admit—as I think we should—that the patch of colour may be both physical and psychical, the reason for distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation disappears, and we may say that *the patch of colour and our sensation in seeing it are identical*" (p. 143).

He holds, then, that "the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply *is* that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the *physical world* and part of what physics is concerned with" (p. 142).

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[1] *An Outline of Philosophy* (p. 293).

It should be noted however that in spite of the attempt to merge sensation and the sense-datum into neutral particulars, Russell retains, here and there a bias for the physical, as would be evident from the above lines.

With the increase of his faith in (metaphysical) monism, Russell tries to reduce the knower or the subject even to a mere fictitious idea of some physical process. The subject appears to him to be "a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants". "It is introduced", he says, "not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar" (p. 141). The idea behind the use of the word 'sense-datum' involves that of something given *to* the subject. But when the subject is dispensed with as a "perfectly gratuitous assumption" (p. 141), the idea of something being given *to the subject in sensation* becomes meaningless; and then "the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes." Thus there remains no need of the word sense-datum in this phase of Russell's philosophy (as also in American Neo-realism).

It should be remembered that epistemological monism which is deduced here from metaphysical monism of neutral entities is secured by reducing sensation of physical objects to those objects. Sensation of an object is nothing but the object as externally related to the organism, as the American neo-realists also would hold. In such external relation the object is not changed. Would it not follow then that the same (unchanged) object can be perceived by two observers? This consequence, however, is denied by the neo-realists on the ground that the object as perceived by me is cross-section of the object as performed by my organism. Though the knowing relation is external and is said not to affect the object, yet it is a kind of selection out of the existing perspectives of the object. This 'external view' can be reconciled with the theory of 'selection' only by an explanation like this:— The aspect of the object selected by its relation to my organism is not changed by this selection; it really belongs to the object. This explanation again can be accepted only if it is admitted that the presentation of selected aspects of a whole is no change of the whole. But this would imply that *suppression is no change or distortion.*

Though Russell agrees to the neutral monism of the neo-realists, and appears also to assent to their epistemological monism by identifying sensation with sense-datum and sensation with a physical object, his belief in the latter kind of monism seems to be rather shaky. For he cannot overcome his knowledge of physics and physiology to be able to get rid of the ideas that physical objects are not identical with what we directly perceive, but are really constructions of elaborate kinds out of what we are directly aware. The dualism of perceptual space and physical space, which appears in the *Problems* never completely leaves him. This re-appears in a conspicuous way in *An Outline of Philosophy.*

In this book Russell draws the epistemological conclusions of the physical theory of perception. He thus comes to regard sensation as the end of a long, but continuous causal process which starts, like a wave, from the physical object and ends in its effect on the nervous system. The following conclusions, therefore, are found inevitable.

(1) What we are directly aware of is not the physical object, but our sensation. "Thus what is called a perception is only connected with its object through the laws of physics. Its relation to the subject is causal and mathematical; *we cannot say whether or not it resembles the object* in any intrinsic respect, except that both it, and objects are brief events in space-time" (p. 155).

This position, then, is no longer epistemological monism, but epistemological dualism. This is clear also from the other conclusion he draws, namely:

(2) Our sensations being in the brain, what we directly perceive is our brain-process. He says, "percepts are what we can know with most certainty; and that percepts

contain what naive realism thinks it knows about the world." "The gist of the matter", he says, "is that *percepts are in our heads*".

We find then that Russell no longer believes either in naive realism or in neo-realism. Criticising such views he remarks: "To say that you see a star when you see the light that has come from it is no more correct than to say that you see New Zealand when you see a New Zealander in London" (p. 144).

The knowledge of the external object is a kind of tracing back the source of the causal series, whose end term is perception, with the help of physical laws. Besides, every observer being peculiarly related to the external event, perceives at least something which is peculiar to him and missed by other observers. "The point that concerns us", he says, "is that a man's *percepts are private* to himself: what I see, no one else sees; what I hear, no one else hears; what I touch, no one else touches; and so on" (p. 144). Percepts are also private in the sense that the perception of an object or event means "a characteristic reaction which is present when the event occurs and not otherwise" (p. 228). To this conclusion, he comes "by following out to its logical conclusion the behaviourist definition of knowledge" (p. 225). The behaviourist theory considered in the light of physics forces upon us "the *causal theory of perception*" and "a view of cognition *far more subjective than* that from which physicists, like the rest of mankind, originally set out". Thus through a chequered career Russell, who started as a vehement critic of subjectivism, comes back to a position not far removed from it.

While giving up the problem of sense-datum in its previous form, Russell comes to discuss datum in a behaviouristic way. (All knowing being speaking), a datum is defined by him in the following way: "A datum is a form of words which a man utters as the result of a stimulus, with no intermediary of any learned reaction beyond what is involved in knowing how to speak." (p. 278).

"If the above definition is accepted, all our data for knowledge of the external world must be of the nature of percepts. The *belief in external objects* is a *learned reaction* acquired in the first months of life, and it is the duty of the philosopher to treat it as an *inference* whose validity must be tested. A very little consideration shows that, logically, the inference cannot be demonstrative, but must be at least probable" (p. 278). All inference worth the name, he holds, is inductive, and "the whole structure of Science, as well as the world of common sense, demands the use of induction and analogy if it is to be believed. These forms of inference, therefore, rather than deduction, are those that must be examined if we are *to accept the world* of Science or any world outside our dreams." (p. 278).

Regarding perception and the physical world, the view of Russell is clearly found here in the following statement. "I take it that, when we have a percept, just *what we perceive* (if we avoid avoidable sources of error) *is an event* occupying part of the region which, for physics, is occupied *by the brain.* In fact, perception gives us the most concrete knowledge we possess as to the *stuff of our brains, not part of the stuff of tables* and chairs, sun, moon, and stars. Suppose we are looking at a leaf, and we see a green patch. This patch *is not out there* where the leaf is, but is an event occupying a certain volume *in our brains* during the time that we see the leaf. Seeing the leaf consists in the existence, in the region occupied by our brain, of a green patch causally connected with the leaf, or rather with a series of events emanating from the place in physical space where physics places the leaf" (p. 292).

This view of Russell is best characterised by Lovejoy's phrase, '*the endocephalic hypothesis*', the hypothesis of a percept being within the skull of the perceiver.

In his reply to criticisms in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Lib. of Living Philosophers Series), published in 1944, we find that Russell has been steadily maintaining the last position noted above. He still sticks to the causal theory of perception (p. 703), denies (1) the distinction between sensation and sense-datum (p. 704) and (2) the identity of the percept with the physical object. He also holds, "what I see is in me" (pp. 704-5).

3. George Santayana (1863-)

Though Santayana happens to be one of the writers of *The Essays in Criticial Realism*, his general position in contemporary philosophy is a little unique. His point of agreement with the other realists of the group is scarcely beyond the fact that according to him, as to the others, the datum perceived is not identical with the existing object. That is to say, he is an epistemological dualist like his colleagues. But the way in which he comes to hold this view is all his own, and it deserves special consideration. We shall state here very briefly his general position, as well as his special solution of the problem of sense-data. We shall follow the account he gives in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, which he himself regards as introduction to his system.

Santayana, like Descartes, employs the method of doubt, but he carries it much further. Man, as an animal, instinctively believes in many things and without such *animal faith* life would have been impossible. But his faith is occasionally disturbed by errors and illusions. He is shocked and surprised and begins to doubt what he instinctively believed to be true. Thus the congenital dogmatism of men gives way to scepticism. The philosopher who desires absolute security for his conclusions cannot, therefore, build on customary beliefs, he has to reject everything that is *liable* to error. The "fear of illusion" disquiets "the honest mind, congenitally dogmatic" and drives "it in the direction of scepticism".[1]

But once reflection is allowed to challenge our customary beliefs, there seems to be no end to the possibility of doubting. Every kind of belief which has been actually disturbed by some error, or can be so, becomes doubted. For "if I am deceived once I may all the more readily be deceived again"[2]. Santayana finds thus that belief in the past is open to doubt. Even if a past event be an object of our own previous experience we cannot assert it now with absolute certainty. Because memory has been often found to commit mistakes. Besides, when we remember a past event now, we are only entertaining in thought a present image which by itself cannot take us beyond the present moment. Like the past the future is equally doubtful. Our expectation of a future event is nothing more than presentation, to present thought, of a picture of the expected event. But this picture is confined to the present and cannot take us beyond itself. Expectation is ultimately found to be based on a customary belief that the future will resemble the past under similar circumstances. This belief in the uniformity of nature may be practically useful for life, and life may even be impossible without it. But there is no theoretical ground which can put this belief beyond doubt.

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[1] *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 72. [2] *Ibid* p. 115.

The sceptic cannot therefore, believe either in the past or in the future. Similarly, he cannot even believe in unobserved present event on inferential grounds.

Inductive inference is doubted because it is after all based on the dogma of uniformity of nature. Deductive inference is also not theoretically beyond doubt; one of the reasons is that in passing from premise to conclusion we have to depend on memory. Without recapitulation, there would be no dialectic.[1] But memory is not absolutely reliable.

Santayana thus shows that a thoroughgoing sceptic must withdraw belief from the past, the future and even those present events which are beyond perception. In a word, every thing that requires belief is distrusted. Such *a sceptic is then left only with what he immediately intuits at the present moment.*

But the question arises at this point : What are we really aware of in such immediate apprehension ?

Ordinarily it is believed that we can immediately know the *existence* of things in external perception; we can see, for instance, a flower, touch a stone. But

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 120

Santayana points out that what is really revealed by intuition, or immediately given in immediate apprehension is *not the existence* of a flower, or stone, but only a colour, a touch etc. The existence of a thing is posited by animal faith. The life of an animal would be impossible without such faith. If a dog on seeing some colour and form did not believe in something, possessed of that colour and form existing outside in space, it would never stretch its paw and scratch at a bone and bite it. It would not then eat or live. But though necessary for life, belief in the existence of a thing is only a kind of expectation, anticipation of some possible perceptions from some existing ones. We see a colour and believe in the existence of an orange. In other words we believe that this colour coexists with and is, therefore, related to other unperceived qualities like taste, smell, touch etc. of particular kinds which have been found in past experience along with such colour, and which qualities, we expect, can be perceived even now. Thus belief in the existence of a thing involves a belief in the relation of the immediately given colour, shape, touch etc. to things not so present to intuition. And such belief taking us beyond the given is sometimes detected to be misleading. In illusory perception we believe from some colour, sound or smell the existence of a thing whose existence comes to be disbelieved afterwards on other grounds.

Santayana holds, therefore, that what is immediately present in external perception is only some such datum as colour, touch, smell, sound, taste and the like each of which he calls *essence* to distinguish it from existence. An essence is a bare form or appearance whereas existence involves reference of that form to a particular space and time and relation of it to other spatio-temporal events.

Doubts can demolish our belief in existence but it cannot remove essence or what appears in immediate apprehension. Even in illusory perception we cannot doubt the phenomenon that appears, though we can disbelieve that it means some existing thing. In the illusion of a bent stick, the appearance of a bent stick is an essence and as such it cannot be doubted ; though one may doubt whether such appearance belongs to any existing stick.

Here the unrelenting scepticism of Santayana discovers a resting place, which can defy all doubts. If we withdraw our belief in the existence of the objects of perception, but rest contented simply with essence or what is immediately revealed by intuition, without imputing to it any meaning whatsoever, we are absolutely safe from error and illusion. An essence is immediately given and it is free from doubt, for no question of truth and error arises until we assert something of that essence.

But complete withdrawal of belief from what appears before us is a difficult task because it goes against the animal instinct which makes life possible. It can be successfully practised only when we can check our instinctive tendency to act on our perception and can remain entirely passive. The passive witnessing of essence, one after another, is a kind of 'open-eyed trance' as Santayana calls it. This is what is called intuition. Intuition finds essense by watching, by exerting animal attention i.e. by the purely receptive mood of the mind without any attempt to interpret and judge what is revealed.

The lesson that is derived about sense-data from this scepticism of Santayana is clear. The datum or what is given is pure essence. This is what emerges before us when scepticism pares away all that is imported into an object by interpretation and animal faith. Existence, position in space and time, relation to other objects are all such imported or superadded elements. What remains after subtracting them is what was really given initially, the pure datum. It is just an appearance, just a colour or shape or sound or taste which shines by its own light so long as it appears. It does not involve any belief, 'comports' no existence. It is free from change, being self-identical. It is, therefore, eternal in the sense of not being in time. It is universal in the sense of not being endowed with any particularising character. It is absolute being devoid of any implication of dependence on anything else.[1]

4. Some Other Views

Many other competent minds have been drawn in recent times to this problem of sense-data, and we have no space to discuss their views here. Important contributions have been made by C. D. Broad (in *Perception, Physics, and Reality*, *The Mind and its place in Nature*, and in an article in *Mind*[2] entitled *The External World*) by G. F. Stout (*Mind and Matter*, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*)[3] G. D. Hicks (*Critical Realism*) and others. A thorough investigation into the problem has been made recently by H. H. Price in his well-known book *Perception*.[4] He makes an exhaustive study of prevalent and possible views and comes to a conclusion akin to Moore's. A short statement of the more important ideas of this work will throw further light on the problem, as well as on the views of other important thinkers.

When we see or touch something or smell it or hear it there is in each case "something which at that moment indubitably exists"—a colour, a pressure, a noise, a smell; and that something directly present to consciousness in that "peculiar and ultimate manner", Price states, is the datum or the given. The datum present in sensation is called sense-datum, and it is distinguishable from the data present to memory and introspection because sense-data, unlike other data, "lead us to conceive of and believe in the existence of certain material things, whether there are in fact any such things or not" and also because they all possess a common and peculiar characteristic which may be called 'sensuousness.'".

As a realist and follower of Moore, Price is interested more in sense-data than in data of any other kind. He tries to ascertain the nature of these sense-data, their mutual relations and their relation to material objects.

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[1] *Vide The Phil. of George Santayana* (Lib. of Livg. Phils. 1940) for his views and influence on contemporary philosophy.

[2] October, 1921.

[3] Also symposium on 'Status of sense-data' with Moore, Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 1913-4.

[4] Pubd. in 1932 by Methuen & Co. Ltd., London

[5] *Ibid* p. 4.

Before investigating these problems he tries to refute the views of those who deny the existence of sense-data. There is a notion, common nowadays, that "the world we perceive is an illusion and only 'the scientific' world of protons and electrons is real." This is "based upon a gross fallacy, and would destroy the very premises upon which science itself depends." Because, all empirical science is based on perception the falsity of the objects of which would entail the falsity of even scientific objects.

The data immediately present to consciousness while I perceive, say a tomato, cannot be doubted. It is possible to doubt whether the red patch perceived is a substance or an event, whether it is physical or psychical, but that there is something red and round then and there, and that *I* am conscious of it cannot be doubted by me. Without admitting some ultimate datum we cannot proceed at all; there would be an infinite regress.

Philosophical argument for proving that there are no sense-data may be either a priori or a posteriori. According to the first the very notion of givenness is absurd and self-contradictory, because it is impossible to apprehend something without apprehending some at least of its qualities and relations. The bare sense-datum is never given or apprehended as such. It is impossible to apprehend something like a patch without apprehending that it is red and round and has certain spatial relations. If this is true, then we always apprehend, as Cambridge logicians say, a fact of the form 'that A is B' or 'the B-ness of A,' and never just a datum like A. To this argument Price replies that it is irrelevant since what it proves is only that nothing stands *merely* in the relation of givenness to the mind without being also 'thought about' and related by the mind to other things; but "this does not have the slightest tendency to prove that *nothing is given at all*". On the contrary, the very fact, admitted by these thinkers, that A is apprehended as related to B itself, "presupposes the existence of A". The existence of the sense-datum is thus rather established than disapproved. The empirical argument against the existence of sense-data, used by many idealists, is that we cannot find in experience anything which is *given*. The so-called datum is seen on analysis to be nothing but a product of interpretation; therefore it is constructed by thought activity and not given to and passively received by the mind. Price points out that the word 'interpretation' may be used in different senses, such as association of ideas, some form of thinking, attention, analysis etc. If it be said that owing to any of these the object is changed and it is impossible to ascertain the datum-in-itself, and find out what is really given and what is due to interpretation, there is a great mistake. For unless something is given what could possibly be associated with or related to existing ideas or be thought about or attended to or analysed?

The existence of sense-data cannot, therefore, be doubted even though one may have doubts about their status, persistence, public character, origin and the like. It should be noted that though like Santayana Price comes to believe the undoubtable character of sense-data, he appears to differ from Santayana in so far as he regards *existence* of sense-data as an indubitable character of it while Santayana holds that even existence can be doubted. But this apparent difference is perhaps due to different senses in which 'existence' is used by the two writers. 'Existence', for Santayana, is something which implies the relation of the given to things not given in direct consciousness, whereas Price seems to mean by 'existence' (of sense-data) the mere presence to consciousness involving relations to things also similarly present. Neither Santayana nor Price would hold that sense-data possess *physical occupancy* as one of their undoubtable characters.

Taking the word 'sense-datum' in the sense indicated above, Price goes on to enquire in what way and to what extent sense-data can really give us knowledge of material things. Among sense-data he points out an important distinction. Sight and touch are the chief sources of our belief in the external world; other data like sound and smell are only auxiliary in this respect, and simply these, without sight and touch, would not yield any belief about the material world.

Price takes up the two important questions namely, how sense-data like colour and touch are related to or *belong* to material things, and what exactly is the meaning of our perceiving those things.

Now Naive Realism maintains on these two points that visual and tactual data 'belong to' material objects being parts of their surfaces and that perceiving means knowing directly that such sense-data form parts of material things. But these replies of Naive Realism become unacceptable in consideration of illusory perception. Rejection of Naive Realism gives rise to different alternative theories. One of them is phenomenalism which holds that sense-data are not identical with material things and having such data is not to know any material thing. We can perceive and know just those data and nothing beyond them. The only particulars which we can believe to exist are the sense-data.[1] The other view is the causal theory which is the official philosophy of Natural Science.[2] According to it data like colour and touch are caused jointly by the material objects and the media, the sense-organ, nerves, brain etc. through which they arise in our consciousness. So sense-data cannot be identical with parts of material objects; that can be said to belong to a material object only in the sense that the material object *causes the sense-data* with which we are acquainted. Perceiving, in this view, would then be an inference from sense-data (the effects) to material things (the causes). But none of these two substitutes of Naive Realism are considered completely satisfactory by Price. Both these views commit the fallacy of tacitly assuming "in their premises the truth of the very theory which they profess to disprove."[3] In other words. neither of these theories can stand without admitting some sense knowledge of the material .object.

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[1] *Ibid* p 282; for a criticism of this view, see Broad, *Perception physics etc.*, Chap. III (On Phenomenology).

[2] *Vide* Broad, *Op. cit.*, Chap. IV for a defence of this theory.

[3] *Perception* p. 88.

Price examines also three recent attempts to save naive realism in modified forms. Each of them tries to meet the phenomenological argument against naive realism, and shows in its own way that even in illusion the "distorted or dissociated or otherwise errant sense-datum is part of the surface of an object but 'with a difference'."

There is first an attempt, made for example by Whitehead, which may be called the *theory of multiple location.* It distinguishes between two kinds of characteristics that an object possesses, characteristics which characterize it *from a place,* and those that characterize it *simpliciter* (in itself or from no place). "The penny *is* elliptical from this and that place, and kinked from such and such others: exactly as in itself (and from certain specially favoured places) it is circular and smooth in outline." According to this theory an object is not confined to only one place, it is in places, it is "a sort of infinitely various porcupine, which is not merely here in this room (as we commonly take it to be) but sticks out as it were in all sorts of directions and to all sorts of distances, 'from' all of which it has its being and is qualified in various ways, whether present to one's senses or not".[1] The advantage of this theory of objective relativism is that the so-called errant characters incompatible with the true ones become quite compatible. The same coin can be both circular and elliptical since it has different characteristics with reference to different places. Price is prepared to concede that there is such a thing as 'being qualified from a place' which only means that it presents a particular sense-datum sensed from a particular point of view. But he doubts if it is really clear that "one and the same entity can *both* be qualified from a place, *and* be qualified simply, from no place: that it can both be elliptical from here and be circular simply".[2] What is the evidence of the existence of qualities 'from no place' (*i.e.,* perceived from no place)? This theory of Whitehead meets with the greatest difficulty in the case of double vision. It would be meaningless to say that a thing is doubled from a certain place.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 56. [2] *Ibid.* p. 57.

Doubleness is not a quality at all; there are *two* qualified *entities* when one sees double, and not merely different qualities. The theory fails again to explain hallucination where there is no entity at all to be qualified from any place. The multiple location theory cannot then save naive realism, it cannot prove that in all cases sense-data are surfaces of material objects.

Another theory, which Price finds in Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity* (vol. 2. pp 183 *et seq.*) and likes to name the *theory of compound objects*[1], is the attempt to defend naive realism by holding that "the illusory visual and tactual sense-data to which the Phenomenological argument appeals, do really in each case form parts of the surface of an object, but of a *compound* object. The stick is not bent, but the compound stick-plus-water really is bent, and the crooked sense-datum is part of its surface. These compound objects really do exist in external Nature and do have their qualities (which differ from those of their constituents taken singly) just as 'simple' objects like sticks have theirs." Price thinks that this theory is open to the following important objections:

(a) If this theory of compound objects is to be held consistently then all factors involved in the apprehension of any datum must be taken into consideration and we cannot then keep even spectacles, sense-organs, nerves, brain, etc., out of the compound of which the datum would be regarded as a part. Then every datum should be said to belong to a *compound* object; and the distinction between simple constituent objects and the compound object would be untenable. For, we cannot then know what objects are simple and what qualities they have.

(b) This theory does not really save naive realism. Because what a naive realist would be interested to hold would be that sense-data belong to individual objects like stick, water, and not to a compound object like stock-plus-water.

(c) To be accurate one should say that the crooked appearance belongs to a compound in which not only stick and water, but also air has a place. But then it would be little sense to speak of the *surface* of stick-plus-water-plus-air.

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[1] *Ibid.* 58-61.

(d) Alexander would say that when a green mountain looks purple from a distance, say of ten miles, the purpleness really belongs to the compound, mountain plus intervening atmosphere. But this is a misinterpretation of perception. It is the *mountain* which looks purple *through* ten miles of air; it is not the mountain *plus* ten miles of air which looks purple.

The third attempt,[1] sometimes made by Prichard and also by Moore, is what Price calls the *theory of appearing*. It tries to save naive realism by pointing out that a thing might have different *appearances* to different observers, though it cannot *be* of different incompatible qualities at the same time. The sense-data are such appearances. The greatest difficulty with this theory is: How can we distinguish between qualitative and existential appearances; between appearing red, green, etc., and appearing to be over there, be double, etc.? In cases of double vision there appear to *be* two existing objects. It is not possible then to maintain in every case of illusion that not the thing, but its qualities appear to be different. Sense-data cannot therefore be regarded as mere appearances distinct from real qualities.

Rejecting these various theories about sense-data and their relation to material objects, Price feels it necessary to analyse more patiently the nature of sense-data before any satisfactory theory can be reached. He finds out gradually that sense-data are not universal since what we perceive (when we have a red sense-datum) is not redness, but a particular instance of it. They are not also facts or attributes. *That a noise is loud* is a *fact* about a sense-datum, but it is not a sense-datum; it is not what I sense. Sense-data are not substances. "A colour-expanse, for instance, or a smell is created *ex nihilo* when suitable bodily and mental states are present; and when the bodily and mental state comes to end, the sense-data vanish *in nihilum*. In this respect, sense-data are unlike substances known to us".[1] Unlike substances sense-data do not change. A sense-datum appears or disappears as a whole at a stroke. Neither can we regard sense-data as phases of physical objects in view of wild or hallucinatory sense-data; nor as phases of the perceiver's mind since we cannot think of the mind being loud or round or sour and the like; nor as phases of the brain, for if the colour seen were a phase of the brain we should have perceived the brain as so coloured. If a sense-datum is compared with a material thing, it is found that the former is relatively *transitory*, enduring only for a few moments; is *spatially incomplete* having no back, top, bottom or insides, is private to the mind which senses it, is of *different kinds* (*e.g.*, colour, sound, pressure, etc.) and *lacks causal* characteristics whereas the latter (a material thing) persists for a long period, is spatially complete, is public and is the same thing to which different sense-data can be attributed.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 61.

Though sense-data cannot, therefore, be identical with material things and cannot be thought to occupy physical space, there is no doubt that we cannot perceive the existence of a material thing except through the presence of sense-data. Analysing the notion of what we mean by a material thing we find two kinds of constituent factors, in conjunction; a set of sense-data peculiarly related, and a something occupying physical space.[2] The sense-data that appear in hallucination are not in conjunction with any object occupying physical space. Now the sense-data belonging to each material thing are so related mutually that they can be distinguished from other sets belonging to other material things. Such a set is called by Price a *family of sense-data.* When we think of a material thing like a tomato, we think of a set of sense-data like a particular colour, touch, size, shape, smell, taste, etc.. intimately related. All of them are not always actually perceived. At any time, under given conditions, some are actually perceived, and the rest though not perceived, are tacitly taken to be there, and to be perceptible if some other conditions of perception are fulfilled.

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[1] *Ibid*, p. 118 [2] *Ibid.* pp. 275 and 282.

A family then consists of actual and possible sense-data which are or can be perceived when a material thing is perceived. The visual and tactual sense-data form the chief members of the family, but smell and sound also are included. The relation among the different members of the family is obviously not one of resemblance, the touch of a thing does not resemble its colour or smell. The chief relation is that all the members of the family form a group which is felt to belong to the one thing. To be sure that a colour seen is really that of a tomato, we have to find out if the other sense-data like touch, smell belonging to tomato are available there. The second characteristic relation among the data of the same object is that all are felt to be emanating from a common source in space, so that approaching towards it we can find better sense-data, that is sense-data with greater differentiated details, subject of course to some limit. As we approach a flower we can have its sight, touch, smell etc. better. There is again a *gradual transition* of sense-data of the same kind, say colours, which seem to belong to the same thing. As I go round a table or away from it the sense-data of colour, size and shape vary with the change of position; but they form a gradual transition series.

There are positions and points of view from which the best sense-data of a thing can be had. The group of sense-data thus available form a family which gives us the best apprehension of the object. These may be called the nuclear sense-data.[1] All the different distorted appearances of the object are data which can be connected with the nuclear data by the fact of a gradual transition series. The nuclear group of data gives a normal view of the material thing, whereas the distortion series gives an abnormal view. But both are of the thing and are made continuous by the gradual transition.

In the light of this conception of family of sense-data belonging to a material thing and the divergent distortion series of sense-data branching off from the normal and nuclear series in the family, Price finds it convenient also to explain all errant data. "An *hallucinatory* sense-datum is one which is completely 'wild'; it is taken to be a member of a family, but does not in fact belong to one. An illusory sense-datum does belong to a family, but does not have that place or rank in the family which we perceptually take it to have."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 222.

Phenomenalism identifies a material thing wholly with the family of sense-data belonging to it. Families do resemble material things in some respects, in which individual data do not. Like a material thing, a family, composed of all possible and actual data is enduring in time since it is composed of data perceived at different times; it is public since it contains data perceived by all possible observers; it is independent of mind since it consists of members not actually observed by any one mind at a particular time though they can be perceived if certain conditions are fulfilled. The actual existence of sense-data is of course dependent on the mind and body of the observer, but the possibility of data is independent of both mind and body.

Inspite of the close similarity between a family of sense-data and a material thing to which it is attributed, there is the great difference that a material thing is believed to possess something which a family of sense-data lacks, namely physical occupancy or impenetrability, that is, the power of resistance or obstacularity.[2] A family of sense-data belonging to a ball approaches another family belonging, say, to a wall, and it is found that it changes its course. Similarly a finger pressed against a table meets with resistance. The question arises: What is there occupying the space of the wall sense-data or table sense-data that resists and modifies in certain ways a foreign family approaching it? The natural answer is, this something is the *physical object*, and impenetrability etc. are its causal characteristics or power.[3]

It is not possible to think that these causal powers and physical occupancy belong not to any physical object but to the family of sense-data appearing there. For there are cases where causal powers are found even in the absence of any sense-data of the resisting thing. A ball thrown against an unperceived wall in the dark is found to bound back. Here wall sense-data do not actually exist, and though they are possible (if favourable conditions are introduced) we cannot think that what is merely possible, and has not itself yet become actual can produce an actual effect, like resisting the movement of the ball.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 228.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 278.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 280.

We must then believe in a physical object (in addition to sense-data) as actually occupying space and causing resistance. So Price is compelled to leave behind phenomenalism after travelling a long common route.

A material thing then consists of a family of sense-data and a physical occupant. It is possible now to give a correct definition of 'belonging to'. When we say that a sense-datum, s, belongs to a material thing, M, it is meant that, (1) s is a member of a family of sense-data F; (2) that there is a physical occupant O, with which F is coincident; (3) and that M consists of F and O in conjunction.[1]

In the light of this conception of sense-data and a material thing Price tries to understand the true significance of perceptual consciousness of a material thing like a tree. Merely to have a sense-datum or even a family of sense-datum before the mind is not to perceive a material thing. We may sense a bright colour on rubbing our eyes without accepting the existence of a luminous material thing out there, or sense a group of visual data in the form of an image in the mirror without accepting the existence of such a material thing in the mirror. Perceptual consciousness of a material thing includes acquaintance with some sense-data, but also acceptance of the existence of some physical occupant, over and above. This latter, as distinguished from mere awareness of sense-data, is called by Price *perceptual acceptance*. It is not a kind of inference from the data to the material thing; it is too immediate and direct to admit of any such explanation. The sense-datum of a tree is presented to us, and "the tree dawns on us, all in one moment."[1] There is no consciousness of mediation. Even if only the front surface of the tree is sensed, the whole tree somehow appears to be simultaneously before the mind, and we are not aware of any passage of the mind from the sensed datum to those not sensed, or from the data to the material thing.[2] Perceptual acceptance takes place *before any judgment*, doubt or resolution of doubt can take place. It is therefore 'pre-judicial'[3]. It is a non-discursive, non-active undoubting acceptance of a material thing, as though it were bodily given as intuitively or immediately as the sense-data. But inspite of such undoubting, unquestioning, intuitive character perceptual acceptance is overturned in cases of illusion and hallucination, and we are forced to disbelieve the existence of a material thing inspite of the presence of sense-data. Is it then philosophically sound to believe in the existence of material things on the ground of perception?

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 308.

In reply Price points out that the uncritical primitive perceptual consciousness of a material object *by itself* is no reliable ground for a rational, philosophical belief. But it is possible to subject the primitive perceptual consciousness to a stringent process of confirmation and, if the result is positive, we increase the degree of certainty, so that the mere unsuspecting acceptance may develop into a *perceptual assurance* based on the removal of doubts. If, for example, we sense simply the front surface colour of a table we can go round and see and touch to find if any other sense-data of the family thought to belong to a table are available. We can moreover press and strike against the supposed object and see if it possesses the causal powers of resistance, and find out thus if something can really be thought to occupy that space. As the number of possible sense-data associated with a table is theoretically unlimited, the process of discovering the specific data of the table can never come to an end. We can, therefore, only increase the degree of probability with

[1] *Ibid.* p. 141. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 150f. [3] *Ibid.* p. 163.

greater and greater positive confirmation, and feel more and more assured of the existence of material things. We can have what Price likes to call *perceptual assurance* about the material world, but never complete certainty. Like Hume Price observes that there can be no demonstrative certainty about matters of fact; nor is it possible to have any intuitive knowledge about them, excepting, of course, some facts about sense-data and ourselves. Perceptual assurance is "the very best that can be intelligibly asked for" in such cases; and perceptual assurance which "cannot strictly be called *knowledge* of the material world, is quite sufficient for all purposes of Science and of daily life"[1]. It is "rational belief, based on extremely strong evidence."[2]

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[1] *Ibid* p. 203.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 198.

CHAPTER VIII

EMERGENT EVOLUTION.

The concept of *emergent evolution* has exerted so great an influence[1] on contemporary thought that it calls for mention in a separate chapter. We shall discuss here the views of C. Lloyd Morgan who popularized this idea and of Samuel Alexander who made the most comprehensive use of it in a grand system of metaphysics. Morgan and Alexander evolved their ideas in close philosophical sympathy and there was a good deal of mutual influence. But both of them were influenced in turn by previous thinkers like Mill, Lewes, Wundt and others who recognized in different forms the truth of emergence.

1. Lloyd Morgan

"Evolution", in the broad sense of the word, Morgan states, "is the name we give to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events."[2] Now, the question naturally arises, does evolution produce any thing new, or is it simply a process that merely re-arranges pre-existing events, merely repeats the old in a new order? To this mechanism replies that changes that take place in the course of evolution are only the resultant effects of the component causes. The effects can be calculated and predicted if the whole set of conditions is known. The mechanistic interpretation regards "a chemical compound as only a more complex mechanical mixture, without any new kind of relatedness of its constituents. It regards life as a re-grouping of physico-chemical events with no new kind of relatedness expressed in an integration."[3]

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[1] *Vide*, W. McDougall, *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*

[2] *Emergent Evolution*. p. 1 [3] *Ibid*. p. 8.

Against such mechanistic interpretation Morgan holds that throughout the course of evolution we can observe the emergence of the new. "Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought." At every one of these critical stages of evolution we can notice a "new departure in the passage of natural events." Though life arises in a material body, the constitution of the living body shows a new kind of relatedness (new terms in new relations)[1] not found in a non-living body. Similarly, though mind arises in a living body, it shows a new kind of relatedness not observed in an organism devoid of thinking power. The theory of emergent evolution is based on the recognition of the emergence of such new qualities. It denies that evolution is merely repetitive. It does not deny that effects are resultants of their causes. But it adds that there is advent or emergence of the new also, and this cannot be explained only in terms of resultants. This conviction becomes very strong as we observe and compare the different grades in the entire process of evolution from the mere atoms and molecules to the most complex facts of consciousness.

The truth of emergence, Morgan points out, is also recognized in different forms by many scientific thinkers and philosophers in various spheres. J. S. Mill and G. H. Lewes draw a distinction between two kinds of effects on the basis of examples drawn from chemistry and physiology. Out of the combination of several conditions there arise sometimes properties which embody the mere addition and subtraction of the conditions; but there arise at times also some properties which are not merely additive and subtractive, not merely resultants, but altogether new and unpredictable. Mill calls this latter kind of effect 'heteropathic'. Lewes calls it *emergent* contrasting it with the former kind of effect which he calls *resultant*.

A first-hand intimate acquaintance with a variety of natural sciences, such as geology, biology, comparative psychology generated in Morgan a deep conviction about the truth of emergence in the different orders and sub-orders of evolution. In his *Introduction to Comparative Psychology* he urged that everywhere in inorganic, organic and mental evolution one can notice "an apparent breach of continuity", which is "not a gap or hiatus in the ascending line of development, but a point of new departure"; one notices, for example, that "there does not appear to be a gradual and insensible change from the physical properties of the elements to the physical properties of the compound, but at the critical moment of the constitution of the compound there seems to be a new departure."[1] He called there this persistent phenomenon, '*selective synthesis*' in evolution. But later on he prefers the more expressive term 'emergence' used by Lewes and renames his own old concept 'emergent evolution', an elaborate exposition of which he offers in his Gifford Lectures (1922) under the title *Emergent Evolution.*[2] The conception of emergent evolution described above is not committed to any particular type of metaphysics. If one rejects the idea of repetitive evolution and comes, on any ground, to the conclusion that something characteristically new emerges in course of the world's changes he can be said to be a believer in emergent evolution, be he a materialist, an idealist or a vitalist or an advocate of any other trend of thought. Though Lloyd Morgan does not deny this general significance of 'emergent evolution', he himself reaches this doctrine following a definite path which is primarily naturalistic, and he offers a constructive metaphysical view of the world consistent with naturalism interpreted in the light of emergent evolution. Reviewing the course of the world as a naturalist he is forced to accept "with natural piety"[3] the truth of emergence at all critical stages of the world's evolution. He tries to understand in a pictorial way, the entire course of evolution as a pyramid. The bottom of this pyramid is composed of physical events spatially and temporally interrelated. The physical world with ubiquitous space-time relations is the most basal level that observation reveals to a naturalist. Mere Space-time, empty of physical events, cannot, therefore, be regarded as the basis.[1] At the lowest observable physical plane the physical events are related spatially and temporally in an extrinsic or non-effective manner. These relations do not affect the natures of the terms related. Events at this level form matter systems alone. At a higher level physical events are found related intrinsically in such an effective manner as to cause the emergence of life. The relation of food to the stomach, both physical terms, transforms the food into living constituents of the body. Such relatedness, therefore, may be said to be effective and intrinsic, and to be the cause of emergence, when it is contrasted with the non-effective external relation between two billiard balls which remain unaffected even while they are related in space and time. Physical events with the new kind of relatedness at the second level form wholes which can be called life-matter systems. At a still higher level, e.g. in the human body, it is observed that another kind of effective relatedness among the living physical parts supervenes and consciousness emerges; we have then a mind-life-matter system.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 19.

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[1] *Ibid.* Appendix. p. 302.
[2] Pub. by Williams and Norgate, London.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 16 and passim.

Mind, the highest emergent, forms the top of the pyramid; but it involves life and matter too. Life forms the middle of the pyramid but it involves matter as well. There is no consciousness *observed* without life, and no life observed without matter. The higher therefore has the relation of (what Morgan calls) involution to the lower. But on the other hand how matter and life would act at the conscious level *i.e.* in a mind-life-matter system, would *depend* on consciousness. And again how matter would act at the level of life, *i.e.* in a life-matter system, would *depend* on life. Thus it would be found that just as the higher, in a particular system, has the relation of involution to the lower, the lower has a relation of (what Morgan calls) dependence on that higher.[1]

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[1] *Ibid* p. 22.

So far Morgan's thought is confined within the strict naturalistic limits of observed phenomena. He leaves behind this phenomenalism, however, to give "a constructive philosophy of emergent evolution." He *acknowledges* on the one hand the objective existence of a physical world, which, he believes, cannot be strictly proved by removing all sceptical, agnostic and idealistic objections. On the other hand he acknowledges God as the ultimate "directive Activity" behind the entire pyramid of emergence, though this also cannot be strictly proved. He reaches the physical world by "following downwards the line of involution" and God by following "upwards the line of dependence".[2] The one is the lower limit, and the other is the higher limit of constructive imagination in its attempt to understand consistently the pyramidal structure of the universe. To understand the phenomena of mere spatio-temporal character at the bottom of the pyramid he supposes, without contradicting any scientific naturalistic evidence, a physical world as its ground. On the other hand, to solve the very legitimate question: "What makes the emergent emerge? What directs the course of events in the process of evolution,", he acknowledges the existence of God. The acknowledgment of God is logically as much beyond proof and disproof as that of the physical world. But belief in both have pragmatic[3] support being valuable for life and practice.

It would be clear from this that the emergent view of the universe, as conceived by Morgan, does neither try to interpret the higher merely in terms of the lower, nor the lower merely in terms of the higher. Giving equal weight to involution and dependence it suggests a reasonable compromise, trying to avoid the monistic excesses of materialism, vitalism and idealism. Again, while it gives a full scope to causation among events within the pyramid of evolution, it assigns free causality to God as the ultimate Activity directing evolution.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 15-18. [2] *Ibid.* p. 33.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 61.

2. Samuel Alexander (1859-1938)

In Alexander's Gifford Lectures, entitled *Space, Time and Deity*[2] the doctrine of emergent evolution is formulated in "a comprehensive system of constructive metaphysics in which the speculative boldness of the great Germans" is "combined with the critical good sense of Locke, Hume and Berkeley"[3]. This work places Alexander among the few system-makers of the present age. In epistemology Alexander is a monist of the neo-realistic type, and he is, therefore, regarded as a leading exponent of neo-realism. But there are so many other aspects of his philosophy, and some of them are so far removed from the neo-realistic outlook, that his philosophy can be best described under Emergent Evolution rather than Neo-realism. The basic elements of Alexander's system can, almost always, be traced to the great philosophers of the past, and the scientific thinkers of the present times, but his greatness lies in synthesizing them into an original form all his own.

Like Lloyd Morgan Alexander is a naturalist and an empiricist, and like him Alexander too presents an emergent view of the universe. But whereas Morgan starts from physical events related in space and time and tries to show how, out of these, all inorganic material substance, life and mind can be conceived to emerge, Alexander pushes the idea of emergence still further and shows how the entire universe including all physical events, life, mind and even deity can be conceived to evolve out of bare Space-Time. In a word, for Alexander everything, except Space-

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 298. [2] Macmillan, London, 1920 (in 2 vols.)

[3] Broad, *Prof. Alewander's Gifford Lectures,* Mind, Jan. 1921.

Time, emerges out of the matrix of Space-Time. A convenient diagram by which Morgan[1] has pictorially represented the basic scheme of Alexander's philosophy consists of a 'synoptic pyramid' like the following:



ST—Space-time.
D—Deity
N—Nisus towards Deity.

Space-Time is the base of this 'pyramid of emergent evolution' and out of it emerge the higher and higher levels, matter, life, mind and deity. Deity forms the apex of the pyramid, and there is a *nisus* towards the deity inherent in the process of evolution. This explains the upward direction of the process.

The metaphysical position sketched above Alexander reaches through an empirical investigation into the nature of human knowledge and that of the different orders of existence. Alexander believes that the method of philosophy, like that of science, is empirical. Philosophy or metaphysics differs from science only in respect of subject-matter. While science deals with special aspects of existing things, philosophy deals with the most comprehensive and pervasive aspects of existence. It is "an attempt to study these very comprehensive topics, to describe the ultimate nature of existence if it has any, and these pervasive characters of things";[2] it "learns from the sciences what is life or matter or mental action, and its problem with regard to them is to ask how these orders of facts are related to one another and to the fundamental nature of things."[1] In proportion as science becomes comprehensive within its own sphere, it tends to border on philosophy. Like science philosophy proceeds on facts of experience, by reflective description and analysis; and it also uses "hypotheses by which to bring its data into verifiable connection."[2]

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[1] *Emergent Evolution* (1923), p. 11

[2] *Space, Time and Deity* (1920) Vol. I, p. 2

The empiricism of Alexander should not, however, be understood to be of the ordinary type. Though Alexander builds his philosophy on experienced facts he does not conceive sense-experience to be the only kind of experience. "Sensations though integral parts of experience are not the only ones. Thoughts are experienced as much as sensations and are as vital to experience."[3] He accepts with (what he calls) "natural piety" facts revealed by all kinds of experience, sensuous, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, social and religious; and tries to understand their mutual relations and ultimate nature in the light of some hypotheses, which he advances for the purpose. The justification for such hypotheses he finds in the satisfactory way in which experienced facts can be described, explained and understood with their help.

Though all conceivable things come within experience in the widest sense, Alexander makes a technical distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical. Some characters of experienced things are found to be pervasive or common to all objects of experience; these he names categorial, pervasive, *a priori* or non-empirical characters. There are others which belong only to *some* objects; they are, therefore, called variable, non-pervasive or empirical characters.[4]

(1) *Alexander's theory of knowledge—Neo-realism*

Alexander does not regard epistemology as the *necessary* preliminary to metaphysics;[5] as an empiricist he thinks of mind as a natural phenomenon; only it is more developed than the rest. But he himself happens to arrive at his metaphysical standpoint primarily from epistemological considerations and we can grasp his point of view more easily if we approach it through his epistemological position.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 3. [2] *Ibid.* p. 4. [3] *Ibid* p. 5. [4] *Ibid* p. 4.
[5] See his *Mind* article, *Some explanation* (Oct., 1921). p. 420.

Every experience, he observes, "may be analysed into two distinct elements and their relation to one another. The two elements which are the terms of the relation are, on the one hand the *act* of mind or the awareness, and on the other the object of which it is aware; the relation between them is that they are together or *compresent* in the world which is thus so far experienced."[1]

Perceiving, imagining, thinking etc. are mental acts. The perceived, the imagined etc. are objects. An act may be called an '-ing', and an object an '-ed', as they are called by Morgan, for the sake of a clear distinction between the two.

But it may be asked, is not an act, like perceiving, itself an *object* at least of introspection? If not, how can it be known at all? Alexander breaks away from the conception, so common in European philosophy, that to know is always to objectify. He points out that everything other than acts of mind are known of course objectively in the objective attitude; mind 'looks on at' them as objects external to itself. Even in so-called introspection we know, in the objective attitude or *extro*-spectively, some images which appear *before* the mind, and we do not know here any mental act. A mental act like perceiving is known however in the subjective way; as it is not possible for awareness or an act to hold itself before itself, an act cannot be known objectively or extro-spectively. "I am aware of my awareness as I strike a stroke or wave a farewell. My awareness and my being aware of it are identical."[2] But I am aware of an object, as something distinct from awareness and present before it. I experience a tree, for example, "as I strike a man or wave a flag." To keep the distinction between subjective knowledge and objective knowledge clear, Alexander calls the former enjoyment, and the latter contemplation. The mind, he says, *enjoys* itself; the act of mind is an enjoyment; but the mind *contemplates* a tree (in perception), an image (in memory) etc.

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[1] *Space, Time and Diety*, Vol. I, p. 11. [2] *Ibid*. p. 12.

With other neo-realists Alexander also holds that "the object is a distinct existence from the mind which contemplates it, and in that sense independent of the mind". Of course he admits that the mind often determines what object, and which part or aspect of it comes before it for contemplation. But this mental determination is really a kind of selection from what already exists.[1] The cognitive relation does not make the object. It is not also at all a unique relation. It is only a particular species of the general relation of togetherness or compresence which obtains between any two objects existing in the space-time world. The so-called uniqueness of the cognitive relation is really due to the fact that one term in the relation is a peculiar existent, a mind. Moreover, the object contemplated or known, Alexander holds with the neo-realist, is present to the mind *immediately*. He is, therefore, an advocate of epistemological monism.

The independence of contemplated objects is maintained by Alexander even in cases of imagination, and so-called introspection. The ideas that appear before the mind in such experiences are also given a place in the space-time world. While "for Berkeley reality is ideas", for Alexander "ideas are reality". Again, the identity of the object contemplated and the object existing is maintained by Alexander even in the case of memory. When we remember an object we are aware, he points out, not merely of an image in the mind. For had it been so, we could not be aware of the past at all, but would have known only a present object, an image. Memory really makes us directly aware of an object *existing* in the past. Just as we can be directly aware of a distant object through the depth of space, we can directly know a past one also through the depth of time.

Illusion presents, of course, a problem to the realist who is also an epistemological monist, and Alexander tries to solve it in his own way. He points out that "even illusory appearances are non-mental" and objective. "For they are *prima facie* on the same level as other physical appearances. The green we see on a grey patch by contrast with a red ground is as much non-mental and objective as the red. It is not an illusion that we see the green; it is only an illusion that we perceive the grey paper green. An illusory appearance is illusory only in so far as it is supposed (whether instinctively in perception or by an act of judgment) to belong to the real thing of which it seems to be an appearance. In so far as it is illusory it is not a revelation of that thing at all but *of something else. The illusion consists in the erroneous reference of it to where it does not in fact belong.* But in itself the illusory appearance is as much object as the real appearance; and only experience shows it to be misplaced."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 15-6.

If this realistic theory of knowledge is accepted it would follow that whatever object the mind can contemplate exists independently of the mind; and moreover, that mind and its objects are co-ordinate members of the world of existence. Alexander tries now to understand the ultimate nature of this world and the interrelations among its different members.

(2) *Space-Time—the ultimate stuff or Matrix*

Space-Time, conceived as 'a system of motion', is hypothetically posited by Alexander as the "stuff or matrix (or matrices) out of which things or events are made the medium in which they are precipitated and crystallised", all finites being "in some sense complexes of space and time." His procedure is not deductive, but, like that of science, empirical. He starts with the hypothesis of Sapce-Time and shows gradually that it can account for all observable phenomena, and thus the hypothesis becomes verified and justified.

If the hypothesis is satisfactory, the question why this one, rather than another, is adopted does not arise. The only useful significance such a question may have is to enquire how psychologically or historically, this hypothesis arises in the mind of the philosopher. And those who are interested in such an enquiry, find an answer in Alexander's historical reference. The present-day mathematical physics, in the thoughts of Minkowski, Einstein and others, has familiarised the conception of space and time being interdependent and fundamental in the constitution of the universe. Spinoza regarded space or extension as the stuff of which all finite material things are the modes. Kant showed that even when we think away material bodies and events, space and time, empty of empirical contents, cannot be thought away.

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[1] *Ibid*, vol. 2 pp. 185-6 (Our italics).

Suggestions for the different elements of his theory of Space-Time Alexander surely gets from many previous thinkers, but he combines them in a new and original way. The physicists and mathematicians generally take for granted the existence of some "substance, electricity or matter or what not" as occupying space-time from the beginning. This we have seen is also the view of Morgan. But Alexander starts with the conception of space-time which is devoid of all such contents, but which is capable of generating them by its essential nature of motion. Unlike Spinoza and Kant he regards space and time as but one inseparable system of motion. Moreover unlike most scientific thinkers Alexander holds that time is not a mere fourth dimension added on to the three of space, but that each dimension of space is dependent on a corresponding aspect of time.

"Space and Time as presented in ordinary experience are what are commonly known as extension and duration." We are not aware of space and time as such, except when we apprehend, in sensation or ideation, any object occupying space and time. We are aware of extension *through* the perception of extended objects, and of duration *through* the perception of an enduring object. Thi awareness of space and time Alexander calls intuitio (after Kant), to distinguish it from sensation an thought. "Intuition is different from reason, but reaso and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empirical dete minations of it."[1] In sensing a colour we are also aware of the place and the time of the colour. The consciousness of the colour and that of the place and time are not separate; the first contains and excites the second. "Every sensory act contains in itself, and consequently conceals or masks, a simpler act of intuition."[2] As we are conscious of a place coloured, the intuition of place (which may contain colour, touch or any other quality) becomes definite or determined here in a particular way (as coloured). "Consequently there are not two acts of mind but only one act of mind, which in its sensory character apprehends the colour, and in its intuitive character apprehends the place of it."[3]

Now the places and times we apprehend through the sensation of particular qualities are necessarily finite portions of Space and Time. But we 'elaborate and extend' by 'ideas and concepts' the finite parts into continuous wholes of extension and duration. Total Space and Time are thus apprehended through thought[4]. This process resembles the one by which we come to apprehend a whole tree or man when actually we sense only some parts of it. Though infinite Space and Time are reached through imagination and conception and not through sense, there is no reason to think that they are unreal. "For sense has no monopoly of reality. We reach reality by all powers. All we have to be sure of is that we use them rightly so that the whole, by whatever powers of ours it is apprehended, shall be itself and self-consistent."[5]

Moreover, sensation itself reveals that spaces occupied by different objects are not disconnected, but continuous, and that each finite space is a fragment of a wider one whose limits are not presented. The same is true also of time. The infinite Space and Time, by which Alexander means self-contained continuous wholes of spaces and times[6], are, therefore, in a way presented along with the finite. The infinite is then not a mere negative, but a positive in the lap of which, and as a limitation of which, the finite appears even in perception. Imagination and thought simply make complete and explicit this idea of infinite space and time given in perception.

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[1] Ibid.p.147. [2] Ibid.p.148. [3] Ibid. [4] Op.cit vol.1.p.41.
[5] Ibid.pp.41-2, [6] Ibid.p.48.

As we reach by synthetic thought and imagination total or infinite extension and duration in which all finite extensions and durations are contained, so on the other hand we reach, by analysis of finite extension and duration, points and events as their ultimate components. And therefore points and events are no less real than the wholes of space and time. Space and Time are ordinarily regarded as separate and independent. But their separate existence is the result of abstraction; and "a little reflective consideration is sufficient to show that *they are interdependent*, so that there *neither is Space without Time nor Time without Space;* that Space is in its very nature temporal and Time spatial."[1] The chief argument that Alexander advances to support this view is that time, apart from space, would be nothing more than a mere succession of discrete instants, and there would be nothing to unite these discrete members into a continuous whole. "Thus the mere temporality of time, its successiveness, leaves no place for its continuity or togetherness and seems to be contradictory to its continuity. Yet the two are found together in Time as we experience it. If, therefore, the past instant is not to be lost as it otherwise would be, or rather since this is not the case in fact, there needs must be some continuum other than Time which can secure and sustain the togetherness of past and present, of earlier and later. . . This other form of being is Space ; that is Space supplies us with the second continuum needed to save Time from being a mere 'now'."[2] "As Time in so far as it was temporal became a mere 'now', so Space so far as merely spatial becomes a blank. It would be without distinguishable elements. But a continuum without elements is not a continuum at all. . . That distinctness is not supplied by the characteristic altogetherness of space. There must, therefore, be some form of existence, some entity not itself spatial which distinguishes and separates the parts of Space. This other form of existence is Time."[1] "Thus Space and Time depend each upon the other."

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[1] Ibid. p. 44 (our italics).

[2] Ibid p. 46.

Space supplies the continuum without which Time would be disconnected instants, a repetition of 'mere nows', which could not even be mutually related as earlier and later. The truth of this would be evident when we remember that we cannot think of the discrete *moments* of time (past, present, future) as a continuous series or whole without representing them as a line which is but an element of space. Time, on the contrary, creates the discreteness of elements without which Space would be a blank extension. This would be evident from the consideration that we are aware of the *different parts* of a line as we perceive its parts at *different* successive moments. Without this differentiation caused by the successive times of perception, the line would be a homogeneous stretch without distinctions of parts. So Alexander points out: "Without Space there would be no connection in Time. Without Time there would be no points to connect."[2]

In fact there is "no instant of time without a position in space and no point of space without an instant of time." A point *occurs* at an instant and an instant *occupies* a point. We cannot think of the existence of a portion of space without thinking of it as existing at a particular date or time; and similarly we cannot think of a particular time without thinking of it as the time of objects existing in space. Ideas of space and time are therefore, mutually interdependent. Hence Alexander concludes:

"There are no such things as points or instants by themselves. There are only point-instants or *pure-events*"[3] "Space and Time by themselves are abstractions from Space-Time" and the real existence is "Space-Time, the continuum of point instants or pure events."

To demonstrate the intimate relation between Space and Time, Alexander goes a little further. He tries to show that corresponding to the three dimensions of space there are the three of time as well, succession of instants corresponding to the length of a spatial line, irreversibility of instants to breadth and betweenness of an instant (due to every instant being preceded and succeeded by others) to depth.[1] The way in which he proves the correspondence between the second and the third dimensions is far from clear and convincing and he himself is also aware of this. But even without this correspondence of dimension to dimension, the relation between space and time is sufficiently intimate, and very few persons will be unwilling to admit Alexander's contention that every point (or part) of space exists in many successive moments of time, and that every instant (or part) of time is in many different points of space. Thus between points and instants there is not one-to-one correspondence, but the relation of one to many.

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[1] Ibid. p. 47 [2] Ibid. p. 48. [3] Ibid.

Space-Time presents, therefore, a very complex system. It is difficult to visualize or conceive it as such. We can approach it however more easily through the familiar idea of motion. We can perceive motion and thus grasp it easily. But when we try to understand motion by conceptual analysis, we realize the complexity of its constitution. The motion of a particle, analysed in the ordinary way, is seen to be the relation of the particle to different points of space at different instants of time. Here we see the same complex relation of one to many which characterises the constitution of the Space-Time system. Alexander finds it convenient, therefore, to think of Space-Time in terms of motion. He does not however mean by motion here any particular motion but one whole motion[2] of which particular motions may be conceived as fragments or modes. If objects are all modes of Space-Time or Motion the question does not arise, how can ultimate motion exist without objects? For, even when we speak of the motion of a particle, the particle itself is a mode of Space-Time, and nothing but Space-Time is, therefore, ultimately presupposed by motion.

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[1] For detailed argument see vol. I. pp. 56f.

[2] Ibid. pp. 61f.

But how is it possible to think of objects (with all their characters) as evolving out of empty Space-Time devoid of any substance? Alexander takes great pains to remove this doubt in all its aspects. His chief arguments are as follows. First of all, there is no reason to think that Space-Time devoid of empirical objects is empty. On the contrary, as we saw, spaces are in times, and times are in spaces. So, "Space is full of Time and Time is full of Space and because of this each of them is a complete or perfect continuum."[1] Space-Time, is therefore, not empty though initially devoid of empirical or finite existences. In the second place, a finite existence is found to be synthesis of different characters, some of which (e.g. substantiality, number, quantity etc.) are common to all finites, and the rest (e.g. materiality, colour etc) are peculiar properties of particular classes of them. And all these common and peculiar characters are, as Alexander shows by elaborate discussions, nothing but different complex differentiations or modifications of Space-Time. If this is understood and accepted the puzzle how bare Space-Time gives rise to all objects disappears.

But it may be asked, supposing that all objects are composed of the stuff of Space-Time how does it follow that it is the only ultimate reality? What about mind? Is it also made of Space-Time? What we have said so far seems to apply only to the objects mind contemplates. How can it be shown that the mental acts (of which the mind is composed) are themselves in space and time, and are also made of Space-Time? That mental acts are in time, that they succeed one another is a common faith. But it is not generally admitted that they also occupy space. Descartes holds, for example, that consciousness is the very oppositive of extension, and mind cannot occupy space.

Alexander shows that space and time enter into our enjoyment of mental acts, as they do into contemplation of objects. When we remember, for example, a conversation we had with a friend in the past and the emotion we experienced then, the act of remembering is enjoyed as a present fact in relation to the feeling enjoyed in the past and enjoyed now as past. This would show that time is enjoyed in the enjoyment of mental acts,[1] and also that the past enjoyment and the present one are bound up with different places where the enjoyments take place. Thus mental acts or mind is also found to be in Space and Time. Alexander holds, as we shall see later, that mental acts are really identical with neural processes, so that awareness of enjoyment of an act of mind is nothing but the enjoyment of a neural process with its own time and space. There would remain no absurdity then in supposing mind also to be made of the stuff of Space-Time.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 56.

It will be noticed that Alexander's theory of Space-Time resembles, as it also differs from, that of Bergson. Alexander thinks highly of Bergson's service to metaphysics in so far as Bergson shows that time is fundamental in reality and that it is identical with the dynamic principle of change. But Alexander feels disappointed that Bergson should reject spatialized time, (or time spread out in successive moments, past, present and future) as unreal. Bergson erroneously thinks that the past is contained in the present. This error arises from his failure to see that though remembering is a present state it gives us a direct knowledge of past *as past.* The present state, of course, contains the past in the sense that the effects of the past are impressed on the present. But these present effects cannot carry us to the past if the *past as such* were never known in memory. "Strangely enough Mr. Bergson, whose method is distinguished by its effort to take the inside view of things, fails, as it appears, to distinguish the act of remembering, of appropriation of the past, which is really present, from the remembered past itself."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 126.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 142.

If the past is not really contained within the present, and similarly the future also is not included within the present, we are forced to think of Time as extended in different periods (past, present and future) outside one another. Time then is necessarily conceived like a spatial line. The spatial conception of time is then found inevitable and Bergson's conception of time without any trace of space is seen to be an impossibility.

(3) *The Categories*

Space-Time which Alexander conceives as "all-containing and all-encompassing system of motion" gives rise to all existents by its internal differentiation. For, objects are nothing but different kinds of groupings or complexes of motion. He shows this as follows. All objects have two different kinds of characters, pervasive and variable. The pervasive characters follow from the spatio-temporal nature common to all objects. These are called categories. The variable characters are those which are generated by special kinds of grouping of Space-Time and are found in special classes of existents. These are called qualities.[1]

The categories are "the essential and universal constituents of whatever is experienced" and they are common to the mental and the non-mental. They are *a priori*, whereas qualities are empirical. The categories are *a priori*, not in the sense that they are not experienced; but in the sense of being pervasive and universal like the *a priori* categories of Kant. Moreover the categories, we may add, are *a priori* in the sense that they can be predicted to belong to any object even before it is actually experienced. We can say from before that whatever will enter our experience must be a substance, have number and so on, but we cannot say whether it will have the quality of life, consciousness etc.

Alexander discusses the natures of the different groups of categories, such as, (1) identity, diversity and existence, (2) universal, particular and individual, (3) relation, (4) order, (5) substance, causality, reciprocity, (6) quantity and intensity, (7) whole and parts, and number, (8) motion. Kant shows how the four categories of the understanding correspond to, and are schematised by, the different aspects of time. In a similar way, Alexander also shows how the categories are derived from the different aspects of the Space-Time system.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 184.

Identity or self-identity of anything is its occupation of a definite part of space-time, diversity is the occupation of another space-time. Every object must, therefore, possess identity and diversity in so far as it occupies a particular space-time. Existence is determinate being which involves self-identity as well as diversity. What has existence has a nature of its own distinct from that of everything else. Identity, diversity and existence arise "out of the nature of any space-time, as being a part of Space-Time and therefore connected with other space-times." Universality is 'identity of kind'. Particularity is distinctness. Individuality is a unity of both. "An individual is a particular as determined by its universal." Universals are 'plans of configuration' according to which existents are formed out of Space-Time. An existent considered apart from its universal form appears as a particular, but as characterized by the universal it is an individual. "Relation amongst existents follows from the continuity of Space-Time". "All existents are in relation because events or groups of them are connected within Space-Time."[1] "Order is a category of things because of betweenness of position in Space-Time."[2] When there are at least three terms one of which is between the other two we have an arrangement in space and time called order. A substance is an existent which remains identical through successive moments of time. "All existents, being complexes of space-time, are substances" because every existent occupies space, and every space endures through different instants. "Space-Time or the system of motion is a continuous system, and any motion within it is continuous with some other motion. This relation of continuity between two different motions is causality, the motion which precedes that into which it is continued in the order of time being the cause and the other the effect."[1] A causal relation subsists between two substances containing the two motions. But when two substances are thus related they form a closed system so that the effect also reacts on the cause, just as the cause acts on the effect. This two-sided transaction is called reciprocity. The horse and the carriage pulled by it have, for instance, this relation because the horse also experiences the pull of the carriage, as the latter does of the horses.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 268.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 262.

In a similar way Alexander explains the other categories or pervasive characters of existents, as determinations of the Space-Time system. Space-Time itself is not a category since it is the ground of all categories. Motion, conceived as a whole, identical with Space-Time, is not, therefore, a category. But particular motions, the modes of Motion, possess categorial characters, being describable as causes, effects, substances etc.

(4) *Qualities*

Empirical objects or finite existents which we can experience by contemplation and enjoyment possess the common categorial or pervasive characters, of course, but they possess also in addition some special variable characters called qualities. It is possible to arrange existents in accordance with these qualities. "Roughly speaking the different levels of existence which are more distinguishable are motions, matter as physical (or mechanical), matter with secondary qualities, life, mind." All these are differentiations or groupings of Space-Time varying in degrees of complexity of constitution. They emerge out of Space-Time. "Empirical things come into existence, because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites," and in this process of differentiation either of Space and Time "creates differences in the other or breaks it up." But in a special sense Time is the source of movement, "the author of finitude". For transition or change is intrinsic to time. Time makes motion possible, and it also "provides for the ceaseless re-arrangements in Space through which groupings of motions are possible."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 279.

Time is related to space as mind is related to body. Mind and body are inseparable, so also are Time and Space. But mind initiates, guides and organizes the activities of the body, so also does Time with regard to Space. Alexander epitomizes this analogy into the formula *Time is the mind of Space*[2] (and so, Space is the body of Time). Just as Leibnitz holds that in every group of monads composing a living body there is a queen (or mind) monad, the most developed of all, so Alexander also thinks that in every configuration of Space-Time there is something that functions like a mind to the rest of the configuration which forms its body; and that at the beginning, in Space-Time itself, Time does the function of mind to Space. This analogy is taken by Alexander directly from our own mind and body, and then extended, as a metaphorical hypothesis, to all levels of existence in order to understand the guiding principle in all emergents. It is to him the clue to the emergence of qualities. At every level the highest component in that particular product of Space-Time, acts like mind to the lower components of the structure.

The first thing to emerge out of Space-Time (or Motion) by the activity of Time on space is finite motion. Simple motion spread uniformly all through Space is broken up or differentiated into simple motions of different velocities in different spaces. Finite motion is the lowest of finites. By a further grouping of finite motions there emerge 'collocation' or 'constellation of motions' of some degree of complexity creating thus matter with primary qualities of "size, shape, number, motion of various sorts."[3] Matter is nothing but a configuration or contour of motion or space-time; size, shape etc which we perceive are all manifestations of such motions. Matter with secondary qualities (such as colour, taste, temperature) emerges by a further complexity generated in motion patterns. Though the manifestation of the secondary qualities to a perceiver requires some other conditions (like the sense-organ, medium) it does not mean that such qualities are not objectively real. The secondary qualities are potentially contained in the object having a particular kind of motion-complex, even when these qualities are not perceived.

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[1] *Op. cit.* vol. II pp. 47-8. [2] *Ibid.* p. 88. [3] *Ibid.* p. 55.

Life emerges again in matter, possessed of primary and secondary qualities, by a further differentiation and complication of motion. Life is not an epiphenomenon or *by-product* of matter, since the quality of life vitalizes and pervades the material structure possessing the degree of complexity required for the emergence of life, and is, therefore, *inseparable* from that material collocation. The supposition of an 'entelechy' or 'psychoid' (as made by Hans Driesch) for explaining the organization and development of a living body is also redundant. The need of an external directive principle is not felt at all when it is realised that the plan and principle of a living structure itself possesses that directive capacity.

As we saw already Alexander holds that the highest component in any product of Space-Time acts *like* mind in that structure. In fact Time is the ultimate guiding and generating principle, and even our mind which possesses the power of direction, derives this power from Time of which it is a highly developed form. The quality of life, the highest component, in a living material body is also a form of Time, and though less developed than the conscious mind, it possesses the characteristic creative and directive capacity of time and can thus prompt and direct though in an unconscious manner, the activities of its own body.

Alexander thus steers clear of both mechanism and idealism; he is idealistic enough to admit the need of a directing principle for explaining evolution, but he is naturalistic as well, and points out that such a principle is immanent in the very nature of the spatio-temporal world, because Time is there to discharge the function.

Mind emerges in a living organism of a higher degree of complexity. As life is identical with and inseparable from the physical body which it vitalizes, mind is identical with and inseparable from the living organism which it illumines or knows. Of all the parts of a conscious living body the nervous system is known, on empirical evidence, to be more specially connected with consciousness. It is legitimate to hold then that the degree of complexity required for the emergence of mentality is not attained by every part of our body, but only by the nervous system. "We thus become aware, partly by experience, partly by reflection, that a process with the distinctive quality of mind or consciousness is in the same place and time with a neural process, that is, with a highly differentiated and complex process of our living body." The mental is thus identified with the neural process.

The mind, for Alexander, is nothing but a system of conscious acts. A mental act, again, he conceives as a conscious response (of the living body) to a non-mental object, every act invariably referring to some object beyond it. Conation is regarded, therefore, by Alexander as the fundamental nature of mind. In fact he holds that 'mind is made up of conations' and tries to explain even cognition and feeling as different kinds of activity. He finds it possible therefore to support "the conclusion that the processes of which mind consists are the highly complex movements carrying the quality of consciousness, which are described as conations."[1]

When our organism responds to an external object we are inwardly aware of this response; we directly experience it, or as Alexander likes to say, we enjoy it. The response, expressed in external behaviour can also be observed from outside or contemplated. Mind which is nothing more than acts of response by the organism is therefore said to be experienced from within or enjoyed. Mind and body (specially the nervous system) are thus the two aspects of the same process. "That which as experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is as experienced from the outside or contemplated a neural one."[1] We have here in a modern form the Spinozistic conception of mind being the idea of the body.

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[1] Ibid. p. 125.

As in Morgan's theory, so also here, we see that every higher emergent involves the lower; the higher flourishes on the lower. And, "Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage, and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages, mind in terms of living process, life in terms of physico-chemical process, sense-quality like colour in terms of matter with movements, matter itself in terms of motion."[2] Finite motion again is expressible in terms of Space-Time. Thus every quality is ultimately expressible, without residue, in terms of Space-Time. But yet what emerges is always a new quality absent at the lower level which does not possess the complexity (of differentiation in Space-Time) necessary for the evolution of that quality.

By showing that all characters of finite existences, variable and invariable (qualities and categories) can be explained in terms of Space-Time Alexander shows that his hypothesis of Space-Time being the matrix of all existence is verified and justified. But, it may be asked, are not values (truth, goodness etc.) and God irreducible to Space-Time? Alexander thinks that these also fall within Space-Time, and therefore he discusses at length the natures of values and deity.

(5) *Values*

The empirical emergents, finite motion, matter, life, mind etc., are *qualities of reality*. They are not dependent on mind or consciousness. Even an illusory appearance, we have seen, is regarded by Alexander as an object like the real appearance. But inspite of this rather extreme realism Alexander admits that there are some characters like truth, goodness and beauty, sometimes described as tertiary qualities or values, the existence of which is dependent on the mind. The emergence of mind creates a new kind of complication in the Space-Time world as mind comes to reflect on the universe out of which it has sprung. The values are the products of such interaction between the mind and reality. They arise out of mind's interpretation, utilization and appreciation, or in a word valuation, of reality. They should be called, therefore, values rather than qualities (of reality). Reality in itself is neither true, nor good nor beautiful. A proposition expressing a fact, such as 'the rose is red', is true only when it is believed; otherwise it is merely a part of reality which is neither true nor false. Similarly the colour of the rose is a part of reality, and is neither beautiful nor ugly, until contemplated and appreciated by some mind. In the same way again there is no goodness in physical facts; the goodness of a fact or an act consists in its relation to some mind whose purpose is satisfied by it. Alexander, therefore, concludes: "Values then are unlike the empirical qualities of external things, shape or fragrance or life; they imply *amalgamation of the object with the human appreciation of it.* Truth does not consist of mere propositions but of propositions as believed; beauty is felt; and good is the satisfaction of persons."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 67.

The primary qualities belong to both subjects[2] and objects, the secondary qualities belong only to objects, the tertiary qualities or values belong to the "totality of knower and known, of subject and object"; they qualify "the whole situation consisting of knower and known in their compresence." It should not be thought, however, that as values are dependent on mind, they are not real. The amalgamation of mind and object is as much a product of Space-Time as mind and its object, and therefore, the characters that belong to this union are as real as any other emergent. They are, therefore, real, though they are not the *qualities* of reality. What is more important to remember here is that even values are products of Space-Time, though their production has to be traced in a little indirect manner, as it does not fall along the direct line of the emergence of qualities.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 288 (our italics)

[2] For even minds have according to Alexander, extension, number, motion etc.

(6) *Deity and God*

On the direct upward path of emergence, deity lies next to mind. So far as our experience goes mind or consciousness is the highest *quality* that has yet emerged out of Space-Time through the creativity of Time. But Time is infinite, and there is no reason to believe that no higher quality can emerge or will emerge. On the contrary a comparison of the successive levels of emergence that have already appeared makes us think there is an upward tendency, a *nisus*, inherent in Space-Time, and that the line of emergent evolution will go up continuously. If Space-Time gives birth to motion, motion to matter, matter to life and life to mind or consciousness, it is reasonable to expect that something higher than mind will emerge out of mind as well.

But what must be the nature of that higher quality? Religious consciousness supplies the clue. The mind in worship strains towards the divine, it tends to reach out to the object of worship. The religious "emotion is our going out or endeavour or striving towards this object."[1] And "the religious emotion is one part of experience, and an empirical philosophy must include in one form or another the whole of experience."[2] On the strength of religious experience then it is reasonable to believe that deity[3] or divinity is the next higher quality that mind in travail strains to bring forth. On the analogy of the lower levels, matter, life and mind which have so far become actual, we can also exercise our imagination to guess the nature of the next higher emergent. Mind or consciousness emerges out of the living material body by the further complexity, specialization and refinement of a particular part of the body namely the nervous system. In a similar way the quality of deity will arise in a conscious, living, material body by a further specialization and refinement of the mind-bearing part of a conscious body. It means then that consciousness (or mind), life, materiality will form the body and deity will be the directing principle or mind (in the metaphorical sense) of the being of that higher level. That higher being will emerge, in a word, out of the conscious level of *existence* to which the human being also belongs, but not necessarily out of the human body. If mind is not bred in a plant body, there is no certainty that deity should be bred in a human structure.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 352. [2] *Ibid.* p. 253.

[3] 'Deity' is used by Alexander in at least three senses: (1) God or a god, (2) the quality of divinity, (3) the next higher being or quality which emerges out of any level of existence.

A being possessed of deity may be either finite or infinite. It is finite if it has for its body a finite space-time complex. Such being would answer to the conception of an angel or a god of polytheism.[2] It is infinite if its body consists of the entire universe of Space-Time. This would be God of monotheism. In either case the quality of deity would be lodged in a special part of the body of that being, and that body must contain all the levels of qualities materiality, life, consciousness and deity. Such a being, moreover, cannot be a spirit or a mind since mentality forms only a part of its inner essence, which is deity. It also follows that such a being is able to look on at consciousness as an object, just as we can know our body. Alexander, therefore, says that though man can only *enjoy* consciousness, angels, gods or God can know it as an object of *contemplation.*

It is very natural to ask: Does any being possessed of deity actually exist? In reply Alexander says that so far as finite gods or angels are concerned they may actually exist or not, we do not know what the fact is. "If Time has by now actually brought them forth, they do exist; if not, their existence belongs to the future." Though such beings are not met within our part of the universe it is quite conceivable that they may exist in, "regions of the universe beyond our ken."[3] But as regards the Infinite Deity or God Alexander's answer is that "the world in its infinity tends towards infinite deity, or is pregnant with it but that infinite deity does not exist."[1] Existence, we have seen, is determinate being; it can belong only to a finite space-time complex distinct from other complexes. Existence cannot then belong to God who is infinite. God is, "not actual but ideal". What is actual is the nisus of the whole universe towards deity,[2] its travail or straining to bring forth godhead. "God is the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of this new quality, and religion is the sentiment in us that we are drawn towards him, and caught in the movement of the world to a higher level of existence."[3]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 356 [2] *Ibid.* p. 354. [3] *Ibid.* 365.

Can such a philosophical conception of God satisfy the religious emotion of man? Alexander thinks that it can, because religion as a sentiment is "the sense of outgoing to the whole universe in its process towards the quality of deity",[4] and his philosophical conception of God is based on this religious experience. The "God of the religious consciousness", to repeat his conception, "is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus to deity".[5]

It is found then that Alexander's conception of God is nither that of theism nor that of pantheism. Though it resembles both in some respects, it is distinguished from them and other current theories chiefly by the fact that the God of man is not the highest, since in the continuous upward push of Time our God, when actualized, will strain and strive for a still higher ideal; the God of our God and so on. What is abiding or unchanging in this changing universe is not any particular emergent, nor even the original matrix, but the constant tendency of the universe to somthing higher, what Alexander calls the *nisus* to deity. God, in the sense of the universe of Space-Time with this upward tendency, is therefore always there, though deity or the quality of godhead actually emerges very late in evolution.

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[1] *Ibid.*
[2] *Ibid.* p. 429.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 359.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 400.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 362.

Philosophy cannot prove God. It only elaborates and justifies the religious consciousness which, therefore, is the ultimate source of belief in God. Faith in God is not any more uncertain than the knowledge of other minds through social intercourse, or even knowledge of objects by sense. Ultimately in all cases "it is our mental responses to objects that discover the objects to us as objects of congnition."[1] Apprehension, Alexander holds, is not distinct from conation, and conation is response to objects. It is born of reciprocity, which, we saw, is a categorial or pervasive character present, even at the lowest level, among all space-time complexes causally connected. The hand that strikes against a table is struck back in turn by the table, the hand then responds to the table's stroke; this response is senastion which makes the human striker aware of the table. Similarly as we have social intercourse with other minds there is reciprocity from both sides; and we know other minds, or as Alexander likes to put it, we are *assured of* other minds as we respond or reciprocate to them. In the same way religious emotion is also a kind of response of our mind to its object, God; and this response itself makes us believe in God. This last kind of apprehension is called *faith.*

The basic teachings of his system of philosophy rooted in the conception of emergent evolution are clearly summed up by Alexander himself in the following sentences at the close of his great work:

"Space and Time have no reality apart from each other, but are aspects or attributes of one reality, Space-Time or Motion. This is the stuff of which all existents are composed; and it breaks up of itself into those complexes within the one-all-embracing stuff." "The fundamental pervasive features of things are the categories. Besides these fundamental features, things possess quality which is the empirical feature of things. Qualities form a hierarchy, the quality of each level of existent being identical with a certain complexity or collocation of elements on the next lower level." "As existents within

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 880.

Space-Time, minds enter into various relations of a perfectly general character with other things and with one another. These account for the familiar features of mental life :knowing, freedom, values and the like. In the hierarchy of qualities the next higher quality to the highest attained is diety. God is the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of this new quality, and religion is the sentiment in us that we are drawn towards him, and caught in the movement of the world to a higher level of existence."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 428-9.

CHAPTER IX

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM

Professor Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) has earned the reputation of being one of the greatest and yet the most unintelligible of contemporary philosophers. In an age when even philosophical readers are apt to brush aside a book that does not yield its meanings at the first reading, there was every chance of Whitehead's profound works being ignored. What averted this calamity was that the present age has also a blind, sometimes almost a hysterical, regard for science and scientists, and Whitehead was primarily an eminent mathematician with a first-hand knowledge of science on which he based his philosophical speculation. Moreover he had already distinguished himself in an allied field, as the collaborator of Russell on the epoch-making work, *Principia Mathematica.*

His philosophical writings were received, therefore, with interest and their unintelligibility made philosophers strain to understand the profound, rather than shun it as obscure. With two decades' strenuous efforts, on the part of readers, and an increasing attempt to be intelligible, on the part of our philosopher, his basic concepts have passed current into modern thought.

The source of Whitehead's originality, profundity as well as unintelligibility, chiefly lies in his attempt to rebuild metaphysics on the foundation of present-day physics with all its mathematical intricacies. Though he studies with unusual zeal and insight the works of all previous European philosophers of note, and is anxious to keep within the bounds of European traditions in philosophy,[1] he regards the language adopted by the traditional systems since Aristotle as unsuitable for the expression of ideas generated by recent physics. He freely coins, therefore, his own terms, and uses many old ones in altogether new senses. The language of his philosophy thus becomes the greatest obstacle to its understanding.

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[1] *Vide. Process and Reality*, p. 58.

An exhaustive exposition of Whitehead's philosophy requires elaborate explanation of the technicalities with which it bristles. Such an attempt is plainly beyond the scope of this brief survey. But more important than these abstruse technicalities are the basic concepts and the general implications which really constitute Whitehead's contribution to, and determine his distinctive place in, modern philosophy. It is these latter with which we shall be chiefly concerned here.

1. The Point of Departure

Whitehead takes for his point of departure the conception of nature in recent sub-atomic physics and the theory of Relativity. His philosophy arises directly out of the soil of natural science in quest of a world-view that can justify and systematize scientific discoveries and can at the same time purge current philosophy of thoughts and expressions brought into vogue by scientific ideas of the previous age, now exploded. The most fundamental change of outlook he finds necessary is to give up the static or semi-static conception of the world in favour of an essentially dynamic one. That the world is made of some ultimate unchanging substances like atoms which can undergo changes in respect of mutual relations, but not in respect of their own inner constitution was the view of science till recent times. The philosophical counterpart of this semi-static notion is the view that the world consists of some substances possessing changing modes or attributes. This way of thinking finds expression in Logic, since the time of Aristotle, in the analysis of every proposition into the subject-predicate form. Common language has also been infected by this mode of analysis, as would appear from expressions like, 'Light moves fast', 'Fever rises', 'Anger passes away'—striking examples of how our language turns even a changing process into a substance. There have of course been two other extreme kinds of philosophy, that of the Parmenidian type regarding reality as altogether unchanging, change being denied as illusory;

and that of the Heraclitian type treating change as the essence of reality, permanence being denied as illusory. But their influence on logic, language and common thought is insignificant.

Now, the philosophy of permanent entities with changing modes, with its corresponding subject-predicate logic, and its typical expressions in common language, are all pragmatically the most convenient.[1] Our ordinary behaviour is based on the surface view of things, and common observation reveals to us both permanence and change. It is natural, therefore, that this semi-static view should prevail in common life in preference to the two extreme views of absolute permanence and absolute change.

Owing to the same reason Newtonian physics was so popular and it held the field for such a long time. It was based on the tacit assumption of the common view of nature with its permanent entities moving and changing in the empty and self-subsistent receptacles of space and time. Though recently physics has gone deeper into the ultimate constituents of nature and has discovered that electrons and protons are the ultimate entities and not atoms, neither scientists nor philosophers nor laymen have always been able to realize the full significance of this new theory. For under the force of old habits they are still apt to think of electrons and protons as substances occupying particular portions of space. Electrons and protons are really forms of electrical energy. In accepting them as ultimate ‘Matter has been identified with energy, and energy is sheer activity; the passive substratum composed of self-identical enduring bits of matter has been abandoned, so far as concerns any fundamental description.’”[2]

This revolution in physics demands, therefore, a purely dynamic conception of nature in which objects have to be understood wholly in terms of energy and activity, as mere differentiations or configurations of motion. If you ask, “Motion of what?” The reply would be "You are still persisting in the old habit of thinking in terms of substances and attributes, subjects and predicates, which are based on ordinary sense-perception that reveals some objects with definite outlines having movement. But this conception holds good only of the grosser sense-objects, or the macrocosmic world. When you consider further the ultimate nature of these objects in the light of physics they dissolve into energy, activity, motion or process, without residue. So in the microcosmic world contemplated by physics no entity is left to claim motion as its attribute or predicate."

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[1] [illegible] and Reality, pp. 109-110.

[2] Whitehead, Nature and Life, p. 80.

An important result of this dynamic conception is that we cannot regard any object as having a self-enclosed existence within clear-cut boundaries. Such an isolated view of objects breaks down as soon as we are able to regard an object as a "set of agitations", as a mere configuration of energy or process. The form of an object like a chair is found then to be but 'the form of process', its apparent stability simply implies that "some elements in the nature of a complete set of agitations may remain stable as those agitations are propelled through a changing environment. But such stability is only the case in general, average way."[1] Being thus nothing but a group of processes or set of agitations, the object must be continuous with the rest of the universe, just as every wave in the ocean affects, and is affected by, and is therefore continuous with all other waves. "Any local agitation shakes the whole world. The distant effects are minute, but they are there." Thus the conception of isolated, localized objects gives way to the conception of a fluent nature which is composed of mutually determined and interrelated processess or agitations. Whitehead protests, therefore, against the common idea of 'simple location'[2] i.e. the idea that objects are located at particular isolated positions in space and time.

Alongside of this dynamic conception of Nature there has also been another revolution in science regard-

[1] *Ibid.* p. 31.

[2] *Vide Science and the Modern World*, pp. 64f. (Pelican Series).

ing the conception of space and time, owing to the researches of Einstein and others. It is the view of such thinkers that space and time are not absolute and independent, but relative and interdependent. Time cannot be observed and measured without space, and the observation and measurement of space involve time. They are thus inseparable and taken together they give rise to the conception of a four-dimensional Space-Time. The commonsense view of time is only an abstraction that separates one dimension from the four, and similarly the common idea of space is an abstraction of the three dimensions, considered together and apart from the fourth. These abstract space and time are mistakenly regarded as concrete by, what Whitehead calls, 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness'.[1]

Moreover, according to this new conception, space and time are not empty receptacles of objects; they are nothing more than the different kinds of interrelations among processes or activities to which all objects are ultimately reduced.

The most embarrassing consequence of this relativistic conception of space and time is that neither space nor time is one; there are many spaces and times, rather many space-times. For space is nothing but an order or relation among different contemporary processes, and time is nothing but a relation among different non-contemporary or successive events; and events which appear contemporary or non-contemporary from a particular point of view to a particular observer, may not be so from another standpoint. I may perceive at this instant, for example, several stars and earthly objects spread out before me in the same space because they present themselves to *me* at this instant. But if I consider the different times that light takes to reach me from the various stars, I can realize that what are present to *me* now as contemporaneous will not appear so to an observer on one of these stars. A phase of the star present to me *now* may have been present, to that observer *twelve years ago*. If we remember this we have to admit that presentation of objects as together or as successive must depend upon the standpoint (the distance and direction) of the observer in relation to the objects observed. There would, therefore, be as many different orders of presentations as there are observers. And if space and time are but the relations in which our percepts are presented as arranged, there must be as many spaces and times as there are view-points, or ways of experiencing objects. But as objects themselves are ultimately nothing but bits of processes, spaces and times are nothing but different kinds of relations among processes.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 66.

This new dynamic and relativistic conception of nature demanded by the recent scientific theories of matter, space and time is the starting point of Whitehead's philosophy. He finds that scientists themselves are not fully aware of the far-reaching implications of the latest discoveries of science. They think and speak in terms of the old static or semi-static conceptions of nature and stick to the old conceptions of space and time as discrete independent, absolute receptacles of objects. "The result is a complete muddle in scientific thought, in philosophic cosmology and in epistemology."[1] Whitehead's task is to expose these errors and consistently carry the new revolutionary outlook of science into the realm of philosophy.

2. The Reformation of Epistemology

The picture of the world drawn above on the basis of the account of matter given by modern science does not however quite tally with our common observations of perceptible objects. Philosophy must be co-herent and must explain all observed facts. Scientific observation of minute objects, and common observation of gross ones through the unaided senses, must be equally explained by the philosopher's conception of the world. Whitehead accepts this principle. But he finds ordinary observation, and epistemology based on it, involved in some mistakes.

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[1] *Nature and Life,* p. 19.

When these are removed, the findings of sense-perception can be easily harmonized with those of science. He feels, therefore, the necessity of reforming current theories of knowledge, as a first step to the proper understanding of Nature. Whitehead's philosophy of Nature cannot be accepted, nor understood, therefore, without grasping his epistemology. He is strongly opposed to epistemological dualism. Nature perceived and nature existing are not two, but one. Apparent nature is the only nature we know and can legitimately speak about. There is "but one nature, namely the nature which is before us in perceptual knowledge."[1] Many philosophers, beginning from Locke down to present-day epistemological dualists, have concluded, chiefly from the transmission theory of light, that colours which we see in objects are not there; objects contain only some powers of reflecting particular kinds of rays which stimulate the visual sense in particular ways, and the result is the sensation of different colours. Similar arguments have been advanced for holding that other kinds of sense-qualities also are not there in objects, but only appear to be there. The consequence of such thought has been the bifurcation of nature into the apparent and the real:— colours, smells, sounds etc. are only apparently in objects of nature, they are the products of the interaction between our bodies and real nature which is composed, say, of electrical energy, and devoid of sensible characters.

Whitehead repeatedly protests against such bifurcation of Nature.[2] He points out that if we are to disbelieve the testimony of sense-perception consistently, we could not even believe in the existence of our own bodies, brains or nervous-systems, depending on which we explain away the perceived qualities of nature. "We may not lightly abandon the castle, the planet and the crimson cloud, and hope to retain the eye, its retina, and the brain."[3] The scientist who reaches the conception of nature as nothing but energy, himself builds on what he *perceives* of Nature;

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[1] *The Concept of Nature*, p. 40.
[2] *The Concept of Nature*, Chap. II.
[3] *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 10.

and if he were to deny the reality of perceived nature he would only cut away the ground from beneath his own feet.[1]

We cannot explain why out of the interaction of energies colours, smells and sounds emerge in perception. "Knowledge is ultimate. There can be no explanation of the 'why' of knowledge; we can only describe the what of knowledge. Namely we can analyse the content and its internal relations, but we cannot explain why there is knowledge."[2] In his philosophy of Nature Whitehead tries to include in a single and continuous system microcosmic phenomena like electrons and protons, as well as macrocosmic objects of perception. He removes altogether the dualism between Nature causing perception and Nature perceived, by showing their fundamental unity.

As an epistemological monist, he treats objects, space, time and all other entities from the same point of view. He sees, no reason for making any distinction like phenomenal objects and things-in-themselves, apparent space and real space, apparent time and real time. On the contrary, like a phenomenologist, he takes objects, space, time etc. as they are experienced and tries to understand their interconnections. As he says, "We must avoid vicious bifurcation. Nature is nothing else than the deliverance of sense-awareness. We have no principles whatever to tell us what could stimulate mind towards sense-awareness. Our sole task is to exhibit in one system the characters and inter-relations of all that is observed."[3]

But Whitehead does not accept the view held by some epistemological monists (e.g. some neo-realists) that our mind is like a passive search-light illuminating objects.[4] On the contrary he admits that perception, and the characters of objects perceived, are determined to a very great extent by the percipient, his body and mind. Nature, so to say, flows into the mind and flows out, transformed by it, into the panorama of perceived objects. Every sense-preception is determined by the spatio-temporal position of the perceiver, the constitution of the perceiving mechanism, senses, nerves, brain etc. and his previous ideas.[1] Yet we have no reason to reject what is perceived as merely apparent, for that is what we can hope to know if we must know at all.

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[1] *Ibid.* [2] *The Concept of Nature*, p. 32.

[3] *The Concept of Nature*, p. 185.

[4] *Vide The Principles*, p. 14.

It is a mistake to think of the perceiver and the perceived, as mutually independent. The bifurcation of the world into subjects and objects, is as erroneous as the bifurcation of Nature into the apparent and the real. The perceiver is a part of the world perceived. His perception is, therefore, nothing but a view of the universe as reflected from one of its own fragments. Every one of such views has, therefore, also a right to be taken into account in the formation of a co-herent view or philosophy of the universe.

But though the evidence of sense-perception must form the basis of our philosophy of nature, we have to sift it at every step; we must purge it of some wrong interpretations, vagueness and confusion[2] and explain it in a way consistent with our total experience.

Whitehead finds it very necessary to remove some common misconceptions about knowledge. Knowledge is commonly thought to be passive, and to be very different from action. But it would appear, from what has been said above, that knowledge issues from a reciprocal interaction between one part of reality and the rest of reality. It is rather an active relation between a part and the whole, a kind of 'self-knowledge' enjoyed by an element of the whole respecting its active relations with that whole. Whitehead, therefore, declares that "knowledge is merely the other side of action."[3]

Another common mistake about sense-perception is to ignore its reference to the percipient's body, and consider only its outward reference to objects. Sense-perception has a dual character—it refers at one end to the body, and at the other to the external object. It, therefore, reveals both the sides. As we touch a stone we are as much aware of a condition of the hand, as of the object touched. Similarly in other kinds of sensation. In the case of vision reference to the body, the organ of sight, is almost suppressed, and attention is directed to the object out there. But even there a little scrutiny reveals the stress and strain felt by the eye in seeing objects.[1] By neglecting this bodily reference one comes to neglect the continuity of the percipient with the rest of nature, and thinks that perception is the revelation of an object away from, and unrelated to, the perceiver. In truth it is the revelation of an active relation existing between the perceiver and nature of which he is a part.

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[1] *Nature and Life*, pp. 77-8. [2] *Ibid*, p. 64.
[3] *The Principles*, p. 14.

Visual perception gives the misleading suggestion not only of a gulf between the observer and the observed, but also of the static and discrete nature of objects. Epistemology generally attaches more importance to visual, than to other kinds of, perception, and philosophy follows suit by forming its conception of Nature on the pattern of visual objects. This is unfortunate. Vision comes last in the order of evolution, and many lower animals do not possess it at all. It is of course the most helpful for life, but it throws the least light on the nature of reality.[2] Visual knowledge should, therefore, be checked and modified in the light of knowledge afforded of reality through the other senses. And then we can realize that perception is really an active affair, an interaction between the percepient and the perceived, that the perceived world is continuous with the perceiver, and moreover that objects perceived are inseparably connected and are undergoing changes. Such would be the notion, for example, of a man born blind and knowing the world through active touch, smell, taste and sound. He would rather feel that he is moving and maintaining himself in streams of forces, than find himself taking an isolated and static position in a motionless field of extension.

Another epistemological mistake Whitehead tries to correct is the supposition that consciousness is the essence of mind, and all experience must be conscious.

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[1] *Nature and Life*, pp. 63f.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 74.

"Mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness".[1] In fact consciousness represents only the highest phase that mind occasionally attains. Consciousness is a flickering flame that arises from a back-ground of experience or feeling.[2] This outlying region of the mind determines to a great extent the nature of consciousness. It is this which forms its base and deserves, therefore, much more attention than philosophy generally gives to it. Analysis of the non-conscious phases of mind supplies, as we shall see, a wealth of information which gives Whitehead's philosophy a distinctive stamp.

What is common to all phases of mind is called by him experience, and sometimes feeling, and he observes, therefore, "The principle that I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness."[3] On this principle it becomes easy for him to understand the continuity between mind and life. Life is unconscious, but it possesses experience like mind. Even so-called inorganic processes involve an unconscious kind of experience, as we shall see. So experience is universal. All existence is continuous as Leibnitz correctly thought.

With Locke and Leibnitz Whitehead believes that what is unconscious can gradually attain consciousness through a continuous process of increasing intensity. "There is nothing surprising in this conclusion; it happens daily for most of us, when we sleep at night and wake in the morning". "We sleep; we are half-awake; we are aware of our perceptions, but are devoid of generalities in thought; we are vividly absorbed within a small region of abstract thought while oblivious to the world around; we are attending to our emotions—some torrent of passion—to them and to nothing else; we are morbidly discursive in the width of our attention; and finally we sink back into temporary obliviousness, sleeping or stunned."[4]

It is thus found that consciousness forms only a small fraction of our entire experience. Philosophy is generally based on conscious experience, and misses, therefore, much that is of real informative value, and also the real significance of experience and consciousness. "In fact, most of the difficulties of philosophy are produced by it."[1] Whitehead tries, therefore, to dive back into the complex elements of inarticulate experience not illuminated by consciousness and yet not beyond the reach of our feeling and intuition.

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[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 118.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 72.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 378.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 224-5.

3. The basic Concepts of Reality

Epistemology based on a correct interpretation of knowledge and experience as suggested above furnishes the idea of a dynamic world in which all that is, is inseparably related. We know the world in so far as we are modified by the rest of the world, or rather as the world goes on through us. The entire world thus manifests itself through its part, each of us.

The basic category in the conception of such a world would naturally be *movement* or *process*, not substance or fact which carries the idea of a static, finished entity. But here the question naturally arises what kind of movement or process? We generally distinguish between movement in organic bodies, externally initiated, and movement of living organisms originating spontaneously from within. We do, moreover, sometimes speak of the movement of thought. Whitehead does not like to treat such distinction as of any fundamental importance, though it may possess sufficient practical value. He is consistently inspired by the idea of continuity running through all levels of existence, lifeless matter, living matter and mind. The justification for choosing such an attitude is that he finds in it a greater hope for a coherent interpretation of the universe, in its microsmic, as well as, macrocosmic aspects.

When all bodies, the so-called living and the nonliving ones, have been reduced by science to configurations of energy mutually determining one another, the distinction between spontaneous movement and externally initiated movement can not stand in the ultimate analysis. "Existence is activity"[1] and the activity of a so-called living body depends on the environment. It can no longer be treated as an isolated system. Influence is constantly flowing into the living body out of the non-living world, and the self-activity of the living body can scarcely be maintained on a closer view. Our body is sustained by the entire world around us without which its life would be unthinkable.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 226.

In the same way our soul is sustained by the body and the external world in all its experiences and activities. Experience is impossible without the world experienced. "All the emotions and purposes, and enjoyments, proper to the individual existence of the soul, are nothing other than the soul's reactions to this experienced world which lies at the base of the soul's existence. Thus, in a sense, the experienced world is one complex factor in the composition of many factors constituting the essence of the soul".[2] On the other hand "our experience of the world involves the exhibition of the soul itself as one of the components within the world."[3]

There is thus "a unity of the body with the environment, as well as a unity of body and soul into one person". The fundamental essence of our experience discloses the 'togetherness of things' and points to the truth of some 'doctrine of mutual immenence' of all things. In the ultimate analysis we cannot isolate the processes of so-called inorganic objects from those of living ones, and those of the latter from the processes constituting the soul, though these different kinds of processes do exhibit some peculiar characters and patterns which justify to a certain extent the distinction commonly made among them for practical purpose. The world of reality is organically one.

In describing this world of process it is possible to take our key notion from the inorganic world or the world of life or that of mind, just as we please, and can thus attempt an explanation of the whole in the light of its particular aspect or part. The materialist chooses the first alternative, a vitalist like Bergson the second and an idealist the third one. Whitehead's choice hovers about the second and the third, rather than the first. Of course like an emergent-evolutionist he tries to point out the characteristic peculiarities of each level of activity or process. But still he traces even in the lowest level of existence some inklings of the highest. Even in the activities of so-called lifeless world he sees rudiments not only of living processes but also of feeling and experience. He repudiates the realistic 'notion of vacuous actuality,'[1] that is, the notion that a real thing can exist 'devoid of subjective immediacy', devoid of feeling.

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[1] *Nature and Life*, p. 96.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 85.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 84-5.

This idealistic leaning is the logical consequence of his method of approach to reality. We must approach, he holds, the world through our own body and mind, through our own living experience ; and the world gets known only to the extent, and in the manner, it runs through our own body-mind, that is, it expresses itself through our experience. We know the falling of a leaf from a tree or the movement of a man's pulse in so far as *we* are stirred and moved by it. We find, therefore, that some of the terms (e.g. experience, subject, emotion, enjoyment, satisfaction, feeling), Whitehead uses to describe the universal characters of all processes, are what we usually use only of mental ones. This has proved a stumbling block to the understanding and acceptance of his philosophy. But once we grasp his method and point of view, we should have no difficulty in following what he *means.* We must remember that he attempts to construct a cosmology out of elements that enter into and constitute our experience not necessarily conscious. Therefore, "The key notion, from which such construction should start, is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life."[2]

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[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 39.

[2] *Nature and Life*, p. 96.

Whitehead's interpretation of the world is idealistic also in a subtler sense, a sense in which William James understands idealism, namely as, the tendency to understand the lower in the light of the higher. The present age is dominated by the spirit which inspired Darwin, and it is materialistic in so far as there is all through an attempt to understand the higher in terms of the lower, the end in the light of the beginning. In tearing himself away, from this current tendency, Whitehead shows the influence of the great Greek philosophers,[1] Plato and Aristotle, whose insight he frankly admires and follows. Like these thinkers, therefore, he looks on the world as the expression of ideals, and tries to discover the end dormant in the beginning, the form contained in matter or fact.[2] That is how he comes to treat the inorganic as a latent embodiment of life and mind, towards the attainment of which it moves.

All processes underlying the universe naturally appear to Whitehead as examples of '*creative advance*'. Activity is never blind or aimless though it sometimes seems so to a superficial observer. The philosophic understanding aims at 'piercing the blindness of activity' and discovering its meaning, purpose and aim, in a word, the teleology behind it. Such teleological activity is the root of all special activities, inorganic, organic and mental. It is named by Whitehead *Creativity*, and is described as "the universal of all universals," "the ultimate principle", "the principle of novelty". "The 'creative advance' is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates."[3]

One should not wonder why 'creativity,' rather than some substance should be the starting point of Whitehead's philosophy. For we have already seen the reasons that lead him to think that act or process is more fundamental than a fact or a substance. It is sure that he admits the necessity of God for the creation of the actual world. But even the idea of Creator or God is based on creativity. God, as creator is but a concrete, determinate form of creativity.

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[1] *Vide Process and Reality*, pp. 58-4.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 27, p. 54 *et passim.*

[3] *Ibid.* p. 28.

He is but the primordial actual form in which creativity is manifested for creating an actual and definite world. Creativity is, therefore, the underlying basic principle even behind God's creation of the world. God is, therefore, described *in this aspect*, as "the primordial, non-temporal accident" of 'creativity'. We shall discuss more fully later this conception of God. But let us try to understand now without referring to 'God', how far this dynamic principle of creativity can explain all facts of experience.

The ultimate *facts experienced* by us, those behind which our experience cannot go, and of which the world in space and time is made are the smallest bits of process called by Whitehead *actual occasions* or *actual entities.*[1] They are described sometimes as sensible objects,[2] sometimes as 'drops of experience'.[3] An object of perception like a chair or a table is but a 'society' or an interrelated system of innumerable actual entities.[4] Such an object occupies many points of space and many instants of time. A chair is simultaneously at different parts of space and endures through different moments of time. Now if we think of the smallest part of the chair as existing for the smallest period of time what we arrive at is a simple or atomic element or component of the chair, and such an atomic entity is called an actual entity.[5] It is the simplest bit of process experienced by us.[6] A chair is only a nexus of such processes or minute drops of experience, related among themselves in spatial and temporal ways. So a chair is experienced as extended in space and time. A sensation of colour or sound or smell, or a flash of imagination or emotion or thought would be an example nearest to an actual occasion. Whatever example we try to mention turns out to be analysable into more than one actual occasion or element of experience. Hence an exact example cannot be cited. But this does not mean that there is no such simple element of experience or process as an actual occasion. For, we cannot resist the analysis of an actual composite into actual atomic elements, and had not these elements or parts entered our experience, the composite whole would never have been experienced.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 24.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 101.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 25.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 87.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 111.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 55.

The continuation of a chair through time is nothing but a continuous series of changing states we experience of it. This *continuity* enables us to *recognize* the chair as the same chair, inspite of its changing states. In the language of Whitehead the chair is composed of a continuous procession of actual entities. One actual entity yields place to another; there is, therefore, a succession or 'transition'[1] of actual entities in the world. But there is no succession or change within each such entity, since by supposition, it is spatially and temporally atomic and so not divisible into successive parts. An actual entity itself is, therefore, changeless. It is the ultimate creature of creativity. It only becomes, and perishes. It "cannot have any external adventures, but only the internal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end,"[2] Whitehead's conception of an actual entity, as he himself notes, resembles Leibnitz's conception of monads, the difference being that 'monads change' whereas actual entities 'merely become'.[3] Another difference, as we shall see, is that an actual entity is not self-enclosed or windowless.

In so far as the life of an actual entity is one moment or 'occasion of experience'[4] it is also named an *actual* occasion. Its existence entails the minimum quantum of extension in respect of time and space. An interrelated series of actual entities, as illustrated by the continued existence of a molecule for a few moments, is called by Whitehead an event.[5] An actual occasion is the limiting point of an event. If we shorten the historic route of the molecule, the limit would be the molecule existing in one moment, and this would be an actual occasion. A more complex organization of actual entities, than an event, is found in what we call an object such as a table. The table which we recognize as a particular table is analysable both as a society[6] (or intimate group) of co-existent elements, in different parts of space and also as a continuous succession of such societies during different moments of time. The unity of such an object depends on its recognizability by a perceiver. The atomic actual entities are the ultimate entities that we actually experience.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 298. [2] *Ibid.* p. 55. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 185 (Pelican).

[5] *Process and Reality*, pp. 101 and 111.

[6] *Ibid.* pp. 47-8.

Though an actual entity is an ultimate unit of experience, and is, therefore, non-composite *as felt*, we can analyse by thought the various factors that must have combined to make this experience emerge into the world of existence. One, and the chief causal factor, must of course be creativity, the ultimate source of all creation. But creativity cannot produce an actual entity, say a colour, out of nothing. It must produce the colour out of the pre-existing world. But this world is also composed of other actual entities, which again are the previous products of creativity itself. The absolute freedom of creative activity is thus fettered by its own previous creatures, the actual entities. The future can be created only out of the present. Moreover in the production of any actual entity, not some, but all actual entities contribute their share of influence, though their effects are not all equally noticed. This is but a corollary of the theory of relativity previously discussed, according to which every event is related to, and is determined by, every other event in the world. Whitehead holds, therefore, that for the birth of every actual entity the whole world is in travail. Each actual entity thus expresses the whole world. It should be admitted, of course, that all that exists in the world is not related to the birth of every actual entity in the same way, for otherwise there would have been a mere repetition, and no variety, of actual entities. The relation and influence of every constituent of the world is not the same with respect to the production of any particular actual object. One is more intimately and directly related, another more remotely and indirectly. Such distinctions Whitehead recognizes as those of relevance, and says that the degree of relevance (of any particular actual object in respect of the birth of another) varies from case to case.[1] Hence all products are not of the same nature, though each is produced by the whole world. The question why all actual entities are not equally used for the production of every entity does not arise if we remember that inspite of its partial dependence on given data or existing conditions, the creative activity remains partly free in respect of its mode of reaction to the data, it exercises this choice in novel ways on different occasions.[2] "Creativity is the principle of novelty"[3].

This activity by which the diverse elements of the world are synthesized and integrated into the concrete unity of a new actual entity is a creative synthesis. The process by which such a concrete is produced is called by Whitehead *concrescence.* As he puts it: "Concrescence is the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel one."[4] The production of new entities by new integration of the diverse existing elements of the world is then what is meant by concrescence.[5]

We find, therefore, by analysing the internal composition of an actual entity, two factors contributing to its becoming; creativity and actual occasions composing the entire existing world. But when we consider the fact that out of an existing world of actual entities creativity has a *choice* of creating a particular actual entity rather than another, we must recognize a third factor too, namely alternative *possible forms* of synthesis. These forms as possibles are not existents, but non-temporal entities. They are named, by Whitehead, '*eternal objects*' or 'potentials'. "The eternal objects are the pure potentials of the universe."[6]

The recognition of this kind of entities is nothing new in philosophy. We have 'form' as opposed to 'matter' in Aristotle, 'possibility' of 'essence' contrasted with 'actuality' or 'existence' in several other thinkers, *e.g.*,

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 69 and 206.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 65.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 28.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 299.
[5] *Ibid.* p. 29.
[6] *Ibid.* p. 208.

Leibnitz and Kant. The justification for admitting this additional class will be clear from the following consideration. If a man is asked to imagine a square or a circle he can imagine it; but if he is asked to imagine a square-circle, he cannot. That shows that imagination does not depend simply on the imagining act of the man but also on the intrinsic nature or essence or form of the thing to be imagined. A man can express or actualise through imagination, only what is possible, and not the impossible. The possible, then, must be admitted to be the prior logical condition of the actual. Given a free power of imagination, only possibles can be imagined. Similarly given the creative power and materials, like the many actual entities, they can be synthesized only into forms which are possible. We must admit, therefore, possible forms in addition to pre-existing actual entities and creativity, in order that we can understand the birth of a particular kind of new actual entity. This is why Whitehead recognizes this additional class called eternal objects. These are eternal as possibles, just as triangles and their properties are eternal, and are logically prior to their actual discovery by a Euclid at a particular time.

An eternal object is thus the definite form into which creativity casts, on any particular occasion of experience, the material of the existing world (that is, the existing actual entities) for the production of a particular new actual entity. But a new actual entity may be either objective *e.g.* a colour, or subjective, *e.g.* a feeling of pleasure; and each has a definite form of its own. So, Whitehead speaks of two primary kinds of eternal objects, objective and subjective. The sense-data (colour, sound, taste etc.) are eternal objects of the objective kind.[1] Any "determinate way in which a feeling can feel" (*e.g.* "an emotion or an intensity, or an adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain") is a subjective type of eternal object.

We find, therefore, that no actual entity, having either a subjective or an objective form can emerge unless an eternal object enters into its composition to give it that particular form. This process of the 'entering' of the eternal object into the constitution of an actual entity is called by Whitehead *ingression.* As he puts it: "The term ingression refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* *pp.* 84, 86 and 412-3.

We had been describing so far the emergence of actual entities in an objective way. But to understand Whitehead's conception more fully we must approach the matter in the subjective manner, for, as we saw, his own approach is primarily subjective. The emergence of the world for him is nothing else than its emergence through experience. Entering into this subjective attitude we must realize that to say that creativity produces a new actual entity with the help of existing actual entities and eternal objects is only to express the fact that the creative energy pulsating within each of us synthesizes the impressions coming from all existing objects of the world into a definite form, and thus there arises one experience of a definite colour, sound or pleasure. Actual entities thus turn out to be 'drops of experience'. As Whitehead puts it: "Each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is a process of 'feeling' the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of one individual 'satisfaction'."[2]

Every bit of experience within us can be regarded then as a bit of teleological process. Actual entities of the existing world supply the data which are sought to be unified, through the act of feeling, into one definite form, and the fruition of the effort, the satisfaction of the innate urge to create, is marked by the emergence of a novel actual entity in experience. The actual entity so achieved is, therefore, called in this aspect, a satisfaction. This feeling of satisfaction is the value which can be said to be the purpose of each creation. Value is the feeling tone emerging out of the actualization of the potential. "It is the ultimate enjoyment of being actual."[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 31, *et passim.*

[2] *Ibid.* p. 55.

What we call 'a matter of fact' and conceive as a finished, static object of nature, is nothing but an actual entity, in its completed phase, regarded in abstraction from the internal process leading to such completion and satisfaction.[2] We disregard the underlying process and attend to the product achieved, we disregard concrescence and attend to the concrete. The world at a moment is nothing but a nexus or interrelated system of objects representing co-existing satisfactions or actual entities.

No satisfaction is however absolutely final.[3] For, as we saw, out of the present universe of completed actual entities new ones are built by creative experience. There is a kind of complex dialectical growth here as in Hegel's philosophy. An actual entity perishes as soon as its process of completion, through the synthesis of previous entities and eternal objects, is over. But in so far as it contributes to the formation of succeeding actual entities by becoming a potential material for it, its effect continues in its products, the succeeding generations of objects. In this sense an actual entity, is said to possess 'objective immortality'.[4]

As Whitehead rejects the conception of substance, there is no abiding soul. There are only successive experiences; and a subject or knower is also nothing more than an experience itself regarded as performing the particular function of knowing objects, that is, holding the many data and reducing them, through feeling, into one object. Such experience belongs to an actual entity in its process of emergence. For the process of the birth of such an entity is nothing other than this unification of the existing entities and eternal objects in an individual experience of a definite form. It appears, therefore, that an actual entity in this aspect of experiencing is itself a *subject*. As an experiencing subject the actual entity can be said to enjoy the process of creating itself out of its data. The completion of its self-creation is a source of satisfaction. An actual entity can, therefore, be said to enjoy its self-emergence. Value is thus ingrained in the very existence of the activity of the actual entity. As an entity which comes to exist through its own activity an actual entity answers to the conception of substance found, for example, in Descartes.[1] An actual entity is thus a subject and substance in one. It is a self-creative centre of experience. In so far as this subject emerges *out of* the pre-existing world of actual entities it is called by Whitehead a superject or subject-superject.

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[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 87.

[2] *Process and Reality*, p. 35.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 155.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 40 and 305.

Now the process of experiencing or perceiving by which an actual entity as a subject *holds* and absorbs each of the diverse data, Whitehead calls *prehension* (which literally means grasping or holding). "Each process of appropriation of a particular element", says he, "is termed a prehension".[2] The actual entity as an experiencing subject holds or prehends the many data together to unify them into one experience. The data for creation, as we saw already, are previously existing actual entities, and eternal objects. Prehensions are, therefore, of two kinds, namely prehension of existing actual entities (which he calls physical prehension) and that of eternal objects (which is called conceptual prehension).[3]

In creating itself an actual entity prehends or admits into its private immediate experience *all* actual entities whose influences are felt in different degrees of intensity. But as these can be synthesized only into *some* definite forms, only some of the eternal objects can be appropriated.[4]

There must be thus a process of selection of the relevant ingredients and rejection of the opposite. The admittance of the relevant is positive prehension, whereas elimination of the irrelevant is negative prehension. Positive prehensions are also sometimes called feelings, in a narrow sense of the word.[1] What is eliminated or not allowed to enter into the experience of the moment exerts a kind of negative influence on such experience, as we feel, for example, when we try to withdraw attention from something claiming attention. Whitehead observes, therefore, that even a negative prehension colours the subject's experience to a certain extent.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 68-9.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 309.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 81.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 209.

Now given the material or data for prehension and the selecting subject (the actual entity striving to emerge through feeling) the forms of experience or feeling of the subject may be of diverse possible kinds. The data may be felt and experienced in the form of an emotion (horror, disgust etc.) or valuation, aversion, consciousness etc.[2] These forms in which the experience of the subject is enjoyed are called by Whitehead 'subjective forms'. What would be the subjective form in which given data will be experienced (whether the completed process would be marked by a tone of feeling, thinking or evaluating or anything else) depends on the directing tendency inherent in the process. This is termed 'subjective aim'. Every bit of activity being teleological, there must be an aim inherent in each actual entity as a subject. The subjective form of a particular actual occasion is, therefore, said to be determined by its subjective aim.[3] The truth of this statement may be realized by considering the fact that an experience of 'red colour' may be to us an occasion for joy or disgust or horror or contemplation. It will all depend on the inherent mood or subjective aim of the moment. This subjective aim is the "subject itself determining its own self-creation as a creature".[4]

It should be borne in mind all through the above discussion that experience, prehension, feeling, enjoyment, satisfaction, subjectivity, subjective form, subjective aim etc. do not necessarily entail the higher phase of mentality called consciousness. Experience in its most general aspect, as we saw previously, can be said to be common to all kinds of process or activity. The basic character of experience is the absorption or synthesis of the many data into a unity; and this process is not initially a conscious one.

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[1] *Ibid.* 31-2. [2] *Ibid.* p. 32 and 34. [3] *Ibid.* p. 25.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 96.

Feeling (in the widest sense) in its primitive and basic aspect, is similarly unconscious. The different elements that come to unite in a specific form of experience contribute their own feeling-tones which are unified into a resultant tone of feeling in an unconscious way. Higher grades of emotion alone are conscious.

Perception also is not necessarily conscious. Primitive perception is fundamentally the same as primitive experience, a mere unification of the many data into a resultant unity. Subjectivity is also basically the reception and absorption of data into the privacy of immediate experience, and is not conscious in its lower phases.

Consciousness really arises in conflict. Contrast among the data presented for unification gives birth to consciousness. The contrast between the expected and the given, between what a thing 'might be' and 'is' stands in the way of mere blind response of the subject and hampers its unconscious unification of the data. It calls for a higher grade of activity. The shock of contrast coming from the unexpected intensifies the struggle for adjustment, and thus consciousness emerges. Whitehead observes, therefore, that consciousness comes to its peak in negative perception, like that of 'a stone as not grey',[1] where there is a clear contrast between the given and the expected or the missing.

But except in such cases of contrast, the data get unified in new forms of combinations without any conscious effort. Each datum that comes from the environment to the subject, comes as an impulse with a definite direction; and the experience or feeling generated in the subject is the resultant of these diverse impulses of the data, and it also acquires a resultant intensity and direction. Each datum and blind feeling which thus arise from the data are therefore, describable in the language of physics as having the character of a *vector*, that is the character of coming from and pointing to a definite direction.[2]

'Feeling' and 'experience' are used by Whitehead almost synonymously. According to him 'the primitive form of physical experience', e.g. experience of a green colour, arises in the form of a blind emotion with green as its qualifying character, that is in the form of a green feeling.[1] That is why aesthetic feelings can be roused by artists by a display of colours.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 225-6.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 163 and 227.

In developed conscious perception of physical objects colours, sounds, etc. are presented not as qualifying our experience or feeling but as external objects. They are objectified in such perceptual presentation. The objects stand out there illuminated by consciousness; but the process of *objectification*, the causal process leading to this consciousness, recedes into a dim back-ground.

Yet even here the vector character of experience points backward to its source; and we are enabled to dive back into the dim back-ground to feel our intuitive way into the causal factors and processes. As for Bergson, so for Whitehead, Metaphysics must unlearn the intellectual habit of searching for reality outside in objects which are posited there by our internal processes; and it must intuitively look within to feel the basic processes which lie at the root of objective reality. Intuition rather than the discursive intellect would supply the materials on which the metaphysical intellect can work to form a co-herent notion of the universe.

Though this method is in a way subjectivistic, it does not end in solipsism of the present moment.[2] For the vector character of feeling points backward to its past and forward to its potential future and thus rescues the experient subject from its imprisonment in the present occasion.

4. The Perceived World

The macrocosmic world presented to us in conscious perception is composed of, and therefore analysable into innumerable actual entities. We have so far concentrated on the internal constitution of an individual actual entity, and found that it is a complex organizing process that synthesizes all prehensions of other actual entities and eternal objects into a new entity. An actual entity is compared by Whitehead to a cell, a microscopic organism. The world is, therefore, like a multicellular organism. As a nexus of diverse actual entities, the world is itself like an actual entity. It is an organic unity of experience welding its many components into a complex system. The universe has an organic structure, therefore, in its minutest parts, as well as a whole. To understand it completely it is necessary to know not only the internal constitution of each actual entity but also the mutual relations among the diverse entities and their consequent properties. In other words the microcosmic and macrocosmic aspects of the universe must be understood in a coherent way.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 227. [2] *Ibid.* p. 406.

The very first character that strikes us when we pass from an individual actual entity to the world composed of such entities is its extensiveness. We may wonder how out of atomic units of actual entities lacking extension there could arise extension in the whole composed by them. But such a doubt should not puzzle us if we remember that an atomic actual entity is reached only by analysing consciously experienced wholes which are extended in space and time. In conscious thought we do not start with atomic units, but reach them by continuous conceptual division of the given. And what is given in experience, Whitehead points out, in agreement with William James and Bergson, is always a whole which can be divided into component parts, and is not an indivisible atomic element.[1] Every process of becoming, experienced by us, can be analysed into earlier and later parts, though the process is *experienced* primarily *as one* whole. Every bit of time we can perceive, is an *epoch* composed of, and divisible into, parts, and is not an indivisible instant. Every object occupying an epoch of time also has a volume of space which is divisible into smaller parts. We should not forget, therefore, that an actual entity is an element occurring in a more inclusive whole possessing extension. Moreover, we should also remember that though from the subjective side an actual entity is a unit of experience yet from the objective side it is analysable into a series of prehensions appropriating the diverse data. Thus when we analyse the genesis and internal contents of the actual entity its subjective unity or the unity of experience, relaxes into, and mainfests thus, a multiplicity of contents, the integration of which can be conceived by us only in an extended or enduring series of prehensions. Extension is, therefore, an inescapable fact connected with the environment and internal constitution of an actual entity.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 96.

The world revealed to us in perception is an extensive continuum. It is experienced, of course, as one whole. But this whole is *divisible* into components which, as we saw previously, are ultimately actual entities. Therefore, the world can be termed an extensive nexus of actual entities.

The characteristic of an extensive continuum is that in it "many objects can be welded into the real unity of one experience."[1] Being a system containing many components it is *divisible,* though not initially given as divided or discrete. Whitehead takes great pains to show that this characteristic is common to both time-order and space-order. Extension is commonly believed to be only spatial in character. But time also involves extension in so far as it entails the unity of a multiplicity of components, which is experienced as one but is divisible into different moments. Extension, therefore, is a general scheme which underlies both space and time. Space is the order in which a multiplicity of contemporary actual entities is experienced, time is the order in which a multiplicity of successive actual entities is experienced, experience in each case being of a whole, which is divisible into multiplicity of components. This conclusion demonstrates the truth of the scientific theory of relativity that space and time are one at bottom. Whitehead elaborately works out this theory and tries to show in successive works how all spatial and temporal concepts, namely of surfaces, lines and points, and of durations and instants can be derived from a common scheme of extension by the process of abstraction. As he put it in an earlier work, "'Time is known to me as an abstraction from the passage of events. The fundamental fact which renders this abstraction possible is the passing of nature, its development, its creative advance, and combined with this fact is another characteristic of nature, namely the extensive relation between events. These two facts, namely the passage of events and the extension of events over each other, are in my opinion the qualities from which time and space originate as abstractions.'"[1]

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 93.

The world is a continuous process in which multitudes of actual entities are emerging and perishing every moment. By disregarding its fluent nature, we conceive its existence at an instant, and get the idea of a static system of interrelated contemporary entities. Space is thus separated from time by abstraction; it is a mere cross-section of the fluent world, viewed at an instant. Concentrating again only on the aspect of fluency or the succeeding stages of the world we conceive time divorced by abstraction from space. But every concrete experience we have in life has a duration, the contents of which are divisible both as co-ordinate contemporary entities, and also as successive ones. In fact it is neither like a surface of extension, nor like a line of succession, but as a fluent stream analysable into both space-order and time-order.

But into whichever order this fluent mass of experience is by abstraction divided, the common character of extension cannot be obliterated. Each portion of time or space as a whole pervades or extends over its parts, and each part over its own parts and so on; and the smallest part that we can *actually* reach by this continuous process is still a whole, however small, extending over its own parts.[2] This is so, because the experience which we divide is itself a whole encasing smaller wholes, each of which again contains still smaller wholes composed of their own parts. In other words, the world in its wholeness and in its parts reveals the structure of an actual entity; and space and time are nothing but the abstract ways of conceiving the relations among the composite and the component actual entities.

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[1] *The Concept of Nature*, p. 34.

[2] Vide *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 105, for diagrams.

We find then that this conception rejects the theory of space and time as receptacles and as being absolute. It conforms to the relative conception of space-time as mutually inseparable relations among entities. But whereas the ordinary relative theory conceives these entities as bits of matter, Whitehead dynamically conceives them as processes of actual entities or the nexus of such entities. Moreover, it should be remembered that as experience is always relative to a subject, space and time are also relative to the particular subject. Whitehead discards, therefore, the ordinary idea of simple location, and replaces it by the conception of relative location, that is location with relation to the standpoint of the percipient actual entity. "'When Dr. Johnson 'surveyed mankind from China to Peru', he did it from Pump Court in London at a certain date".[1] Thus, 'Each actual occasion defines its own actual world from which it originates. No two occasions can have identical actual worlds".[2] The conception of an actual world for all percipients, that is a public world, is the result of an abstraction of the world from the standpoint of a particular percipient.[3]

But yet it is not impossible that there should be a great deal in common between the worlds of two percipients, since the actual occasions out of which my world of this moment is constructed enter into the constitution of your world of that moment too. In fact I, the percipient entity along with my world may become included in your world the next moment, as every actual entity of the previous moment exerts its influence on the making of your world.[4]

The distinction between the subjective and the objective, the private and the public, can thus be bridged over to a great extent to make inter-subjective communication possible. But it cannot be eradicated, since like the convex and concave sides of the same curve, there are always two possible views of an individual actual entity, as well as the universe. An actual entity considered in reference to itself, as privately enjoying its process of self-creation is a subject. All facts regarding this aspect of it are private or subjective. On the other hand, in so far as it refers to facts beyond itself, it reveals a world called objective or public. This is the only acceptable and reasonable meaning of objectivity. The physical world of the scientist is the world that is revealed to *each* scientist as objective. There is nothing like a world independent of all observers, a world-in-itself. Apparent nature is the only nature we know. "But we may drop the term apparent; for there is but one nature, namely the nature which is before us in perceptual knowledge".[1]

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[1] *The Principles*, p. 13.
[2] *Process*, p. 299.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 325.
[4] *Ibid.*

The nature that appears in my perception now is the product of the nature of the previous moment acting on my mind. Nature as cause flows into the mind and nature as effect flows out of it and stands out before it recreated. The world is thus perpetually perishing and creating itself through every centre of experience, each actual entity. It is being constantly gathered into the unity of an individual experience and shooting forth re-diversified as objects of that experience. "The world expands through recurrent unifications of itself, each, by the addition of itself, automatically recreating the multiplicity anew."[2] Such is the nature of creative advance.

It is easy to ignore the basic nature of this process and lapse back into the ordinary notion of advance taking place in the serial order; and the mistake would be fatal to the correct understanding of Whitehead.[3] Time as a series of successive occurrences, or space as a relation of co-existing ones, are but the forms in which co-ordinate actual entities (arranged one after another or side by side) are experienced. It is then a relation of actual entities, as accomplished products, among themselves. The process of the becoming, growing or experiencing of an actual entity is not extended in time or space. It is a unitary act. It can be divided only artificially or theoretically into successive prehensions, but not given as, or primarily experienced as, extended or divided. Creative advance does not therefore imply a serial succession in physical time (that is time as an extended order). Here Whitehead's conception comes very near that of Bergson. Neither the *elan vital* nor creativity advances in the linear way. For both, the past history of the world is not left behind, but gathered up in the present moment; progress is like that of a snow ball, swelling as it is rolling along. But whereas Bergson's stress is on the bursting forth of the one into the many, the direction of creativity being from the centre to the circumference, Whitehead, a pluralist and relativist, tries to stress both the passing of many into the one (the subjective unity of the experient), and the projection of the many again out of that one, the two moments being organically related and conceived as inseparable.

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[1] *The Concept*, p. 40.

[2] *Process*, p. 405.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 48.

The problem of causation among objects of nature has proved a great puzzle to many philosophers. When these objects are regarded as independent entities, it becomes unintelligible how one of them can produce another. As Bradley shows in the form of a dilemma, if the cause is identical with the effect, there is no causation worth the name, and if it is different how can the one give rise to something different from itself? The organic philosophy of Whitehead does not experience such a puzzle, because it denies the basic assumption of independent objects of nature, and holds the opposite theory of the relativity or mutual immanence of all things.[1] Occurrences are not detached from one another, but organically related. On each occasion or entity, all entities of the world past and present shed their direct or indirect influence. The whole antecedent world, and not a particular part of it alone, combines to produce or cause a particular occasion. The alternative possible forms of combination explain the possibility of novel creation and advance. The laws of nature which possess 'relative stability' and yet make room for novelty, become also more intelligible. Since in this view, there is a good deal in common between the total antecedent world causing one entity and that causing another, effects take place more or less in the same manner and nature appears uniform. But in so far as these antecedents are not exactly similar, there is the possibility of new effects as well. Creative advance means, therefore, also emergent evolution through the different levels of existence, beginning with the barest experience devoid of consciousness and ending with the highest degree of human self-consciousness.

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[1] *Nature and Life*, p. 87 f.

"None of the laws of Nature gives the slightest evidence of necessity."[1] These laws are the average modes of Nature's behaviour observed by men during a particular span of existence, and "after a sufficient span of existence our present laws will fade into unimportance."[2] The laws are "the statistical expressions of the prevalent types of interaction."[3]

The most general truths illustrated by the behaviour of inanimate, animate and conscious beings are that there is activity or process everywhere, that every process is intelligible as a creative advance towards the realization of an aim, and that realization of the aim is an enjoyment of self-creation for the emergent entity. To understand the world more fully we should turn to the conception of God.

5. God

We saw that a novel actual entity is born by the new synthesis of existing actual entities into a novel form. The possible forms of new synthesis, that is, eternal objects, are unlimited. Therefore a decision or limitation is necessary as to the particular form in which the new synthesis will occur, i.e., as to the particular eternal objects which will be made to ingress into the existing actual entities. This decision is caused, we said so long, by the subjective aim of actual entity, that is, the inherent aim which is sought to be satisfied on that occasion by that process, the actual entity in question. Each actual entity was thus admitted to have a self-creative, subjective aim of its own, determining its own specific order of concrescence or synthesis. But this is only a fragmentary view explaining the emergence of each isolated actual entity. When we consider further the fact of the creative advance of the world as a whole through continuous births of many, mutually adjusted, actual entities we have to recognize not simply the individual subjective aims that regulate the diverse entities separately, but a common subjective aim realizing itself through the specific aims of individual entities and thus making the universe possible as a continuous and harmonious series of satisfactions. This ultimate principle from which the subjective aims of individuals may be conceived to be derived is termed God by Whitehead. God so conceived is, therefore, the inward directing or controlling force behind the creation of each actual entity, God is the ultimate principle that decides which of the infinite possible forms should go to constitute each actual entity. He determines in what manner the many actual entities of the present will be synthesized into each actual occasion of the next moment. He is, therefore, called the principle of limitation or "the principle of concretion."[1] Without this directing principle we cannot understand why there should at all be any creative advance making for determinate, novel creations, nor how there could be an orderly evolution of an organic whole of creation in which different actual entities are harmoniously blended into varying patterns. God is responsible for the order, harmony and progressive continuity of the universe. He is constantly guiding the universe from within. "He is the binding element of the world."

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 67.

[2] *Ibid.* p.

[3] *Process and Reality*, p. 148.

But this conception of God is also reached in another way. The eternal objects presupposed by the world form a logically interrelated, harmonious system of potentials.[2] In accordance with the basic principle of Whitehead's philosophy we cannot think of any reality without a subjective core of experience, nor think of any system, or unity in multiplicity, without reference to some actual unifying experience or feeling. Therefore the totality of eternal objects implies some actual experience in which it is felt and by which it is grasped and unified. But it cannot be the experience of any created actual entity, since eternal objects are logically prior to the emergence of such actual entities. Therefore we have to suppose some primordial, basic experience in which the eternal objects are first conceived and realized. This primordial entity is God. God in this aspect is prior to the world of created entities; He is its presupposition. Eternal objects have their being in God's conceptual feeling. His mind is thus the embodiment of all eternal objects or possibilities which would be actualized in the world. The "ideal world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of God himself. Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms."[1] But this primordial experience of God cannot be conscious, since consciousness cannot arise without prehensions of other actual entities. The realisation of eternal objects by God at this stage is through unconscious conceptual feeling which may be regarded as the first example of the creative process. God in the primordial aspect is, therefore, said to be the first actualization or manifestation of creativity. He is the primordial actual entity.

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[1] *Ibid. p.* 345 and p. 488.

[2] *Science and the Modern World*, Chap. X.

But God is not simply prior to the world. In another sense he also penetrates into it. As actual entities of the world emerge, they are experienced by God. The actual entities thus react on, or become related to the totality of eternal objects, the primordial nature of God, and give rise to a complete conscious experience in which all actual entities and all eternal objects get synthesized. The distinction between this divine experience, and that of an ordinary actual entity is that in divine experience all actualities are experienced in *all* possible forms, whereas in ordinary experience all actualities are experienced in *some* specific forms to the exclusion of the rest. God in this aspect is a concrete realization of all possibilities through all existent entities. This aspect as being the product of and subsequent to, the primordial one is called the 'consequent nature' of God. It is necessary to remember both these aspects of God to have a complete conception of divinity. Like every actual entity, which can be regarded as both cause and effect, as the process of concrescence as well as the concrete generated, God may be regarded as both the Creator prior to the world, and the constant companion of the world. The world not only emanates from God, but also returns back to God to be enjoyed in its entirety in all possible forms. As each actual entity feels and enjoys its own process of creation individually, so God too takes it up completely into his own all-comprehensive experience and enjoys the creation of the world as a whole. It is in fact through such all-inclusive divine feeling or experience that the world comes to exist as one whole of interrelated actual entities. It is also in this way that God emerges as a conscious actual entity, realizing His infinite potentiality through the actualities of the world. As the world progresses through creative advance, so does God too, descending into the world of each moment or epoch and renewing his experience by receiving into himself each new world. Raised to the status of being the object of God's immediate experience, the world rises above the flux of time. For, time is but the relation among succeeding actual entities. The world thus becomes immortal or everlasting in God. The multiplicity of discrete finites composing the world is synthesized in the unity of divine vision or immediate experience, and thus it is raised above the space-time order, which obtained among those finites. The world is thus immortalized or deified at every moment of creative advance. God saves the world from utter destruction.

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[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 188.

But, "Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them God and the World, is the instrument of novelty for the other."[1]

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[1] *Process*, etc. p. 493-4.

Whitehead finds in the above conception of God and the world a synthetic vision which renders intelligible the different one-sided and conflicting views current among philosophers and mystics. If we bear in mind the two aspects of God, primordial and consequent, and the two aspects of the world as well, the world as the multiplicity of separate actual entities existing in space-time, and the world synthesized into a unity above space-time in the vision of God, we can reconcile many apparently contradictory views we find in different philosophies and religions. Whitehead concludes, therefore, that we should equally emphasize the two opposite aspects of God, and of the world, and then the ultimate truth about them can be expressed only in the form of some such antithetical, apparently opposite, statements, as follows:

> "It is as true to say that God is permanent, and the world fluent, as that the world is permanent and God is fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the world many, as that the world is one and God many. It is as true to say that in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently. It is as true to say that the world is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the world. It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God. It is as true to say that God creates the world, as that the World creates."[1]

In these antithetical statements we find the many opposite and controversial views regarding God. According to Whitehead such religious controversies flourish only by a one-sided view of God and the world, and when we care to look at them from the two opposite sides, opposition would give place to a mere contrast of divergent aspects which require each other and supplement each other.

Whitehead's conception of God is unique. But he tries to show that all the essential conceptions of God in traditional religions are to be found here, provided we are prepared to see things in new lights. The conception of God as creator, answers to Whitehead's idea of God, in the primordial aspect. The world is but the actualization of the eternal possibilities envisaged by God and the particular form in which it is actualized is also determined by the directive force of God's decision. On the other hand the conception of God as the goal of the universe also gets some support in Whitehead's conception of the consequent nature of God, especially in the thought that as the world of actual entities is born, it is experienced and enjoyed by God in the light of the totality of eternal objects, that is in every possible way, in his infinite wisdom, and thus the world is re-absorbed by God; the world returns to God. In so far as God is an actual entity experiencing the world, He may be regarded as a continuous subjective process of experience having an aim and purpose to realize. In this sense the conception of God as person is supported by Whitehead. Again his idea of God as absorbing or taking up into his infinite experience every actual entity born in the world lends support to the idea of God as a kind companion who saves all creatures from ruin inspite of their apparent perishing. Everything born becomes an element in the infinite and immortal experience of God. God, moreover, can be described as 'the poet of the world'[1] since it is His harmonious vision of eternal objects (that is, the possibilities) which guides the creation of the world.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 492.

Whitehead's conception of God has thus a very wide appeal. It is not only for the metaphysician and the theologian, but also for the poet and the mystic. The appeal has been all the more effective because of its coming from a scientific authority. It has been regarded, however, with some suspicion by some philosophers who find in it an example of careless use of words, and unclear thinking.[2]

Whitehead is frankly conscious of the shortcomings of his thought and expression, but he would only ask his readers to bear in mind that "Philosophy is an attempt to express the infinity of the universe in terms of limitations of language."[1] Remembering the stupendous nature of the task and the vastness of the data—from life, science, art, religion and philosophy—upon which he has drawn to build a synthetic philosophy of the universe, one would rather like to give a large measure of assent to the verdict, "The philosophy of organism is the ultimate intellectual achievement of the nineteenth century. The centuries to come will profit far more than we."[2] With special regard to his philosophy of religion, it should be mentioned that, like William James and unlike most western philosophers, Whitehead draws, for his data, not only on Christianity but also other forms of religion and tries to evolve his thoughts which might, therefore, be unintelligible from the point of any one of them. But of course he tries always to adjust these thoughts also to his general philosophy of the world to have a harmonious view.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 490.

[2] Vide L. S. Stebbing's review of *Process and Reality in* Mind, p. 475, 1930.

The history of religions shows four main kinds of expressions of religion: ritual, emotion, belief and rationalization of beliefs into a system. But all of these are based on some religious experience or insight which consists in realizing, in different forms and degrees, the existence of some permanent order behind perishing events, some harmony in the apparently chaotic world, some guiding principle and purpose behind our acts and the changes in nature. Such experience is nothing but the vision of God as immanent in the world. This is the starting point of religious faith which, if genuine and sincere, creates in the individual the enthusiasm for reforming life and bringing it in tune with God by stressing the eternal, imperishable and harmonious elements of existence. So, "Religion is the art and theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and what is permanent in the nature of things."[3] The core of genuine religion, stripped of dogmas, churches, rituals and collective enthusiasms which are only outer trappings—consists in the sincere effort for self-improvement carried by oneself in isolation and detachment. Whitehead says, therefore, "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness."[1]

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[1] *The Phil. of A. N. Whitehead*, p. 14. [2] *Ibid.* p. 124.
[3] *Religion in the Making*, p. 6.

This brief account of Whitehead's philosophy does little justice to his profound thoughts which can be mastered only by years of patient study of his original works. But it may be found sufficient for a rough idea of his main position. Though elements of his thought are traceable to other thinkers, they emanate so spontaneously from his basic principles, and they have been so harmoniously blended by the one steady vision that lies behind his philosophy, that they all appear intrinsic to his system.

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[1] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER X

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

1. The Origin of the Movement

One of the most recent lines along which contemporary thought has been developing is that of logical positivism, sometimes also called logical (or logistic) empiricism. In it we find united in a peculiar way the empiricism of Hume, the positivism of Comte and Mach, and the logical analysis of the type initiated at Cambridge by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Whitehead, and on the Continent by Frege and others. The adherents of this trend of thought organized themselves into a philosophical group at Vienna in 1928. The group became known as the Viennese Circle (Der Wiener Kreis). The prominent members of this group were Moritz Schlick,. Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. The movement gradually spread, and Prague, Warsaw and Lwow became some of its active centres. Hans Reichenbach founded a centre also in Berlin.[1] At Oxford the movement found a staunch advocate in A.J.Ayer. In America also it has found some sympathizers like C. W. Morris.[2] Political vicissitudes on the continent have thrown the youthful movement out of gear, and two great advocates of it, Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath, have transferred their activities to America by organizing a representative body of scientists and philosophers to produce an *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, several volumes of which have been already published.

The official programme on which the Viennese circle was first organized had two principal aims, to provide a secure foundation for the sciences, and to demonstrate the meaninglessness of metaphysics.[1] The method employed for realizing this double aim was logical analysis, specially of language. It is this method which mainly distinguishes this new movement from the positivism and empiricism of earlier times. It is distinguished, for instance, from the empiricism of Hume by the fact that while Hume based his philosophy on the *psycological* analysis of experience, these new empiricists base their theories on the *logical* analysis of it. Again while earlier positivists objected to metaphysical speculation either because it is unprofitable or because its truths cannot be proved, the new positivists object to it because logical analysis of metaphysicsal language convinces them that all metaphysical propositions are meaningless. The anti-metaphysical attitude of logical positivism is, therefore, more radical. It dismisses metaphysical quetions themselves as nonsensical, so that the question of their solution does not at all arise.

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[1] For historical accounts of the origin of the movement, see articles by Ernest Nagel in *The Journal of Philosophy* (Jan.-March, 1936), *An Examination of Logical Positivism* by Weinberg, and Black's Introduction to Eng. trans. of Carnap's *The Unity of Science* (Kegan Paul).

[2] Vide his *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism*.

2. The Conception of Meaning

To understand this peculiar attitude it is necessary to consider the positivist's conception of meaning. This conception is first developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein through the logical analysis of language and experience in his celebrated treatise *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.[2] He points out that language is the symbolic representation of facts experienced. It can be analysed into significant assertions called propositions, and all propositions can be shown by further analysis to consist of some elementary propositions. Every elementary proposition, Wittgenstein holds, is a picture[3] of some atomic fact experienced. The world is composed of such facts, and can be completely analysed into them.[4] By a fact he means 'what the case is', that which makes a proposition true. Now as a proposition represents a relation, the fact which makes such a relation true must itself be relation of objects in reality. Even "an atomic fact is a combination of objects."[1] The proposition, this book is blue, can be true only if a book is experienced *as* blue. Logical analysis of the world of experience as pictured by propositions asserting the existence of the world brings us thus to facts (or objects related) as the ultimate constituents of the world. This position is different from that of Hume. For Hume analyses experience psychologically, not logically, and finds simple impressions (not propositions) to be the ultimate elements of it, and these impressions, according to him, yield the knowledge of non-related sense objects (like blue colour) and not of any fact or combination of sense objects (like 'this object having a blue colour').

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[1] *Vide* Weinberg, *An Examination, etc.*

[2] Written in 1918 (in Vienna), now available in English along with the original German in Kegan Paul's International Library series.

[3] "The proposition is a picture of reality."—*Tractatus*, p. 63 (Kegan Paul ed. 1933).

[4] "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." "The world divides into facts."—*Ibid.* p. 31.

Now if it is true that all propositions are completely analysable into ultimately simple propositions which again picture the simple or atomic facts of the world experienced by us, it follows that the ultimate referents or objectives of propositions are empirical facts. A proposition which does not refer to 'any state of affairs' *i.e.* any fact of experience is, therefore, no proposition at all; it fails of its purpose by failing to express any sense.[2] It is then a nonsensical expression, a pseudo-proposition. Wittgenstein does not of course mean that to have sense a proposition must have a corresponding fact in reality, for in that case all propositions would be true, and there could be nothing like false propositions. Even a false proposition possesses sense, and that because it has for its *apparent* objective some fact of experience. While the truth of a proposition requires that it should agree with reality, the sense of a proposition requires that it should at least refer to *possible* empirical facts.

Wittgenstein's conception of meaning is summed up by the dictum 'The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification.' Though this dictum sounds rather odd, it logically follows from Wittgenstein's conception of proposition as a pictorial representation of experienced facts. For in this conception "to understand a proposition is to know what is the case, if it is true"[1], that is, what facts it stands for, which can be expected to be observed or experienced if the proposition is true. But the method of verifying the proposition is also to observe such facts. Hence the very experience which can verify a proposition is also that which constitutes its sense.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 81.

[2] 'This proposition has such and such a sense' = 'This proposition represents such and such a state of affairs'—*Ibid.* p. 69.

This verificational theory of meaning supplies the point of departure to the positivists of the Viennese circle. They utilize this theory for demonstrating the meaninglessness of metaphysics, as well as for clarifying the propositions of science.

3. The Elimination of Metaphysics

By metaphysics these positivists mean theory of reality lying beyond experience. The 'fundamental postulate of metaphysics' is that there is 'a super-(or hinter) phenomenal reality.'[2] As all significant propositions are ultimately reducible to (what Carnap calls) *protocol statements*[3], that is, simple propositions which are immediately derived from, and verifiable in, experience, no proposition which is not so reducible to empirically verifiable protocol propositions (or is itself not one such) can possess any significance. But metaphysical propositions (including some epistemological and ethical ones)[4] by their very nature ultimately rest upon some propositions which purport to assert the existence of unverifiable, trans-empirical entities. They do not, therefore, possess any sense. Such propositions are really not propositions at all. They constitute a body of nonsensical expressions.

Consider, for example, the metaphysics of Descartes. His entire system ultimately rests upon, and is deduced from, the basic assertion 'Cogito ergo sum'. If we analyse it we find that it consists of two parts, 'cogito' which represents an immediate feeling, and 'ergo sum', which is sometimes interpreted as a mere paraphrase of the 'cogito' and sometimes as a deduction from it. Now if the first interpretation is accepted, there is no ground for objection, because then the whole assertion would mean, that thinking, which is an experienced fact means the existence of a thinking being. But this interpretation which endows Descartes' assertion with an empirical significance, fails to prove the existence of the self, as desired by him; it simply proves something whose entire existence is identical with the immediate feeling of the moment. If again the second interpretation is accepted, we have to show that something (namely, a simple, abiding substance) other than the immediate experience represented by the cogito can be inferred from it. But this inferential passage from experience to something beyond it is unwarranted by experience, and is, therefore, illegitimate. In fact as soon as we try to attach to the symbol, 'I', any meaning other than the experienced body, or immediate feeling, we cease to understand its meaning. In a similar way the metaphysical systems of Spinoza, Leibnitz and other thinkers who assert the existence of trans-empirical entities can be analysed to show their meaninglessness.

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[1] *Ibid.* p. 67.

[2] Ayer, Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics, *Mind,* July, 1934.

[3] *The Unity of Science,* p. 45.

[4] *Ibid* p. 23.

But the question very naturally arises, how could such great thinkers slip into the curious habit of talking nonsense? Carnap and other logical positivists try to account for this strange but common phenomenon. The method employed for this purpose is the logical analysis of language to which Carnap devotes two of his important works.[1] There are two chief sources that give rise to meaningless sentences. *Either* the component words of a sentence lack meaning, and the sentence, as a whole becomes nonsensical. *Or* it may be that the constituent words are all individually capable of expressing meanings in other contexts, but in the particular context the words taken togeher do not yield any sense. The example of the first kind would be, "Twas brilig and the slithy toves," and of the second, "Caesar is a prime number," or "Quadratic equations attend races." Metaphysicians propound the first kind of nonsense chiefly under the misconception that "to every word or phrase that can be the grammatical subject of a sentence, there must somewhere be a real entity corresponding. For as there is no place in the empiricial world for many of these 'entities', a special non-empirical world is invented to house them."[1] Carnap points out how in this way Heidegger spins metaphysics out of the supposition that even corresponding to the word 'nothing' there must be some mysterious entity.[2] The metaphysician indulges in the second kind of nonsense, when, for example, he speaks of the thing-in-itself lying beyond all experience. Every one of these words, 'thing', 'in', 'itself', 'lying', 'beyond', 'all', 'experience', possesses meaning in other sentences and contexts. But as combined here they do not yield any sense, since no empirical verification is possible with regard to what is admittedly beyond all experience.

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[1] *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (1935), and *Logical Syntax of Language* (1937).

4. The New Role of Philosophy as Logical Analysis of science

But the elimination of metaphysics does not mean for the logical positivist the abandonment of philosophical activity. He disallows, it is true, all philosophical questions about super-phenomenal reality on the ground of their meaninglessness. On the other hand he also regards all questions regarding the properties of empirical objects as falling properly within the domain of science. Yet philosophy has a field of its own within the empirical sphere. It is not, as it may be supposed, the function of philosophy to piece together or synthesize the empirical results of the different branches of science into a world view, and thus play the proud part of the science of all sciences. Really these synthetic views are the work of poetic and aesthetic imagination, and do not admit of empirical verification, and do not, therefore, deserve to be called scientific or philphical. The proper function of philosophy is to analyse "the statements asserted by scientists", "study their kinds and relations, and analyze terms as components of those statements and theories as ordered systems of those statements."[1] The analysis of the linguistic expressions of science just indicated is what is called by Carnap the *logic of science*. This again consists of two branches. One of these studies the *forms* of the linguistic expressions of science, and is called *logical syntax* or formal logic. It does not enquire into the relations of expressions to objects, or the speakers or the audience. It simply analyses complex and compound sentences into simple ones, and the simple sentences into their component words, and discovers the laws governing the combinations of words, into significant sentences. It also investigates the logical relations of consistency and inconsistency, dependence and independence, among different sentences. Logical syntax or the formal analysis of the language of science thus enables us to realize the basic or fundamental assertions of the different sciences, and their logical interrelations. The other branch of the logic of science is called *semantics*. It considers the relations of linguistic expressions to objects designated by them. Semantical analysis of the language of science discovers, for example, that a term may designate a certain particular object (*e.g.*, the sun), or a certain property of things (*e.g.*, iron), or a certain relation between things (*e.g.*, fathership), or a certain physical function (*e.g.*, temperature). It also reveals that two or more terms may be synonymous (*e.g.*, 'homo sapiens' of biology, 'person' of economics, and 'man' of ordinary use), and that one expression is reducible to another on the ground of identity of meaning.[2] It is thus shown by the logical positivists that though philosophy is deprived of its metaphysical quest, and is also prevented from the construction of world-views, it is not deprived of occupation. On the contrary the clarification, interpretation and co-ordination of the results of the sciences through logical analysis constitute a very useful and worthy programme which philosophy can legitimately pursue.

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[1] Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p.

[2] Carnap's article in *Erkenntnis*, Vol.
ger's *Was ist Metaphysic*. *Vide*

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[1] Carnap, *Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science*, in Int. Ency. of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 1.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 43-44.

5. The difficulties of Logical Positivism, and its gradual modification

The positivistic attack on metaphysics has evoked vehement protests and counter-attacks from many quarters, and the positivists have been compelled as a result to modify their views in some respects. The counter-attack has also destroyed the former unanimity of the school, different members trying to defend their positions in different ways. We shall briefly consider now the chief criticisms against logical positivism, and their reactions on the adherents.

As the verificational theory of meaning is foundational to logical positivism most of the attacks have been directed against it from different angles.

What, it is asked, is the meaning of verification when it is said that the meaning of a proposition depends on the method of its verification ? Does it mean testing the truth of the proposition by actually observing its content in sense perception ? If so, then how is it possible to understand the meaning of statements about objects not yet perceived, or of historical statements about the past, or of statements about other minds, or about interperceptual states of physical objects, none of which can ever be actually observed ?[1] Faced by these difficulties some positivists admit that by 'verification' should be meant verification in theory or principle, and not necessarily in practice.[2]. Schlick and Ayer point out that a statement about a mountain on the other side of the moon, for exampple, is significant, since there is no *theoretical* impossibility in thinking of a man, with sufficient improvement of the necessary mechanisms, being able to observe the object and test the proposition. In case of the other objects which by their very natures cannot be directly observed, verification is possible in an *indirect way*, by observing the perceptible consequences that follow if the given proposition is true. "For example, we can determine the presence of an electric current by observing either the heat produced in the conductor, or the deviation of a magnetic needle, or the quantity of substance separated from an electrolyte etc.''[1] Similarly, statements about past facts can be verified by observing their present consequences, and those about other minds by their observable external manifestations.

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[1] Vide Stace's article *Metaphysics and Meaning* in Mind, Oct., 1935.

[2] Ayer, *Language*, etc., p. 20f.

Another question raised about the meaning of verification is whether it is taken by positivists in the sense of *conclusively proving* some proposition to be true or false, and if so whether it would not make even the general propositions of science meaningless, as it is not possible to prove conclusively or exhaustively the truth of a general statement like 'Arsenic is poisonous' or 'Man is mortal' by any limited series of sense-perceptions. Schlick meets this situation by the rather heroic and embarrassing confession that these general propositions are really nonsensical, only they are an important type of nonsense. This defence can hardly save science from vanishing into the limbo of the meaningless along with metaphysics. Karl Popper tries to save the situation by suggesting that even a limited number of crucial observations can conclusively confute if not establish a general proposition, and that a sentence should be allowed to be significant if it expresses something which can be confuted by experience. Ayer does not accept any of these solutions. He rejects Schlick's view because it renders the criterion of meaning self-stultifying. He rejects Popper's view because even the confutation of a hypothesis by crucial observation is not conclusive, and absolutely certain since it rests upon some presuppositions about the circumstances under which observation takes place. Rejecting these views Ayer suggests that the general propositions of science are significant because it is possible to observe facts which render them *probable* if not certain. He maintains, therefore, that 'verification', in the definition of meaning, should include both strong verification, that is conclusive proof of truth or falsity, and weak verification, that is proof of probability of a proposition.[1] It is only *a priori* or analytic propositions which can be demonstrated to be certain or verifiable in the strong sense. But no empirical or synthetic proposition can be verifiable in the strong sense. It is verifiable only in the weak sense (capable of being rendered probable). Hence only in this sense a synthetic proposition can be said to be significant. According to most positivists ostensive or protocol propositions based on immediate experience (*e.g.* This is green) do not stand in need of any further verification as we feel immediately certain of their truth. They point out that there would be an infinite regress if even these propositions have to depend on others for their verification. Ayer rejects this view of the positivists, for, he feels, one cannot in language simply point to an object or simply register his immediate impression without describing it, and describing invariably involves classifying which again means going beyond the given. He fails, therefore, to admit that "any synthetic proposition can be purely ostensive"[2] and can be absolutely certain. Consequently he holds that no proposition, except the tautologous or analytical ones, can be absolutely certain. In other words all synthetic propositions, without exception, are only probable and verifiable in the weak sense.

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[1] Carnap, *Encyclopedia and Unified Science*, p. 51. (Int. Ency. of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 1).

But does not this position of Ayer commit him to relativism? If we cannot stop at any proposition as absolutely certain the process of verification proceeds without end and is never final. Ayer and some other positivists accept this relativity and ally themselves with the pragmatists, and hold with them that there is no absolute and final standard of truth, or even of probability, in the sphere of experience. We accept a factual proposition only if, and so long as, it enables us to anticipate experience, and is practically dependable. Verification stops when the probability of a proposition under investigation is regarded by the enquirer sufficient for practical purposes.

If all these explanations and amendments of the verificational theory of meaning are accepted it would assume roughly a form like the following. A proposition has meaning only if it is possible in principle or in practice, to have sense perception which can directly or indirectly show that it is true or false, or at least that it is more or less probable.

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[1] Ayer, *Language etc.* p. 22f.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 126f.

This theory of meaning as amended claims to show the meaningless character of metaphysical speculation which, the positivist thinks, is not amenable to verification in any sense of the term just explained. On the contrary it is able to retain the value and significance of scientific propositions. How far is this claim justified?

Critics of logical positivism have shown many defects even in this modified conception of meaning, and the consequent untenability of this claim. First of all, it is arbitrary to make meaning dependent on verifiability, seeing that the two concepts are by no means necessarily and directly related, since we can understand the meaning of sentence without thinking in the least of its verifiability. The absurdity of this conception of meaning is indirectly proved by the fact that if this conception were true absurd conclusions would follow. For, a sentence like 'this circle is a square' would be quite significant according to this criterion as the falsity of this assertion can be shown by observation and the sentence is thus verifiable and on the contrary, a *story* sentence like 'a king had four sons' would be meaningless as no question of verification can even arise here. A complete subversion of the ordinary meaning of 'meaning' thus follows. A possible defence against this criticism would be that the ambiguous word 'meaning' is used by the positivist in a *special* sense, and not in the ordinary sense. By the meaning of a sentence he means other sentences which follow from it by implication and with the help of which it can be verified. We have an approach to this special sense in common usages like 'Marriage means responsibility', 'Fear means weakness'. Meaning is, in brief, logical implication. We can see now that 'this circle is square' can be said to have meaning in so far as its truth has some implications for future experience, such as 'then it must have four right angles' which can be verified to be false. We can also see now how a story sentence can be said to be meaningless, because we realize that such a sentence implies no consequence which can possibly be observed.

But this defence suffers from at least two defects. It makes the positivistic theory confined to a particular special aspect of meaning which is not the primary sense of the term, and leaves the primary sense unaffected. Secondly, metaphysics can no longer be said to be meaningless in the ordinary and primary sense of the word. Positivism thus becomes considerably weakened.

Another criticism against the positivistic criterion is that it renders its own basic assertions meaningless. The statement, for example, that 'the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification' is nonsensical as it does not assert any experienceable fact, nor is it reducible to simple factual propositions, nor does it imply any matter of fact which can be observed to verify its truth. In fact some positivists do admit this. They hold that no proposition concerning syntax or logical principles possesses significance. But they add that these are some important types of non-sense. Critics have, therefore, urged that this self-contradictory position is sufficient condemnation of the positivist's conception of meaning, and shows that the positivistic speculation, tested by its own criterion, fares no better than metaphysics.

Again, it is pointed out that the positivist sets out with the express intention of justifying and serving science but gradually it finds it impossible to defend science consistently with its basic principles, and it begins to re-interpret and reform science to suit its principles, or sometimes changes the principles to be able to defend science.

Still another criticism is that the positivist arbitrarily confines his notion of experience to sense-experience. This is partly true. But some positivists include also introspection within experience, and Carnap in his recent writings does not overlook mystical experience. But no change in the basic outlook is noticed inspite of such recognition.

6. The Re-interpretation of Science

We have just referred to the fact that positivists find it necessary to re-interpret science. We shall briefly illustrate this by showing how they grapple with some of the basic concepts of science such as probability, induction, laws of nature. As we saw previously, the problem of probability is closely connected with that of verification. There are three chief theories advanced by different positivist[1] thinkers. (1) Hans Reichenbach holds that owing to variations and errors of observation no assertion can be said to be unconditionally true or false, but can only be said to be probable. Probability lies then between the two limits of absolute truth and absolute falsity. According to this theory no conclusion follows from any premise with absolute certainty, the latter can only imply the former to some degree of probability. Against this theory the chief objection is that it is self-contradictory to deny an absolute standard of truth, and at the same time speak of the unreliability of observation due to variation, since variation itself presupposes deviation from some fixed standard. (2) R. Von Mises, therefore, advocates what is known as the *frequency theory of probability*. It attempts to base the idea of probability on the observed frequencies of the happening of a class of events. Probability according to this conception can be asserted only on statistical observations and computation. When, for example, on the basis of relevant figures collected for some years it is asserted that "the probability that a person of thirty residing in the United States survives his thirty first birthday is .945", we have a case of what probability means according to the frequency theory. It is clear that this theory does justice to the statistical aspect of probability, but it overlooks the sense of probability as used, for example, in the assertion, 'in the light of available evidence the probability is that the earth is round.' It is applicable only in cases of phenomena which can be regarded as members of classes or groups, not as individuals. (3) The third conception of probability is what is more general among logical positivists and is supported by Wittgenstein and Waismann. In this view probability is a kind of logical *relation obtaining between two propositions.* Between any two propositions P and Q there may be three kinds of logical relations. Using Euler's circles these may be shown as follows :—

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[1] Vide Weinberg, *Op. cit.*, Chapt. 8 and Ernest Nagel, *Principles of the Theory of Probability*. (Int. Ency. of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 6).



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

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

III

In the first case P includes Q, and Q follows from P. P entails Q and the relation between the two is called entailment. (*E.g.* 'All Kings are human' and 'All Kings are animate'). In the third case P excludes Q. The relation between the two is contradiction. (*E.g.* 'All Kings are human' and 'All Kings are inanimate'). In the second case however P neither entails, nor excludes Q, P partially overlaps Q. This kind of logical relation between two propositions is called probability (*E.g.* 'All Kings are human' and 'All Kings are fallible').

This conception of probability as a logical relation is also advocated by J. M. Keynes. It should be noted that in this conception probability is not a subjective measure of the degree of belief. Moreover probability is not a character of any single proposition. But it concerns the question whether and how far one proposition can be the ground for inferring another when the one does neither necessarily imply the other, nor contradict it.

We see then that the logical positivists form different conceptions of probability, and they select as important some out of the various senses in which the word 'Probability' is found used by people in different contexts. No one of these theories satisfactorily covers the diverse aspects of probability, and hence no unanimity is reached.

Induction, like probability, is also considered by the positivists[1] from their own point of view, because a proper understanding of the meaning of induction is indispensable for the correct interpretation of science which forms the most important part of the positivistic programme. Induction is generally conceived in traditional logic as the process of discovering and proving general propositions. But what is a general proposition? Is it a mere summary of singular propositions based on observation? Or is it something which contains more than what has been observed? The first view does not present any difficulty to logical positivism which holds that all factual propositions are ultimately analysable into elementary ones based on immediate experience. But this view of general proposition will exclude all general propositions about classes whose members are too many to be exhausted by observation. If then the second view of general proposition, which is the more common one, is accepted the positivist experiences a great difficulty. For he can no longer hold that all propositions (including these general ones) can be exhaustively analysed into singular propositions of perception. Moreover, as his empiricism prevents him from believing in any *a priori* universal proposition like the law of causation and the uniformity of nature, he fails to show how one can pass from the observed to the unobserved, and from some to all.

In such a predicament the positivist is forced to find out a new interpretation of induction. He denies that induction presents any logical problem. The tendency to generalize is a mere psychological process the justification of which is to be found not in any logical necessity, but, as the pragmatist would say, in practical utility. Induction is an attempt to arrange our experience, for prediction and verification, in a form consistent with the greatest practical economy and convenience. The principle of induction, as Feigl says, is a rule of operation like the following, "Seek to achieve a maximum of order by logical operations upon elementary propositions. Generalize this order

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[1] Weinberg, *op. cit.*, Chap. 4.

(whatever its form be: causal, statistical or other) with a minimum of arbitrariness, that is according to the principle of simplicity."[1] Thus "The principle of induction is prescriptive injunction to choose those laws which enable us to predict successfully with greatest ease and to describe with the maximum simplicity."[2] But the laws of science though expressed in the form of general propositions, should not be taken to possess any existential import. Really these are some tentative models devised for conveniently arranging past experience so that *singular* propositions embodying anticipations or predictions about future experience can be framed on these models and be verified. As Weinberg says, "Briefly stated, the contemporary Positivistic theory of natural law is: Laws in science are not general empirical propositions capable of verification. They are schemata or models from which singular propositions can be constructed. We can verify the singular propositions derived from laws, but it is meaningless to speak of the verification of laws themselves because they are not propositions."[3] With these new interpretations of induction and laws of nature the logical positivist attempts to give a consistent empirical conception of science, avoiding all metaphysical assumptions and avoiding also the descriptive view of science. But the empirical view raises a very important question. If science is ultimately based on experience, and as experience must be of the individual who observes, how can there be any objectivity in science? The reply that though experience is of the individual, language in which it is embodied is a public means of inter-subjective intercourse does not solve the difficulty because the meanings of linguistic symbols are in the last analysis derived from experience itself.

Different attempts have been made to avoid this solipsistic consequence of the empiricial theory of language and meaning. Those of Carnap and Neurath may be mentioned here in brief. Giving up the initial empirical position of Wittgenstein that word symbols stand for and can ultimately be linked up *only* with sense-experience, Carnap tries to show that it is possible to establish connections between words and physical phenomena. He distinguishes two kinds of language, protocol and physical. Roughly speaking a protocol language is the language of experience, it is the report of a person's own experience. The words of this language refer to the immediate experiences of that individual. Physical language on the other hand is the universal language of physics, the words of which refer to physical phenomena. It is possible to interrelate the protocol and the physical. When a particular colour is pointed at and another person is asked to give the name, and says 'red', I can form a connection of the symbol with my subjective feeling of red, as well as with the physical phenomena of pointing, motion of lips etc. Hence I come to know the values of linguistic symbols in terms of my internal feeling of red, as well as with the physical phenomena of pointing, motion of lips etc. Hence I come to know the values of linguistic symbols in terms of my internal feelings as well as external physical phenomena observed. As there are observable physical counterparts of biological, and even psychological, processes all sciences can be based on the physical language. Thus there can be unification of the different sciences.[1] This dream of *physicalism* has been the source of the international movement for the unity of science recently started by Neurath, Carnap and others with their head-quarters in America. In reply to the doubt whether it is possible to determine the meanings of terms without ultimate reference to experience, Carnap says that such a possibility really exists because if we have a sufficiently large number of sentences, we can observe the different linguistic contexts in which a particular word is used, and determine its meaning in the light of such sentences, without reference to experience. The use of words with reference to experience can be called material mode of expression whereas their use with reference to meanings determined by linguistic forms, is called the formal mode of speech. This formal mode is able to obviate the difficulty of solipsism, since in it meaning is not determined in terms of experience.

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[1] *Ibid*. p. 139. [2] *Ibid*. p. 142. [3] *Ibid*. p. 143.

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[1] *Vide* Neurath, *Unity of Science*, and Carnap, *Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science* (Int. Ency. of Unified Science, Vol. I. No. 1).

To avoid the solipsistic implications of the empiricial foundations on which the movement was initially based, Neurath also holds that the ultimate elements given, the sense-data, are not mental, but, are "physiological processes in our brains".[1] This behaviouristic attitude of Neurath has come to influence Carnap also, and has helped the foundation of physicalism which characterizes the recent activities of these thinkers.

We have tried to give above a short and general account of a movement born of the strange union of the once antagonistic currents, empiricism and logical rationalism. Like every hybrid it was born strong and vigorous. Armed with the technicalities of symbolic logic it proved at first a serious menace to metaphysicians. But its inordinate destructive zeal ate into its own vitals. Rent by its internal disruptions, and continuously modified by counter-attacks, the vigour of the movement has been sufficiently toned down. Rapid changes have made its description difficult, and what we have attempted here is nothing more than a rough outline.

The greatest thing in the movement is the method of logical analysis, the attempt to analyse a question logically before trying to answer it. Like all sharp weapons it can be a source of wanton destruction, as well as of immense good. A dispassionate use of this method can really relieve metaphysics, and even common sense, of many puzzling problems which vanish at the touch of the analytic wand. A great teacher was puzzled by a child's question, "Where does light go when put out?" The puzzle disappears, when analysis of the meanings of words shows that the question of going can be legitimately asked about an object or substance occupying a part of space, and that 'light' means only a property (not a substance) which cannot be literally spoken of as possessing movement, and that even when science speaks of the movement of light it must be understood in an indirect, metaphorical sense, and this metaphor should not be taken seriously, nor pushed further. It is also a great merit of this movement, specially the theory of Carnap and Neurath to point out the method of determining the meanings of words in the light of the different sentences in which they are used. The benefit of such a method is realised when, for example, we find disputants engaged in deciding whether God exists, without determining first the meanings in which the word 'God' is used in different sentences or contexts, and becoming thus involved in endless controversies most of which arise from verbal ambiguity.

But the great defect of the movement is that it forgets its own principles. It does not determine the meaning of the word 'meaning' itself by reference to different contexts or sentences in which it is used. The result is, as we have seen, arbitrary limitation of the word to special senses which overlook many important aspects of its significance. Only an assertory sentence with existential import and allowing a particular kind of verification can possess meaning according to the positivist's arbitrarily chosen criterion. All ethical precepts, commands, expressions containing different kinds of appreciations of values, become meaningless thereby. Even the positivist's own sentence containing the criterion of meaning becomes nonsensical, and so also does a general proposition of science which is interpreted by some positivists as having prescriptive or regulative, but not existential import. These inherent self-contradictions and arbitrary use of words have considerably discredited the movement, and impaired its prestige even in the eyes of sympathizers.[1]

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[1] *Vide* Russell, *An I* [illegible] *Truth* (1940), for a penetrating discussion.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF MARXISM

1. Introduction

Karl Marx is not the founder of any new philosophical system. Therefore, a student of academic philosophy scarcely comes across the name, Marx, in philosophical literature, except in stray references or foot notes which deal with the unimportant groups of thinkers who succeeded Hegel and snapped his magnificent system into mere fragments. He was born in 1818, thirteen years before Hegel died, and lived up to 1883. But to-day while Kant is derided as 'a mistake' and Hegel as 'a misfortune', Marx is almost worshipped as a Philosopher-Saviour of the masses by millions of people almost all over the world. His philosophy formed the conscious theoretical basis of the great social upheaval in Russia leading to the establishment of the rule of the working classes and socialization of all national wealth. It has also supplied the moral stamina of the victorious Russian army in the present world war and sustained it against tremendous odds. As nothing succeeds like success, the success that Marxian Ideology has attained as a practical philosophy in peace and war has captured the imagination of the world at large, but particularly of the deprived and the down-trodden, whom Marx calls 'the expropriated.' No philosophy is more widely known now than the Marxian, and no other is of greater practical consequence.

Yet academic philosophy takes little note of Marxism. This stolid indifference is perhaps due to the general European tradition which treats philosophy as a mere intellectual sport divorced from practical life.

But Russia has set an example in this respect. The Leningrad Institute of Philosophy has prepared a text-book of Dialectical Materialism, which is taught not only to students of philosophy, but also to engineers, doctors, chemists, teachers and others who pass through the institutes for higher education. Philosophical interest has been roused to such an extent that even an abstruse work like "Hegel's *Logic* has been translated into Russian and has been printed in editions running to tens of thousands."[1] Workers, who are the rulers there, are also being trained up to understand the philosophical basis of their society and state, so that they can consciously follow the ideals in their daily lives. Nowhere else has philosophy been applied to life before on such a wide scale, and in such a conscious manner.

In India itself we find a gradually increasing influence of the Russian outlook. Students, political workers and others not otherwise interested in philosophy, and even with little or no previous philosophical training, passionately study works on Marxist ideology, and strain every nerve to understand philosophical concepts like 'dialectic', 'materialism,' 'empiricism,' and even 'negation of negation.' And more often than not, they come out convinced that 'Hegel was revolving on his head, and Karl Marx set him on his feet.' In most cases they understand little the real meaning of what they glibly talk about and what they sometimes stake their lives for. If things have come to such a pass, it is incumbent on students of philosophy to shake off their indifference or scoffing attitude, and study, examine and discuss problems which can be expected to be treated more efficiently only by those who have a philosophical training. There is an opportunity here for utilizing their academic knowledge for social good and revitalizing the study of philosophy by linking it up with the life around them.

2. History of Marxist Philosophy

Karl Marx was born in a Jewish family in Germany. His father was a lawyer who accepted Christianity and even changed his name in the vain hope of escaping social stigma and invidious legal discrimination against the Jewish community, existing there even in those times. Karl began his career as a student of Law in the University of Berlin where Hegelianism reigned supreme and which influenced the study of almost every branch of knowledge: Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Politics, Religion and the like. There were then the two main wings of Hegelians, the right or the conservative and the left, or the progressive, each trying to interpret Hegel, from its own partial point of view, for justifying the existing order or changing it wholesale. Marx got attracted to the left wing thinkers and diverted his attention from Law to the Philosophy of Hegel. It is said that after studying the works of Hegel day and night for three weeks 'he announced his complete conversion.'[1] He got a doctor's degree by writing a thesis on Democritus and Epicurus both being shown as precursors of Hegel. But his idealistic convictions were only skin-deep. He was by temperament realistic and paid more attention to concrete historical facts and circumstances than to philosophical subtleties. His native inclinations were released from the temporary spell of Idealism by the materialistic work of Ludwig Feuerbach, namely *Theses on Hegelian Philosophy*. Marx was very much impressed by Feuerbach's attempt to understand the evolution of social phenomena by reference to material conditions and historical events without supposing, like Hegel, an Absolute Idea or a spirit behind them. Two other thinkers seem to have created a lasting impression on Marx in this formative period. One of them was Moses Hess, a Jewish writer, who "preached the primacy of economic over political factors, and the impossibility of emancipating mankind without previously liberating the wage-earning proletariat".[2] The other was Saint Simon who was "the first writer to assert that the development of economic relationship is the determining factor in history and who also tried to show that the history of human so[illegible] is one of continuous economic struggles between opp[illegible] classes.[4] Though subsequently Marx repudiated Hege[illegible] and criticized the young Hegelians, and even Feu[illegible] and Saint Simon he preserved some of the basic elements of each of these thinkers. The ideas of the dialectical development of society, the determination of human history by material and especially economic factors, through continuous class struggles, became inseparably blended in his mind. It is in the light of these that he carried on his revolutionary activities as well as his investigations in social history all through his later life.

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[1] Introduction to *Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy* (Kitab Mahal), p. 28.

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[1] Berlin, *Karl Marx* (Home Univ. Lib.), p. 79.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 73.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 89.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 92.

At the end of his University career Marx first wished to be a teacher of philosophy. But it appears that owing to his repulsion against Neo-Hegelianism, which had become, for him, synonymous with Philosophy and which was utilized by some opportunists for justifying all established institutions, he became disgusted with Philosophy as a whole. Moreover inspite of his great talent, his uncompromising and subversive views stood in the way of any ordinary employment. By force of his own inclinations and circumstances he resorted to journalism, and even there owing to his revolutionary writings, instigating working classes against their oppressors, he was hunted out from country to country until at last he found asylum in London. There he lived from 1849 till he died in 1883. While he tried to maintain his family by journalism, he devoted all his spare time to the satisfaction of his gigantic appetite for knowledge by reading at home and at the British Museum, all books, journals and documents throwing light on the evolution of society. The result of his profound and extensive study of social and economic phenomena was his great work *Das Kapital* completed in three volumes in 27 years.

What Marx founded was a new system of economics, and not philosophy. But as Lenin points out,[1] German Philosophy, English Political Economy and French Revolutionary ocialism were all utilized by Marx's great genius, for the eation of this new system. His chief doctrines are:—

The Labour theory of value. This inculcates that the meaning of economic value is not the use or utility of ng, but what the thing can be exchanged for, and that timate basis of exchange is (not money but) the amount of labour that the production of the thing requires, and that, therefore, labour is the ultimate economic value and producer of value. (2) *The theory of surplus value.* This asserts that capital is acquired by an employer by giving to the labourer only the means of subsistence and appropriating for himself the remaining part of the fruit of the worker's labour. (3) *The theory of class war.* This asserts that society has passed through a series of revolutions caused by struggles between opposing economic classes, e.g., slaves and masters, serfs and feudal lords, labourers and capitalists, and that such revolution would finally overthrow the present capitalist society and establish the rule of the working class or the proletariat. (4) *The theory of economic determination.* This propounds that the economic relations of production obtaining at a particular stage of society determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life and that the legal, political, religious, aesthetic and philosophical aspects of social consciousness are all the products and reflectors of the type of economic struggle unconsciously going on then in society.[1]

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[1] in, *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, p. 10.

Though these economic theories of Marx had their philosophical basis and presupposition, he was not primarily interested in *these* and tried little to justify them with *philosophical* arguments. The only philosophical discussions in which he engaged himself were of a polemical character (e.g., *German Ideology* and *Poverty of Philosophy* written to refute the young Hegelians and Proudhon respectively). Their sole aim was demolishing the philosophical ideas on which rival social theories were sought to be based. In such refutation also he scarcely entered into any academic metaphysical consideration but rather satisfied himself with peculiar views of philosophy taken from the practical communist point of view. On the whole Marx was practical and anti-metaphysical. As Marx often said, he believed not in theoretical criticism, but in positive practice. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, *to change* it."[2]

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[1] Marx and Engels, German Ideology, pp. 13-14 (Lawrence and Wishart).

[2] Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (Appendix to *German Ideology*, p. 199).

Frederick Engels, a German revolutionary journalist, was a life-long comrade of Marx, shared his ideas and ideals, supported him morally and economically and co-operated with him in drawing up the *Communist Manifesto* and establishing the International Working Men's Association. Possessed of a power of clearer expression, Engels often retouched the writings of Marx, elucidated his ideas and answered his critics, and therefore, Engels has come to be bracketed with Marx in all subsequent accounts of Marxist Ideology. In his polemical work, *Anti-Duhring*, written in refutation of Duhring, a German socialist, he gives a connected account of his and Marx's world view. This is a basic work for Marxist philosophy.

Towards the beginning of the twentieth century, there arose a group of thinkers, mostly Russians, who tried to revise or undermine Marx's ideology. Some of them tried to base it on Kantian idealism, others on the Empiricism of Mach and similar thinkers. There were others again who attacked Marxism in the light of contemporary developments in science and philosophy. At this critical hour, Lenin appeared on the scene. A devoted follower of Marxist ideology, Lenin studied, during long years of exile and imprisonment, contemporary scientific and philosophical literature obviously with the motive of rescuing Marxism from attack and misinterpretation. In 1908 he published his great polemical work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* in which he gave on the lines of Engels's *Anti-Duhring*, a crushing reply to all scientific, empirical and idealistic writers threatening, or tampering with, the original outlook of Marx and Engels.[1] Lenin appears to be the profoundest of the Marxist thinkers so far as the understanding of philosophical issues is concerned. He formulates clearly, and justifies with reasons, the basic epistemological and metaphysical pre-suppositions of the school. Stalin follows Lenin in re-affirming his materialistic interpretation of Marxism. His small writings like *Dialectical and Historical Material-*

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[1] Plekhanov's *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (pub. in 1888 Eng. Trans. by Cedar Paul, pub. by Martin Lawrence Ltd. in 1928) contains an earlier lucid exposition of Marxist Philosophy.

ism contain cut and dry statements of the basic ideas, though at places where he adds criticisms of his own, he shows a very meagre grasp of the rudiments of philosophy. The clearest philosophical exposition of Marxism, in this latest form and in its different logical, epistemological and metaphysical aspects can be had, however, in the *Text Book of Marxist Philosophy* compiled by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy to which we have already referred. We have to remember this short history in order to understand the real nature of current, orthodox Marxist Ideology which is described by its zealous adherents as Marx-Engels-Leninist philosophy. This will enable us also to distinguish the main current of Marxism from its many modifications attempted at different times and places, and even now in our own land.

3. The Basic Philosophical Doctrines

Socialism in general is inspired by some humanitarian ideal of social reform or another and expresses a spirit of revolt against social inequalities of different kinds. But Marx and his followers were never tired of distinguishing *their* socialism from the great variety of common brands, e.g. Platonic, Christian, French, German and the like.[1] For this purpose of distinction they also gave to their creed the name of communism. The basic aim of communism according to Marx, can be "summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property."[2] But this aim is based not on a mere pious wish caused by soft sentiments (as in the case of other kinds of socialism) but on a rational and realistic recognition of the inevitable end towards which the human society is slowly but surely advancing under the pressure of a necessary law that directs the evolution of the world. This law is nothing other than the law of dialectic movement, through thesis, antithesis and synthesis, by which Hegel tried to explain the evolution of *a priori* logical ideas, the objects of Nature and the social and individual phenomena of the human world. The only, but an important, difference is, that while Hegel conceived this law as that of Universal Reason or Idea underlying all, Marx and Engels, on the contrary, came to regard it, (in the light of Feuerbach's materialistic reformulation of Hegel) as the law of motion always belonging to matter which is regarded by them as the basis of all reality. "Our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter."[1] "Motion is the mode of existence of matter," "Matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter,"[2] "All that exists," says Marx while explaining Hegel's dialectic from his point of view, "all that lives on land and in water, exists, lives only by some movement. Thus the movement of history produces the social relations, the industrial movement gives us the products of industry, etc."[3]

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[1] Vide *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and *Anti-Duhring*.

[2] *Manifesto*.

We find thus that the philosophical conviction which sustains the Marxist ideal of socialism is a blend of Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's materialism. It has, therefore come to be called *Dialectical Materialism* because it stresses the importance of looking at all social phenomena in the historical perspective, which is but the dilectical way of regarding things as products of a continuous series of antecedents, and as the precursors of things to come. In its affirmation of the materialistic point of view socialism appeals to the natural sciences, and therefore it proudly calls itself *scientific socialism* (to contrast itself with mere Utopianism.).

In giving a materialistic turn to Hegelian dialectic Feuerbach or Marx did not experience much difficulty. Of the three realms of Logic, Nature and Spirit through which Hegel's dialectic ran the first could easily be knocked out as a realm of shadows, that is of ideas (like 'being,' 'nothing,' 'becoming') which were mere abstract generalizations from concrete objects of the material world, and which could not really exist apart from them.[1] What remained were Nature and spirit; and it was Hegel himself who showed in the Philosophy of Nature how out of unconscious nature through a series of thesis, antithesis and synthesis Man at last evolved, and he further showed in the philosophy of spirit how from Man, the highest category and product of nature, the different spiritual phenomena, Art, Religion and Philosophy, dialectically evolved. So even the so-called spiritual phenomena are also found to be evolutes of Nature. The Idealism of Hegel is thus easily transmuted into a thorough-going materialism that explains dialectically exactly as Hegel does all phenomena, external and internal, individual and social, economic, political and religious. Speaking of this process of inversion Marx says: "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the mystical shell."[2]

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[1] Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 430-31 (quoted by Stalin in *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 11).

[2] *Anti Duhring*, p. 56.

[3] *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 116 (Charles Kerr & Co.).

Applying this dialectical method to the particular domain of the economic structure of society, Marx discovers that the different economic stages through which human society passes can be understood dialectically, historically as a continuous process. The earlier stage contains within it the seed of its own destruction, the unfailing cause of the appearance of the latter. The seed of destruction or the contradiction inherent in every stage consists according to Marx, in the economic relation of opposition between the exploiters and the exploited. Barring the primitive, prehistoric stage of society in which there was common ownership of property by a classless society, there are three distinguishable stages namely slave, feudal and capitalist. In the first the master or the free-man exploits his slaves who are totally dependent on him for life and subsistence. The opposition between the oppressor and oppressed ultimately causes the overthrow of this system and ushers in the next, namely the feudal stage, in which serfs, partly liberated from slavery freely work for their feudal lords who still retain land and the means of production. The opposition between these two classes leads again to the overthrow of this stage which is replaced by the capitalist system of production. At this stage the labourers acquire greater freedom and solidarity and on the contrary, the owners of the means of production, the capitalists, also become more organized. The opposition between the two classes also becomes more and more pronounced and organized.

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[1] *Ibid.* pp. 115_16.

[2] *Das Capital,* preface to the 2nd ed.

It is in this capitalist stage that Marx is most interested; and all his genius, erudition and mastery of facts are employed for showing how the capitalist system prevailing during his time almost all over the world is heading towards its own final doom by the increasing development of its inherent contradictions. To give only a very rough idea, Marx shows that as the greed for profit increases, the capitalist constantly tries to increase production by employing greater and greater number of workers, training them and organizing them more and more. Again for the sale of his increased production he seeks out market in all parts of the world, develops the means of communication and thus establishes close commercial relations among all countries. But all these, inspite of himself, only push forward the process of his own destruction. For, the workers of the world organized by the capitalist and brought closer by trade relations and improved means of communication get greater and greater chance of unifying themselves by their common grievances against the capitalist. When they are once organized, their overwhelming number is sufficient to overthrow their exploiter and destroy the capitalist system of production.

It is under the compelling force of this deep intellectual conviction that Marx and Engels thunder forth, in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, "Working men of all countries unite!" "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."

But what would the overthrow of the Capitalist system lead to? To solve this question you have again to utilize the dialectical method. The Capitalist system (along with slave and feudal ones) consists in appropriation, by the capitalists (the employers) of the property produced by the labourers. Capitalism means, therefore, "expropriation of the immediate producers, *i.e.*, the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner."[1] By the 'bursting asunder' of this capitalist system "the expropriators are expropriated."[2] We have here the dialectical triad, labourer's individual private property (thesis), capitalists' private property (anti-thesis or negation), socialized property produced possessed and shared by all individuals in common (the synthesis or negation of negation).

In ordinary formal logic *negation of negation* would mean affirmation and in its light the critic of socialism would complain that the negation of capitalism should lead us back to individual property. But Marx[3] and his followers try to show, in the light of Hegel, that negation of an antithesis yields only a new synthesis in which the thesis (along with the antithesis) is restored not *as such* but only in a higher form, in which the contradiction between the thesis and the antithesis is completely lost. Socialized property, the synthesis, allows property both to the former labourers and to the former capitalists, but none of them exist any longer as such but only as common members of a classless society, where the distinction between labourers and capitalists has vanished.

What Marx predicted, on the strength of the dialectic, about the disappearance of capitalism by the growth of socialism, has actually taken place in Russia. This has added fresh force to the belief of the Marxist in the unerring character of the dialectic method, and in the inevitable doom of capitalism the world over.

In the dialectic evolution of society it is the economic factors which constitute the basic driving force. The 'system of economic relations'—that is, the relations into which the different members of society enter (e.g. as masters and slaves, or as feudal lords and serfs, or as capitalists and labourers) for producing the necessaries of life—is what governs the society of a particular stage. Therefore, Marx's theory of determinism has been called *economic determinism.* Social consciousness of a particular stage is, according to Marx, product of the economic conflict present in that society. The "political, religious, aesthetic, philosophical" ideas of the society only reflect in different ways, on the conscious level, the unconscious economic conditions and struggles, into which the people of a society find themselves born. They are, as Marx says, "the ideological forms in which men become conscious of the conflict and fight it out."[1] But though these ideologies are the secondary products of economic forces, they themselves are also great forces which are added to the primary ones, and hasten the dialectical process.

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[1] *Capital* (Burmon's abridged edition), p. 91.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 95.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 95.

Determinism, which we find here, should not spell fatalism. It is true that man as a part of nature is guided by the inexorable (dialectical) laws of nature. But man is capable of labour, by which he "opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants."[2] Marx and his followers follow Hegel here again, in understanding *freedom as the knowledge of necessity.* The animal is driven unconsciously by laws of nature, but man can know these inexorable laws and use this knowledge for the control of nature herself. "Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity."[3] "Necessity is *blind* only in so far as it is not understood."[4]

Man being a free agent, in this sense, he can hasten or retard the dialectical march of the present capitalist society towards socialism. But he cannot prevent it because the tremendous currents of favourable forces which have already been set into motion by the past history of mankind cannot be unmade now. Opposition to the inevitable end is sheer foolhardiness. Prudence would demand "the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation." "Force is the mid-wife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power."[1] It has been found in the past that use of political force has hastened 'hot-house fashion' the birth of capitalism out of feudalism.

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[1] Quoted by Berlin, K. Marx, p. 128.
[2] *Capital* (abridged), p. 208.
[3] Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, p. 108.
[4] *Ibid.*

In justification of revolution or 'forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions" which the *Manifesto* 'openly declares' to be the end of communism, the Marxist also appeals to Hegel's Logic.[2] Hegel has shown that dialectical changes do not always occur gradually. The attainment of a certain degree of accumulated quantitative changes suddenly generates a new quality. So there are 'critical' stages or 'nodal' points (e.g. the freezing point and the boiling point of water) where there is a sudden '*transition of quantity into quality.*'

Seized with the consuming thought of hastening revolution through the accentuation of the conflicts and miseries that result from the capitalist system, the Marxist is bitter against all who fail to fall in with them. There are in his eyes only two classes of people, the exploited and the exploiters, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Those, who are not actively for the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie, are all enemies of the revolution. They all come under one class, the bourgeois. There is no room for neutrality or passivity. The "passively rotting mass" of society is described by Marx[3] as the 'dangerous class' as a tool of reactionary forces. "Economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, ... hole and corner reformers of every kind" are all dubbed as a part of the bourgeoisie. They all actively or passively 'dull the edge of revolution' and delay the attainment of the inevitable good, and prolong suffering. It is foolish to prolong the birth-pang; wisdom lies in intensifying it in order to end it.

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[1] Capital (abridged), p. 75.

[2] Vide *Anti-Duhring*, p. 120.

[3] *The Manifesto*.

Chiefly also for this reason the Marxist is dead against religion. In his criticisms of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law*, Marx, says: "Religion is the opium of the people."[1] According to Lenin, "This postulate is the corner stone of the whole philosophy of Marxism with regard to Religion."[2] Religion helps the exploited mass of proletariat *tolerate* all sufferings in the hope of compensation hereafter. Lenin says, "The helplessness of all the exploited in their struggle against the exploiters inevitably generates a belief in a better life after death, even as the helplessness of the savage in his struggle with nature gives rise to a belief in gods, devils, miracles, etc."[3] Religion, therefore, only reflects the economic condition of the society. So long as man is unconscious of the economic factors that determine his physical existence, and feels helpless before the 'world market,' which as Marx says, appears to him as a blind fate regulating his economic destiny, man seeks religion. The spectre of religion can therefore be removed by removing his ignorance and his helplessness. But this will be possible only when socialism is fully established and the life of society is based on consciously planned and controlled economic relations among "freely associated men".[4] The most effective method of checking religion is to oppose it in a 'positive way' by working for the arrival of the social conditions which will make it vanish. It is one of the reasons why Engels and Lenin do not believe much in mere theoretical polemics against religion.

Morality also is explained by the Marxist as a reflex of the economic struggle. Engels tried to show that "morality was always a class morality," a justification of the "interests of the ruling class" or the rising class. There is nothing like an 'eternal,' immutable moral law."[5] "We deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions." says Lenin. "We say that this is a deception, a swindle, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landlords and capitalists. We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat.''[1]

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[1] Lenin, *Religion* (Burman), p. 11.
[2] *Ibid*. p. 16.
[3] *Ibid*. p. 11.
[4] *Capital*, p. 137.
[5] *Anti-Duhring*, p. 89.

4. Conclusion

These are, in brief, the basic philosophical theories on which Marxism rests. We may pause to consider now how far they are conclusive. We shall not indulge here in any criticism of Marxist philosophy from an alien point of view. There is no end to such criticism. But we shall only examine how far it is *self-consistent.* Marxism rejects the *a priori* principles of Logic which Hegel based his philosophy, but it retains his dialectic method. In doing so it quite consistently denies all eternal truths and *a priori* principles and is satisfied to depend on empirical observation of historical facts, which, it follows therefore, can give us only relative truths constantly liable to modification by future observation. This logical conclusion is advocated by Engels very forcibly in criticizing the attempts of Duhring who tries to deduce laws of society from eternal *a priori* principles. Engels rightly points out that with the progress of the sciences, 'final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare'' even in the field of the so-called exact sciences like mathematics, physics, astronomy; that in the realm of life they are rarer, and in "the historical group of sciences'' like sociology they are rarer still. As he says, "In social history, however, the repetition of conditions is the exception and not the rule. Therefore, knowledge is here essentially relative, in as much as it is limited to the perception of relationship and consequences of certain social and state forms which exist only at a particular epoch and among particular people and are of their very nature transitory.''[2]

Now if this is true, then the social theories of Marx based mostly on the economic history of England and western

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[1] *Religion,* pp. 50—60.

[2] *Anti-Duhring,* p. [illegible]

Europe can give us only very tentative anticipations about the future of human society. Nay, even the observation of all historical facts of the world, can give us no sure idea about the future. It will appear, therefore, that the cocksureness with which the Marxist anticipates the inevitable overthrow of capitalism and establishment of International Socialism stands self-condemned. And once this cocksureness is infected by doubt and relativity, then fanaticism and intolerance in which the average follower of Marx beats even religious bigots must give way. As Marxism claims to be based not on sentiments but on scientific knowledge and observation of historical facts, intellectual honesty requires it to understand the probable, relative character of the ideologies on which it stands. In a word, in its attempt to found the dialectic of Hegel on *a posteriori* grounds, the dialectic loses its demonstrative force. In attempting to turn Hegel upside down Marx goes downside up. Both are involved in a common crash. Many corollaries unfavourable for the Marxist ideology can be deduced from this position. But there is no space for them here.

As to the Marxist conception of religion, if it be true that religion arises from the ignorance and helplessness of man, there is little hope that it will ever disappear. For, as Marx and Engels are honest enough to admit in different places, man's power of knowing the universe, in which he lives, is so limited and is so insignificant before the forces of nature that ignorance and helplessness can never disappear. Yet Lenin believes that religion can be liquidated by science. But seeing that many of the first-rank scientists themselves support religion he loses temper and calls them bourgeois scientists. He demands that "the natural scientist must be a *modern* Materialist— a conscious adherent of that Materialism which Marx represents"[1] This only means the vicious circle of supporting Marxism with science based on Marxism. The preceding chapters of this book clearly show that different kinds of philosophy can be built on science by selecting its different aspects for material and interpreting them in different ways. Each of these alternative theories can claim to be as scientific as Marxian Socialism.

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[1] Religion, p. [illegible]

The deduction of morality "from the facts and needs of class struggle" reduces morality to convenience, and goodness to prudence. But if this relativistic and class view of morality is admitted, the Marxist has to grant that the capitalist is quite morally justified to deprive the workers and promote the interests of his own class. There being no common moral principle between two opposite classes there can be no moral persuasion or conversion by appeal to moral sentiments. 'Fight and force' would then be the only method. This is explicitly admitted by Marx. He says, "Between equal rights force decides."[1] But in his exaggerated emphasis on class struggles the Marxist seems to forget the basic truth of Hegelian dialectic that there is also unity behind opposite categories, identity in difference. Two opposite classes like capitalists and labourers come after all under the common category of man, and even if morality is to be deduced from needs and interests, there will always be, riding over class morality, a *human* morality based on the needs and interests of man as man.

Though not admitting this conclusion in so many words, the Marxist does always appeal to human moral sentiments, like those of justice, equality, fellow-feeling, mercy in his scathing criticism of the bourgeoisie and in pleading the case for the expropriated proletariat. As a very tame example, take the following sentence of Marx describing the wickedness of the capitalist depriving his workers: "The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious."[2] Does it not presuppose that Marx is speaking with his feet deeply planted on the common soil of *human* morality? Is it not also the method by which he and his followers have succeeded in converting a good part of the bourgeoisie to their creed? Considering these facts it will be found that as at the beginning so also now, the chief force in favour of socialism is human sympathy for the deprived fellow-beings. Without this sentiment there would neither be a Marx, nor an Engels, nor any bourgeois-born advocate and leader of the movement, and perhaps no prosperous creed of socialism.

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[1] Capital, p. 245.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 99.

But what is more important to note, without the cultivation of the human moral sentiments, socialism can scarcely hope to realize its dream of being international; nor can there be any guarantee that a particular country which has turned socialist will not develop imperialism, or will not lapse back even into internal class struggle under the force of greed and other base sentiments which, according to Marx, were responsible for destroying primitive communism. Recent tendencies in Russia go only to confirm these misgivings.

These are but some of the results of the examination of the internal consistency of Dialectical Materialism assuming the truth of its basic theories. But as every student of philosophy is aware, even these theories (*e.g.*, materialism, dialectic, determinism and economic determinism) are not at all unassailable. As a philosophical doctrine dialectical materialism is, therefore, at least as uncertain and as frail as any other rival doctrine as, for example, dialectical idealism. Its air of certainty, finality and all the dogmatic fanaticism that follows therefrom would thus appear to be unjustified,—a mere product of the ignorance of alternative possibilities.

APPENDIX

The Contribution of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy[1]

Partly because of her internal struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi, and partly because of world forces precipitated by the last great war, India got back her independence sooner than was expected. Political freedom is like the backbone of a nation. With the loss of it, for centuries, India could not bear the burden of her ancient culture and philosophy, nor stand erect before the world so as to be able to win any attention or admiration. With the return of it she is gradually trying to stand up again and is arousing interest.

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To understand the present trends of philosophy in India and the contribution they can make to the fund of world philosophy, it is necessary to understand the ancient background of modern Indian thought. For many of the time-honored ideas still have a firm hold on the general Indian mind, and they form a substantial part of even modern creative thought. We propose, therefore, first to give a brief account of ancient Indian philosophy and then to discuss the views of the most prominent of India's modern philosophical thinkers, religious teachers, and socio-political leaders. We shall consider at the end the contribution India can make to world philosophy. By "modern" we shall mean roughly the present century.

1. The Ancient Background

The germs of philosophical thought can be traced in the earliest literature of India, the Vedas, which go back to at least 3,000 years before Christ.[1] In the Rig-veda, along with apparent polytheism there is the underlying faith that the one Real is called by different gods' names (*ekam sad vipra bahudha vadanti*).[2] This monotheism is further expressed in the clear description of God as the Supreme Person (Purusa), pervading all beings as His parts and yet remaining beyond them. In the Upanishads, the philosophical literature of the Vedic period, we have a further development of this monistic conception. Brahma, the absolute and ultimate Reality, is both immanent and transcendent; is not only that out of which the world emanates and by which it is sustained; but is also that into which the world dissolves. Brahma is at once Reality (*sat*), Consciousness (*chit*), and Bliss or Joy (*ananda*). Brahma is the Reality that underlies the self (*atma*) as well as the world. Realization of the Indwelling Self is the realization of God as well as immortality. Moral discipline (e.g., harmlessness, truthfulness, nonstealing, self-continence, and nonacceptance of unnecessary things), study, reasoning, and repeated contemplation of truth are regarded as constituting the method of realization by the Upanishads as well as by almost all subsequent schools of philosophy and religion.

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[1] Extracts from author's article in *the Philosophical Review* America), November, 1948. The American system of spelling is retained there.

This Upanishadic philosophy forms the basis of Vedanta, which, in its various forms, dominates the life and culture of India even today. The most influential school of Vedanta, established by Sankara, emphasizes the transcendent aspect of Brahma as the highest Reality, the world as an appearance, and the self as really absolutely identical with Brahma. The creative, personal, and immanent aspect of God is regarded as an inferior conception of Brahma. Worship of God is helpful as a step to the realization of the transcendent aspect. But it is knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahma which brings about final salvation. The many other schools of Vedanta subsequently founded by Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabha, and others give theistic interpretations of the

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[1] For a more detailed account of ancient Indian thought see Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (London: G. Allen and Unwin) ; and Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, England).

[2] Rigveda, 1.164.

Upanishads, uphold the reality of the world and of the creatorship and personality of God, and maintain, to different degrees, a distinction between self and God, and advocate devotion as essential for liberation. These theistic religious schools of Vedanta, commonly known as Vaisnava schools, have a large number of followers in modern India, particularly among the religious laity, while the pure monistic Vedanta of Sankara is more prevalent among the intellectual and educated people.

Besides the Vedic literature, the theists attach great importance also to the many devotional epics. The most important among these is the Bhagavata (the Divine Book). It teaches the unity of the immanent and the transcendent, of the manifested incarnations of God and the unmanifested Absolute. It emphasizes the total conception of God and the possibility of realization through consummation of the different emotional attitudes towards God. God is conceived as the One Goal of all our best aspirations. God thus comes to be worshiped as Truth, as Master, as Friend, as Child, as Lover, and so on.

Another theistic development of the conception of Brahma is found in the Saiva and Tantra literature, where the Ultimate Reality is viewed in the dual aspects of the Quiescent Substratum and its dynamic creative energy, and worshiped respectively as the Father and the Mother.

Mention must be made here of the *Bhagavad-gita*, popularly known as the *Gita* or Divine Song, which is universally regarded as one of the basic scriptures and held in high esteem by philosophers, theists, and ethical teachers both of ancient and of modern times. The *Gita* tries to synthesize and reconcile all views and all paths. It teaches that God, while transcending all, also manifests himself in all existence and in diverse forms. There are different ways of realizing Him—through knowledge, through devotion, and through action without attachment. Any of these can be chosen, according to one's own fitness. The duties of all stations are equally sacred. There should be no conflict among different faiths or paths. There are natural divisions among men in accordance with their intrinsic qualities and actions; their capacities and duties vary accordingly (and not according to hereditary castes). The teachings of the Gita have, therefore, been an inspiration to modern Indian social and religous reformers as well as to political leaders engaged in fighting artificial social inequalities, harmonizing as they do the different religions and replacing quietism and inactivism by the ideal of work without attachment.

The philosophical systems of India are divided, in the postvedic period, into two major groups—the pro-Vedic and the anti-Vedic. The chief systems in the first category are Mimamsa, Vedanta, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisesika, and those in the second are the Jain, Bauddha, and Charvaka (materialism). Of the pro-Vedic group, the first two establish themselves directly on the teachings of the Vedas and the Upanishads respectively, whereas the last four are based on independent grounds, though not opposed to the Vedic culture. Mimamsa is a philisophical justification of Vedic rituals. But incidentally it enters into deep metaphysical and epistemological discussions aiming to maintain a pluralistic and realistic position. The Vedanta, the chief trends of which we have noted previously, also develops different types of metaphysical and epistemological theories in its various schools. Sankhya propounds a dualistic metaphysic of souls and Nature and the possibility of the liberation of the soul from its bondage to Nature by discrimination and detachment. Yoga, based on a similar metaphysic, goes deep into the psychology of attention and concentration and lays down a practical path to liberation by the gradual concentration of attention on the nature of the soul, aided by physical culture, moral discipline, and meditative exercises. Nyaya and Vaisesika propound a realistic pluralism, emphasizing particularly a realistic epistemology with an acute logical analysis of language and the different processes of thought, and developing an algebraic logical terminology for precision of statement. This terminology is adopted later on by all schools as the language of philosophical discussion, and it makes, therefore, like the symbolic logic of the modern West, the later philosophical literature of India a sealed book to the uninitiated. The special contrbutions of Jain philosophy, which is a kind of realistic pluralism, are its theory of reality as many-faced, its conception of truth as manifold, its sevenfold scheme of judgment representing different truths, and its strong advocacy of the duty of non-injury to life in any form. Buddhist philosophy is divided into four schools which may be referred to as those of indeterminism, subjective idealism, naive realism, and critical realism. The Charvaka school holds to an uncompromising theory of materialism and hedonism.

These different schools, running parallel for about 2,000 years and criticizing one another, develop a huge philosophical literature which, studied even with the critical eye of a Westerner, will be found to contain momentous contributions in epistemology, logic, and analytic psychology and general metaphysics.

But whatever their later theoretical developments, the original and express motive of each system, except the materialist, is practical. It is to attain a state of perfection beyond suffering. The four cardinal teachings of Buddha namely, there is suffering, there is a cause of it, there is cessation of suffering, and there is a path leading to this cessation—represent in a nutshell the basic common attitude of all these Indian systems. All of them show, in different ways, how philosophy can help man know the cause of suffering and how knowledge can help him terminate suffering and attain perfect peace. All of them, again, believe that true and effective knowledge cannot be attained by mere study. Moral and physical discipline must accompany study reasoning, intense concentration on, and repeated meditation of, the philosophical truths so that every thought, speech, and action in life may reflect them.

It is thus that the Indian systems are more than theoretical discussions; they are ways of molding life in accordance with different perspectives. So most of these schools particularly the Vedanta, Jain, and Bauddha, live still today in the lives of millions. In spite of their theoretic differences, all of them insist upon a common pattern of intellectual, physical, and moral discipline, which stamps them all as Indian. We can call this a unity of moral outloook. One of the common theoretic components of this outlook is the conviction, sustained by different arguments, that the constitution of the world is moral, that the actions of its beings determine the course of events in nature as well as in minds, and that the moral worth of every action is preserved so that everyone gets his due here or hereafter. This belief, usually known as the law of Karma, is accepted by both theists and atheists, among the latter being the Mimamsa, Sankhya, Bauddha, and Jain school. To remove a possible misconception, which has actually occurred even in India, it should be mentioned that the law of Karma does not mean complete determinism. The present life in its beginning is determined by the past, but it can be changed for the better by present effort (purusakara). To remember this is to remember that man is fully responsible for his suffering and enjoyment; he is the architect of his destiny.

With this bird's-eye-view of the ancient but persisting background of modern Indian thought, we may now enter upon the modern period itself.

2. Modern Indian Thought

With the advent of the British and the introduction of the English system of education through the different universities established on the British model, European philosophy began to be studied in English under European teachers largely drawn from the clergy. Indian philosophy, being the philosophy of the conquered pagans and also being mostly confined then to original texts unintelligible to the foreign teachers, was naturally ignored or despised as too crude to be studied at the modern seats of learning. Consequently, for about a century, Indians studied with European teachers Greek, medieval, and modern European philosophy in all its branches and aspects, and nothing of their own systems. Meanwhile with the discovery of Sanskrit by Europe and the translation of the less technical philosophical literature, particularly by German scholars like Max Müller, Indian philosophy rose a little in the estimation of the British as well as of the Anglicized administrators of the universities; and it began to be recognized in the universities during the first and the second decades of this century. But even at the present moment Indian philosophy does not form more than a fifth part of the courses in philosophy, and in many places it is only there as an alternative to some branch of European philosophy.

But this arrangement proved a blessing in disguise. Kept in the dark as to the philosophical systems which lay behind their own culture, the more inquisitive and talented students and teachers of European philosophy began to study all the more greedily the original texts with the help of the teachers at the indigenous Sanskrit academies. The more they read, the more they marvelled at the treasure that lay hidden there and that compared very favourably with the Western philosophy they learned at the universities. Comparative study of Indian and Western philosophy has thus become the main occupation of the more advanced Indian scholars. Facing two long and mighty currents of thought, of the East and of the West, they find it an extremely difficult task to make up their minds and contribute anything new through the understanding of both and through removing doubts coming from two different directions. Unlike their Western brethren Indians feel it their duty now to understand and assimilate the Eastern and the Western before making any new contribution. This is one of the reasons why India's original contribution has been so meager in present times. The other great reason is, of course, the loss of confidence caused by long political subjugation.

But those few modern Indian thinkers who have at all succeeded in making any new contribution have brought to their task a much wider knowledge and a more catholic outlook than their Western colleagues, whose minds have been fed only on one kind of fare. Their thoughts are based upon a comparative understanding of the Indian and the Western and may, therefore, be regarded as attempts to show the different lines along which the two can be united. *They are, therefore, already steps towards the evolution of a world philosophy.* Let us illustrate this with the help of the philosophical constructions of the most prominent Indian thinkers of the present day. In the limited space at our disposal we prefer to devote some attention to each of these important few rather than give a running account of many thinkers.[1]

* * * *

The dynamic idealism which we have just noticed in Radhakrishnan is not altogether absent in ancient Indian thought. Though in the Vedanta of Sankara and particularly of his followers change and multiplicity were emphatically denied, the early Vedanta in the Upanishads (and even some statements of Sankara himself) leave some room for change and multiplicity. In Ramanuja and most other later schools of Vedanta creation is taken as a real process; change and multiplicity are also regarded as absolutely real. In Saivism and some forms of Tantrism (the origins of which are traced by some to non-Vedic works existing since the beginning of the Christian era or thereabouts) we find a kind of monism which holds that the world is evolved by the one ultimate Reality (Brahma) which expresses itself in the two aspects, Siva (quiescent) and Sakti (the creative energy). Under the influence of the realistic and activistic ideas of modern Western philosophy and culture, there has been a general reaction in modern Indian thought against all kinds of acosmic, idealistic, and static theories which are also regarded as having been responsible for India's political downfall. As a result of this, the younger generation, unacquainted with the Indian systems, have adopted some form of Western realism, pragmatism, or Marxism. Among those who are acquainted with Indian thought the general tendency has been to search for, emphasize, and try to revive the realistic and dynamic trends in the ancient systems of their own. But even under these conditions the more prominent and maturer thinkers have preferred to choose some form of Vedantic idealism purged of acosmism and inactivism than to espouse a full realistic and pluralistic theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesika type.

(i) In this connection we can mention the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Educated in England. Aurobindo entered life as a college teacher, then became a revolutionary political leader in Bengal, and after some time retired from politics to the life of a recluse in Pondichery, a French possession in South India. He has been living there for more than thirty years in perfect seclusion, in a hermitage which has grown into a large center for spiritual culture, like the asramas of the sages of ancient India. As a political worker he adopted the philosophy of the *Gita*, the philosophy of action without attachment and with self-surrender to the will of God. With it he has synthesized the idealism of the Vedas and the Upanishads and developed a dynamic philosophy closely resembling that of Saivism and Tantrism mentioned above. His views have recently been published in three fat volumes, entitled *The Life Divine*,[1] which has suddenly brought this unprofessional sage-philosopher within the notice of official philosophy. We find in his work an important integral approach to Reality based not only on intellectual apprehension, but on a long life of realization and a spiritual technique for the uplift of the human race.

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[1] Then follows an account of Sir Radhakrishnan's Philosophy for which see Chap. III.

His integral approach cansists in holding (1) that while it is true that the finite is not the ultimate Reality (*neti*), it is also true that it is nothing but the expression of Reality (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*); (2) that both materialism which denies the spirit and asceticism which denies, and withdraws from, the material world are equally onesided and untenable; (3) that change and permanence, force and existence, (*sakti and siva*), are both real; (4) that Brahma enjoys self-manifestation and expresses itself in *all* forms—matter, life, mind—and it includes all. "Brahman is in this world to represent itself in the values of life. Life exists in Brahman in order to discover Brahman in itself........To fulfil God in life is man's manhood."[2] By the creative force of God the world has evolved gradually through the successive stages of matter, plant, animal, and man. Mental consciousness is the highest faculty the ordinary man has attained to. It makes him feel his existence as a separate entity and gives him partial knowledge of and control over his body, life, and mind. But evolution cannot stop until man rises higher to the intuitive and immediate knowledge of God.

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[1] Published by Aurobindo Asram, Pondichery, South India.

[2] *The Life Divine*, I. 47.

God is the spirit that underlies his body, life, and mind and regulates them from within. Man is aware of the divine urge within him and, therefore, he tries to rise through religion to the Divine. The possibility and necessity of the divinization of man are testified to by all the great religions of the world. Any of these religions may be chosen by man, according to his temperament, for raising himself above ordinary mental consciousness to the supramental consciousness which would make him feel at one with the Divine, whose force has so long been unconsciously and semiconsciously pushing him from within to evolve higher through the material, vital, and mental planes. Man is proud of his intellectual achievements. But these have not been able to give him peace and satisfaction; they have rather involved him in all kinds of crises which the present world has come to face. Through the intellect he has dimly and imperfectly caught glimpses of the underlying unity and harmony of the world. But without an immediate intuitive identification of himself with the inner Reality underlying himself and the world, he cannot feel at one with the universe and harmonize his own interest completely with that of the rest of the world; he cannot fully get over his limited ego and adjust it to others.

With the attainment of his unity with the Lord seated in him and the universe, he can consciously share with the Lord the creative work of upward evolution. He can completely know, master, and guide his body, life, and mind, and also *co-operate with God* to hasten the evolution of other men to the level of supermen. This task of helping the human race to its inherent destiny is what Sri Aurobindo is said to be performing, though apparently his material body has remained confined, for decades, within a narrow space in his hermitage. This retreat has gradually been attracting a large number of persons of different religions, races, and professions, all of whom are struggling for the spiritual uplift of themselves and the human race by the spiritual method very briefly and untec nically described above.

Aurobindo's conception of the evolution of man to the Divine will remind us of Samuel Alexander's view of emergent evolution leading to the Deity. But the great difference is that whereas Space-Time is the ultimate matrix for Alexander, God is so for Aurobindo; so that creation is really a process of the descent of God to ascend again—through matter, life, and mind—back to the conscious realization of His existence by man. Perfection is therefore, attainable here, in this very body, and is not an ever-receding goal, as has been thought by most Western thinkers. Creation is the free self-diffusion of the Divine Energy which can be self-concentrated and thus creation ended, as has been held by all Indian theists. The most striking thought in Aurobindo is that of the duty of man to rise to the superhuman, divine level by cooperation with the creator and by the joint upward effort of the human race for the elevation of all its members. We may notice here a revival of the ideal of Bodhisattva which rejects the thought of individual liberation and strives for the liberation of all beings.[1]

* * * *

The more inquisitive reader is requested to refer to *Contemporary Indian Philosophy, The proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress* (founded in 1925), and *The Philosophical Quarterly*[2] for other recent developments in Indian thoughts[3]. We shall now pass on to a brief account of the wider field of Indian thought, to see how India has been trying to readjust herself to modern times in the spheres of religion, literature, and politics, with the help of her philosophical outlook.

(ii) With her inherent conviction (as already found in the Upanishads, the Gita, and modern thinkers) that religion should vary wth the individual's capacity and temperament, India has favored religious latitude and toleration. Proselytization by external force has never been recognized by any religious scripture. What is known now as Hinduism is a collective name for a variety of religious faiths found in India by foreigners who called the land Hind and the inhabitants Hindus. The word Hindu is most likely of Persian origin; it is not a Sanskrit word and is not found in any of the religious books. Hinduism as a collective creed was thrown, by contrast, into relief by the Mohammedanism of the Muslim conquerers during whose rule (ninth to sixteenth centuries) there was large-scale conversion.

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[1] Then follows an account of the philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharya, for which see Chap. III

[2] Published by the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, Bombay.

[3] See also an article with this title by Prof. J. B. Pratt in the *Journal of Philosophy* (September 14, 1938.)

As a result of this aggression there was a long line of religious reformers among the Hindus who tried to reconcile Hinduism with Islam by emphasizing their common aspects. The ideas already contained in the ancient scriptures in favor of monotheism, a personal God, devotion, the symbolic nature of idol worship, the classification of man by natural qualities rather than by castes, etc., were revived by the different religious saints and reformers like Ramananda, Vallabhacharya, Chaitanya, Namadeva, Kabir, Nanak, and others. In course of time the Muslim rulers who made India their home also became influenced by the cultural atmosphere of the country and adopted an attitude of toleration and understanding. One of them, the Great Moghul Emperor, Akbar, took many practical steps to reconcile the two faiths.

With the advent of Christianity and the British in the seventeenth century there arose a fresh necessity for readjustment. The two most noteworthy indigenous religious movements which resulted from it are those of the Brahma Samaj and the Arya Samaj. The first of these was founded in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohan Ray, who was a great scholar and social and political reformer of indomitable energy. He studied, in the original, many of the basic sciptures of Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and other faiths, and incorporated the best elements of all in his new faith, the main basis of which was a modernized and rationalized theistic form of the Upanishadic religion, the worship of Brahma in His personal aspect. It was mainly confined to enlightened Indians who had received Western education in India and abroad. The Arya Samaj was founded by

Svami Dayananda (1824-1883), a recluse of great Sanskrit scholarship and a dynamic personality. On the one hand he opposed Islam and Christianity, and on the other idol worship, the caste system, and the Vedantic monism, Jainism, and Buddhism prevalent among the Hindus. He revived Vedic ritualism and monotheism, based on the philosophy of three fundamental realities—God, soul, and nature. His movement spread far and wide in western and northern India, particularly among the non-Europeanized and backward classes, prevented the Hindus from conversion into other faiths and also reconverted some of the already converted, and gave birth to a network of educational institutions.

The account of modern religious currents of India would be incomplete without any mention of the work of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa (1836-1886) and his famous disciple Svami Vivekananda (1836-1886) who visited America and Europe and attracted great admiration from William James, Max Müller, Romain Rolland, and many others. Its special contribution is the revival, in life and in the service of humanity, of the philosophy of the monistic Vedanta of Sankara and the attempt to re-emphasize the unity of all religions. An illiterate temple priest, who had been initiated into the Tantric, Vaisnava, and Vedantic methods of spiritual discipline, Ramakrishna attained, by each, the desired goal as an orthodox Hindu. He then practiced with similar success the Islamic and Christian forms of worship and realized ultimately that all paths lead unto God. He justified even the symbolic worship of God through an image as one of the possible methods. His plain but direct teachings arrested the attention of many educated persons whose doubts he would remove by very homely arguments and examples. Among them was Vivekananda, whose mind was assailed by agnostic and rationalistic doubts derived from his Western teachers. He accepted Ramakrishna as his master and devoted his life to the propagation of his ideas and the founding and the guiding of the Ramakrishna Mission for humanitarian service. He introduced into Hinduism the missionary zeal of Christianity, imparted to the monistic Vedanta a practical shape by emphasizing its positive aspect—that all is Brahma, and, therefore, that service of man as God (nara-narayan) is better than quiescent meditation. He has been a source of inspiration to the type of positive Vedanta which we find in philosophers like Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo, to the many religious orders and institutions now engaged in social service and propagation of Hindu ideas at home and abroad, and even to political workers like Aurobindo, Subhas Bose, and Mahatma Gandhi who made, in different ways, a religion of practical politics.

(iii) Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), the famous poet of India, was also one of the foremost leaders of Indian renascence in art, music, dance, and literature. He used his great genius, for about half a century, in fostering the spiritual and political revival of India and devoted his life to the establishment and development of a cultural and educational center, the Vishvabharati,[1] with international ideals. But his long life of many-sided creative activity was an expression of the Upanishadic philosophy which he imbibed as a child in the holy companionship of his sage father Devendranath Tagore, a leader of the Brahma Samaj. His early education in England and close friendship with some humanitarian Christians and other kindred souls of the West left a permanent impression on his mind and work. His ideal was the combination of Western science and practical efficiency with the spiritual heritage of the East.

His nationalism was opposed to any form of geographical patriotism. "The civilization of ancient Greece was nurtured within city walls." It begot the habit of "securing all conquests by fortifying them," and it bred a spirit of self-centered isolation and "suspicion of whatever is beyond the barriers." But the civilization of the Indian Aryans, nurtured in the lap of nature, in forest cottages under the open sky, enlarged their consciousness. The "Indian mind never has any hesitation in acknowledging its kinship with nature, its unbroken relation with all." The West has made marvelous achievements in science. But the ultimate motive has been to conquer nature in order to secure wealth and enjoyment even at the cost of other men. But the Upanishadic philosophy of India has taught her that wealth and other objects of desire are not to be desired for their own sake, but for the sake of the self which seeks satisfaction through them; and that man should try to be one with the Eternal, Universal Self that runs through the whole of nature and man. India's heart has tried to keep this ideal aloft even in the days of her material prosperity, and sometimes she has had to pay dearly for it.

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[1] At Santiniketan, West Bengal.

Rabindranath was temperamentally opposed to puritanism, asceticism, and impersonal absolutism. He rather chose to emphasize, like the Vaisnava, those aspects of the Upanishads which taught that the finites were created by the Infinite out of its own endless joy and love, and they are, therefore, not illusory but real. Beauty in nature and man is nothing but the expression of the Spirit which is the hidden center of all attraction. "Beauty is his wooing of our heart." Art in its genuine form is also the self-expression of the spirit in man which overflows the limitations of utility. All evils and pains are the marks of "want of adjustment of our individual self to our universal self"; they should stimulate us to rise above narrow selfishness and find our unity with the Universal, the supreme perfection and joy. If man is imbued with the spirit of the unity of his self with that of nature and of other men, he can realize it in action, in love, in art, and religion. His life becomes joy and harmony in every sphere.[1] This is the message of India's saints and seers to the universe, to all "sons of Immortality," heirs to "Infinite Joy."

(iv) This message, repeated again and again by Vivekananda, Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Aurobindo and others, would have remained a philosopher's Utopia or a poet's fancy but for its translation into practical politics by Mahatma (Great-souled) Gandhi (1869-1948), whose recent loss India has mourned with unprecedented sorrow and pride. Before he entered Indian politics (about 1917), the struggle for political freedom was inspired by the examples of the French Revolution, American Independence, the Italian Republic, and the phenomenal rise of westernized Japan. The Indian examples of the military heroism of the Rajputs, the Marhattas, the Sikhs, and others added strength to these foreign ideals. India's downfall was regarded as a demonstration of the truth that high moral and philosophical ideals should not be allowed to meddle with practical politics. Constitutional agitation, terrorist organization, political assassination, and the like were, therefore, adopted as the only sane methods of liberation. But through Gandhi India's old philosophy reasserted itself. How little would India gain if she lost her soul to gain political freedom! "There is no wall of separation between means and end." "The bad means corrupt the end." "Violent means (in politics) will give violent swaraj (self-rule). That would be a menace to the world and to India herself." India should gain freedom by the same method which would take herself and the world nearer the spiritual goal of mankind—the unity of man with man and with the rest of existence, through love born of the love of God in whom all move and have their being.

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[1] For Tagore's Philosophy, see Radhakrishnan. *The Philosophy of Rabindranath*, and Tagore's own works: Sadhana; *Personality; Riligion of Man*, etc.

"God is truth," (*Satyam*), as the Upanishad says. Love of God, therefore, demands love of truth in every sphere of life, and even in politics there should be no room for the soul-killing art of falsehood and duplicity which thrive in the name of diplomacy. If you remember that God or the Universal Soul resides in the soul of every man you can neither deceive him nor injure him. Love is the only method of dealing with him. But if he happens to be your enemy, if the God in him has been lulled to sleep by ignorance, hatred, passions, and greed, you can rouse Him not by violence and hatred which only start a widening circle of similar reactions, but by increasing your love, removing your vices, and suffering for him until His heart melts and he wakes up.

The teachings of Buddha and Christ, as also of the Jainas, require us to return love for hate, overcome vice by virtue. For the attainment of God, the Truth, we must practice, in individual, political, and international life, truthfulness (*satya*), nonviolence (*ahimsa*), which entails universal love, and self-control (brahmacharya) without which neither truth nor love can be maintained. Following this philosophy and ethics in life, every individual can bring about his own salvation, as well as that of mankind. There should be no wall between private morality and public morality.

In the light of this philosophy Mahatma Gandhi analyzed the heart of subjugated India to find out the vices which tempted and perpetuated foreign rule. The chief vices were found to be want of communal harmony, backwardness of women and the depressed classes, economic dependence on foreign lands in respect of the basic needs of food and clothing, and the want of a system of education suited to the condition of the country. For the removal of all these, and connected vices found by self-analysis, Mahatma Gandhi started a number of organizations which he ran for about thirty years with the help of thousands of selfless workers. Along with social and economic work he also led successive nonviolent political campaigns, such as noncooperation with the rulers, disobedience of morally unjustifiable laws, general strikes, etc. Though the struggle did not fully reach the ideal of moral purity demanded by him, yet it enabled millions of men and women to develop the nonviolent heroism of suffering persecution without anger and fear. It did not fail to melt and change even the hearts of the British rulers who quitted India in 1947.

As political freedom was for him only a milestone on the journey of the individual and the nation to spiritual perfection, he carried on his mission of love and service in course of which he sacrificed his body (in January, 1948), like Socrates and Christ, for the good of humanity.

3. India's Contribution to World Philosophy

In order to show what contribution modern Indian philosophy can make to world philosophy we have taken the reader rapidly through a period of about five thousand years—from the Vedas to Mahatma Gandhi. Our intention has been to throw into relief the deeper and more pervasive forces in Indian thought which have persisted till today through changing conditions and can, therefore, be regarded as more truly representative of the basic Indian mind. The adoption of this method has automatically kept out of view stray and casual tendencies which may be found here and there and now and then, but which cannot yet be regarded as being either common or abiding.

We have shown how the West has influenced India in the reshaping of her ancient philosophy to suit the stress of modern conditions, and how as a result there has evolved, in different directions, a synthesis of Indian and Western tendencies. Western dynamism, realism, and secularism have proved a corrective to Indian thought, which degenerated during the past few centuries towards quietism, acosmism, and defeatism. But even in her recovery from these undesirable tendencies India has not merely copied the West, but has retained her basic peculiarities. We have, therefore, today different attempts to combine realism with idealism, dynamism with pacifism, secular interest with spiritual ideals, and activity with detachment.

The main trends of Indian thought which deserve special attention at this critical age of our planet are (1) its attempt to base philosophy on *all* aspects of experience and not simply on sense experience; (2) its practical insistence that philosophy is *for life* and must be lived in all its spheres, private, social, and international; (3) its emphasis on the necessity of controlling the body and mind, the necessity of moral purity and meditation, to make philosophical truths effective in life; (4) its recognition of the fundamental unity of all beings, particularly mankind, and the consequent consciousness that our moral or religious duties are toward all, and not simply to the members of our own group, country, or race; (5) its conviction that the Ultimate Reality manifests itself, or can be conceived, in different ways, and consequently that there are divergent paths to perfection *any one* of which can be adopted in accordance with one's inner inclination; (6) its belief that political freedom and material progress are necessary, but only as means to ultimate spiritual peace and perfection, so that they should be attained in ways not detrimental to the latter; and lastly (7) its contention that the ultimate aim of every individual should be to perfect himself with a view to raising the world to perfection.

If it is felt that these ideas are not the monopoly of India but can be found also in the greatest teachers of all countries and times, it will only mean, what India has always believed, that there is a bedrock of human unity behind the superficial diversities of time and place, and that the greatest persons of many lands have often penetrated to it. It should be the duty of modern philosophers—persons with the widest outlook and the deepest insight—to discover this, our common human heritage, and try to mold their own lives and thereby those of others around them in the light of these basic truths. It is only by this process that we can achieve one world based on the gradual progress of all humanity.

Philosophy, of even the most catholic kind, if confined to mere intellectual discussion, will remain a helpless spectator of war, intrigue, and devastation repeatedly carried on by persons with narrow outlooks and uncontrolled passions.

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